An Iskander missile that Russia fired at Kyiv Oblast on 10 July was built from more than 140 foreign parts, 62 of them American, and at least 20 were made in 2025—components that cleared every Western control and reached a Russian assembly line within about a year, Euromaidan Press reported.

Without those parts, Ukraine’s presidential sanctions commissioner Vladyslav Vlasiuk said, Russia could not build the weapon.

Explore further

62 of the 140 foreign parts in this Russian missile were American. Ukraine wants that gap closed

A paradox runs through Europe’s answer to that problem. The EU is preparing to blacklist more than 1,600 companies for helping Russia’s war industry, its largest single batch of corporate designations, Bloomberg reported, while at the same time deepening trade with India, a country the same Western parts move through on their way to Russia.

And closing that gap will matter even after the war ends: a new study of Russia’s arms makers finds they will keep producing weapons at wartime speed—and keep needing imported parts to do it—whether or not the fighting stops.

Ukraine has been pulling the same finding out of downed Russian drones and missiles for two years—Indian electronics in Shahed drones among them.

The India route grew before the trade deals arrived

A 29 July report by the strategic intelligence company Strider put a number on the wider channel: more than 50,000 sensitive goods, or goods with potential dual-use applications, reached Russian defense companies through Indian supply chains after the full-scale invasion.

The security intelligence firm compared totals from 2019 to 2021 with those from 2022 through the first quarter of 2025. Since the invasion, sensitive exports from India to Russia have multiplied several times over—and the sharpest jumps come from the countries deepening their own trade with India.

Swedish-origin goods rose almost sixfold. British, Swiss, and French exports of the same kind roughly doubled or more. The pattern extends beyond Europe: American-origin goods more than five times over, Australian goods even faster. German trade was the exception, falling by more than a third—though Germany still ships more of these goods through India than anyone.

Without those parts, Ukraine’s presidential sanctions commissioner Vladyslav Vlasiuk said, Russia could not build the weapon.

French carbon fiber—used in aircraft, drones, and missiles—reached Polymer Company LLC in Russia through India in 2025, according to Strider. The Russian government has designated the firm part of its military-industrial complex, and it supplies several restricted entities.

None of this shows that a part in the 10 July Iskander passed through India. It shows Western goods moving through the country where Britain’s trade deal took effect on 15 July and where the EU is targeting entry into force in 2027. Those deals expand legitimate commerce, not evasion.

Strider’s warning concerns what happens after Western goods enter long, opaque supply chains, and the report urged end-use monitoring to be written into the agreements themselves.

Brussels is preparing 1,600 more names

The blacklist Brussels is drafting would target companies rather than whole industries, reaching corners of Russia’s military supply chain that earlier rounds missed.

The firms have a combined annual turnover of more than $20 billion and employ more than a quarter of a million people. If members approve it, the number of EU-sanctioned entities would jump by half. Foreign ministers are expected to take it up in October.

The bloc’s 21st package, adopted on 23 July, had already tightened dual-use export curbs on dozens of firms, some outside the EU. Six days later, the firm published the scale of one route around exactly those curbs.

Russia plans to keep producing

That is why the flow of parts outlasts the war. A 14 July study of five major Russian defense manufacturers found them still dependent on imported components despite sanctions, corruption, labor shortages, and inflated costs—and likely to hold high output in select weapons while slowly rebuilding reserves.

Its sharpest warning is about time: Russia’s arms industry will probably stay on a wartime footing even if the shooting in Ukraine stops, while Western industry is unlikely to mobilize on that scale until a major war is already underway.

The Iskander compresses that long problem into a single year. At least 20 of its foreign parts were made in 2025, fitted into the missile, and fired at Kyiv Oblast on 10 July 2026.