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Corporate greed over principles: Zara’s secret path back to Russia

Zara shop in Spain

Russian retail chain “Tvoe” has begun selling Inditex brands, including Zara, Bershka, Stradivarius, Massimo Dutti, and Oysho across nine stores in seven Russian cities, according to RBC and other Russian media reports confirmed on 22 September 2025.

It happens just three months after Inditex CEO Óscar García Maceiras explicitly ruled out a Russia return, telling the Financial Times on 20 June 2025 that conditions for the group’s return were “certainly not” in place due to the “unfavorable geopolitical environment.”

How the “exit” was structured for easy return

Inditex designed its 2022 Russian ‘withdrawal’ as a temporary retreat, not a permanent exit. The Spanish fashion giant sold its 245 Russian stores to the Lebanese Daher Group—longtime Inditex franchisees in the Middle East—with a built-in mechanism for immediate return.

The sale contract explicitly stated that “in the event of new circumstances that, in Inditex’s opinion, could allow the group’s brands to return to this market,” Daher would be obligated to become an official Inditex franchisee.

This arrangement effectively created a holding pattern rather than a genuine exit.

Financial details raise additional questions about the transaction’s authenticity. Inditex injected €57 million ($67 million) into its Russian operations just two months before selling them for what the company described as a “not significant” sum to the Daher Group in early 2023.

Meanwhile, operational continuity never really stopped. According to a Ukrainian whistleblower’s report, Daher maintained the same supply chains, employed the same staff (including eight employees transferred from Inditex’s Spanish operations), and produced 124 products identical to Zara collections between February and June 2025.

Products now appear in Russian stores

The “Tvoe” chain has now begun selling Inditex brands in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kazan, Togliatti, Volgograd, Nizhny Novgorod, and Krasnodar. The clients cannot order or reserve products online in advance, and the company has not disclosed its procurement methods.

According to TASS, this development follows trademark applications filed by Inditex with Russia’s patent office (Rospatent) in September 2025, suggesting formal preparation for re-entering the Russian market.

Corporate conduct undermines Ukraine’s struggle

The timeline exposes how Western corporations maintain profitable relationships with Russia while Ukraine fights for survival. Inditex reopened 50 stores in Ukraine in spring 2024, presenting this as support for the war-torn country while preserving its Russian market access through legal arrangements.

Then Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba had previously welcomed international brands’ return to Ukraine as demonstrating “confidence” in the country’s future.

However, the revelation of parallel Russian operations undermines this narrative of corporate solidarity with Ukraine.

“This appears to be a similar playbook to other ‘boomerang’ withdrawals where the groundwork to return when palatable is laid,” Professor Kristian Lasslett of Ulster University, who studies corporate conduct in conflict zones, told the Financial Times in May 2025.

Pattern of sanctions evasion

As the Financial Times explains, the Inditex case illustrates a broader pattern of Western companies using complex legal structures to maintain Russian market presence while avoiding sanctions. More than 800 apparel shipments arrived in Russia from Daher’s Middle Eastern operations before the 2023 sale was even completed, suggesting coordinated preparation for seamless business continuity.

The arrangement allows Inditex to claim technical compliance with sanctions while benefiting from Russian market access through its franchisee network.

The structure provides legal cover while enabling the company to resume official operations instantly when politically convenient.

Inditex generated approximately 8.5% of its operating profit and 5% of its revenue—roughly €1 billion ($1.18 billion)—from Russia before the February 2022 invasion, making the market too valuable to abandon permanently despite public statements about moral opposition to the war.

The corporate conduct reveals how Western self-deterrence enables continued economic relationships with Russia, undermining sanctions effectiveness and prolonging Ukraine’s struggle against Russian aggression.

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Russia controls 1 in 5 “shadow fleet” oil tankers worldwide to dodge sanctions and fund war

Russian shadow fleet's tanker Eagle S, detained by the Finnish police.

Russia operates approximately 17% of all active oil tankers worldwide through its “shadow fleet,” according to analysis published by The New York Times.

The 940 aging vessels allow Moscow to sidestep Western sanctions and keep war funding flowing.

The fleet has exploded in size—up 45% in just one year, according to S&P Global Market Intelligence data cited by the Times. These aren’t legitimate commercial operations. They’re Moscow’s workaround.

How Russia avoids shadow fleet restrictions

Here’s how it works: Ships use sketchy insurance or sail without coverage entirely. They fly flags from third countries. Most importantly, they transmit false location data to hide where they loaded Russian crude.

“The sanctions don’t put them out of business,” maritime security expert Ian Ralby told the Times. “They put them out of legitimate business.”

The fleet emerged after Europe banned Russian seaborne oil imports in late 2022 in response to its full-scale aggression in Ukraine.

Moscow suddenly needed India and China to buy its oil instead of European customers. Those longer shipping routes to Asia required more vessels. Russia also wanted to dodge the $60-per-barrel price cap imposed by the G7, European Union, and Australia. The EU and Britain have since dropped that ceiling even lower.

The deception creates what the Times calls “plausible deniability” for oil buyers who can claim they didn’t know the cargo’s true origin.

A Russian oil tanker, illustrative image. Photo via Wikimedia.
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Environmental and security threats of shadow fleet

However, this system poses significant environmental risks, according to experts quoted by the Times. The shadow fleet vessels average 20 years in age, compared to 13 years for the global oil tanker fleet broadly.

“Lack of insurance combined with the really old vessels — this just increases the risk of environmental catastrophe,” Natalia Gozak, office director of Greenpeace Ukraine.

The poorly maintained tankers are already causing frequent oil spills and fuel leaks that contaminate marine ecosystems across the Black Sea and Baltic Sea, killing marine life and polluting thousands of kilometers of coastline.

Western intelligence also suspects some vessels of underwater sabotage against pipelines and cables.

russian shadow fleet's eagle s remains under arrest damage claims mount tanker off porvoo 30 2024 finnish authorities have issued dual orders over suspected involvement damaging undersea infrastructure helsinki maritime
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Western enforcement response

In response, Western nations have intensified enforcement efforts. The European Union has placed more than 500 shadow fleet ships on sanctions lists as of its latest announcement, while the United States, Britain, Canada, and Australia are also targeting these vessels.

Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced in August that the EU would adopt its 19th sanctions package against Russia in September. The package was expected on 17 September, but Brussels postponed its presentation.

However, the ships continue finding workarounds, including transferring cargo at sea and “flag hopping” by changing registrations to conceal identities.

Ben Harris, a former Biden administration Treasury official who helped architect the price cap, acknowledged the system’s imperfections while arguing that sanctions still impose costs on Russia through expensive shipping routes and fleet construction.

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