Ukraine’s State Service on Ethnic Policy and Freedom of Conscience (DESS) has issued Metropolitan Onufriy an ultimatum: prove your church actually left Moscow or face dissolution.
The directive gives the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP) until 18 August 2025 to produce formal documents severing ties with Russia’s Orthodox Church. Three years after claiming independence, Ukrainian investigators found the church remains canonically subordinate to Moscow through multiple mechanisms—governing documents, institutional structure, and liturgical requirements.
The timing? Two weeks after Ukraine stripped Onufriy’s citizenship for allegedly hiding his Russian passport since 2002, and one week after DESS found that his church is still affiliated with Moscow.
What Ukraine actually wants
The State Service (DESS) isn’t asking for vague promises. They want Metropolitan Onufriy to provide decisions from the UOC MP’s highest governing bodies confirming the church’s exit from Russian structures. He must publicly reject any appointments to Russian church bodies and prepare an official statement terminating all connections with Moscow.
Can he do it? That depends on whether the UOC MP’s governing documents actually allow such independence—something the recent state investigation suggests they don’t.
The DESS investigation found multiple indicators of continued Russian control. The UOC MP still cites the 1990 Gramota (Charter) from then-Patriarch Alexy II as its constitutional foundation, which explicitly states the church is “connected through our Russian Orthodox Church.” The church must still commemorate the Moscow Patriarch in liturgy, have its statutes approved by Moscow, receive holy chrism from Russia, and ensure Ukrainian bishops participate in Russian church councils as obligated members.
Each requirement demonstrates canonical subordination that contradicts independence claims.
What the commission found
The Ukrainian Orthodox Church says it left Moscow. Documents say otherwise.
The Moscow test: when push comes to shove
Want to know if the UOC MP really left Moscow? Look at what happened when Russia started grabbing Ukrainian dioceses.
Since 2022, Russian authorities unilaterally transferred three UOC MP dioceses in occupied territories to direct Moscow control—Crimea, Rovenky, and Berdiansk. The UOC MP leadership’s response? Silence.
When 33 UOC MP bishops condemned these seizures in October 2024, did their church’s governing bodies support them? No. Complete silence again.
This stands in stark contrast to protests and condemnation when UOC MP parishes defect to join the rival Orthodox Church of Ukraine.
It shows that the UOC MP can resist when it chooses to. It just doesn’t choose to resist Moscow.
Legal machinery grinding forward
This ultimatum represents the practical implementation of Ukraine’s August 2024 law banning Russian-affiliated religious organizations. The legislation gave religious groups nine months to sever Russian connections—a deadline that’s already expired.
Theologian Cyril Hovorun, who has closely followed the law’s development, argued it’s “not primarily about the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, nor is it about banning it outright” but rather about forcing the UOC MP to “get out of this deadlock it’s put itself in” with Moscow.
DESS will now compile a list of religious organizations connected to the banned Russian Orthodox Church structure. That potentially affects the UOC MP’s approximately 8,000 parishes serving millions of faithful.
Religious scholar Yuriy Chornomorets, who participated in earlier expert evaluations, told Euromaidan Press that “the conclusions use only facts; therefore, its findings are impossible to counter.”
The UOC MP has filed a lawsuit against Ukraine’s Cabinet of Ministers over the investigation. They consistently maintain they severed ties with Moscow after Russia’s February 2022 invasion. Ukrainian investigators? They concluded these claims lack any documentary foundation.
Explore further
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What’s Moscow’s stake?
The UOC MP represents 23% of the Russian Orthodox Church’s parishes worldwide—the largest concentration outside Russia itself. It remains Moscow’s sole surviving pillar of influence in a Ukraine that has otherwise severed all connections to Russia since 2022.
The church’s ideological power runs deep. The fantasy of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus as “Holy Rus” united against the “satanic West” forms the theological cornerstone of Putin’s war.
Ukraine’s Intelligence Directorate previously reported that under the guise of “religious cooperation,” the Russian Orthodox Church functions as an instrument of hybrid influence aimed at destabilizing Ukraine.
The citizenship revocation of Onufriy serves as legal theater. The real drama unfolds in courtrooms where the UOC MP’s survival hangs in the balance.
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Anatomy of treason: how the Ukrainian Orthodox Church sold its soul to the “Russian world”
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Ukrainian authorities have confirmed that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP) remains legally subordinate to Russia’s Orthodox Church despite its claims of independence.
The State Service of Ukraine on Ethnic Policy and Freedom of Conscience (DESS) concluded in a 21-page investigation that Ukraine’s second-largest Orthodox denomination has maintained canonical ties to Moscow through its governing documents and institutional structure.
The timing proves significant as it comes just one week after Ukraine stripped UOC MP leader Metropolitan Onufriy of Ukrainian citizenship for allegedly concealing his Russian passport since 2002.
Russian church charter still governs Ukrainian operations
The DESS investigation revealed that the UOC MP continues to cite the 1990 Gramota (Charter) from then-Patriarch Alexy II of Moscow as its constitutional foundation. The document explicitly states that “the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is connected through our Russian Orthodox Church to the One Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church.”
According to the findings, the UOC MP must still commemorate the Moscow Patriarch in liturgy, have its statutes approved by Moscow, receive holy chrism from Russia, and ensure Ukrainian bishops participate in Russian church councils as obligated members.
Religious scholar Yuriy Chornomorets, who participated in earlier expert evaluations, told Euromaidan Press that “the conclusions use only facts; therefore, its findings are impossible to counter.”
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The documents that prove Ukraine’s Moscow Patriarchate Church never left Russia
Limited response to Russian diocese seizures
The commission noted that Russian authorities have unilaterally transferred three UOC MP dioceses on occupied territories to direct Moscow control since 2022, including dioceses in Crimea, Rovenky, and Berdiansk. The UOC MP leadership offered no resistance to these transfers.
When 33 UOC MP bishops condemned Moscow’s diocese seizures in October 2024, their own church’s governing bodies remained silent, the investigation found.
Legal implications under Ukraine’s church ban
The findings provide legal justification for implementing Ukraine’s August 2024 law banning Russian-affiliated religious organizations. The legislation gave religious groups nine months to sever Russian connections or face dissolution through court proceedings.
DESS will now compile a list of religious organizations connected to the banned Russian Orthodox Church structure, potentially affecting the UOC MP’s approximately 8,000 parishes.
The UOC MP has consistently maintained it severed ties with Moscow after Russia’s February 2022 invasion, but the Ukrainian investigation concludes these claims lack documentary foundation.
Explore further
Ukraine just stripped citizenship from the leader of Putin’s favorite church—his 8,000 parishes are next
You could close this page. Or you could join our community and help us produce more materials like this.
We keep our reporting open and accessible to everyone because we believe in the power of free information. This is why our small, cost-effective team depends on the support of readers like you to bring deliver timely news, quality analysis, and on-the-ground reports about Russia's war against Ukraine and Ukraine's struggle to build a democratic society.
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The historically Moscow-aligned Ukrainian Orthodox Church is still affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church despite claims to the contrary, a Ukrainian state committee has found.
In a lengthy investigation, the Ukrainian State Service of Ukraine on Ethnic Policy and Freedom of Conscience (DESS) has concluded that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC MP) is still legally part of the Russian Orthodox Church.
The timing of the document, which confirms an earlier expert committee probe, is particularly crucial. It comes just one week after Ukraine stripped citizenship from the UOC MP leader.
Ukraine is gearing up for a lengthy legal battle with the UOC MP after banning Russian-affiliated churches in August 2024.
The law gave religious organizations nine months to sever relations with Russia. Now, DESS is probing whether the connections are still there.
But, how does one establish such matters? After all, the UOC MP insists it supports Ukraine and that it already cut its Russian ties back in 2022.
Moreover, it is leading a global campaign decrying alleged state religious persecution. This initiative has been particularly fruitful among American Republicans, in part thanks to lavish lobbying efforts.
The destroyed Virgin Mary Skete in Sviatohirsk, one of the many UOC MP churches destroyed by Russia’s attacks. Photo: The World Council of Churches
Canonically speaking
The path of an Orthodox church to autocephaly (independence) is notoriously vague and complicated. Unlike the Catholic Church, governed by a single primate from Rome, global Orthodoxy is defined as a constellation of amicable jurisdictions that received independence according to pastoral needs.
Ideally, of course. In practice, however, the path to church independence has been fraught with political strife, stonewalling, and competition between two centers of Orthodox gravitas—the Moscow and Ecumenical patriarchates.
Enter the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.
The UOC MP’s predicament stems from centuries of imperial church politics. The 1686 transfer of the Kyiv Metropolitanate from Constantinople to Moscowbegan Russian control over Ukrainian Orthodoxy—control that outlasted the Soviet Union and continued into independent Ukraine.
This pattern wasn’t unique to Ukraine. The Russian Orthodox Church historically granted limited “autonomy” to Orthodox communities in its sphere—a status somewhere between full independence and direct diocesan control. The Japanese Orthodox Church, Latvian Orthodox Church, Estonian Orthodox Church, and Ukrainian Orthodox Church all received similar arrangements.
True autocephaly, by contrast, means complete independence—as Moscow granted to the Polish Orthodox Church in 1948 and the Orthodox Church in America in 1970. The language was unambiguous: full canonical independence with no mention of accessing global Orthodoxy “through” another church.
The DESS investigation shows that Ukraine’s “autonomy”—that ambiguous middle ground between independence and subordination—remains unchanged.
The 21-page report reads like a forensic autopsy. It dissects the UOC MP’s claims using two key criteria:
What the church’s foundational documents say
and what its actions reveal.
The smoking gun lies in a 1990 document: the Gramota (Charter) issued by then-Patriarch Alexy II of Moscow. The UOC MP still cites this in its governing statutes. It grants the Ukrainian church “independence and autonomy in its governance”—but with a crucial caveat.
“The Ukrainian Orthodox Church is connected through our Russian Orthodox Church to the One Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church,” the Gramota declares.
Emphasis ours
For DESS investigators, this single line proves subordination. Ukraine’s second-largest Orthodox denomination remains canonically tied to Moscow.
But wait—doesn’t the UOC MP claim it severed these ties after Russia’s 2022 invasion? The church leadership has repeatedly insisted they’re no longer part of the Russian Orthodox Church structure.
The investigation reveals a different story. A 2017 addition to the Russian Orthodox Church’s statutes—Chapter X, titled “The Ukrainian Orthodox Church”—still mandates that the Ukrainian church must:
Commemorate the Moscow Patriarch’s name in all Ukrainian churches
Have its statute approved and confirmed by the Moscow Patriarch
Have its primate blessed by the Moscow Patriarch
Submit decisions about creating or dissolving dioceses to Moscow’s Archiereus Council for approval
Ensure Ukrainian bishops participate in Russian church councils as obligated members
Accept Moscow’s Holy Synod decisions as binding
Receive holy chrism (consecrated oil) from the Moscow Patriarch
A conference of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate on 27 May 2022 in Kyiv claimed to have severed ties with the Russian Orthodox Church. Photo: UOC MP
What about the 27 May 2022 Local Council at Feofania Monastery? The UOC MP points to this gathering as proof of their independence. The council did adopt changes to the church statute, removing some explicit references to Moscow.
But the DESS investigation calls this a “notable step toward independence” that “did not mean the withdrawal” from the Russian Orthodox Church. Why not?
The 2022 statute preserved the constitutive provision that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church operates “according to the Charter of the Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus Alexy II of 27 October 1990.”
The Gramota remains the constitutional foundation.
Has the UOC MP issued any foundational documents superseding the Gramota? The answer is no.
The investigation found no documents from the UOC MP’s governing bodies—its Sobor, Bishop’s Council, or Holy Synod—declaring withdrawal from the Russian Orthodox Church structure. The silence is deafening.
UOC MP actions speak louder
Moscow Bishop Luke holds clergy meeting in Russian-occupied Berdiansk, 1 June 2023. Photo: website of the Berdiansk Eparchy
But documents only tell half the story. What have the churches actually done?
Russian church authorities have been unilaterally transferring UOC MP dioceses on Russian-occupied lands to direct Moscow control since 2022. Three Crimean dioceses in June 2022. The Rovenky diocese in October 2022. The Berdiansk diocese in May 2023.
Did the UOC MP resist these transfers? Not once.
Some UOC MP bishops have publicly supported Russian aggression. Metropolitan Panteleimon of Luhansk and Alchevsk participated in pro-war events and attended celebrations for Patriarch Kirill’s anniversary.
True, some clergy operate under Russian occupation, where resistance could mean imprisonment. But the church’s response reveals its priorities.
The UOC MP aggressively condemns priests who defect to the rival Orthodox Church of Ukraine, granted independence by Constantinople in 2018. It bans them from serving.
When Moscow transfers entire dioceses? Silence.
In October 2024, 33 UOC MP bishops condemned Moscow’s unilateral diocese transfers. Were they supported by their colleagues? No. The church’s governing bodies said nothing.
This shows they can resist when they choose to. They just don’t choose to resist Moscow.
UOC MP leader’s Russian citizenship
Ukraine just stripped citizenship from the leader of Putin’s favorite church—his 8,000 parishes are next
The grassroots revolt
Between 2022 and 2024, multiple groups of clergy and laypeople issued appeals to Metropolitan Onuphrius. They demanded complete canonical separation from Moscow.
Were these appeals considered? The investigation notes they were “left without consideration by the highest organs of church authority and governance of the UOC MP.”
The verdict
The DESS conclusion is unequivocal: the Kyiv Metropolitanate remains affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church under all four criteria established by Ukrainian law:
the UOC still belongs to Moscow’s structure
its documents still reference Russian control
Moscow still makes binding decisions for Ukrainian dioceses
Ukrainian bishops still sit on Russian church councils.
For Ukrainian authorities, this provides legal justification for potential further action. For the church itself, it represents a canonical Catch-22. It must maintain the Russian connection that legitimizes its existence while operating in a country that has banned that very connection.
Is the commission biased?
While the UOC MP hasn’t responded officially to the DESS conclusion, prominent figures like Iona Cherepanov have decried it as “Soviet,” implying that the commission is biased and implements state decisions to, allegedly, persecute the UOC MP.
That’s impossible, says religious scholar and philosopher Yuriy Chornomorets, who had previously taken part in an expert committee that arrived at similar conclusions. The DESS conclusion uses only facts; therefore, its findings are impossible to counter, Chornomorets told Euromaidan Press.
Archimandrite Cyril Hovorun, professor of ecclesiology, international relations, and ecumenism at Saint Ignatios College
The sophistication and detail of analysis testify to the high level of expertise of the DESS experts, he maintains. Moreover, the conclusions in the documents are supported by quotes from UOC MP leaders themselves.
Theologian Cyril Hovorun told Euromaidan Press that the conclusions “correspond to canonical realities as they are understood in Eastern Christianity.”
The UOC still references Moscow’s 1990 charter. It still operates under Russian Orthodox Church statutes. Ukrainian bishops still sit on Russian church councils.
These aren’t interpretations—they’re documented facts.
Why doesn’t the UOC MP break free from Russia?
Yuriy Chornomorets, professor, religious scientist
The path forward is surprisingly straightforward, according to Chornomorets. The UOC would need to officially decide to leave the Russian Orthodox Church. It must notify all Orthodox patriarchs of its new status. It should condemn Moscow’s seizure of Ukrainian dioceses.
“The UOC must start acting like an autocephalous church,” he argues.
So why haven’t they?
This question haunts Ukrainian religious observers. The UOC’s response reveals a stunning contradiction.
“Today the UOC admits it remains part of the Russian Orthodox Church but claims it intends to become autocephalous,” Chornomorets notes. “Yet it demands Ukrainian authorities treat it as if it already achieved independence.”
The duplicity runs deeper. “When UOC bishops operate outside Ukraine—in Europe, for instance—they demand local Orthodox hierarchs treat them as Russian Orthodox Church representatives,” he explains. They want to be independent in Ukraine but Russian abroad.
Andriy Smyrnov, historian and religious scholar at the Ostroh Academy
Religious historian Andriy Smyrnov believes Metropolitan Onuphrius is waiting for the war to end. Why? “To return to the Russian Orthodox Church.”
Chornomorets offers a blunt explanation. “UOC leadership maintains passivity because they’re not afraid of Ukraine’s democratic state—they’re panicked by Putin.” He suggests UOC leaders fear they could end up dead like Russian officials who displease the Kremlin.
Financial incentives provide another explanation. Influential Russian-born oligarch Vadym Novinskyi—who obtained Ukrainian citizenship in 2012 under Viktor Yanukovych, serves as a UOC deacon, and is widely considered the church’s main financial patron—allegedly channels VTB Bank loans to pro-Russian bishops.
L-R: Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) primate Metropolitan Onufriy, Russian Orthodox Church primate Patriarch Kirill, prominent financier of UOC MP, Ukrainian oligarch and lawmaker Vadym Novynskyi during a UOC MP visit to Moscow to greet Kirill with the 10th anniversary of his election to primate of the Russian Orthodox Church, 16 June 2019. Photo: Novynskyi’s Facebook
Novinskyi’s funding could be part of the explanation, Hovorun believes. But not all of it.
Meanwhile, Smyrnov believes the UOC MP hasn’t declared autocephaly “because it would place them in a schism.” Breaking away unilaterally would leave the church without recognition from other Orthodox patriarchates.
“But really, over three years they could have appealed to church primates, could have restored communication with the Ecumenical Patriarch [severed in 2018 – ed] and asked for help,” he says.
The irony is palpable. While Chornomorets notes that 74% of UOC faithful support immediate separation from Moscow, their bishops cling to Russian ties that Ukrainian law now explicitly forbids.
What happens next?
Viacheslav Horshkov, religious expert working at DESS, one of the authors of its conclusion
DESS expert Viacheslav Horshkov, one of the report’s authors, outlines the immediate next steps. “It’s too early to talk about parishes now,” he tells Euromaidan Press. “The next step is a directive to the Kyiv Metropolitanate of the UOC to eliminate signs of affiliation with the Russian Orthodox Church.”
The church will have 30 days to comply, with a possible 60-day extension upon request. If they meet the requirements—which Horshkov considers realistic—the matter closes.
If not, the Kyiv Metropolitanate will be officially recognized as affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church, and the case goes to court.
The timeline remains uncertain. But if the court strips the Kyiv Metropolitanate of its legal entity status, questions will arise for subordinate structures—diocesan administrations, monasteries, missions, and spiritual educational institutions.
Parishes face different options. “Parishes can peacefully transition to independent status or exist without legal entity status,” Horshkov explains. “They have several options for determining their fate. They can even register a new association.”
“The new law preserves Russians’ right to worship freely, hold gatherings, and maintain their own temples,” Chornomorets explains. “But it strips them of privileges to use approximately 3,000 religious buildings belonging to the state as historical monuments or local communities.”
He notes the law’s limitations.
“The sanctions are too mild—loss of legal entity status for religious communities, monasteries, seminaries, dioceses, and the Kyiv Metropolitanate, but nothing that would constitute a real ‘ban on the Russian Orthodox Church.'”
DESS will now compile a list of religious organizations connected with the banned Russian Orthodox Church structure. “If a parish ends up on the list and doesn’t comply with the directive to eliminate affiliation, and uses state property, then the lease agreement will be terminated,” Smyrnov says.
But there won’t be mass prosecutions. The focus remains on the Kyiv Metropolitanate itself.
Metropolitan Onufriy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate in his office standing next to the photograph of Patriarch Kirill, the head of the Moscow Patriarchate. (Image: UNIAN)
Smirnov expects Metropolitan Onuphrius might convene a bishops’ council to declare the UOC independent in response to the DESS directive.
But the 75-year-old Metropolitan, who came of age in Moscow’s Holy Trinity-St.Sergius Lavra, represents a generation of church leaders whose worldview remains fundamentally tied to the Russian Orthodox tradition, regardless of political circumstances.
Why does it matter if the UOC MP is still affiliated with Russia?
Since Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion, Ukraine has attempted to prod the UOC MP with its 8,097 parishes, vs the roughly 9,000 of rival independent OCU, into ditching Moscow, thus reducing the amount of Russian soft power in the embattled country.
The UOC MP has been viewed as Russia’s soft power tool for decades, promoting a version of the “Russian world” ideology that envisions Ukraine as part of a “Holy Rus” rather than an independent state.
As Andriy Smyrnov notes, the church spread Russian narratives that Ukraine should exist as Russia’s province, not a sovereign nation.
The stakes extend beyond theology.
Russia will inevitably influence Ukraine’s political and religious situation if the Moscow Patriarchate remains, which is why not only Ukraine but Baltic states seek solutions to evict Russian church influence.
Ukraine’s second-largest Orthodox denomination faces a choice: genuine independence or continued subordination to a church that blesses the bombs falling on Ukrainian cities.
Editor’s note: the article was updated to include comments from Viacheslav Horshkov
Read also
Another Ukrainian Orthodox Church actually got its independence
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We keep our reporting open and accessible to everyone because we believe in the power of free information. This is why our small, cost-effective team depends on the support of readers like you to bring deliver timely news, quality analysis, and on-the-ground reports about Russia's war against Ukraine and Ukraine's struggle to build a democratic society.
Become a patron or see other ways to support.
Anna Paulina Luna, a US lawmaker from the Republican Party, has connected an arms freeze to Ukraine’s ban on the Moscow-affiliated church.
Kyiv has banned the activities of Moscow Patriarchate churches in 2024 to ban ties with organizations that pose a threat to national security. Head of the church, Patriarch Kirill, is Russian President Vladimir Putin’s ally. He blessed Russian soldiers to die in Ukraine, promising them forgiveness of sins. Ukraine found numerous agents in Russian churches, some of whom were also accused of sexual harassment of children.
This week, the Pentagon halted the delivery of certain air-defense missiles and precision-guided munitions to Ukraine, citing concerns over depleting US stockpiles.
Immediately after the pause and Putin’s phone conversation with US President Donald Trump, Russia launched its largest missile attack on Kyiv since the start of the war, and shows no intention of stopping.
In a post on X, Anna Paulina Luna accused President Volodymyr Zelenskyy of banning the Orthodox Church.
“Zelenskyy BANNED THE ORTHODOX CHURCH. I CAN PROMISE THERE WILL BE NO WEAPONS FUNDING FOR YOU @ZelenskyyUa. NEGOTIATE FOR PEACE. WE ARE NOT YOUR PIGGY BANK,” she wrote on X.
Meanwhile, an analysis conducted by senior US military officers showed that the weapons package for Ukraine, but halted, did not pose a threat to American military capabilities. Sources say that US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has unilaterally blocked arms for Ukraine, which were approved during Joe Biden’s presidency.
No fresh arms sanctions have been endorsed by US President Donald Trump’s administration. At the same time, since Trump’s peace efforts began, the only thing that has changed for Ukraine is the intensification of Russian attacks and an increase in the number of civilian victims.
You could close this page. Or you could join our community and help us produce more materials like this.
We keep our reporting open and accessible to everyone because we believe in the power of free information. This is why our small, cost-effective team depends on the support of readers like you to bring deliver timely news, quality analysis, and on-the-ground reports about Russia's war against Ukraine and Ukraine's struggle to build a democratic society.
Become a patron or see other ways to support.
Metropolitan Onufriy, leader of the Moscow-aligned Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC MP), has had his Ukrainian citizenship revoked, the Ukrainian Security Service announced.
The announcement comes amid growing tensions over the UOC MP’s allegiance in a war increasingly recognized to be driven by the quasi-religious ideology of the “Russian world,” promoted by the Moscow Patriarchy, which is still recognized as the mother church by many UOC MP faithful.
The Security Service (SBU) reported that Onufriy, birthname Orest Berezovskyi, had willingly received Russian citizenship in 2002, while still holding the status of a Ukrainian citizen.
At the time, dual citizenship was prohibited by Ukrainian law, and while a groundbreaking law allowing dual citizenship is pending approval by Ukrainian President Zelenskyy, it still prohibits allegiance to “unfriendly states” like Russia for Ukrainian citizens.
Reportedly, Zelenskyy has signed the decree stripping Onufriy of citizenship, although it has not been published.
UOC MP denies everything, vows to fight back
A UOC MP spokesman rejected the claim that the UOC MP primate has a Russian passport and stated that Onufriy has only Ukrainian citizenship.
Metropolitan Onufriy of the UOC (MP) will also appeal the presidential decree and prove that he has no other citizenships than Ukrainian, the spokesman said in a comment to Suspilne.
The issue of Onufriy’s citizenship had already come up in 2023, when a media report found that he and 20 other UOC MP hierarchs had Russian passports.
After the publication, the UOC MP’s top hierarch decried Russia’s invasion and claimed that his Russian citizenship was extended by default from the time when he lived and studied in Moscow. Nevertheless, now he does not have a Russian passport now and considers himself only a Ukrainian citizen, he said without specifying when he stopped being a Russian citizen.
However, media reports from NV and Agenstvo have circulated scans of Onufriy’s allegedly valid passport, casting doubt on these refutations.
The Russian passport of UOC MP primate, Metropolitan Onufriy, as per NV sources
Can Ukraine actually strip its citizens of citizenship?
Ukraine’s Constitution prohibits stripping citizenship—but allows terminating it for those who voluntarily acquired foreign passports without resolving their Ukrainian status.
Parliament member Serhiy Vlasenko explained that Onufriy now automatically becomes a foreigner in Ukraine, losing all citizen rights. He must register as a foreign resident, obtain residence and work permits—”the same procedures as any Russian Federation citizen coming to Ukraine.”
The legal distinction matters. President Zelensky previously terminated citizenship for oligarchs Igor Kolomoisky, Viktor Medvedchuk, and businessman Hennadiy Korban using identical grounds: holding undeclared foreign passports.
Onufriy can challenge the decree in court. But if judges confirm he holds a Russian passport, the presidential decree stands. And renouncing Russian citizenship isn’t simple—it requires a “long, complex, bureaucratized procedure” involving personal participation in Russian consular processes.
The citizenship revocation transforms Ukraine’s top Moscow-aligned cleric into a legal foreigner in the country where he leads 8,000 parishes.
What will happen to Onufriy?
Ukrainian law technically gives stateless individuals three months to leave before facing deportation. But reality operates differently. As Archbishop Iona of the St. Iona Monastery casually noted on Facebook, many UOC bishops stripped of citizenship “continue to live and serve the church and people of Ukraine. Don’t panic.”
Namely, 13 UOC hierarchs lost their citizenship in January 2023. Five more followed in February 2023. None were deported. They remain in Ukraine, conducting services, managing parishes—functionally unchanged despite their legal limbo.
The SBU’s move creates a different kind of pressure. If Onufriy attempts international travel, he faces the fate of businessman Hennadiy Korban and others stripped of Ukrainian passports: denied re-entry, effectively trapped inside the country they call home.
But deportation? Unlikely. Ukraine lacks both political will and practical mechanisms to forcibly remove an 80-year-old religious leader whose 8,000 parishes still serve millions of faithful. The state has bigger battles, like the ongoing court proceedings under August 2024’s law banning Moscow-linked religious organizations.
The nine-month transition period for churches to prove independence has expired. The UOC MP now faces potential dissolution of its entire network—a far more existential threat than one prelate’s passport problems.
The citizenship revocation serves as legal theater while the real drama unfolds in courtrooms where the UOC MP’s survival hangs in the balance.
Does the law ban the UOC MP? Not so fast
“Not about banning.” Theologian unpacks Ukraine’s new anti-Russian church law
Is the UOC MP aligned with Moscow?
The status of the UOC MP in Ukraine became especially contentious after Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. The Moscow-aligned church, which enjoyed privileged status for years while promoting “Russian world” ideology, came under increased pressure to clarify its allegiance.
And while the UOC MP claimed to sever ties with its mother church, the Russian Orthodox Church, in May 2022, it did not walk the talk, a Ukrainian expert committee found in 2023.
A conference of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate on 27 May 2022 in Kyiv claimed to have severed ties with the Russian Orthodox Church. Photo: UOC MP
Reportedly, there is a split within the church, with hardliner parishes ignoring the instructions to no longer pray for the Moscow Patriarch during liturgies.
As well, the alleged severance of ties is not followed up by recognition of the UOC MP as a separate entity in the Orthodox world’s constellation of independent churches. The UOC MP hierarchs are also, apparently, still part of the Moscow Patriarchy’s ruling structure—the Synode.
The Ukrainian state has attempted to curb the UOC MP’s influence—not only via the August 2024 law, but by opening 174 probes into the collaboration of separate church hierarchs with Russia, with 31 guilty sentences.
However, many UOC MP faithful insist they are patriots of Ukraine, with select church voices stressing that UOC MP faithful defend Ukraine in the ranks of the Ukrainian army.
Thus far, the UOC MP’s status is hybrid: while some leaders like Metropolitan Iona have flipped from “Russian world” advocate to self-declared Ukrainian patriot, leaflets promoting Russian chauvinistic and imperialistic views are still observed in other church centers.
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Anatomy of treason: how the Ukrainian Orthodox Church sold its soul to the “Russian world”
Growing church drama in Ukraine
The UOC MP’s precarious position is complicated by competition with the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), granted independence by Moscow Patriarch Kirill’s nemesis, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, in 2018.
Both structures have roughly similar numbers of parishes (8,097 UOC MP vs 9,000 OCU). 687 parishes have ditched affiliation with the UOC MP to join the OCU since 2022. However, these transitions are increasingly marred by accusations of forceful takeovers amid state backing.
What is Moscow’s stake? The UOC MP represents a whopping 23% of the Russian Orthodox Church’s parishes worldwide, and is the largest concentration of parishes outside Russia itself.
The UOC MP remains Moscow’s sole surviving pillar of influence in a Ukraine that has otherwise severed all connections to Russia since 2022. Its ideological power runs deep: the fantasy of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus as “Holy Rus” united against the “satanic West” forms the theological cornerstone of Putin’s war.
OCU members occupied a contested UOC MP church after a standoff at a funeral of a KIA Ukrainian defender. Photo: Suspilne, 6 April 2023
This, as well, as revocations of leases on historic churches in state property, has prompted the UOC MP to lead a campaign decrying alleged religious persecution in Ukraine. This messaging has had impressive success among American Republicans, largely due to the lobbying efforts of lawyer Robert Amsterdam.
The Ukrainian state would indeed prefer a single Orthodox Church, and public opinion increasingly backs decisive action.
A June 2025 SOCIS poll found 34.7% of Ukrainians support liquidating the UOC MP as a legal organization, while 10.8% favor forcing its merger with the OCU.
Combined, 45.5% want the state to act decisively.
Yet 31.7% believe the government shouldn’t interfere in religious affairs, revealing Ukraine’s deep ambivalence about using state power against a church that still claims millions of faithful.
The resistance of even Ukraine-oriented UOC MP parishes to joining the OCU structure hints at deeper issues beyond historical animosity between two competitors.
Clashing allegiances, models of religious life, and the OCU’s desire to occupy the privileged state-promoted status once held by Moscow’s church in Ukraine will continue to stir Ukraine’s religious life for many years ahead.
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Russian World: the heresy driving Putin’s war
Editor’s note: This article was updated to include the section “Can Ukraine actually strip its citizens of citizenship?”
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Metropolitan Onufrii of Kyiv, the primate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, has had his Ukrainian citizenship suspended by a presidential decree, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) announced on July 2.
The SBU said it had established that Onufrii, also known by his secular name, Orest Berezovskyi, voluntarily received Russian citizenship in 2002 and failed to inform Ukrainian authorities of the fact. The new Ukrainian law on multiple citizenship lists holding a Russian passport as grounds for the removal of Ukrainian citizenship.
The security agency also said Onufrii has maintained ties with the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and actively resisted Ukraine's efforts to secure ecclesiastical independence from Moscow and its leader, Patriarch Kirill.
The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) has faced growing scrutiny and public criticism in Ukraine since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022, with many officials accusing it of maintaining loyalty to Moscow and undermining Ukraine's sovereignty.
The Moscow-linked church is separate from the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, which was granted autocephaly (autonomy) by Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I of Constantinople in 2019.
"Despite the full-scale invasion, Berezovsky (Onufrii) continues to support the policies of the Russian Orthodox Church and its leadership, particularly Patriarch Kirill (Gundyaev)," the SBU said in a statement.
Zelensky signed a law in 2024 banning the activities of religious organizations affiliated with Russia. The law was widely seen as targeting the UOC-MP, which remains legally subordinate to the Moscow-based ROC despite its claim to have severed ties.
Since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, over 100 UOC-MP clergy members have come under criminal investigation for alleged collaboration with Russian forces or spreading pro-Kremlin propaganda, according to the SBU. Nearly 50 have been charged, and courts have issued verdicts in 26 cases.
The UOC-MP continues to insist that it operates within Ukrainian law and that its 2022 declaration of independence from Moscow was genuine, though many in Ukraine view it as purely symbolic and lacking credibility.
Pope Leo XIV welcomed Ukrainian Greek Catholic pilgrims to the Vatican on June 28, saying their country has been "martyred" by Russia's "senseless war."
Greek Catholicism is Ukraine's second-largest Christian denomination, with adherents making up around one-tenth of the country's population. Prevalent mainly in western Ukraine, it has retained many rituals and practices of the Orthodox Church while under the pope's jurisdiction.
"I wish to express my closeness to the martyred Ukraine — to the children, the youth, the elderly, and especially to the families who mourn their loved ones," Pope Leo said in an address to Greek Catholic pilgrims at St. Peter's Basilica.
"I share in your sorrow for the prisoners and for the victims of this senseless war."
Sviatoslav Shevchuk, Head of the Greek Catholic Church in Ukraine, was among the pilgrims greeted at the Vatican, along with other bishops, priests, and lay believers. The pilgrimage was made in honor of the Jubilee, a Catholic holy year last observed in 2015-2016. The theme of the 2025 Jubilee is "Pilgrims of Hope."
In his address, Pope Leo said that the faith of Ukrainians is being "sorely tested" by Russia's full-scale invasion.
"Many of you, since the war began, have surely asked: Lord, why all this? Where are you? What must we do to save our families, our homes and our homeland?"
The pope also offered a special blessing to mothers of soldiers killed on the front lines in Ukraine.
After Pope Leo's remarks at St. Peter's, President Volodymyr Zelensky thanked the pontiff for his support.
Thank you, Your Holiness, for your continued prayers and compassion for Ukraine and our people," Zelensky wrote on X.
"Together we must stop this wanton Russian aggression and protect innocent lives. A just peace is needed. And we would also deeply appreciate your kind help in bringing back all our people — adults and children — held in Russian captivity against their will."
Pope Leo XIV, formerly Cardinal Robert Prevost, was elected head of the Catholic Church in the conclave on May 8 after the death of his predecessor, Pope Francis. Zelensky met with Pope Leo at his inauguration mass on May 18 and described him as "a symbol of hope for peace." The two discussed the return of children forcibly deported by Russiaand other humanitarian issues.
Pope Leo has called for "a just and lasting peace" in Ukraine and has offered to host peace talks between Kyiv and Moscow at the Vatican — an offer Zelensky has welcomed and Kremlin officials have dismissed.
Early in June, Pope Leo spoke on the phone with Russian President Vladimir Putin, urging Russia to make "a gesture that would favor peace."
The pope's support for Ukraine has been viewed as a departure from his predecessor Pope Francis, whose legacy among Ukrainians was marred by his at times controversial comments about Russia. In 2024, Pope Francis called on Ukraine to have the "courage" to "raise the white flag" and negotiate with Moscow.
Violent clashes broke out on June 17 outside the Holy Spirit Cathedral in Chernivtsi, a city in southwestern Ukraine, as hundreds of people attempted to force their way into the church following a long-running dispute over its religious affiliation, Suspilne reported.
The unrest reflects Ukraine's broader struggle to sever ties with the Russian-affiliated Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) amid the ongoing war, which was extensively used by Moscow as a propaganda tool.
According to public broadcaster Suspilne, the crowd gathered to assert control over the church, which had recently voted to switch allegiance from the UOC-MP to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) — an autocephalous (autonomous) Ukrainian church not affiliated with Moscow.
The police were reportedly deployed to prevent escalation but were eventually overwhelmed as protesters breached the church fence and entered the grounds. Officers deployed tear gas, and medics reported treating around 30 people for injuries.
The confrontation came after local authorities re-registered the Holy Spirit Cathedral and two other major parishes in Chernivtsi under the jurisdiction of the OCU earlier this year. Bishop Feognost of the OCU confirmed to Suspilne that the day marked the first Ukrainian-language prayer service in the cathedral, a significant symbol of the national church’s growing influence.
The dispute stems from decades of tension between Orthodox churches in Ukraine and has intensified since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in 2022. The UOC-MP, while claiming to have severed ties with Moscow, remains legally subordinate to the Russian Orthodox Church, which is seen as a close ally of the Kremlin.
Ukrainian lawmakers passed legislation in August 2024 banning religious organizations with ties to Russia. The law, signed by President Volodymyr Zelensky, gave such organizations nine months to cut all legal and institutional connections with Moscow. Over 100 UOC-MP clergymen have been investigated for suspected collaboration with Russian forces, with dozens facing criminal charges.
Local media say the scene outside the cathedral grew tense as both UOC-MP and OCU supporters gathered. Some attempted to tear down gates while chanting "shame!" and others blocked roads, disrupting traffic. The police temporarily restricted access to the site and launched an investigation.
Suspilne reported that Metropolitan Meletii of the UOC-MP later entered the cathedral after the gates were forced open. Worshippers not aligned with the OCU began a service inside, prompting further clashes. Fire extinguishers were reportedly used inside the building to push back demonstrators.
Chernivtsi Mayor Roman Klichuk initially welcomed the transition of the church to the OCU as a "historic day" for Ukraine's national church, but later deleted the post from his social media page, Suspilne said.
The Moscow-linked church claims it is the victim of religious persecution and insists that it operates lawfully. Critics argue its claims of independence are symbolic and that it remains deeply tied to Russia's religious and political structures.
While Orthodox Christianity remains freely practiced and the most widespread religion in Ukraine, the government and a growing number of citizens view the UOC-MP as a potential security threat.
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