Only a couple of days after the Russian invasion in February 2022, a group of Ukrainian female tennis players – Elina Svitolina, Marta Kostyuk, Lesia Tsurenko and Dayana Yastremska - published an open letter harshly criticizing the Women's Tennis Association (WTA).

That was the first step in a campaign against tennis and the world conducting business as usual with Russia after its invasion of Ukraine.

"By 2026, a combination of sporting excellence, authenticity, and modern media influence has made the Ukrainian female tennis players possibly Ukraine's most effective unofficial ambassadors."

Back in 2022, the Ukrainian women players called for stronger sanctions, a condemnation of the invasion, and declared that they would not play any Russian or Belarusian players unless the WTA made them compete as neutral athletes - no flags, no promotion of Russia or Belarus.

At that point, only Elina Svitolina – with a ranking as number 15 in the world – was an established star, the rest hovered between 50 and 150, young and inconsistent.

This coordinated and very public action from the Ukrainian players directly prompted the WTA and the ATP – in charge of men’s tennis - to change their policy within 24 hours.

Soon after, the Ukrainians also made it clear that they would not be doing the customary pre-match handshake with Russian and Belarusian players.

"What would Ukraine soldiers think if I shook hands with Russians?”, as Elina Svitolina formulated it.

Since then – for almost four-and-a-half years - there has been no handshakes – nor love lost – between Ukrainian and Russian/Belarusian tennis players.

Letting Russia back in

The outrage against the shocking Russia invasion was strong in most places around the world at that point. In 2022.

Since then, slowly but certainly – naturally, perhaps - the war in Ukraine has slipped down the international agenda.  And Russian athletes are now, slowly but surely, being welcomed back by many international sports federations—such as gymnastics, aquatics, skating and weightlifting. Despite that fact that nothing has changed - Russia is still occupying close to 20% of Ukraine and bombing the rest of the country almost every night.

Vladimir Putin himself has said Russia is planning to intensify the attacks to force Kyiv to surrender. The last few weeks have seen the war’s worst missile attacks on Ukraine, with 31 people being killed in Kyiv on 1-2 July.

Nevertheless, this past weekend, The International Olympic Committee (IOC) cleared the way for Russian athletes to return to Olympic competition.

But this Spring and Summer have seen a striking campaign of the Ukrainian tennis women against this normalization of the Russian invasion. A campaign that in some ways is a continuation of their initial protests in 2022.

Their renewed campaign is more sophisticated and directed against the idea that neutrality in the face of war crimes can be acceptable.

A combination of sporting excellence, authenticity, and modern media influence has made the Ukrainian female tennis players possibly Ukraine's most effective unofficial ambassadors. Against the backdrop of an ugly, old, corrupt dictator who keeps murdering innocent Ukrainians.

The best example is the 24-year old Marta Kostyuk who Wednesday qualified for the semifinals at Wimbledon.

But before we get to Marta, let us look at how these young Ukrainian women became the country’s most efficient spokes people.

More Russian bombs = attention

Timing is everything - not just in sport, but also if you want to attract attention, to use your platform, to have a political impact.

This Spring was the deadliest months for Ukrainian civilians, with April and May recording the highest civilian casualty toll since April 2022, according to the UN.

At least 274 civilians were killed and 1,763 injured in Ukraine in May 2026, and 238 were killed in April.

So when the tennis world number one, the Belarusian Aryna Sabalenko, strives to stay neutral – “"Nobody supports war. If we could stop it, we would. Unfortunately, it's not in our hands" – it does not fall well with her Ukrainian opponents, least of all with Marta Kostyuk:

"She has a big platform... and she's rejecting her responsibility."

"I feel like journalists should change the questions that you ask these athletes because the war is already there."

In May, when Ukraine's Oleksandra Oliynykova – number 50 in the world rankings - faced Russia's Diana Shnaider at the French Open, we witnessed a very public collision between two visions of what sport is supposed to be during wartime.

A couple of days earlier, as a result of a Russian attack at least 22 people had been killed across Ukraine. Diana Shnaider shied away from any comments on anything but tennis, but her Ukrainian opponent was not having it.

Before the match, Oliynykova criticised Shnaider's appearance at a Gazprom-sponsored exhibition match in Russia last year, and she pointed out Shnaider's social media activity—what Oliynykova described as liking "pro-Kremlin" and "pro-war" posts.

Oliynykova described Gazprom as "a company which is financing war crimes" and compared playing at such an event to "playing in Nazi Germany for Gestapo officers, on the tournament organized by a company which built Auschwitz."

No love lost between Ukraine's Oleksandra Oliynykova and Russia's Diana Shnaider during The French Open tennis tournament in Paris, Saturday, 30 May 2026. AP Photo/Thibault Camus/Eastnews

Oliynykova continues to live and train in Kyiv. Her father and her boyfriend have both volunteered for the Ukrainian army.

"My home is being attacked by Gazprom money," she said.

Talent gives you a platform

Another essential factor has been the fact that the Ukrainian women right now are storming the world rankings.

Using your platform for politics is somewhat easier when you are playing finals and semifinals.

Elina Svitolina is ranked 8th in the world, Marta Kostyuk – with her success these past two weeks at Wimbledon – is now 10^th, and Ukraine has a further 5 players in top 100.

But journalists get tired of writing the same story again and again, repeating the same questions. Even to the best in the world. So flamboyant tattoos, fashionable tennis outfits and flair for using social media helps.

And, again, against the backdrop of a Russian dictator who keeps killing innocent Ukrainians sleeping in their beds.

And nope, the point here is not that these women “use” their beauty to get attention. Not at all.

The point is that these young Ukrainian women are using the “weapons” they have at their disposal, very, very efficiently:

The athlete as diplomat: By consistently refusing symbolic gestures such as handshakes with Russian and Belarusian, forcing the tennis world—and viewers—to confront questions it often prefers to avoid.

A new generation of Ukrainian identity: these women have grown up and had their career during wartime. (I hope I don’t have to remind you that Putin, in fact, first invaded Ukraine in 2014.) Their public identity isn't simply "she is a tennis player from Ukraine" – no, being Ukrainian is absolutely central to how they present themselves.

The complete modern package: Tennis alone rarely creates global influence today. These Ukrainian players combine:

• elite athletic ability
• youth
• media fluency
• fashion appeal
• a strong social media presence
• and a willingness to express political opinions
• humanizing Ukraine beyond headlines. Rather than speaking as a politician, they speak as women in their twenties whose peers around the world follow them

That is a combination that brands, journalists, and audiences notice.

The Marta Effect

Nobody illustrates this coming together of factors better than 24-year old Marta Kostyuk.

She is using her “weapons”, her position on the tennis stage and industry, to openly criticize tennis’ governing bodies, she questions the neutrality policies, and she challenges fellow players to take a stand.

Journalists know she'll give substantive answers, and that makes her newsworthy.

Kostyuk was, in fact, a teenage prodigy - reaching the third round of the Australian Open at the age of only 15. But injuries, inconsistency and, of course, the Russian invasion of her country have held her back. She spent several years fluctuating outside the elite, typically between the top 30 and top 70 in the world.

She showed flashes of brilliance but lacked the consistency to break through.

This year, Kostyuk has finally fulfilled the promise many believed was inevitable. Kostyuk won her first WTA 1000 title in Madrid in April and reached her first Grand Slam semifinal at the French Open in May, and has now followed that up at Wimbledon.

Her tennis credentials cannot be questioned. But add to this that she is approachable, attractive and charming, with flawless English.

Last week, as Wimbledon started,  Marta entered the Centre Court – the holiest of the holiest grounds in tennis – twirling, demonstrating a haute couture tennis outfit modelled on her wedding dress.

Kostyuk twirling has now become “her thing” – but then she proceeds to the packed press conference where she invariably thunders against the Russian invasion of her country, and lambasts those who pretend to be neutral.

In May, Kostyuk reached the semi-final in Paris - after a win over Elina Svitolina - at 31 “the grand old lady of Ukrainian tennis - in what was the first all-Ukrainian women's quarter-final at a Grand Slam.

Kostyuk did her on-court interview with tears running down her cheeks. She dedicated the win to Ukraine, referring directly to the previous night's Russian attack on Kyiv:

"So many people are dead," she said. "I want to give this to the Ukrainian people."

At her press conference the next day, asked about her Russian opponents, she went further:

"They are all grown-ups. They know what's going on. They have phones. They have Instagram. They have news… I wish there was some more clear stance on what's going on, especially when your country is killing other people.”

“I don't know how you can sleep at night peacefully when you know that this is going on, and you have nothing to say about it."

After her quarter-final triumph over Jasmine Paolini on Wednesday, Kostyuk again spoke extensively about the war in Ukraine during her post-match press conference.

She now plays her first Wimbledon semifinal, Thursday, against Linda Noskova of the Czech Republic.

Asked about the decision of The International Olympic Committee to let Russians compete at the Los Angeles Olympics in 2028, Kostyuk did not mince her words:

“It is terrible and I think it is very, very far from fair play…. I 100% do not agree with this decision, but a lot of people spoke out on this issue and they (IOC) obviously don’t agree as well. I don’t think anything is going to change. I just want to go out there and hopefully beat every single Russian I play in the Olympics and that’s it.”

Again, her remarks figured prominently in international media.

Kostyuk wants to use her platform, she told reporters in Paris, to make sure that the world does not get to look at Russia’s invasion of her country as “normal”:

"The biggest thing I can do is sit here and talk about it so more people can find out about it so they don't get used to this terrible life."

In another era, Marta Kostyuk might simply have become an excellent tennis player. In the age of Instagram, 24-hour news and digital diplomacy, she has become something else: a sporting icon whose talent, intelligence, elegance and uncompromising advocacy combine to make her one of Ukraine's most effective unofficial ambassadors.

That is the Marta Effect.

According to reports on G7 summit discussions, Donald Trump expressed admiration for Ukraine’s long-range strikes against Russia and advised Kyiv to act more boldly. “For the first time since early 2023, the momentum in the Russo-Ukrainian war is on Kyiv’s side,” US Under Secretary of State for Foreign Assistance, Humanitarian Affairs, and Religious Freedom Jeremy Lewin said on 24 June.

Ukrainian forces are on the offensive while Russia appears to be in a holding pattern, Lewin said. “This is a crucial moment; Ukraine can keep applying pressure on the battlefield.”

Ukraine’s Armed Forces commander-in-chief Oleksandr Syrskyi offered a far more sober assessment in an interview with The Times on 26 June. “I cannot say unequivocally that the war is nearing a turning point. We hope there will come a moment when the enemy mobilizes all its forces, resources and efforts, after which exhaustion will set in, and a turning point may follow,” Syrskyi said.

Two qualified but widely different assessments of the situation on the battlefield

Both reflexes distort the picture. When the battlefield disfavour Ukraine, the reporting declares it doomed; when it moves the other way, Russia is being crushed. Neither holds.

What the trends below show—drawn from four years of Ukrainian General Staff daily reports—is more specific: Russia’s losses have become unsustainable in the war it set out to fight, which is precisely why it abandoned maneuver warfare for attrition.

Attrition, however, is survivable for both sides, because both are kept in the fight by their partners—Russia by China, Ukraine by the collective West minus the United States. Unless fundamentally reconfigured, changing the military balance on the battlefield, this is why the war will continue, and why Ukraine’s present success, as Syrskyi warns, may prove temporary.

Russia’s losses have become unsustainable in the war it set out to fight

To fully understand the status, situation reports alone are insufficient. One also needs to study trends. The following analysis is based on a synopsis of the daily reports from the Ukrainian General Staff, providing detailed insight into Russian losses and casualties.

A note on the figures: annual totals for 2026 are full-year projections based on the trends through the first half of the year, while cumulative “to date” figures are actuals as of June 2026. The two are therefore not directly comparable—the projected annual totals run higher than the running totals.

Personnel

Russia has lost more than 1.4 million soldiers since the full-scale war started, including both wounded and killed in action. The numbers have varied from year to year:

In June, Russia suffered its highest losses since March 2025: about 39,300, of which potentially 26,200 were killed in action. Why?

Today, up to 90% of Russian casualties are caused by FPV drones with unrivalled precision.

Russia launched a staggering 301,000 FPV drones against Ukrainian positions this month. Ukraine, however, is launching 50% more. “Ukraine maintains a 1.5-to-1 numerical advantage over Russia in FPV drones and is outpacing Russian recruitment into drone units by 12,500 personnel since January,” according to commander-in-chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi.

Additionally, Ukraine is scaling up its ground robotic capacity, an area with possibly significantly greater combat potential. In May alone, the Ukrainian Armed Forces executed 12,500 missions, indicative of a rapidly scaling capability.

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The frontline is replaced by a “kill zone”

This is why Russia is finding it increasingly difficult to recruit new soldiers. According to CNN, military recruitment was down by 20% in the first quarter of this year compared to 2025, and there are signs it is still faltering, according to Russian economy expert Janis Kluge. In Moscow, the number of people willing to sign contracts with the Defense Ministry and go to war against Ukraine fell by one-third in the spring. The same pattern is emerging in the regions.

In an interview with The Times, Syrskyi said that Russian losses during the first half of 2026 for the first time exceeded the number of recruits to the occupying army.

Analysts say the Kremlin is resorting to increasingly desperate measures to shore up its forces, and President Putin will likely be forced to make more unpopular decisions this year if he wants to continue the full-scale war against Ukraine.

The problem is that Russia is not the only party struggling to recruit soldiers for frontline duty. Despite fighting for its survival, Ukraine is also struggling to recruit enough soldiers.

Heavy weapons

At the start of the full-scale war, artillery, main battle tanks (MBT), armored fighting vehicles (AFV) and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) were Russia’s preferred offensive tools.

That is no longer the case in Ukraine. Against a less qualified opponent like NATO, the picture remains more nuanced.

From a doctrinal perspective, artillery has been one of the defining features of Russian and Soviet military thought for over a century. It is not simply another combat arm—it has traditionally been regarded as the primary means of destroying enemy forces, with infantry and armor often maneuvering to exploit the effects created by artillery.

At the start of the full-scale war, artillery inflicted about 80% of the casualties. It has been overtaken by FPV drones, which have transformed the traditional 1:3 KIA/WIA ratio into a horrific 2:1 ratio as of 2026. Equally important, Ukraine has long hunted what used to be Russia’s main weapons. The number of artillery pieces destroyed and damaged has grown persistently from day one of the war: 2022: 2,016 — 2023: 6,448 — 2024: 13,009 — 2025: 14,105 and, if present trends continue, 2026: 18,770.

Artillery is still relevant on the battlefield, not least when weather makes FPV drone operations impossible. But it is today, by far, less crucial than only two years ago.

Russia has lost 1,901 MLRS to date; 598 of which have been confirmed.

Russian losses of MLRS are following the same trajectory as that of its artillery: it is escalating. 2022: 423 — 2023: 519 — 2024: 319 — 2025: 327 and, if present trends continue, 2026: 629—nearly as many as the last two years combined.

Russia has lost 12,066 MBT to date; 4,394 of which have been confirmed.

It has nearly emptied its strategic storages of old tanks to replace losses on the battlefield. Still, the losses have declined year by year since the peak in 2024, when industrialized-scale FPV drone production started: 2022: 3,029 — 2023: 2,948 — 2024: 3,678 — 2025: 1,813 and, if present trends continue, 2026: 1,180.

Despite the enormous losses, the Russian tank force is actually bigger than it was pre-war. Russia is losing fewer MBTs because it no longer fields them in numbers.

Main battle tanks are less relevant on a drone-saturated battlefield like Ukraine’s. That is why they are being spared for future conflicts against a NATO that still lacks Russia’s and Ukraine’s drone capabilities. NATO is not technologically behind—in many areas it possesses more advanced aerospace, sensor, networking, and AI capabilities than Russia. The gap lies in combat experience, doctrinal adaptation, and the ability to field inexpensive drones at massive scale.

Almost none of Russia’s newly produced tanks are being sent to Ukraine; instead they are being stockpiled in Russia for “later use.”

According to ISW, the planned production increase indicates that Russia plans for military contingencies beyond the current war against Ukraine, on the backdrop of its “Phase Zero” operations against Europe, and that Moscow seeks to project power against NATO.

Russia has lost 24,845 AFVs to date; 9,641 of which have been confirmed.

The trend follows the same trajectory as the Russian MBT: Ukraine is destroying fewer AFVs because Russia is fielding fewer on the battlefield. The losses have declined year by year since the peak in 2024: 2022: 6,075 — 2023: 5,005 — 2024: 8,951 — 2025: 3,787 and, if present trends continue, 2026: 2,000.

Russia has not run out of AFVs. Rather, it has reached a point where AFVs have become the limiting factor for force expansion and mechanized operations. Russia continues to produce and refurbish vehicles, but not fast enough to fully equip its expanding army or replace losses with modern equipment.

As a result, Russian soldiers are forced either to use unarmored vehicles—civilian cars, ATVs and motorcycles—or to walk through the kill zone to attack Ukrainian defensive positions.

Reports indicate that 60% to 70% of Russian soldiers are killed or wounded before ever reaching Ukrainian lines or firing a shot during unarmored or dismounted “meat assault” tactics.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies concluded that Russian territorial gains throughout 2024–2025 came at exceptionally high material cost. The Russian rate of advance in 2026 has been the lowest since the start of the war. During the spring, it lost more territory than it gained.

Russia has lost its ability to conduct maneuver warfare and to secure a mechanized breakthrough and the subsequent collapse of the frontline. Its ability to defeat Ukraine is therefore no longer linked to territorial conquest, but to its ability to destroy Ukraine through attrition warfare across all domains.

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Air defense

Russia produces some of the most formidable air defence systems in the world and fields them in large numbers. Before the full-scale invasion, Russia had as many air defense systems as all NATO countries combined, according to estimates by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Russia is believed to have possessed about 2,000 to 2,500 ground-based air-defence systems.

But it has since suffered enormous losses.

To put it in context: NATO has identified Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) as a top priority for the Alliance’s survival and deterrence and has called for a 400% increase in air and missile defense capabilities across member states to counter the evolving threat from Russia.

In October 2024, NATO’s “minimum capability requirements” suggested increasing the number of ground-based air defense systems from 293 to 1,467.

Russia has lost nearly as many air defense systems as NATO is planning to procure: a staggering 1,454.

There is no authoritative public estimate of Russia’s annual production of complete ground-based air defense systems (launchers/vehicles), but open-source intelligence, industry analysis, and expert assessments allow a reasonable estimate.

Russia is probably producing around 80–160 new launcher vehicles per year—not nearly enough to replace the air defense systems destroyed by Ukrainian strikes. Additionally, Russian air defense interceptors are currently being fired faster than they can be produced.

If everything continues as it is now, the situation for them should become extremely critical by the fall. That said, Ukraine’s efforts to destroy Russia’s air defense capability escalated in 2023 already, and not in the last year as some claim. From 2022 until the end of 2025, Ukraine destroyed 212, 411, 399 and 235 air defense systems respectively. If present trends persist, Ukraine will destroy an additional 380 systems in 2026.

The fluctuation in numbers destroyed reflects in part that Russia fields fewer air defense systems because of Ukrainian strikes, but also tactics. They have started hiding to avoid being destroyed. The effect is the same: Russian air defense is reluctant to perform its main task out of fear of being struck.

Ukraine notably intensified its strikes, primarily with drones, against Russian ground-based air defenses and radars in late 2025. According to a recent analysis by the international open-source intelligence collective Tochnyi, Ukraine executed over 492 strikes on air-defense infrastructure between June 2025 and early March 2026, alongside hundreds more targeting A2AD (anti-access/area-denial) assets—the wider systems that support air defense, such as electronic warfare, command systems and missile units.

To date, at least 23–25 dedicated air-warning/air-surveillance radar losses have been confirmed destroyed, which means the real losses are higher.

Russian forces also lack sufficient Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft to maintain surveillance and detect low-flying missiles. Ukrainian forces have struck Russian AWACS aircraft throughout the war, contributing to shortages, ISW reports. Russia reportedly has fewer than ten operational A-50 AWACS aircraft as of 1 June 2025, of which only four or five are the modernized A-50U variant.

The campaign has enabled increasingly more long- and medium-range Ukrainian missile and drone strikes against Russian military bases, command-and-control networks, defense industry, logistical hubs and—not least—its ground lines of communication.

Ukraine’s deep-strike capability has increased immensely since the start of the full-scale war. More importantly, it will continue to increase as Russia’s air defense network is slowly taken apart.

This is why Ukraine is about to cut the land bridge between mainland Russia and Crimea, isolating and starving the occupation forces in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts. It is also the reason Ukrainian strikes have turned the Crimean Peninsula from what Moscow once cast as the “jewel of the empire” and Putin’s “historic achievement” into a strategic burden.

Missiles and medium- to long-range UAVs

In February, I published the article “Russia’s war is getting cheaper. That’s the worst news Europe has heard in years.” Building on statistical trends over the last four years—based on reports from the Ukrainian General Staff—the article outlined the strategic shift on the battlefield: from expensive heavy armor to cheap mass drones, from maneuver warfare to attrition, from soldiers to robotics.

The numbers are staggering.

In January 2025, Russia launched 2,330 FPV drones per day at Ukrainian positions. In June 2026: more than 10,000. If the trend holds, Russia will launch 3.8 million FPV drones this year—up more than 300% in less than 1.5 years. Its Unmanned Systems Forces now number 87,000 troops, with plans to raise new brigades and 96 battalions this year.

Long-range strike drones tell the same story. Russia launched 11,200 in 2024, then 54,500 in 2025. Projections for 2026: 96,700. At current intercept rates, nearly 10,000 will hit targets—energy infrastructure, rail networks, hospitals, schools.

Guided glide bombs surged from tens per day to nearly 240, with range growing from 60–80 km to over 150 km. Russia is developing variants reaching 400 km—putting more Ukrainian cities in range of indiscriminate bombing. It is using about twice as many guided glide bombs this year as in 2025. Despite Ukrainian strikes against Russian combat aircraft on the ground, Russia has increased the number of sorties flown by 15% over the last two months.

Conclusion

In the February article, I stressed that this is not a war for territory. It is a war about Ukraine’s right to exist. In the Russian world, Ukraine does not exist.

Sovereignty is not defined by territorial integrity alone. It encompasses the state’s monopoly on legitimate force, political self-determination, security autonomy, economic independence, and information sovereignty. Russia’s stated demands—“demilitarization,” “denazification,” neutrality, and territorial concessions—collectively amount to something far more far-reaching than a border adjustment. If accepted, they would strip Ukraine of the ability to defend itself, choose its own leaders, join Western institutions, or resist future coercion.

The strategic shift from heavy weapons and maneuver warfare to drone warfare and attrition means Russia’s ability to sustain this war improves while Ukrainian devastation increases.

This is not a war for territory. It is a war about Ukraine’s right to exist. In the Russian world, Ukraine does not exist.

Ukraine’s ability to execute deep- and medium-range strikes against Russia has improved tremendously this year. In April 2026, French analyst Clement Molin claimed Ukraine had already overtaken Russia in deep-strike drone attacks. While many called that report overly optimistic, it can be stated with certainty that over the past year the number of successful and large-scale Ukrainian attacks has increased dozens of times and become almost a daily occurrence.

More crucially, the Ukrainian capability is likely to continue to increase, inflicting ever more pain on the aggressor. It might even help force Russia to withdraw from Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, turn the Crimean Peninsula into an island and, ultimately, help liberate Crimea.

During a briefing on 11 June, General Syrskyi described a drone-warfare ecosystem in which Ukraine holds a quantitative advantage in FPV systems, a qualitative advantage in interceptor capabilities, and a structural advantage in the attrition of Russian drone-operator personnel.

Ukraine has built its unmanned-systems capacity faster than Russia can build a counter.

Syrskyi’s closing note, however, was a warning against complacency. Russia is studying Ukraine’s methods and adapting. The advantage Ukraine holds today is not permanent—it must be maintained through continued production, innovation, and the same accelerated development cycle that produced the current position. “The results achieved must not lead to relaxation,” Ukraine’s Armed Forces commander-in-chief stressed.

In order to set the Ukrainian strike campaign into proper context: Ukraine is today doing what Russia has been doing for more than four years already, without breaking the spirit of the Ukrainian population.

Ukraine has survived because it is supported by the collective West (minus the United States). Russia is being supported by the world’s second-largest economy, China—and by all the other states that do not support the West’s attempt to isolate the aggressor.

Europe’s efforts are being undermined by the world’s largest economy.

The bottom line is that the war of attrition is likely to continue, potentially indefinitely, as long as Russia is being supported by China—or until Russia attacks a NATO member state, with the silent consent of China.

My main message, therefore, remains the same as before: this war can only be ended by fundamentally changing the military balance on the battlefield—a military intervention by a Coalition of Like-Minded Countries (CALM).