Ukraine's army doesn't have as extensive human resources as Russia, so it is teaching its machines to do more of the work on their own. Ukrainian developers are building autonomy into aerial and ground drones so the systems take over tasks the operator once did, the defense outlet Oboronka reported.

Across reconnaissance, bombing, interception, and ground robots, Ukrainian firms are automating the steps that once tied up a pilot, allowing a single operator to run multiple drones at once.

Automating reconnaissance and mission planning

The heaviest early demand for autonomy is in reconnaissance. Farsight Vision's FSV Platform builds real-time 3D terrain maps from drone imagery for planning assaults and strikes, and models where enemy electronic warfare and radio dead zones lie, so FPV pilots can avoid losing their link.

Meanwhile, Sine Engineering offers "autonomy modules" that let a drone navigate on its own. A Mavic flies to an observation point, works for 30 to 40 minutes, and returns, with the pilot only turning the camera, so one operator can run several drones.

"70 to 80% of the need for autonomy right now is reconnaissance," Sine Engineering CEO Andrii Chulyk said.

Autonomy for bombers and FPVs

Heavy bomber drones waste most of a pilot's time in transit. A bomber's target can sit 35 to 60 kilometers from launch, over 25 minutes each way, and a mass raid needs a pilot per drone, so Lasar's Group uses route-planning software to tie up to five bombers to one pilot, who connects for a few minutes to line up each strike.

A single pilot can carry out bombing runs one after another with a group of bombers, preserving personnel for other missions.

Autonomous FPVs are pricier but far more capable: Chulyk estimated an AI drone that finds and destroys a target in a swarm would cost $2,000 to $3,000, against about $700 for a pilot-flown night FPV with auto-capture.

Sine Engineering argues one automated FPV can replace up to ten simpler drones in hard missions, while The Fourth Law's Maksym Savanevskyi favors adding auto-capture to cheap existing drones, which he says makes a radio-controlled drone two to four times more effective.

"Fire and forget" for interceptors and robots

The hardest problem for interceptor drones is the "last mile", spotting a small target against open sky. The Fourth Law's TFL Anti-Shahed module scans the sky and detects targets at twice the range of the human eye, marking a Shahed so the pilot knows where to fly.

Savanevskyi predicts Ukrainian makers will field automatic Shahed-killing solutions by year's end. That points toward "fire and forget" interception, said Yevhen Lesin of the 412th Nemesis unmanned-systems brigade, though he warned against autonomy for its own sake, noting automated launch from ground robots creates technical problems and needs more people, not fewer.

Ground-robot autopilots remain among the field's hardest tasks: DevDroid's Oleh Fedoryshyn noted it took Tesla ten years to make the car autopilot work. At the same time, frontline dirt roads, cratered and unmarked, are nothing like marked highways, so DevDroid's robots now cross only short link-dead stretches on their own before the operator resumes control.

A Ukrainian officer says the army still has no proper system for getting its wounded off the battlefield. Tetiana Chornovov, the commander of a platoon of anti-tank guided missile systems, has called for systemic reform of casualty evacuation in Ukraine's Armed Forces, saying that in the fifth year of the full-scale war, evacuating soldiers from the battlefield remains in most units "a force majeure that no one is ready for."

Most Ukrainian units lack dedicated evacuation groups and specialized armored transport, so evacuations happen in chaos with improvised means, with exceptions only in individual brigades, she says.

Amid public debate over whether ground robots can do the job, Chornovol argues the problem is larger than any single technology, and that the absence of a reliable way out shapes how soldiers fight.

The psychological stakes

Chornovol said the certainty of rescue matters as much as the rescue itself.

"You can't imagine how the existence of professional evac groups would improve the psychological atmosphere at the front. Everyone wants to hope that someone will come for them, will save them," she said.

Her own fear is concrete. Fighting in her fifth year, she said her greatest fear is "that something happens to my people and we'll be helpless, because the evacuation problems will be my problems, and in a small platoon I can't allocate resources to create my own evac group."

One evacuation, seven casualties

Chornovol has backed her argument with a case from a year ago, when her Stuhna anti-tank missile crew was subordinated to a neighboring brigade. At four in the morning, she was told of one killed and one wounded by an enemy chemical-weapons strike, with the evacuation placed entirely on her crew despite weak coordination and unfamiliar terrain.

The rescue attempts compounded the toll.

"My combat vehicle with excellent electronic warfare and an anti-mine grader, which set out for the evacuation, blew up on an anti-tank magnetic mine dropped from a drone," she recalled.

The grader saved lives, but four of her best soldiers were badly concussed. A second vehicle from the brigade, with one of her men as a guide, hit another anti-tank mine, but without a grader: "the mine exploded under the hood, the driver lost his legs, the others were concussed." A third vehicle made it through by luck and took out the wounded and the dead.

"So one evacuation, seven casualties. One severe, without legs," she said, noting the brigade simply had no normal evac group or evac protocol.

She organized the Stuhna evacuation herself, bringing in border guards to control the road, waiting for a window in drone flights, and repairing the electronic-warfare gear stripped from the first knocked-out vehicle.

What Chornovol wants built

Chornovol believes that creating separate staffed evacuation units within brigades is the most necessary reform now, each with an autonomous team and special transport.

"There should be the best drivers, with salaries like assault troops, but also medics, pilots, EW specialists, sappers to defuse mines dropped by drones, and pros: hunters with shotguns to down drones," she said.

On equipment, she argued against relying on ground robots, which she agrees are too slow for evacuation and often easy targets for enemy drones. The main transport, she said, should be a small, fast, lightly-armored vehicle with an anti-mine bottom, light enough to survive the anti-tank mines the enemy drops.

"For a platoon, such equipment is too much, but I don't understand why the whole brigade we were attached to didn't have such an evac vehicle," she said.

She nearly lost five of her men, she added, because of the absence of adequate evacuation approaches and proper light-armored vehicles in the army, asking why the National Guard has them for evacuation while the Armed Forces do not.