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Brussels completes Ukraine screening as farm politics threatens EU unity
Ukraine and the European Commission wrapped up final agricultural screening meetings in Brussels on 15 September, completing a multi-year process that marks a historic milestone in the country’s EU accession journey.
This breakthrough has profound implications for global food security and European integration.
Ukraine’s agricultural sector—which supplied 50% of the UN World Food Programme’s grain before the war and remains a critical supplier to food-stressed regions—is moving closer to EU Common Agricultural Policy integration.
Yet, the milestone also exposes a fundamental disconnect that threatens Ukraine’s European future and the EU’s strategic coherence. While Brussels debates abstract concerns about Ukrainian “mega farms,” the reality on the ground reveals a far more complex agricultural landscape fighting for survival under Russian bombardment.
Screening completion sets the stage for integration challenges
The three-day Brussels meetings represented years of preparation culminating in Ukraine presenting 28 thematic blocks covering agricultural reforms, digitalization, state support, and market regulation.
Officials reported that the European Commission positively assessed Ukraine’s readiness to integrate into the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy.
The screening completes Cluster 5, “Resources, Agriculture and Cohesion Policy,” the final piece in Ukraine’s six-cluster accession negotiations. According to EU officials, the bilateral screening process will be finalized by autumn 2025, with Ukraine aiming to meet opening benchmarks by the end of 2026.
But agriculture remains the most politically sensitive chapter. Deputy Prime Minister Taras Kachka called it one of the “most sensitive” negotiation topics, reflecting concerns that have triggered farmer protests across Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia, forcing the EU to pay €156 million in compensation to affected farmers.
War damage meets policy misconceptions
Let us consider the context. As Ukrainian agriculture faces its most challenging period since independence—with an estimated $80 billion in war damages and farmers operating under daily missile and drone attacks—European policy debates continue to focus on abstract threats.
The European Parliament’s research briefing, published in April 2024, confirmed that Ukrainian agriculture has been “a primary military target of Russia’s aggression,” with Ukraine now controlling an estimated 26.5 million hectares of arable land, down from 32.7 million before the war.
Yet as Ukrainian farmers die defending their fields, European discourse remains fixated on what Politico describes as “farm giants and oligarch-owned holdings” that have become “the face of the country’s agriculture in Europe, looming as an existential threat at the border.”
The human reality tells a different story. Oleksandr Hordiienko, a 58-year-old farmer from Kherson, was killed by a Russian drone in early September while driving across his war-scarred fields.
At his funeral, mourners called him “the farmer with a shotgun”—he had cleared thousands of mines from the 1,000 hectares his cooperative shared with a dozen other farmers and patrolled the skies with a Turkish shotgun to protect his workers from drones.
Current agricultural statistics underscore the wartime challenges. Ukrainian exports dropped 33% in the first two months of the 2025/26 marketing year compared to the previous season, with wheat exports totaling just 3.1 million tons through early September—over 1 million tons less than last year.
Yet grain prices are rising, with wheat climbing from 7,350 UAH/t ($178) in mid-September to 8,750 UAH/t ($212), driven by Russian attacks on energy infrastructure rather than supply shortages.
The complex reality behind the stereotypes
Ukrainian farmers increasingly challenge the aforementioned European misconceptions about the country’s agriculture being dominated solely by oligarch-held farm giants.
“Ukrainian farmers must start now: To explain who we are: not oligarchs, but independent producers. To show what we need: not handouts, but clarity and fairness,” argues Andrii Dykun, Chairman of the Ukrainian Agri Council.
The reality indeed is quite diverse, with medium-sized and family businesses accounting for about 80% of agricultural enterprises, while only 20% operate companies with more than 10,000 hectares. Nearly 4 million households work the land, producing 95% of Ukraine’s potatoes, 85% of vegetables, 80% of fruit and berries, and 75% of milk.
These small-scale operations, invisible in European debates, are keeping Ukrainian families fed throughout the war.
The 8,600 medium-sized farms of 200-2,000 hectares—not the massive holdings that dominate headlines—produced over 50% of cereal output before the war. Even EU analysis acknowledges that 58% of production comes from structures under 1,000 hectares.
The picture is quite far from the “oligarch” stereotype, also when looking at operations that would be considered massive by European standards.
Politico recently profiled Akhmil Alkhadzhi, whose Syrian father helped build a family company cultivating 3,500 hectares—“middling” in Ukraine but enormous by European standards. When Russia invaded, wheat prices collapsed from $250-300 per ton to $70. To keep the business alive and support 60 employees representing “300 or 400 lives depending on us,” Alkhadzhi sold his apartment abroad. “We stayed without an apartment, but with a business,” he said.
Markets diversify as political tensions persist
Russia’s systematic targeting of Ukrainian food systems has evolved beyond direct agricultural attacks toward economic warfare. Moscow inflates costs across food production sectors by attacking energy infrastructure while maintaining plausible deniability.
“Electricity, logistics, and fuel costs for businesses are constantly rising,” Denis Marchuk, deputy head of the Ukrainian Agri Council, explained.
Despite these pressures, Ukrainian agriculture demonstrates remarkable adaptability.
While the EU became increasingly important during the war, now taking 51% of Ukraine’s wheat exports compared to 30% in 2021, Ukraine maintains global diversification. In the first months of 2025/26, key destinations included Egypt (18% of grain exports), Indonesia (13%), China (10%), Vietnam (8%), and Türkiye (8%). India takes 17% of vegetable oils, with Iraq, Türkiye, and China following.
This diversification proves Ukrainian farmers’ core argument: they seek “regulatory access” to EU markets rather than dependency. As Dykun notes: “Once it became clear that Ukrainian producers were not looking for shortcuts, but rather fair treatment under EU rules, the tone softened.”
Political tensions nonetheless persist. Trade preferences expired in June 2025, quotas were reinstated, and emergency brake mechanisms now cover multiple Ukrainian agricultural products.
The legacy of previous restrictions by Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia continues to shadow EU-Ukraine agricultural relations, with tensions persisting into 2024 despite political changes in some countries.
These ongoing disputes underscore the challenges ahead as Ukraine moves from completing technical screenings to implementing actual integration. The 15 September screening completion was easy, demonstrating regulatory alignment on paper. The harder test comes with the political acceptance of Ukrainian competition in European markets.
Integration challenges and strategic stakes
Chapter 11 on Agriculture and Rural Development encompasses substantial EU law governing direct payments, rural development measures, and market interventions. Most rules apply immediately upon accession, making proper implementation critical.
Yet historically, agriculture has proven contentious in most enlargement negotiations, and integrating Ukraine’s sizeable agricultural sector poses unique challenges, especially without prior Common Agricultural Policy reform.
The screening completion demonstrates Ukraine’s institutional capacity for European integration amid active warfare.
For Western policymakers, understanding Ukrainian agriculture’s complexity becomes essential for supporting Ukraine’s EU aspirations and broader democratic resilience.
As Deputy Prime Minister Kachka noted, “This screening session is not a starting point but a culmination of years of cooperation with the EU. We know our strengths, we understand the challenges and today we have the opportunity to lay the foundation for further integration of Ukraine’s agricultural sector into the EU’s common policy.”
While Russian forces steal grain from occupied territories and systematically target food infrastructure, Ukrainian farmers continue producing crops that feed both domestic and global markets.
This agricultural persistence represents more than economic necessity—it demonstrates the resilience and institutional capacity that make Ukraine’s European integration both possible and strategically vital—if Brussels can move beyond its misconceptions to recognize the complex reality of Ukrainian agriculture fighting for survival and a European future.
