Russian troops have made new advances on the front between Kostiantynivka and Pokrovsk in Donetsk Oblast, said Viktor Trehubov, spokesperson for Ukraine’s Khortytsia operational group, during a broadcast on Suspilne.

Pokrovsk is one of the main strongholds of Ukraine’s defense in Donetsk. For more than a year, Russian forces have been trying to capture the city because its loss would open the way for deeper advances, cut key supply routes, and expose Kostiantynivka and other Ukrainian-held towns to direct threat.

According to Trehubov, Russian units are now trying to bypass Pokrovsk from the east to put the city in a partial encirclement rather than storming it head‑on.

“There has been some movement on the Pokrovsk front — a partial penetration between Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka. They are trying to expand this foothold, while our forces focus on inflicting maximum losses in manpower and equipment, slowing their advance and pushing them back,” Trehubov said.

Encirclement instead of direct assault

Russian forces, he said, are avoiding a direct assault and aiming instead to isolate Pokrovsk. Military analyst Yan Matveev explains that the Russian plan is to pin down Ukrainian units inside the city, sever their supply lines, and, if possible, surround and destroy them.

Two axes of fighting

Combat is currently active on two main fronts:

• The southwestern outskirts of Pokrovsk
• The northeast, around Rodynske, Suvorove and Nikanorivka

Small Russian infantry groups are also infiltrating through Zverevo and Pervomaiske. Their task is to slip into the outskirts, unsettle Ukrainian defenses from the rear, and prepare the ground for larger forces.

Supply lines under threat

At the same time, Russian units are attempting to seize Rodynske or bypass it from the north, which would allow them to cut Pokrovsk’s two main supply roads. Drones and ground attacks are being used to make these supply routes impassable while defenders are pinned down on the city’s edge.

“For Russian forces, synchronization is crucial,” Matveev said. “If supply lines remain intact, their losses will be heavy. If Ukrainian troops are free to maneuver, they can avoid encirclement.”

Broader concerns from analysts

Military analyst Kostyantyn Mashovets warns that the danger goes beyond Pokrovsk itself and reflects a broader weakening of Ukrainian positions along several stretches of the front.

“What worries me most now is the way the front is starting to give way in several areas, at least at the tactical level,” Mashovets wrote. “If the country’s military and political leadership keeps focusing on anything other than the war itself, the consequences could be extremely serious.”

Mashovets outlines a stark scenario if the situation does not change:

• Pokrovsk could fall before autumn.
• Kostiantynivka and Kupiansk could be at risk in the autumn.
• By the end of the year, Russian forces might reach the approaches to Zaporizhzhia, a major industrial city of roughly one million people, and once again threaten the Sloviansk–Kramatorsk agglomeration, which serves as the administrative and logistical hub for Ukrainian defenses in Donetsk.

He points to two factors driving these risks:

1. Russia’s considerable — “multiple,” as he puts it — advantage in combat-ready infantry across several operational directions.
2. The growing likelihood that Russia will move from voluntary recruitment to a system of forced mobilization. Mashovets warns that this shift is becoming more and more real and must be addressed as quickly as possible.

Ukraine’s difficult choices

The failure to hold the defensive line along the Kazennyi Torets River has left Pokrovsk more vulnerable. Analysts now see only two options:

1. Withdraw from Pokrovsk (considered unlikely)
2. Defend the city and its northern approaches at the same time, holding out as long as possible and counterattacking if reserves are available.

“If Syrskyi — who commands Ukraine’s Armed Forces — has mechanized reserves,” Matveev adds, “this is the time to use them.”

A longer timeline than it seems

Not all analysts see Pokrovsk as the most immediate danger.

While some experts emphasize the urgency of holding the city, military analyst Bohdan Myroshnykov argues that Russian operations around Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka are still in a preparatory phase rather than ready for a full-scale assault.

“The Kostiantynivka axis is only beginning,” he says. “The enemy is creating the conditions for an encirclement or an assault, and this will not be resolved in a month—or even in three.”

According to Myroshnykov, around Pokrovsk these conditions are already about 75% in place, but the main phase—the attempt to storm the entire Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad agglomeration—is still months away.

“Even by the end of the year they will still be setting up for that,” he adds, “and it is far from certain they will meet their own timetable.”

He notes that Russian units are now close to Pokrovsk’s outskirts, but says this is not yet enough for a full assault. In his assessment, other sectors of the front—Novopavlivka, Kupiansk and Siversk—pose a more immediate concern because Ukrainian forces there have less clarity and fewer resources to stabilize the situation.

What lies ahead

Without a major counteroffensive to clear its flanks, Pokrovsk could eventually fall. Whether that happens within weeks or the city holds out for several more months hangs in the balance.

Matveev identifies the Poltavka – Nova Poltavka – Vozdvyzhenka axis as the most promising route for a Ukrainian counterattack. Such an operation might sever the Russian salient, alleviate pressure on Kostiantynivka, and restore supply access along the T‑0504 highway.

Pokrovsk also marks the southernmost point of Ukraine’s “fortress belt” in Donetsk Oblast—a chain of fortified cities that stretches north through Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka, and Kostiantynivka. Its loss would weaken defenses along the entire belt and allow Russian forces a strong foothold for further operations north and west.

Whether Ukraine has the manpower, mechanized reserves, and strategic support to mount a counterattack along that axis—and to hold the fortress belt—remains a critical question in the weeks ahead.

Ukraine can win the war against Russia, but only by building “national resilience” systems and embracing asymmetric technological warfare rather than hoping for traditional military breakthroughs.

That’s the strategic roadmap from Valerii Zaluzhnyi, Ukraine’s former commander-in-chief and current ambassador to Britain, in a foreword that consolidates his strategic thinking developed over the past year.

Writing for journalist Roman Romaniuk’s upcoming book “What Will Be Used to Fight World War III?”, Zaluzhnyi argues that victory depends on adapting to a new kind of warfare that makes conventional operations increasingly impossible.

“The key to our victory is not just resilience, but decisive and timely responses,” Zaluzhnyi writes. But those responses must target infrastructure protection and technological capabilities, not territorial gains.

His analysis explains why current fighting has devolved into World War I-style stalemate—and why that’s actually creating Ukraine’s path to victory.

Why breakthrough operations won’t work

The precision weapons era that dominated warfare from the 1970s through 2022 has ended. Electronic warfare now blocks most guided munitions. Battlefield reconnaissance drones make troop movement lethal. The result is a grinding stalemate where neither side can achieve major territorial gains.

“When robots began to appear massively on the battlefield, they made any movement of soldiers impossible,” Zaluzhnyi explains. “We couldn’t move forward towards the Russians, and the Russians, accordingly, couldn’t move forward either.”

This isn’t temporary. Zaluzhnyi predicts the technological factors creating this deadlock will persist until around 2027, when new navigation systems and autonomous weapons restore the possibility of offensive operations.

The war is shifting toward “the remote dismantling of a nation’s capacity to resist” through systematic infrastructure attacks rather than front-line advances.

The new victory formula

Rather than lamenting this shift, Zaluzhnyi sees opportunity. Ukraine’s survival strategy becomes its victory strategy: build systems that can withstand remote warfare while developing asymmetric capabilities to target Russian infrastructure.

“The development of technology, along with the demographic and economic situation in the coming years, is likely to favour a war of attrition,” he writes.

Ukraine’s advantage lies in adapting faster to this reality than Russia.

The victory formula requires three elements:

1. National resilience infrastructure: Power grids, transportation networks, and government systems designed to function under constant attack. Ukraine has already begun this transformation out of necessity.
2. Asymmetric technological capabilities: Cheap, scalable autonomous systems that can target high-value Russian assets at minimal cost. Ukrainian innovation in drone warfare exemplifies this approach.
3. Information warfare defense: Protecting public morale and mobilization efforts from Russian psychological operations designed to erode resistance.

“War strategy will focus not so much on capturing territory as on depleting the enemy’s resources and capabilities, creating chaos and ultimately eroding the nation’s capacity to resist,” Zaluzhnyi explains.

Why Ukraine can win this way

Ukraine’s advantages in attritional warfare are real but require strategic focus. The country has already demonstrated superior “tactical application and technological support” compared to Russia’s numerical advantages.

Ukrainian forces achieved decisive victories in 2022 using precision weapons like Javelin anti-tank missiles, HIMARS rocket systems, and Neptune anti-ship missiles that destroyed Russia’s Black Sea Fleet flagship.

But these successes came before electronic warfare created the current deadlock.

The next phase requires different tools. Autonomous drone swarms that can overwhelm air defenses. Cyber capabilities targeting Russian critical infrastructure. Most importantly, resilient systems that allow Ukraine to function while Russian infrastructure degrades.

“Large-scale attacks by autonomous swarms of cheap precision drones using entirely new navigation channels will destroy not only frontline personnel, weapons, and military equipment, but also the enemy’s critical economic and social infrastructure,” Zaluzhnyi predicts.

But if Ukraine builds proper resilience systems, this becomes a contest Ukraine can win.

The timeline factor

Zaluzhnyi’s analysis carries urgency. By 2027, technological advances will restore the possibility of massive conventional operations using “totally ruthless” autonomous weapons.

“Artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies continue to develop at a rapid pace,” he writes.

“For the first time ever, human involvement will be fully or partially removed not only from the process of control, but also from decision-making about target engagement.”

The window for building resilience systems and asymmetric capabilities is narrowing. But Ukraine has already demonstrated what’s possible. The challenge is scaling successful innovations while protecting the infrastructure that keeps the country functioning.

Help Ukraine win the war through developing technology, like Zaluzhnyi says: support the David vs. Goliath defense blog to support Ukrainian engineers who are creating innovative battlefield solutions and are inviting you to join us on the journey.

Our platform will showcase the Ukrainian defense tech underdogs who are Ukraine’s hope to win in the war against Russia, giving them the much-needed visibility to connect them with crucial expertise, funding, and international support. Together, we can give David the best fighting chance he has.

Join us in building this platform—become a Euromaidan Press Patron. As little as $5 monthly will boost strategic innovations that could succeed where traditional approaches have failed.

Western implications

Zaluzhnyi’s framework has implications beyond Ukraine. Most NATO countries couldn’t handle the scale of attacks Ukraine endures regularly. “In October alone, Ukraine faced over 2,000 air threats, including drones and missiles,” he noted recently. “Few NATO countries could counter such an onslaught without exhausting their air defense systems.”

Western militaries remain focused on expensive legacy systems that become vulnerable in massive conflicts. Meanwhile, the real military revolution is happening in cheap, scalable, autonomous systems that Ukraine pioneered out of necessity.

“Half of winning is knowing what it looks like,” Zaluzhnyi concludes, quoting military strategist Sean McFate. “Brains are more important than brute force.”

Ukraine’s path to victory lies not in outgunning Russia, but in out-thinking it. Building systems that can survive what’s coming while developing capabilities Russia can’t match.

The war of attrition isn’t something Ukraine must endure—it’s something Ukraine can win.

The Ukrainian capital has new rituals. At midnight, Kyiv moms drag their camping gear and babies to the nearest metro station, where they try to catch a few hours of Z’s while Russia pummels killer drones into apartment buildings all night. Others take the risk of the “bathroom shelter.“

The Iranian-designed Shahed drones whirr like lawnmowers but screech when diving on their final descent, too fast for missiles to intercept. Hiding behind two walls of the bathroom doesn’t guarantee survival if it’s a direct hit—your entire apartment will likely be vaporized.

While NATO countries study drone threats in war games, Ukraine is finding the answer to a riddle nobody has solved yet—how to counter swarms of cheap, mass-produced, deadly drones if the missiles needed to down them are ten times as expensive.

Russia says it will soon be launching up to 1,000 of these $35,000 Iranian-designed drones each night. They’ve gotten too upgraded to be shot down by gunfire, too high-flying for mobile air defenses. The West can’t produce enough interceptor missiles to match this volume, and even if they could, the cost would be prohibitive.

Is this the end of the war—will Russia terrorize Ukrainian civilians into accepting the Kremlin’s enslaving conditions?

How it feels

My bomb shelter is a bathroom floor

Not so fast, said President Zelenskyy in Rome last week. Ukrainian engineers have cracked something no NATO country has figured out: how to hunt these drones cheaply.

“We will shoot down everything. Scientists and engineers have found a solution. This is the key. We need finances. And we will raise it.”

Hours earlier, those same swarms had just finished a 10-hour bombardment of Kyiv with 400 drones and 18 missiles, leaving two people dead, 16 wounded, and apartment buildings burning across Ukraine’s capital.

Russia’s bureaucracy finally finds its groove

The pattern is consistent throughout the entire war. Ukraine is nimble with decentralized innovation. Russia’s bureaucracy moves slowly, but eventually overpowers with sheer numbers. Numbers of bodies thrown into the trenches. And now, numbers of Shaheds rammed into apartment buildings.

Putin called for 1.4 million drones annually in 2025—ten times Russia’s 2023 production. At the Alabuga facility in Tatarstan, Russia aims to build 6,000 drones by summer 2025 using Iranian blueprints and Western electronics that somehow keep trickling through sanctions.

The plan is working. Russia quintupled its Shahed campaign from 200 launches per week in September 2024 to over 1,000 weekly by March 2025. Experts warn Moscow could launch over 1,000 Shaheds daily by the end of 2025.

The upgraded Shaheds are nastier than the originals. Russian engineers reprogrammed them to approach at 2,800 meters altitude—beyond the reach of mobile air defenses—then dive at targets traveling 600 km/h while carrying 90-kilogram warheads, double the original payload.

Explore further

Shahed drones now dive like missiles—and Ukraine can’t shoot fast enough

Russian forces now target one or two cities at time instead of deploying 500 drones nationwide, flying at altitudes above 2km to stay out of reach of machine guns, Counteroffensive.Pro reported.

For months, the pendulum swung Russia’s way. Civilian casualties reached record levels—June 2025 alone saw 232 civilians killed and 1,343 wounded from drone attacks.

“Another night hunched over mobile phones in the dark,” reported Al Jazeera’s correspondent from Kyiv, describing how residents track incoming threats while “listening for that change in pitch that a Shahed engine makes when it goes into its terminal descent.”

What NATO discovered it couldn’t do

NATO has been trying to solve the same problem with typical Western approaches: expensive, complex systems designed by committee.

• The Pentagon’s most ambitious counter-swarm test in June 2024 successfully defended against up to 50 attacking drones using eight different weapon systems.
• The UK just tested radio frequency weapons against multiple drone targets simultaneously—but only at ranges up to one kilometer.

But when 400 Shaheds converge on Kyiv simultaneously from multiple axes, even a perfect grid of 1-kilometer defense bubbles would get overwhelmed by the sheer numbers attacking each sector at once. NATO’s September 2024 exercise showcased over 50 counter-drone technologies, yet Ukrainian officials who attended warned that defending European cities against drone swarms would be “near impossible.”

Ukrainian creativity strikes back

Then Ukrainian engineers did what they do best: find a cost-effective solution no Western country could crack.

The breakthrough came from Ukraine’s decentralized innovation ecosystem. Sixteen companies developed interceptor drones costing as little as $1,000 each—a fraction of Western missile costs. The budget Сhaika costs just 39,900 UAH ($950) on the Brave1 marketplace, while Sky Defenders’ ZigZag interceptor costs 128,000 UAH ($3,000), still dramatically cheaper than $430,000 IRIS-T missiles.

Ukrainian interceptors achieved a 70% kill rate against Shaheds in optimal conditions—nearly double the 35-40% success rate of traditional mobile fire groups using machine guns. Over 100 strike drones have been destroyed by Ukrainian interceptor drones as of March 2025.

The “Clean Sky” program intercepted 550 Russian drones during pilot testing, with one remarkable night operation destroying 33 enemy aircraft.

Three developers told Counteroffensive.Pro the minimum requirements:

• speed over 200 km/h (regular FPV flies at 120 km/h),
• ability to climb to 6 km altitude, terminal guidance systems,
• warheads between 600-1200 grams.

“The bigger the target, the bigger the warhead needed for more precise detonation. Because you can hit a wing, but it will only tear it off and not destroy the target itself,” Olha Bihun, CEO of Anvarix, told Counteroffensive.Pro.

Ukraine’s approach creates a budget version of Israel’s Iron Dome concept. Where Iron Dome uses $40,000-$100,000 interceptor missiles against cheap rockets, Ukraine deploys $1,000-$5,000 interceptor drones against $35,000 Shaheds. The economics look promising—but proving they work at scale remains the challenge.

Anti-Shahed strategy still a work in progress

But intercepting Shaheds isn’t like shooting down tanks with FPV drones.

Operator training takes six months, Taras Tymochko of the Come Back Alive Foundation told Counteroffensive.Pro, but Ukraine has very few training centers, forcing experienced units to spend time teaching new operators instead of focusing on interceptions.

The economics get messier under real combat conditions. While a single $2,000 interceptor against a $35,000 Shahed sounds like a winning trade, operators often need multiple attempts. Counteroffensive.Pro found that five interceptors are sometimes required to down one Shahed—suddenly that’s $10,000-$25,000 per successful intercept.

Operational challenges compound the complexity. Ukrainian electronic warfare systems meant to jam Shaheds also interfere with interceptor communications, creating coordination nightmares between different units with different equipment. Counteroffensive.Pro reported the average wait time for radar stations from Ukrainian producers reached 13 months, up from six months just half a year ago.

Weather remains a formidable enemy: rain and snow significantly degrade performance, with moisture damaging electronic components. Strong winds above 10 m/s affect flight stability, while cold temperatures reduce battery performance by up to 50%.

Current deployment covers only frontline regions and Kyiv, leaving major cities like Kharkiv, Odesa, and Zaporizhzhia vulnerable. Despite interceptor successes, civilian casualties continue mounting. Falling debris from successful intercepts creates additional casualties: a drone intercepted above Kyiv can still fall on an apartment building, killing those beneath.

Technology is Ukraine’s chance to win the war. This is why we’re launching the David vs. Goliath defense blog to support Ukrainian engineers who are creating innovative battlefield solutions and are inviting you to join us on the journey.

Our platform will showcase the Ukrainian defense tech underdogs who are Ukraine’s hope to win in the war against Russia, giving them the much-needed visibility to connect them with crucial expertise, funding, and international support. Together, we can give David the best fighting chance he has.

Join us in building this platform—become a Euromaidan Press Patron. As little as $5 monthly will boost strategic innovations that could succeed where traditional approaches have failed.

Ukraine pioneers asymmetric warfare solutions at global scale

Ukraine faces what no NATO country has solved: how to defend sleeping cities against hundreds of simultaneous drone attacks designed to terrorize civilians into political submission.

Russia’s nightly Shahed campaigns aren’t random terror. They’re a calculated military strategy to force Ukrainian mothers into metro stations with their babies, to exhaust entire populations, to break morale until Ukraine accepts Moscow’s political demands.

Every intercepted drone above Kyiv isn’t just a military victory; it’s a family that gets to sleep in their own bed.

Throughout Russia’s invasion, Ukraine keeps pulling this off: finding cheap and effective solutions that redefine how wars are fought:

• When Russia’s Black Sea Fleet dominated Ukrainian waters, Ukraine developed naval drones that forced the entire fleet to retreat from Sevastopol.
• While Western capitals worried about escalation, Ukraine trucked in dirt-cheap drones to destroy Russian bombers right in their bases in Operation Spiderweb.

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“Kill a navy for the price of a car”: Ukraine’s drones drove out Putin’s fleet from the Black Sea — then turned on his fighter jets

Now, with Shahed swarms, Ukraine is inventing the rules for hunting cheap attack drones with even cheaper interceptors.

NATO allies are watching closely. Iranian proxies are already copying Russian tactics. The technology being tested over Kyiv tonight could be protecting London, Berlin, or Washington tomorrow. Ukraine isn’t just defending itself; it’s developing the playbook for asymmetric drone warfare that every major city will eventually need.

Can Ukraine scale innovation faster than Russia scales terror?

The crucial test: can Ukraine’s decentralized creativity scale to match Russia’s industrial bureaucracy?

In 2024, Ukraine’s drone industry operated at only 37% capacity due to lack of government contracts. However, the recent $4 billion in G7 funding secured for interceptor manufacturing could turn that around.

Component shortages plague the industry. Defense Express noted that interceptor drones require expensive night vision cameras to catch Shaheds, which are typically launched in dark hours, driving up costs compared to regular FPV drones.

Russian forces adapted faster than Ukraine could scale defenses. New Shahed variants feature rear-facing cameras for evasion, programmed evasive maneuvers when detecting interceptors, and enhanced warheads carrying 90kg payloads. Russia launches dense formations of 10-15 drones simultaneously, mixing decoy drones with armed Shaheds to deplete defenses.

In previous cycles, Ukraine innovated, Russia adapted and scaled, forcing Ukraine to innovate again. But interceptor drones represent something different—a technology that demands both innovation and industrialization.

Can Ukrainian engineers prove they can master mass production too? The answer determines whether families in Ukraine sleep safely in their beds or pack camping gear for another night underground. Ukraine must win at Russia’s own game: turning clever ideas into industrial reality fast enough to counter a terror campaign designed to break civilian morale and force political submission.

Ukraine’s human rights commissioner Dmytro Lubinets claimed the United Nations had finally accused Russia of the Olenivka prison massacre that killed Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs). The problem? No such UN report exists.

Lubinets posted the news 30 June with obvious satisfaction. “Finally, things are called by their proper names!” he wrote, linking to what he said was a UN investigation proving Russia planned and executed the attack on the correctional colony.

Mysterious international center investigated Olenivka massacre

Journalists at Slidstvo.Info followed Lubinets’ link and found something odd. The source was the Centre for Human Rights in Armed Conflict—an organization that explicitly denies any UN connection. Right on their website: “We are not affiliated with the United Nations or any other intergovernmental or governmental organization.”

The website was created on 22 May 2025, and contains only the single investigation about Olenivka with no other publications or detailed organizational information.

“We conduct thorough investigations into violations of international human rights and humanitarian law during armed conflicts, with a current focus on Ukraine and Gaza, to help establish the truth and bring perpetrators to justice,” the organization’s description on the website states.

Who runs the Centre? Nobody knows. No headquarters, no leadership names, no country of operation listed.

When Slidstvo.Info contacted Lubinets’ office, his team quickly backtracked. “Unfortunately, the Ombudsman’s Secretariat did not conduct proper verification,” they admitted, removing the post and promising “enhanced control over published information.”

The Centre itself later confirmed none of its report authors worked for the UN. They described themselves as “international experts who prefer not to reveal their identities” operating without a permanent headquarters and claiming none of its experts are located in Ukraine or Russia.

UN finds Russia responsible, but avoids public blame

The incident highlights confusion surrounding the actual status of UN investigations into the July 2022 Olenivka attack. According to Associated Press reporting, an internal UN analysis does conclude that Russia was responsible for planning and carrying out the attack, but this 100-page document was never intended for public release and does not constitute an official UN accusation.

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AP: UN investigation finds Olenivka attack planned by Russia

The UN analysis examined 70 open-source images, 20 statements from Russian officials, 16 interviews with survivors broadcast on Russian television, and conducted detailed interviews with 55 released prisoners of war. The analysis determined the missile flew from east to west, contradicting Russian claims that Ukraine struck the facility with HIMARS missiles.

However, the UN dissolved its official investigation mission five months after the tragedy because Russia refused to guarantee expert safety. 

Can Ukraine get justice for Olenivka? Currently, only Ukrainian prosecutors are investigating. No active international probe exists among the tens of thousands of war crimes cases.

Meanwhile, the mysterious Centre for Human Rights in Armed Conflict says it plans to publish reports on civilian casualties in Mariupol and Ukrainian military deaths since the full-scale war began —though their credibility remains questionable after the Olenivka controversy.