Even as Zelensky and his European allies descended on Washington, I found myself still processing what we had witnessed just days earlier in Alaska, where Putin and Trump turned crisis into theater, and where Putin issued a seductive invitation to step "from yesterday into tomorrow."

Put aside memories, responsibility, and accountability, he suggested. Drift into business as usual.

Every summer, when news slows to a languid crawl, journalists trade a well-worn joke: just wait, August will deliver its crisis. This August, the crisis came packaged as theater: a spectacle in Alaska with Trump and Putin center stage, military helicopters overhead, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in his intentionally provocative "USSR" sweatshirt and a swarm of media chasing every move.

Putin basked in his return from international isolation. Trump beamed as he applauded him. As far as we know, they achieved nothing. The summit wrapped up with vague platitudes..

I felt anger swell inside me as I watched the spectacle. Not at Putin or Trump, who are expertly playing the roles they have chosen for themselves, but at the rest of us who keep letting them get away with it.

The Media's Unwilling Complicity

In coverage of the Alaska summit, report after report on US television referred to Ukraine as "the war that started in 2022," echoing a narrative that strips away years of conflict, occupation, and loss. What Putin and Trump are successfully inviting us to forget isn't just the past, but the throughline of consequences that have brought us to this moment.

Our recent investigation exposes the anatomy of how authoritarians manipulate not just history but living memory itself: how the tweaking of tiny details, the quiet adjustment of timelines or the reframing of a single moment can change the entire story.

For me, the story is deeply personal. In 2008, Vladimir Putin carried out his first invasion of a sovereign state: Georgia. I flew home to cover the war for the BBC, filing updates on Russian troop movements, statements from officials, and frontline reports.

But my reports, no matter how thorough, sat within the BBC's larger narrative of the Georgia war as a sudden, out-of-the-blue August crisis. This narrative completely ignored the reality that for those living it, the war was simply the latest catastrophic chapter in Russia's decades-long campaign of aggression.

This is the paradox of news: one of society's essential pillars, designed to inform, yet structurally unable to capture the very continuity that defines how people experience life. The pressures are real: audience attention spans, commercial demands, the sheer volume of breaking news, but the effect remains the same. It makes news media, even well-intentioned, ethical media, an unwilling accomplice to authoritarian manipulation.

The Architecture of Forgetting

All of us understand our lives in context: in relation to history, memory, and culture. For Palestinians, today's violence is inseparable from the Nakba of 1948, the catastrophe that started their displacement. For Ukrainians, the conflict didn't begin in 2022. For Georgians, the war was never just five days long. For the Sudanese, the current war isn't separate from decades of Darfur's trauma.

When the news machine reduces these stories to start dates and breaking news alerts, it strips them of crucial continuity. It is precisely in these interrupted threads, these gaps where collective memory should live, that authoritarians find their opportunity.

Authoritarians operate in the spaces left empty by our collective forgetting, reshaping narratives and bending truth to serve their aims.

"I'm looking around, looking for a homeland inside my homeland," says one woman in Masho's piece, capturing the alienation spreading across societies where people are forced to give up not only their land but also their stories and memories, their truth.

Masho Lomashvili's investigation, "Erasing August: How Russia Rewrites Georgia's Story," was supported by Coda's Bruno Investigative Fellowship. We are currently seeking applications for our 2025-2026 Bruno Fellow. Apply here.

A version of this piece was originally published in our Sunday Read newsletter. Sign up here to receive weekly deep dives into the patterns of power shaping our world.

The post The Alaska Spectacle and the War on Memory appeared first on Coda Story.

On August 7, 2008, Maguli Okropiridze, almost nine months pregnant, fled her village of Ergneti in the Georgian region of South Ossetia.

For Maguli, who had become used to a life lived in the backdrop of bullets and artillery shells, it took a week of heavy shelling to push her out of her home. She had finally decided to flee what was now a war zone. But the stress of evacuating herself and her four children sent her into labour. With just a quarter of an hour to go before midnight, in a hospital in the small nearby town of Gori, Maguli gave birth to a baby girl, Keto. 

Just two days later, on August 9, Russian planes began bombing Gori. Maguli, still dressed in a hospital gown, grabbed her newborn daughter and, without hesitation, jumped out of the second floor window. 

"Keto is as old as the war", Maguli told me. “Every year on her birthday, I first mourn and then I congratulate her”.

Like Maguli, many Georgians believe the war began on August 7, when Russian troops crossed into South Ossetia. In Moscow, the start of the war is said to be August 8, when Russian troops apparently responded to Georgia’s shelling of Tskhinvali, 30 kilometers from Gori and now the capital of disputed South Ossetia. But Maguli’s own government disagrees with her.

In the ruling party’s version of events, the Russo-Georgian war broke out on August 8, just as the Kremlin says. 

A day’s difference might seem minor, but it flips the script. It reverses the roles between victims and perpetrators. It changes how Georgians will describe the war to future generations. And it calls into question the national memory and, in part, Georgia’s national identity.

When I was 10-years-old, wondering why fighter jets were hovering in the skies above us, my grandmother told me that Russia had invaded Georgia and annexed 20% of the country. I’d stand behind her chair, as the women gathered in her kitchen would curse Russia between sips of tea. Many had sons who were on the front line. These women, whose words I absorbed, are now being told that it wasn’t Russia’s fault that their sons had to go into battle. Since 2012, when Georgian Dream came to power, the party has maintained that its predecessors brought the war upon themselves by provoking Vladimir Putin.

As recently as April this year, Georgia’s prime minister told a government-friendly TV station that the 2008 war was the fault of former president Mikheil Saakashvili, acting on orders issued by a shadowy, nefarious Western cabal. The Georgian government has authorized a public commission to investigate “the circumstances surrounding the start of the 2008 war in South Ossetia,” particularly the role of the former government, the party of war as Georgian Dream characterizes it, while referring to itself as the party of peace even as it has spent months brutally suppressing street protests since October last year.

My country is now effectively putting itself on trial, 17 years after suffering an invasion from a foreign force. 

Georgia, a tiny country in the Caucasus region, wedged between eastern Europe and western Asia, has always been at a crossroads. For centuries, its location along the Silk Road brought both prosperity and peril, with invaders chasing the same riches that trade delivered.

For the past 200 years, the invader has been Russia. And resistance against those invasions has formed a core part of Georgian identity. “For us, the field in which we have lived is non-traditional and foreign,” noted the Georgian philosopher Merab Mamardashvili. This, he added, “is the field of Russian power which took shape, let us say, around the 17th century and reached its culmination under Soviet rule. The main idea of this field is that the state stands above all, and the person is nothing more than a servant of the state and of the state’s idea.”

The stories of Russian conquests and local defiance show up in textbooks, films, and casual dinner conversation not just as historical events, but as a lens through which the present is understood.

For much of Georgian society, the effort to preserve the memory of Russia’s past aggressions is about staying alert to patterns and remembering the lessons that help us make sense of what it means to live next to a former colonial master that never truly left. In the words of the writer Grigol Robakidze, “no one has inflicted as much harm – moral and intellectual harm – as Russia has.” The Russians, he wrote, “once they came to Georgia, immediately reached into the very soul of the Georgian people and set about corrupting it, erasing its uniqueness.”

It is this antipathy and foundational mistrust that the current government of Georgia must contend with as it sets about rewriting the story of the 2008 Russo-Georgian war.

At 27, I have lived under the same government for nearly half my life. And every protest I’ve ever attended against this government (and there have been many) has, in some way, circled back to Russia. The Kremlin’s reach, most protestors agree, extends to the highest levels of the Georgian government.

Georgian Dream emerged in 2012 as an alternative to the pro-western Saakashvili’s increasingly authoritarian rule. It had momentum and money to spend. Founded and funded by the oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, who made his billions in Russia's post-Soviet maelstrom, the party promised citizens democracy, stability, and integration into the European Union and NATO. 

While many were wary of Ivanishvili’s intentions, given his background and ties to Russia, citizens were ready for change and his party emerged as the only viable option after absorbing much of the disjointed opposition.

The story of Ivanishvili’s authoritarian takeover is familiar across post-Soviet republics. A billionaire appears out of nowhere, cloaked in populist promises about creating wealth, stability, and in Ivanishvili’s case, giving away literal ‘free money’. He wins, and then begins to capture state institutions one by one. Only then does he reveal the long game – absolute power. By the time the public sees the full picture, the tools they might use to push back have already been taken away.

During its first term, and even for several years after, Georgian Dream largely maintained the appearance of a somewhat democratic, West-facing government. It was a necessary performance in a country where the overwhelming majority of citizens support Euro-Atlantic integration, and where openly pro-Russian politicians have had little to no chance of mainstream success.

My own doubts about Georgian Dream started around two years into its rule. I was 17, interning at a fact-checking organisation. It was 2015, the year when Russia’s ‘borderization’ policy was at its peak. 

Borderization was a euphemism for what was basically a land grab, the slow but inexorable expansion of Russian territory within Georgia. Russian forces, often in the middle of the night, would move fences or put up new “border” signs, inching the occupation line further into Georgia. Sometimes it was a few meters, sometimes more. Either way, people would lose access to their farmland, water, and sometimes wake up to a completely different reality, with their house now inside occupied territory, unable to access the ‘Georgian side’. 

One day, I was tasked to fact-check a quote from then-Defense Minister, Tina Khidasheli. She said: “20% of our country is occupied, and if Russians move the ‘border’ by two kilometers, it’s bad, but it’s also just a continuation of the same political line that has been happening in the country for a long time.”

I remember being baffled by this. For two reasons. First because she referred to the occupation line as a border. If you call the occupation line a border then you’re legitimizing it, you’re going along with Russia’s talking points. And second because she made it sound like moving the line by two kilometers was nothing, but try telling that to the people who went to bed in Georgia and woke up in Russia, or at least subject to Russia’s rules.. 

This was my first sign that the government was softening its stance on occupation. But folks older than me remember pro-Russian rhetoric surfacing even earlier.

For instance in 2013, Ivanishvili claimed Russia was not, in his view, an imperial nation interested in rebuilding its empire.  

“I don’t think and I don’t believe that Russia's strategy is to conquer and occupy the territories of neighboring countries. I don't believe that,” he told an interviewer and then went on to boast about his superior analytical skills. 

The same year, he spoke of forming an “investigative commission” on the causes and triggers of the 2008 war. In 2018, during the presidential election, the Georgian Dream-backed candidate, Salome Zurabishvili claimed that Georgia had started the 2008 war and even suggested the previous government may have struck a covert deal with Russia.

In the face of a swift backlash from the public, most Georgian Dream politicians either avoided commenting on the matter or distanced themselves from Zurabishvili’s remarks. Tea Tsulukiani, the Justice Minister at the time, even said: “Georgia’s position is singular and unchanged: it is the position we present in Strasbourg and at The Hague: that Russia started the war against Georgia.”

But in the years that followed, that “singular and unchanged” position would very much change.  

While the international community eventually understood Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia to be a dress rehearsal for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 – a connection the world failed to heed in 2014 – Tbilisi took the opposite tack. On the international stage, criticism of Russia was avoided, and Georgian officials blamed NATO’s eastern expansion for provoking Moscow into war. 

Back home, Georgian Dream doubled down on a worldview seemingly lifted straight from the Kremlin.

In this world, every critic, every opposition party, and every Western-backed NGO or media outlet was just another node in a vast international plot. Georgian Dream officials and affiliated media claimed that the entire opposition was controlled by Saakashvili and his party, the United National Movement, which took its orders from a “global war party”  run by elites in Brussels and Washington. 

The goal? To create a submissive regime in Georgia which would realize the elites’ covert plans to drag Georgia into war with Russia and open another front in a perpetual war against the Kremlin. On the civic front, these same Western elites were working to erase Georgian culture — to undermine the church and traditional values, and to advance a “liberal ideology” which includes “gay propaganda.” 

Georgian Dream, rather like Vladimir Putin does for the world at large, casts itself as the last line of defense in Georgia, a guardian of peace and sovereignty and traditional values. And for these reasons, they claim, the West, particularly the EU, wants them gone.

And while the phrase “global war party” originated in Russian propaganda, similar rhetoric is part of a wider, international authoritarian playbook. When Georgian Dream saw a familiar narrative about globalist elites gaining ground in Donald Trump’s America, it rebranded its “global war party” as the “deep state”.  Soon after, soundbites from U.S. politicians began appearing regularly in propaganda outlets.

In the run-up to the 2024 parliamentary elections, Georgian Dream’s central promise was peace with Russia. Fearmongering about war saturated the media landscape. And this is when the narrative turned once again to 2008.

Party officials said that the same Western cabal that had manipulated Saakashvili into war with Russia was at work again. Georgian Dream campaigned on prosecuting Saakashvili for his “well-planned treason”. Then, Bidzina Ivanishvili declared that Georgia should apologize for the war.

This story became central to the state-sanctioned version of recent history, one in which Russia was recast not as the aggressor, but as a misunderstood neighbor. And Saakashvili was not a flawed leader defeated in elections, but a Western puppet. And the 2008 war not as an invasion, but a provocation. 

Given the violently contested election results and rampant allegations of fraud, it’s hard to measure how effective Georgian Dream’s historical revisionism was. But in December 2024, a large part of Georgian society made its position clear: when Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze announced Georgia was halting its EU accession negotiations for four years, the response was immediate.

Outraged, Georgians flooded the streets demanding a reversal of the decision in what became the largest protests in the country’s modern history. 

The government responded with an unprecedented crackdown.

In just six months, the no longer independent courts passed reams of repressive laws, citizens were brutally beaten by police not only at the protests but also on their own doorsteps, and attacks on independent media and civil society organizations intensified. More than 60 political prisoners now face long jail terms, and at least eight prominent opposition politicians are already behind bars.

Yet, while the already tight authoritarian screws in Georgia have been further tightened, Ivanishvili has not yet engineered a full ideological takeover. The battle over Georgia’s minds and collective memory is still being fought. 

For more than 250 days, Georgians have been fighting to preserve their versions of the truth and for their visions of the country’s future. 

The view outside my windows in Tbilisi reflects that fight. In just the last year, the building in front of me now features a portrait of Maro Makashvili, a teenage nurse killed in the 1921 Soviet invasion of Georgia. A neighboring building features a mural of Giorgi Antsukhelidze, a Georgian soldier tortured by Russians during the 2008 war. And a third building features Georgian and Ukrainian flags.

This isn’t just a fight against authoritarianism for many of us. It’s the latest episode in a 200-year struggle against Russian imperialism and it’s a struggle for the rights of Georgians to write our past and, by extension, our future. 

As the 2008 war once again became a staple of daily conversations, I found myself drawn into discussions about assigning blame. What surprised me most was hearing even those who regularly protest against the government repeat Georgian Dream’s official talking points about the conflict.

It left me wondering if I was misremembering the war, or if there was an actual coordinated effort to rewrite the past. 

We tend to think of rewriting history as reinterpreting distant events, reworking details buried in time to fit a particular cultural or political moment. But what does it mean to reshape the memory of a war that nearly every Georgian remembers?

I set out to answer two questions: What really led to the 2008 war? And how deeply has Georgian Dream’s version influenced the national memory? I spoke to former government officials, international experts, and, most importantly, the people living along the occupation line – those still living with the war’s consequences day in and day out.

My first stop was Kirbali, a village notorious for being a focal point of Russia’s borderization policy, including the kidnapping of residents. Here, the occupation line is mostly invisible, there is no barbed wire, fence, or  natural boundary, it’s only marked by occasional signs, making it largely impossible to know where the line is actually located.  

This is deliberate. It sets up  Russia’s so-called “kidnapping” tactic—with Georgian citizens allegedly snatched from their land to sow fear among the population and pressure whole communities into abandoning their homes, clearing the way for borderization. 

In a village as small as Kirbali, outsiders don’t go unnoticed. As soon as I arrived, the police flagged my car. They asked about the purpose of my visit and insisted that a patrol vehicle accompany me wherever I went.

Authorities knew whom I spoke to and which homes I entered.

I started by heading to the central square. The first thing you see is a portrait of Tamaz Ginture that appears to float in the sky. He was shot and killed by Russian troops in 2023 while attempting to visit a local church. Right below the picture, people gather to chat and play dominoes or backgammon. But as soon as I mentioned the 2008 war, their openness vanished. Most refused to talk. Two men who were willing to speak simply parroted government propaganda.

After an hour, one man who had initially brushed me off quietly invited me to his home for a coffee.

“Everyone’s afraid to talk,” he told me as soon as we sat down. “You won’t get any answers out there.” His wife nodded in agreement, as she set the table.

He explained why: one of the men I’d spoken to in the square was a Georgian Dream coordinator. No one dares to contradict the party line when he’s around.

These “coordinators” are informal, sometimes semi-formal, representatives of Georgian Dream. They’re local operatives embedded in public institutions who help the party monitor communities, manage voter turnout, and shape opinion. In election season, they mobilize supporters. Outside of it, they track who says what.

The fear they instill is real, especially in rural and tight-knit communities. Speaking out can mean losing government benefits, being fired from a public-sector job, or, in some cases, facing physical threats.

That’s the setup in most villages. But in Kirbali, the constant police surveillance made it even harder to get people to chat, to reveal their thoughts or opinions. A patrol car followed my every step.

So I moved on to Ergneti – the first village Russians troops crossed when they entered undisputed Georgian territory. It’s also where a river overlaps with the occupation line, meaning fewer kidnappings and less police presence.

It gave me a little more space to listen and for others to speak.

https://youtu.be/f65lQvqQ2IU

Around much of the world, the 2008 Russo-Georgian war came to be known as the “five day war”, the fighting taking place from August 7 to August 12, when a ceasefire agreement was brokered by the French President Nicolas Sarkozy.

But in Georgia, people don’t often refer to the “five-day war”. Here, the war did not feel like it lasted only five days. All the chaos, death and suffering of war were not contained in just those five days.

While the term captures the war’s most intense phase, it flattens the reality on the ground. It erases the escalation that preceded August 7, and the devastation that continued after the ceasefire was signed – when Russian and Ossetian forces looted villages, set homes ablaze, and remained on uncontested Georgian territory for many more weeks.

For those living along the occupation line, the idea that the war lasted only five days is absurd. When they speak about the war, their timelines stretch far beyond a single week – and often, far beyond 2008. 

“We have been living with this war for 35 years now,” Nadika told me as she showed me the occupation line from her window. “Many first heard about guns being fired in 2008 and the first bomb was a shock. But that was nothing new for us,” she added. 

Nadika, now in her 50s, has spent her entire life in Ergneti, a village that borders Tskhinvali, the de facto South Ossetian capital. Today, Ergneti is eerily quiet. The closer you get to the occupation line, the more houses you see standing empty. Nadika and Maguli live in the strip closest to the line, their families among the few who remain. Ergneti has no shops or pharmacies, and many residents commute to Tbilisi for work. 

Only one bus runs twice a day, covering several villages on its way. It often starts full, with people sitting on makeshift chairs, but few passengers make it all the way to Ergenti where the last stop is right in front of the Georgian patrol post. Before the 2008 war, Ergneti was not a ghost town even though for Nadika, Maguli and other residents, gunfire and shelling were so frequent they became part of the day’s sounds, like a rooster crowing in the morning. It’s why Nadika doesn’t talk of 2008 alone, when she talks about the war. She traces it back to the Soviet Union’s collapse and the wave of violence that followed in its wake, culminating in the 1991 war between Georgian government forces and Russian-backed South Ossetian separatists.

Others trace it back even further. 

On the one bus that takes you to Ergneti, I met Tamara Kviginadze, a soft-spoken philologist in her 60s who grew up in Tskhinvali. She travels to Ergneti almost every week to visit the graves of her parents who wanted to be buried close to their hometown, Tskhinvali. 

For her, the war began in the beginning of the 19th century, when the Russian Empire first arrived in Georgia.

By the end of the 18th century, Georgia was a fractured land. In the west, minor kingdoms operated under heavy Ottoman influence. In the east, King Erekle II had recently managed to shake off Persian rule, taking advantage of a succession crisis in the Qajar dynasty. But he knew the peace wouldn’t last. With another Persian invasion looming, Erekle had few options. He sent appeals to Europe. No one answered. The only door left open was to the north. Russia, then expanding southward, presented itself as a Christian ally and protector. 

So, in 1783, Erekle II signed an agreement with Russia. Moscow promised to safeguard Georgia’s independence and territory. Georgia, in return, renounced any allegiance to Persia or the Ottoman Empire.

On paper, the deal seemed beneficial to Georgia but when the Persian army came marching, there were no Russian troops in sight. And when the smoke cleared, Russia came, not to help, but to annex. By 1801, Georgia was no longer sovereign.  

For the next two centuries, Georgia only managed to gain independence only once: in 1918, after the Russian Empire crumbled. Its independence lasted just three years.

That year, 1918, also marked the first outbreak of violent clashes between the Georgian army and separatists formations in the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 

After the February Revolution in Petrograd in 1917, which precipitated the end of the Romanovs, Ossetians and Abkhazians set up National Councils which advocated for the creation of organs of self-rule in Abkhazia and  Ossetian-inhabited areas. The councils in both regions, dominated by Bolshevik ideology, became deeply intertwined with Bolshevik forces inside Soviet Russia. 

For the Georgian authorities, these uprisings were viewed not as a fight for autonomy, but as a Soviet-backed attempt to destabilize the fragile new republic. The Georgian army eventually crushed the rebellion, but the violence left deep scars, fueling a legacy of mistrust and ethnic tension. The victory was also short-lived. In 1921, the Red Army invaded from the north and the country was forcibly absorbed into the newly forming Soviet Union. The promise of independence was snuffed out, replaced by 70 years of authoritarian rule, during which the roots of many future conflicts, including the war in 2008, took hold.

“The empire has one rule,” Tamara told me on the bus. “Divide, indoctrinate, rule. That’s it.” 

After the Soviet Union collapsed, Georgia’s first decade of independence was defined by economic ruin, crumbling institutions, and civil war in the streets of Tbilisi. A newly independent nation was rejecting its former master and looking towards the West for protection. 

In Abkhazia, separatists emboldened by Moscow started calling for independence. In South Ossetia, the goal was unification with Russia. “By the late ‘80s,” Tamara told me, “you could feel it changing – when it came to politics, we were divided.” She recalls Ossetian militias appearing in Tskhinvali around 1988. 

In Tbilisi, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, a former Soviet dissident, came to power. As demands for autonomy grew, so did his nationalistic rhetoric. By 1990, in Tskhinvali, ethnic tensions were rising. Tamara’s family now slept with their suitcases packed. 

“They started marking Georgian houses with a Z – just like in Ukraine now,” she told me as she recalled her encounter with a young Ossetian boy who came to her with a warning: “He told me that he was at the base and overheard a conversation about which Georgian families were in line to be terrorized.” Seal the windows, Molotovs are coming, he said and left.

Soon, South Ossetia declared independence, Gamsakhurdia responded by revoking its autonomy. A year-long war followed. Over 1,000 people lost their lives and tens of thousands were displaced, including Tamara’s family who are still unable to go back to their home. 

Abkhazia saw even more devastation. The separatists captured Sukhumi in 1993. The war left 10,000 dead and over 250,000 Georgians ethnically cleansed – one of the largest population displacements in the post-Soviet space.

Just like in 1921, the support for separatist movements came from Russia but this time, it played the roles of both arsonist and firefighter: arming separatists, providing air support, and deploying irregular fighters who would later become a staple in Russia’s foreign wars, all while offering to broker peace.

By the end of 1990s, Georgia ended up with two breakaway regions, and Russian peacekeepers on the ground. 

Meanwhile in Tbilisi, a political transformation was underway. In 2003, mass protests – known as the Rose Revolution – toppled the old regime and brought Mikheil Saakashvili to power. Young and U.S.-educated, Saakashvili was a reformer with a clear message: Georgia would no longer orbit Moscow. Instead, it would pursue modernization, with EU and NATO membership as the ultimate goal.

Russia hit back. It banned key Georgian exports, cut gas supplies, and illegally deported thousands of Georgian migrant workers. On the ground, it expanded support for the separatist regimes, quietly increased its military presence under the cover of peacekeeping and issued Russian passports to their populations, a move that would later enable Moscow to claim protection of Russian citizens as a pretext to invade Georgia. 

In 2007, Vladimir Putin stood before an audience of Western leaders in Munich and delivered what many thought was a theatrical outburst. He railed against U.S. hegemony, accused NATO of encroachment, and warned that a unipolar world was unacceptable. The speech was blunt – but few in the West took it seriously. Instead, it was viewed as a nostalgic rant from a former KGB man still mourning the Soviet collapse.

But the Kremlin wasn’t bluffing. The Munich speech was a statement of intent. And the West’s underestimation turned out to be a strategic miscalculation.

By mid-2008, Russia was in a position of unusual strength. Oil prices were soaring. European states – particularly Germany, France, and Italy – were deeply entangled in energy deals with Gazprom. 

In Washington, George W. Bush’s presidency was limping to an end. His foreign policy legacy – Iraq, Afghanistan – had sapped both credibility and political capital. Barack Obama, still a candidate, was already talking about a “reset” with Russia. The West wasn’t ready for a confrontation, and Moscow knew it.

While the Baltic states and some Eastern Europeans were sounding alarms about Russian aggression, Western Europe remained fixated on maintaining business as usual.

Russia, though imperfect, was still seen as a partner – a regional power with whom the West could reason, negotiate, and, when needed, do business. Against that backdrop, Georgia’s young, Westward-looking president was easier to caricature. Saakashvili’s warnings of further Russian aggression were brushed off as alarmism.

So when war broke out in August 2008, that pre-existing perception – a stable, reactive Russia versus a hot-headed, unpredictable Georgia – shaped how the story was told. Western media fixated on the question of who fired the first shot, not who had laid the groundwork or moved troops into another sovereign country. And Western leaders, unwilling to jeopardize fragile ties with Moscow, leaned into the narrative that Georgia bore at least partial blame.

This mindset shaped the “Tagliavini Report”, the EU’s official post-mortem on the war written by a team led by Swiss diplomat Heidi Tagliavini and published in September 2009, just over a year after the war. While the document acknowledged years of escalating provocations, Russia’s disproportionate use of force, and the presence of the Russian army in Georgia  prior to August 8, it also placed significant responsibility on Tbilisi for launching the first full-scale military assault on Tskhinvali. It was a legal framing that ignored the broader political climate – in which Russia had been undermining Georgian sovereignty through proxy forces, passportization, and military buildup for years.

The result was a narrative that satisfied diplomatic caution: both sides bore blame, so the West wouldn’t have to choose. And by the time Russian troops settled into new military bases deep in Georgia’s breakaway regions, the world had already moved on. Obama went on to push the ‘reset’ button, while EU countries continued selling military equipment to Russia, some of which would later appear on the frontlines in Ukraine. 

Subsequent reporting and analysis would complicate that picture with Western analysts later publishing satellite images that appeared to support Georgia’s timeline, showing large Russian convoys already moving through the South Ossetian mountains on August 7. But first impressions are hard to shake. For many outside observers, the image of Georgia shelling a breakaway capital – regardless of the context – became the war’s defining moment. That framing, cemented in early news coverage and echoed by the Tagliavini report, continued to shape international opinion.

The international view of the 2008 war shifted only after 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea and backed separatists in eastern Ukraine. Suddenly, Georgia was seen less as an isolated case and more as a test run. Yet even this re-examination was half-hearted. It wasn’t until Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 that the implications of Russia’s actions in 2008 became impossible to soft pedal.

Governments that had once blamed both sides for the Georgia war now spoke of “patterns”. Think tanks drew direct lines from the Roki Tunnel to the Donbas. Many experts in the West now saw 2008 as the opening move in a long campaign of revanchist warfare. But while the international community was re-contextualizing 2008 as the beginning of something larger, Georgia’s own government was trying to prove otherwise. Georgian Dream has organized what they call a “Nuremberg trial” in Georgia that will show that it was the previous government, in other words the Georgian state, which bears primary responsibility for starting the war.

For hours on live TV, retired generals and ex-officials have been grilled on minute details, on exact locations, timelines, on who participated in what meeting. Each session was packed with people spewing dense detail about military plans and discussion inside the corridors of Georgian power at the time. The questions being asked appeared laced with accusation and insinuation. The aim seemed to be to lay the blame squarely on Saakashvili and his allies, while also absolving the military of guilt. 

Several politicians who refused to attend the hearings have been arrested.  

For now, it seems the government's efforts are already paying off. On what is now the 17th anniversary of the war, people remember those five days in starkly different ways, shaped not just by their lived experience but by competing narratives. 

Nadika remembers the shelling and the chaos. But her memories are laced with suspicion. She’s come to believe that the war was staged; part of a plot by Saakashvili’s government. “They were bought off,” she says. “From the very first day, they were on TV boasting about how the army took this village or that one.” She thinks Georgia provoked Russia, maybe even invited the invasion. “Why did the commanders run?” she asks me, citing a conspiracy theory that is not rooted in any evidence. More recently, she’s begun echoing another popular Georgian Dream line: that the West once again tried to pull Georgia into another war in Ukraine. “They were pushing for a second front,” she says. “Even Ukrainians were calling on us to join.”

But not everyone in Ergneti buys into that version. Maguli, who gave birth during the bombardment, says she has no loyalty to Saakashvili, but she remembers who shelled her town. “I’m not a supporter of this government or the previous one,” she says. “But I had to jump out of a hospital window with my hours-old baby while the town was being shelled. And I’m still the one to blame?” She wants peace but not historical revision. “I can’t go along with people rewriting history,”she tells me, adding that she’s been trying to bring together historians, researchers, and neighbors to revisit what really happened.

Tamara, meanwhile, outright rejects the notion that Georgia could have started the war. “How can we be the ones to start a war on our own land, while bombs are falling and the [Russian] army is invading?” she asks, incredulous. She remembers, she tells me, what she saw, what she witnessed happen – bombs going off and Russian soldiers crossing into Georgia on August 7. 

Three women. Three versions of the same war. Three memories shaped by where they lived, what they lost, and increasingly what they’ve been told happened. Their stories show how even recent history can splinter under the weight of competing truths. Their stories show how collective memory can be pulled in competing directions by politics, fear, and the calculated reconstruction of events long after the bombs stop falling.

Authoritarian leaders have long understood the power of history. It is by recasting the past that authoritarians reinforce their hold on the present and even the future. 

While the details of stories differ, the playbook is often the same: simplify the past, claim things were once great until the bad people ruined it. For Georgian Dream, it is the previous government that brought the 2008 war with Russia to Georgia. But its narrative has the effect of blaming Georgia as a whole for poking the bear.

I spoke to the American historian, Timothy Snyder, who has long warned of the authoritarian tenor and tone of Donald Trump’s presidency. Referring to Georgian Dream’s version of the 2008 war, he said: “The problem with the story is that Georgia is not really the subject. The story is about how Russia is innocent and how poor Russia was provoked by Georgia. This is not a native authoritarian phenomenon, but a foreign one being reproduced as a native story.” 

So how does this story benefit Georgian Dream? The most common explanation is that they are using their version of the past to discredit local rivals and prolong their rule. If Russia is rational and only violent when provoked, then Saakashvili’s government appears irrational, reckless, and responsible for the war. And remember, in Georgian Dream’s political rhetoric, all opposition to it is affiliated with Saakashvili. 

But it’s hard to believe that this is the entirety of Georgian Dream’s intent. To me, the larger goal seems to be dismantling anti-Russia sentiment in Georgia – a goal that’s reflected in other attempts at rewriting history.

Take, for example, the ruling party’s adoption of a new political icon: the 18th-century king, Erekle II who signed a treaty with Russia that effectively led to Georgia’s subjugation. 

Since 2022, Erekle’s name has been intrinsic to Georgian Dream’s slogans. And a statue of Erekle II is set to rise on the Kakheti Highway, near the headquarters of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Erekle is being celebrated as a symbol of pragmatism, a savior of Georgian Christianity, and proof that alignment with Moscow is Georgia’s historic path. But Georgian Dram ignores Erekle’s pro-European efforts, until he felt he had little choice but to turn to Russia for protection from Persia, and Russia’s betrayal of that very treaty. 

Another example is the rewriting of the April 9 tragedy in 1989, when Soviet troops violently suppressed a peaceful Georgian protest, killing 21 people. This year, the government’s official statement replaced the word “Russia” with “foreign power,” the term officials often use for the West. Putin’s Russia, the argument seems to be, must not be conflated with the Soviet Union.

But why might some Georgians go along with the idea that we started the war?

Because memory is fragile. Every time we recall the past, we reshape it, filter it through what we’ve heard, what we’ve lost, and what we choose to believe. Repeated messages from those in power can overwrite what we thought we knew. Even if it’s victim-blaming on a national scale. “No one, no serious future historian is ever going to contest that Russia invaded Georgia, or Ukraine,” Snyder told me. “But if you can make it hard for people to say basic truths, because you have another big narrative in the mix, then you make it hard for people to recognize one another.” 

Tamara, whom I met on the bus to Ergneti, said something about this collapse of shared reality that continues to haunt me: “This is truly the feeling I have, that I’m walking around looking for a homeland inside my homeland. I need help because I feel lost.”

The post Erasing August: How Russia Rewrites Georgia’s Story appeared first on Coda Story.

In September, the International Criminal Court will conduct a confirmation of charges hearing against warlord Joseph Kony. Leader of the once notorious rebel group Lord’s Resistance Army and the subject of ICC warrants dating back two decades, Kony is still at large, still evading arrest.

Thirteen years ago, a group of American do-gooders tried to do something about this. 

The NGO Invisible Children published a 30-minute YouTube video with high hopes. With their film ‘Kony 2012’, they sought to stop the Lord’s Resistance Army, which had kidnapped, killed and brought misery to families across several Central African nations since the late 1980s. The video opens with our blue orb home spinning in outer space as the director reminds us of our place in time. “Right now, there are more people on Facebook than there were on the planet 200 years ago,” he says. “Humanity's greatest desire is to belong and connect, and now, we see each other. We hear each other. We share what we love. And this connection is changing the way the world works.” In other words,  the technology of connection will solve this problem.

Despite the uber virality of the film,100 million plus views nearly overnight, Kony remains a free man, though much more infamous, and his victims didn’t get all the help they needed. The campaign seemed to embody slacktivism at its most poisonous: the high hope that you can change the world from your sofa.

“Hope,” Gloria Steinem once wrote, “is a very unruly emotion.” Steinem was writing about US politics in the Nixon era but the observation holds. Hope is at the core of how many of us think about the future. Do we have hope? That’s good. It’s bad if we have the opposite – despair, or even cynicism. 

Former CNN international correspondent, Arwa Damon knows this unruly quality of hope firsthand. For years she worked as a journalist in conflict zones. Now she helps kids injured by war through her charity called INARA. She discussed this work last month at ZEG Fest, Coda’s annual storytelling festival in Tbilisi. In war, Damon has seen how combatants toy with hope, holding out the possibility of more aid, less fighting only to undermine these visions of a better tomorrow. This way, she says they snuff out resistance. This way they win. 

In seeing this, and in surviving her own close calls, Damon told the Zeg attendees, she realized she didn’t need hope to motivate her. “Fuck hope,” she said to surprised laughter. 

So what motivates her to keep going? “Moral obligation,” she said. After everything she has seen, she simply cannot live with herself if she doesn’t help.  She doesn’t need to hope for an end to wars to help those injured by them now. In fact, such a hope might make her job harder because she’d have to deal with the despair when this hope gets dashed, as it will again and again. She can’t stop wars, but she can, and does, help the kids on the front lines. 

Most of us haven’t crawled through sewers to reach besieged Syrian cities or sat with children in Iraq recovering from vicious attacks. And most of us don’t spend our days marshalling aid convoys into war zones. But we see those scenes on our phones, in near real time. And many of us feel unsure what to do with that knowledge because most of us would like to do something about these horrors. How do we deal with this complex emotional reality? Especially since, even if we are not in a physical war zone, the information environment is packed with people fighting to control the narratives. In this moment of information overload and gargantuan problems, could clinging onto hope be doing us more harm than good? 

Emotion researchers like Dr. Marc Brackett will tell you that instead of thinking of emotions as good or bad, we can think of them as signals about ourselves and the world around us. And we could also think about them as behaviors in the real world. Dr. Brackett, who founded and runs the Center for Emotional Intelligence at Yale, said hope involves problem solving and planning. Think about exercising, which you might do because you hope to improve your body. In those cases hope could prove a useful motivator. “The people who only have hope but not a plan only really have despair,” Dr. Brackett explained “because hope doesn't result in an outcome.”  

Developing a workout plan seems doable. Developing a plan to capture a warlord or stop kids from suffering in wars is a good deal more complex. The 2010s internet gave us slacktivism and Kony 2012, which seems quaint compared to the 2020s internet with its doom scrolling, wars in Ukraine and Gaza and much more misery broadcast in real time. What should we do with this information? With this knowledge? 

Small wonder people tune out, or in our journalism jargon, practice news avoidance. But opting out of news doesn’t even provide a respite. Unless you’ve meticulously pruned your social media ecosystem, the wails of children, the worries about climate change, the looming threats of economic disruption or killer machines, those all can quickly crowd out whatever dopamine you got from that video of puppy taking its first wobbly steps. But paradoxically, the pursuit of feeling good, might actually be part of the problem of hope. 

I took these questions about hope to Dr. Lisa Feldman Barrett, an acclaimed psychologist and neuroscientist. She too talked less about our brains and more about our behaviors. The author of, among other things, How Emotions are Made, Dr. Barrett noted that we might experience hope in the moment as pleasant or energizing and it helps with creating an emotional regulation narrative. Meaning: we can endure difficulty in the present because we believe tomorrow we will feel better, it will get better. However, Barrett said hope alone as a motivator “might not be as resistant to the slings and arrows of life.” If you assume things will get better, and then they don’t, how do you keep going? 

“I think people misunderstand what's happening under the hood when you're feeling miserable,” she added. “Lots of times feel unpleasant not because they're wrong but because they're hard.”

I told Dr. Barrett about Damon’s belief that she keeps going because of moral obligation and she again looked at the emotional through the behavioral. “There is one way to think about moral responsibility as something different than hope,” she said, “but if hope is a discipline and you're doing something to make the parts of the world different you could call it the discipline of hope.” This could be a more durable motivation, she suggested, than one merely chasing a pleasant sensation that tomorrow will be better.  “My point is that, if your motivation is to feel good, whatever it is you are doing, your motivation will wane.”

After ‘Kony 2012’ shot to astonishing success, in terms of views, the creators raised tens of millions of dollars but achieved little on the ground – an early lesson in the limits of clicktivism. Once upon a time American do-gooders hoped they’d help Ugandan children simply by making a warlord infamous, now the viralness of  Kony 2012 feels like a window into a cringey past, a graveyard of hopes dashed. But maybe we just grew up. Maybe our present time and this information environment full of noise and warring parties asks more of us. Maybe hope has a place but among a whole emotional palate of motivations instead of a central pillar keeping us moving forward. Because let’s be honest: we may never get there.  Hope, as the experts told me, doesn’t work without a plan. And, raising hopes, especially grand ones like changing global events from your smartphone, only to have them dashed can actually prompt people to disengage, to despair maybe, or even to embrace cynicism so they don’t have to go through the difficult discipline of hope and potential disappointment.  

One day, during the start of the pandemic, when my home doubled as my office, I got a piece of professional advice I’ve held tight. A therapist who works with ER doctors shared with a group of us journalists that when we work on tasks that seem never ending, burnout is more likely. To prevent it, he advised that we right-size the problem. Put down the work from time to time, celebrate our achievements (especially in tough times), develop rituals and build out perspective to nourish us as we keep doing the work.

The pandemic ended but we bear the scars and warily look out at a horizon full of looming troubles, most of them way outside the control of any one of us. Both Dr. Marc Brackett and Dr. Lisa Feldman Barrett reminded me: emotions are complex and humans aren’t motivated by just one thing. But no matter what mountain we want to climb we would all do well to adopt this conception of hope as a discipline rather than just a feeling. Because in this environment, there’s always someone on the other side betting we’ll give up in despair.

A version of this story was published in last week’s Sunday Read newsletter. Sign up here.

The post The Danger of Hope appeared first on Coda Story.

Recent events in the South Caucasus show how the authoritarian playbook is exported and adapted to suit local contexts. From Armenia’s clergy allegedly plotting coups, to Azerbaijan raiding Russian state-funded media offices as retribution, to Georgia’s mass arrests of opposition leaders, the region revealed how authoritarianism and resistance to it adapts and spreads through digital-age tactics.

The three nations of the South Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, have long occupied a place of strategic and symbolic importance for Russia. The region is a vital transit corridor linking Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, making it a coveted prize for energy routes and geopolitical influence. For Moscow, the South Caucasus has always been more than a neighboring periphery, it is an enduring obsession. And perhaps more so now, as Russia’s position in the Middle East has weakened following setbacks in Syria and its diminished sway in Iran. Today, the Kremlin’s desire to assert control in the South Caucasus is as strong as ever. Yet in each of these three countries, Moscow’s efforts to shape events and narratives are meeting unprecedented resistance. The divergent responses—ranging from defiance to accommodation—highlight how the authoritarian playbook is being adapted, contested, and exported across the region.

So what constitutes this playbook? Legal weaponization through foreign agent laws, criminalization of dissent with disproportionate penalties, systematic impunity for state violence, economic warfare against independent media, and international narrative manipulation. Below are three examples:

Armenia: Hybrid war and the Kremlin’s shadow

Armenia, once Moscow’s closest ally in the South Caucasus, has openly expressed disillusion with years of Russian inaction during regional crises. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan now warns of “hybrid actions and hybrid war” from Russian circles, without directly blaming the Kremlin, while the EU and France step in to support his decision to jail clergymen in defence of Armenian democracy. The clerics were accused of plotting a coup. Fingers were also pointed at Russian-Armenian businessman Samvel Karapetyan, the alleged orchestrator. It was, in one analyst’s words. Moscow’s “Ivanishvili 2.0 operation”, a reference to Bidzina Ivanishvili, the billionaire founder and de facto leader of Georgian Dream, Georgia’s ruling party since 2012. Georgian Dream, under Ivanishvili, has steered Georgia in an increasingly illiberal and pro-Russian direction. But for a couple of years now, the Armenian government has been gradually distancing itself from Russia, hedging its bets rather than relying on Moscow to guarantee security. In the aftermath of the alleged coup attempt, Armenia’s Foreign Minister bluntly told Russian officials that they “must treat Armenia’s sovereignty with great respect and never again allow themselves to interfere in our internal affairs.” Pashinyan has of late made conciliatory gestures towards both of Armenia’s arch-rivals, Azerbaijan and Turkey. The loss of Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan — while Russian peacekeepers stood by — largely drove Armenia toward European integration as an existential necessity. Armenia's experience with alleged coup plot, and its possible Russian backing, shows how the playbook adapts to different political contexts, exploiting religious institutions and diaspora networks to destabilize governments that drift from Moscow's orbit.

Azerbaijan: Asserting independence, testing the edges 

The raid on Russian state media offices in Baku last  week sent an unmistakable message about the limits of Moscow’s influence in the region. The targeting of Sputnik journalists came after violent police action in Russia in which two Azerbaijani nationals were killed, an incident Baku condemned as ethnically motivated. For years, Azerbaijan has been systematically moving out of Moscow’s orbit, growing closer to Turkey and unafraid to assert itself in disputes with Russia. The arrests of Russian journalists represent more than bilateral tensions; they signal how even traditionally Moscow-aligned states now calculate that defying Russia carries fewer costs than submission. Russia’s response — summoning the Azerbaijani ambassador and protesting the “dismantling of bilateral relations” — revealed Moscow’s diminished leverage. Azerbaijan’s confidence stems from military victories in Nagorno-Karabakh, increased energy exports to Europe, and strategic ties with Turkey that provide alternatives to a subservient partnership with Russia. Azerbaijan's bold move illustrates another dimension of the regional dynamic: how countries with strong alternative partnerships can successfully resist Russian pressure tactics, even when those tactics include media warfare and diplomatic intimidation.

Georgia: The authoritarian laboratory 

Georgia presents the starkest illustration of both the Kremlin’s enduring shadow and the systematic deployment of authoritarian tactics. The ruling Georgian Dream party has implemented what Transparency International calls a “full-scale authoritarian offensive,” with eight opposition figures jailed in just a single week. The crackdown follows months of mass protests against the foreign agent law — a carbon copy of Russian legislation designed to crush civil society. Among those arrested is Nika Gvaramia, the former head of the country’s leading opposition TV channel, who spent a year in prison, received the Committee to Protect Journalists’ International Press Freedom Award, and emerged to found his own political party. Now Gvaramia faces another eight-month sentence plus a two-year ban from holding office, an example of how the repressive state systematically eliminates viable opposition while maintaining a veneer of legal process. 

The foreign agent law itself has become a remarkably successful Russian export — a tool used from Nicaragua to Egypt to stigmatize independent civil society as “trojan horses” serving foreign interests. In Georgia, the law forces organizations receiving over 20% foreign funding to register as entities “pursuing the interests of a foreign power,” enabling harsh monitoring requirements and the systematic isolation of critics.

Since Russia pioneered the foreign agent model in 2012, it has been adopted by countries including Nicaragua, where it has been used to shut down over 3,000 civil society organizations, and Hungary, where officials explicitly cited the US FARA law as justification when facing international criticism. The model's appeal to authoritarian leaders lies in its appearance of legitimacy — claiming to mirror democratic precedents while systematically dismantling civil society. The chilling effect extends beyond legal restrictions.

Physical attacks on journalists have become routine, with not a single perpetrator facing accountability. Instead, the state's message is unmistakable: challenge us, and you will pay. According to the 2025 World Press Freedom Index, economic pressure has become a critical threat to media freedom globally, with the economic indicator hitting an “unprecedented, critical low” of 44.1 points — Georgia exemplifies this trend through its systematic economic warfare against independent outlets.

Mzia’s story 

The story  of one Georgian journalist Mzia Amaghlobeli, founder of two independent newsrooms Batumelebi and Netgazeti, is a textbook case of how modern authoritarianism operates through seemingly proportional responses to manufactured crises. 

Amaglobeli was taken into custody for placing a solidarity sticker reading “Georgia goes on strike” and subsequently slapping Police Chief Irakli Dgebuadze after hours of degrading treatment, including watching colleagues being beaten by police. 

Amaglobeli was arrested for assaulting a police officer, but many suspect her journalism was the real target. The charges against Amaglobeli — from “distorting a building’s appearance” for the removable sticker to “attacking an officer” — could mean seven years in prison. Evidence has been manipulated, timelines don’t match, and the authorities’ narrative shifts with each wave of international criticism. During detention, she was subjected to degrading treatment — insulted, spat upon, and denied access to water and toilets.

“It’s not only her being on trial, it’s independent media being on trial in Georgia,” said Irma Dimitradze, Amaghlobeli’s colleague who is now leading the global campaign to free her. She was speaking at Coda’s annual ZEG Fest along with Jodie Ginsberg, CEO of the Committee to Protect Journalists; human rights barrister Caoilfhionn Gallagher, and Nobel laureate and co-founder of Rappler Maria Ressa. All three argued that the systematic nature of the persecution of Amaglobeli reveals the broader strategy that’s similar the world over. Her case demonstrates how authoritarian systems create conditions where any human response to injustice becomes criminal evidence. 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fy8ir5ZG-iw&ab_channel=ZEGStorytellingFestival

As Caoilfhionn Gallagher put it: “You are not dealing here with a rule of law compliant system... there’s a whole series of absolutely farcical things which have happened in this case so far. The criminal investigation was headed by the officer who was the alleged victim. I mean these are…you couldn’t make this stuff up, really... it is clear that in Georgia you are not going to get a fair trial. She hasn’t had due process yet and really what's going to make the difference here is ensuring that the world is watching and that there's a proper international strategy.”

After a 38-day hunger strike, Amaglobeli remains defiant, standing for hours in court, refusing to sit, determined to show she cannot be broken. Her symbolic gesture of holding up Ressa’s book, “How to Stand Up to a Dictator”, during court appearances has become an icon of resistance. 

“We know,” said Ressa, “that journalism around the world is under attack.” With 72% of the world’s population living under authoritarian rule, added Ressa, “the time to protect our rights is now.” Gallagher spoke about the “power of international solidarity,” how what authoritarians fear is “journalism with a purpose, with an editorial line which is designed to undermine the false narratives and the gaslighting on a grand scale.”

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The post Resisting the Authoritarian Playbook in the South Caucasus appeared first on Coda Story.

When I think back to my time growing up in the 1980s and ‘90s in a small authoritarian Eastern European state bordering Greece, Turkey, Romania and the Black Sea, one scene always springs to mind: arriving at my high school in Sofia, the capital of Bulgaria, early in the morning to find a queue of sleepy students dutifully waiting to be let in. The girls were in their regulation “prestilka" – a dark blue apron with round white collar, incomparably unflattering and now reminiscent of something from “The Handmaid’s Tale”. The queue had formed because the staff were conducting a spot check on our appearance. Joining the end of the queue, I felt an undercurrent of anxiety. Would I be reprimanded today? What for?

 Living in an authoritarian state is a performative juggling act, an act of camouflage, of deflection, of concealing your true preferences, opinions and thoughts. Blending in, rendering yourself invisible increases your odds of leading a functional life.

Since Donald Trump returned to the White House, watching from London where I now live, I find myself reminded of the self-censoring and isolationist culture of 1980s Bulgaria. Every time I ask friends in the U.S. how they are doing, I receive remarkably familiar, self-distancing responses. “I’m trying to steer clear of all the information,” says one. “I guess I’m going insular and trying to focus on my family and what I can control,” says another. “I can’t cope with the news”, says a third. “I know that sticking our heads in the sand is not helpful,” a fourth one tells me, “but I feel helpless and scared and I’m not sure what I can do. Call it self-preservation.”

And there it is. The antibiotic-resistant superbug I and everyone around me grew up with. I sense it. Smell it. Feel it. Fear.

At my school in Sofia, no one was spared from scrutiny. For girls, three conformity boxes had to be ticked: aprons not too short; nails not too long or painted; hairstyles deemed neat and, if you were particularly unlucky, unceremoniously, publicly checked to be certified free of nits. If the staff decided you had failed on any of these parameters, you were reprimanded. Too many of these and you would find yourself with a reduced mark for “behaviour” at the end of term. If you graduated from school with a less than “excellent” behaviour mark, you could not apply to university, even if you’d achieved the highest possible academic grades. A short apron, fancy nails, messy hair or a smart mouth could cost you your future.

I have always been one to talk back. An ambassador’s daughter who grew up in Bulgaria, Switzerland, Afghanistan and Ethiopia before being accepted into the only English-teaching selective high school in Sofia at the age of 14, I insisted on speaking my mind at every opportunity. It was a bad, even dangerous habit. Freedom of speech in any shape or form was not a concept anyone dared entertain. The periods of terror in the late 1940s and ‘50s had made sure of that, though at the time I knew nothing about them. The terror and multiple purges were a state secret, undiscussed in books and not a topic for even private conversations. Their legacy was an atmosphere of inherited fear and mute obedience.

In hindsight, I realize that what I struggled with most at school was the uniformity of thought and the unwillingness to question the status quo that the teachers demanded from us. The rules were understood, without being explicitly written down – “never talk politics, even with friends and extended family”; “never be heard criticising Todor Zhivkov,” Bulgaria’s leader from 1954 until his eventual removal from office in 1989. There was always a certain distance between people. What we said at home, mild as it was, could not be repeated outside, which meant always being guarded around others. And that is exactly how the ruling Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) wanted it.

With sorrow, I see now that my American friends, who grew up on the progressive side of the iron curtain, suddenly have much more in common with me than we ever imagined we would. It is hard to comprehend that the United States of America -- that most coveted destination for young Bulgarians who dreamed of basking in unrestrained freedom, self-made wealth and the coolest pop, rap and grunge music scenes of the 1990s – could be clamping down on self-expression in the 21st century. 

Like me, Americans now know what it is to feel an insidious fear of the state. To experience that ever-present fear of punishment and retribution, a fear that incessantly obstructs and eventually destroys social cohesion. A fear that is evidently penetrating deep within the ranks of even the Republican party. Lisa Murkowski, a longtime Republican senator from Alaska, recently made a startling public admission: “We are all afraid,” she confessed at a conference in Anchorage. A courageous statement that reflects the mood of the nation. A national poll from the Institute of Politics at Harvard Kennedy School conducted among 2,096 18 to 29 year-olds between the 54th and 66th day of Trump’s second term revealed astonishing levels of fear among young Americans across gender and education status. Six in 10 of those surveyed, whether college-educated or not, admitted to being fearful for the future of America.

In Bulgaria, the trust in those around you, which is the social glue in every society, was stripped away, destroyed through the repeated post-1945 purges. Like Musk’s DOGE purges of the federal government across multiple sectors, these had eliminated or rendered destitute thousands of “bourgeois”, police and civil servants, military personnel, workers and anyone who opposed the ruling party. Informants were encouraged, not unlike Trump’s administration threatening government workers to either report DEI initiatives within their departments or face the “consequences”.

The news of immigrants being deported to El Salvador despite having no criminal records, as well as the recent disappearance of a Venezuelan legal immigrant who had been detained in Texas reminded me of Bulgaria’s Belene labor camp, an island on the Danube whose existence I only learned about long after the communist regime was gone. Thousands of people targeted by the regime were marooned there over the decades, sometimes disappearing altogether, never to be seen again.

Fear of the state affects everything, every relationship. I know, because in my adolescent years it even crept into my relationship with my late father. The son of ethnic Bulgarian refugees from Greece, who had settled in a small southern Bulgarian town in the early 1900s, my father finished his professional career as an ambassador, which placed our family within the small minority of privileged Bulgarians allowed to travel abroad.

Like all those in governmental or high-profile jobs, my father was a member of the BCP. But he was also a compassionate man who truly believed in the ideals of equality and social justice. Unlike many others, he did not use his status to profiteer, taking pride instead in the integrity reflected in our two-bedroom apartment, which I shared with my parents and sister. My parents had no holiday villas, no second flat, and none of the other substantive material possessions typically enjoyed by the nomenklatura.

Kind though he was by nature, my father could be uncharacteristically hard on me. He was particularly critical of my outspokenness and worked hard to tame it during my teens. For years, I took his harsh words at face value and felt somewhat deficient. At the turn of the century, I became one of the hundreds of thousands of young Bulgarians who left Bulgaria to move to the West – the land of freedom, democracy and self-expression. I transformed my deeply instilled feeling of deficiency into hard work and determination to succeed in the most libertarian city of all - London.  I explored unfamiliar ways in which humanity was celebrated in the U.K., including practicing critical and creative thinking, and attending gigs and personal growth courses to name a few. Following a ruptured marriage, I even embarked on personal therapy, which was and perhaps still is a somewhat foreign concept in Bulgaria.  

In therapy I frequently explored the wound that my father’s judgements had inflicted on me, along with my distorted relationship with power, control and visibility derived from the regime with which I grew up. For some time I blamed the patriarchy for my father’s harshness towards my younger self. After all, feisty girls and women have never been in fashion anywhere, at any time.

It was only recently that it dawned on me that this was far from being the whole story. My father wasn’t just conditioned by patriarchy but by authoritarianism too. What he had feared above all was that my desire to name things as they were, to say it as I saw it, would endanger my future in a country that demanded unquestioning loyalty, obedience and conformism. He had been trying to protect me. I was surprised I hadn’t made the connection earlier. As the authoritarian regime in Bulgaria fell at the end of 1989, so did my father’s harsh stance towards my way of expressing myself. He softened dramatically, encouraged me to study, to develop professionally, and travel, his natural kindness coming to the fore as he got older.

Since Trump returned to power in January, many journalists, columnists, political pundits and academics have been stunned by the speed and brutality with which he has grabbed American society by the scruff of the neck and is marching it head down towards what some call authoritarianism, others autocracy, competitive authoritarianism, oligarchy,  patrimonialism, kleptocracy or more pejoratively kakistocracy. Whatever the exact version of the oppressive regime Trump is thundering towards or will be allowed to settle on, the one thing he is already circulating is the currency of fear – the currency in which all authoritarian regimes trade.

To succeed, repression requires submission. What more efficient way to achieve it at national scale than by instilling widespread fear of loss of income, status and freedom, and personal reprisal? In the words of the prominent Bulgarian political commentator Ivan Krastev: “Make people fear the future and democratic institutions are paralysed.” Once fear sets in, the boundaries that protect us from the state’s all-encompassing control can completely crumble.

In authoritarian Bulgaria the state held sway over how you looked, what you learned, and how you behaved, all with a view to ensuring that you complied with the party’s need for a surrender of individual agency. My friends and I still lived our teenage lives, fell in love, slacked on homework and had fun, but we, and our parents, were always looking over our shoulders.

To avoid the danger of any form of organised resistance or independent thinking, extracurricular clubs, beyond the odd choir or orchestra, did not exist in our high schools. Art and music and critical thinking were not part of the curriculum. What was mandatory, however, was introductory military education (IME) in which students were taught how to handle a Kalashnikov.

Reading through the journals I kept between the ages of 16 and 18 has revealed many of the tensions I held deep inside. Amidst the predictable descriptions of my relationships’ peaks and troughs, I discovered much yearning for freedom and longing for resistance and courage. I also discovered fear, humiliation and disempowerment - the polar opposites of freedom and courage. The humiliation and disempowerment did not belong to my generation, but had been inherited, creeping into my worldview through the buried experiences of those before me. My 1989 journal was peppered with quotes from books I had read, alluding to freedom and courage or fear and cowardice:

 “If I am fear-struck and sensible enough

And yet I still die

Do not look for bullets in my skull.

Do not look for a knife in my belly.

Do not look for potassium cyanide in my blood.

Pay attention to my knees.

If you find scars from crawling –this was my death.”

[my translation]

I had copied this from the 1962 poem “The Real Death” by Stefan Tsanev. 

A Bulgarian saying warning against resistance also found its way into the pages of my journal: “Many ahead of their time have been forced to wait for it in very uncomfortable places.” Another Tsanev quote also warns of the cost of rebellion: “The murdered quietly lay under the pedestals, the murderers stood on the pedestals.” But I also copied down a Bulgarian saying condemning the meek acceptance of one’s fate: “Like a bomb hidden in your pocket, silence is dangerous.”

In recent years I have been pondering the damage that Bulgaria’s almost half-century of authoritarianism (preceded by centuries of enslavement under the Ottoman empire) has caused subsequent generations. The three greatest barriers to societal and individual flourishment I have identified are these: the inherited terror of visibility, passed down through the generations, that perpetuates self-repression; the severed trust in institutions and each other which makes democracy permanently volatile; and the underdeveloped ability to ask each other meaningful questions for fear of “prying”, which is a prerequisite for intimacy and social cohesion. Sometimes I close my eyes and fantasise about where Eastern European societies might be if they hadn’t inherited authoritarianism’s straitjacket.

And then I turn my gaze to the U.S. in the hope that this traditionally free society can avoid this crushing straitjacket, no matter how bad things seem now. Having grown up in a regime which institutionalised voicelessness, I find myself in imaginary dialogue with all Americans, and my friends in particular, pleading with all those who understandably feel fearful, worried and consequently apathetic not to mute their voices just yet.

Having lived through authoritarianism with its controlled planned economy, I remain optimistic that the US, the oldest democracy functioning within a free economy, is well placed to resist the Trump administration’s brisk march towards authoritarianism. This would require more individuals, whether CEOs, academics, lawyers, business owners, news journalists, ordinary Americans or any other civil society actors, to be brave and to choose to resist (overtly or covertly), despite feeling fear. In fact, robust research of over 300 violent and nonviolent campaigns from 1900 to 2006 which resulted in government overthrow or territorial liberation shows that a successful campaign for political change requires a remarkably small proportion of the population: just 3.5 percent. In the US this would still amount to over 11 million people mobilising.

It’s been rewarding to witness the power of the free market economy and the voice of the consumer in action in the United States. They have already made a difference by punishing Elon Musk’s Tesla for his widely damaging leadership of DOGE. Market analysts have recently concluded that the 71% year-on-year drop in Tesla profits has been driven at least in part by Musk’s role in the White House, causing a branding crisis for Tesla. Consequently, he will be curtailing his role in DOGE which is exactly what those giving up their Teslas or Tesla orders wanted. This development could have never happened in any planned economy, like the one in Bulgaria during the second part of the 20th century. I hope this news serves as a strong impetus for ordinary Americans who deem themselves powerless to take a stand. For example, what better way to resist than supporting the free press by donating/subscribing to news outlets or to non-profit organisations like CPJ and ICFJ whose mission is to protect press freedom and the truth. In an act of defiance, Sheryl Crow not only publicly discarded her Tesla but also chose to donate to NPR who have been continuously attacked by Trump’s administration.

Under deep state surveillance, you learn not to ask questions or share much about yourself as a way of staying safe. Now I consider it a joyful expression of a free existence to ask questions.

In hindsight I realise that what helped my parents to not profiteer from the corrupt communist system was having moral clarity and actively choosing to act with integrity. In the current context this means choosing whether to be a Harvard or a Columbia University, a Murkowski or a silent Democrat or Republican senator. For remaining neutral is choosing a side, the enabler’s side. The anti-democratic assault Trump is inflicting on American society cannot survive without the apathy of every citizen who chooses to remain silent. To feel more resolute I remind myself of Martin Luther King Jr.’s wise words that “our lives begin to end the day we become silent about things that matter.”  

One of the most efficient ways in which authoritarianism in Bulgaria managed to maintain obedience was through destroying the existence of small communities. Those who were afraid, worried, or anxious lacked not only town halls to turn to but also local communities where they could just speak to one another. We had no way of finding out what the true preferences of those around us were because we did not meet regularly in bigger groups. So to me, the single most defiant and joy-inducing action an American citizen could take would be to create or participate in activities that strengthen social cohesion at the local level. Whether it’s joining local community social events, choirs, sports activities, arts or other clubs, participation strengthens the social glue that keeps democracy alive at a grassroots level and has the potential to weaken false narratives and government control.

Whenever I went back to Bulgaria during my first decade of living abroad, I was often surprised by how few questions everyone asked each other. At times I felt frustrated and was judgemental, rolling my eyes every time I heard someone admitting to not having asked an important question for fear of being deemed nosy. I had mistaken this underdeveloped skill to ask questions for a lack of interest in those around them. Until one day I realised that this too had been a legacy of authoritarian times. Sharing or finding out the “wrong information” in an era of deep state surveillance could cost you your freedom. You therefore learned not to ask questions or share much about yourself as a way of keeping yourself and your family safe. This insight ignited my passion for deep conversations. Now I consider it a joyful expression of a free existence to ask profound questions. In times of a heightened threat of authoritarianism, asking deeper questions is a way of truly understanding yourself and connecting with those around you. Practicing the art of conversation is a defiance of authoritarianism.

Being creative, producing any form of art (and yes, everyone is intrinsically creative!) and supporting arts institutions is another powerful form of resistance against authoritarianism. To keep us subservient, my generation of Bulgarians were deprived of the opportunity to express themselves creatively throughout high-school education. This came at a high cost to us all, the cost of believing that being creative was the preserve of the lucky few.  By its very definition, creativity resists conformity and repression while neuroscience tells us that creativity is also an antidote to anxiety. Embracing our creativity is a way of maintaining a free spirit.

The lack of freedom of speech in authoritarian Bulgaria was reflected in the news media being reduced to a propaganda machine. Its sole role was to legitimise those in power every day and in every way. For this reason, I feel a twinge of sadness every time I hear my friends anywhere in the world voicing their temptation to completely switch off from the news. Knowing the truth is not a given, but a consequence of tenacious and hard-fought journalism operating in a functioning democracy. Turning away from the news is exactly what authoritarian leaders like Trump want us to do because it enables them to act without restraint. While I understand the need to limit the consumption of breaking news as a way of protecting our mental health, I know too well how profoundly discomfiting a world with no truthful news can be. Not switching off the news is perhaps the most subtle yet powerful way to defy authoritarianism.

Like many around me, I too sometimes find it challenging not to feel defeatist and to remain hopeful for the future of my children. When such moments descend on me I take solace in their transience and, more importantly, in history. I look back and remind myself that no dictator, tyrant or autocrat has ever irreversibly crushed the human spirit or won the long-term battle for a better world and greater justice.

The post How to find your voice when you are being silenced appeared first on Coda Story.

In early April, I found myself in the breathtaking Chiesa di San Francesco al Prato in Perugia, Italy talking about men who are on a mission to achieve immortality.

As sunlight filtered through glass onto worn stone walls, Cambridge Analytica whistleblower Christopher Wylie recounted a dinner with a Silicon Valley mogul who believes drinking his son's blood will help him live forever.

"We've got it wrong," Bryan Johnson told Chris. "God didn't create us. We're going to create God and then we're going to merge with him."

This wasn't hyperbole. It's the worldview taking root among tech elites who have the power, wealth, and unbounded ambition to shape our collective future.

Working on “Captured: The Secret Behind Silicon Valley's AI Takeover” podcast, which we presented in that church in Perugia, we realized we weren't just investigating technology – we were documenting a fundamentalist movement with all the trappings of prophecy, salvation, and eternal life. And yet, talking about it from the stage to my colleagues in Perugia, I felt, for a second at least, like a conspiracy theorist. Discussing blood-drinking tech moguls and godlike ambitions in a journalism conference felt jarring, even inappropriate. I felt, instinctively, that not everyone was willing to hear what our reporting had uncovered. The truth is, these ideas aren’t fringe at all – they are the root of the new power structures shaping our reality.

“Stop being so polite,” Chris Wylie urged the audience, challenging journalists to confront the cultish drive for transcendence, the quasi-religious fervor animating tech’s most powerful figures. 

We've ignored this story, in part at least, because the journalism industry had chosen to be “friends” with Big Tech, accepting platform funding, entering into “partnerships,” and treating tech companies as potential saviors instead of recognizing the fundamental incompatibility between their business models and the requirements of a healthy information ecosystem, which is as essential to journalism as air is to humanity.

In effect, journalism has been complicit in its own capture. That complicity has blunted our ability to fulfil journalism's most basic societal function: holding power to account.

As tech billionaires have emerged as some of the most powerful actors on the global stage, our industry—so eager to believe in their promises—has struggled to confront them with the same rigor and independence we once reserved for governments, oligarchs, or other corporate powers.

This tension surfaced most clearly during a panel at the festival when I challenged Alan Rusbridger, former editor-in-chief of “The Guardian” and current Meta Oversight Board member, about resigning in light of Meta's abandonment of fact-checking. His response echoed our previous exchanges: board membership, he maintains, allows him to influence individual cases despite the troubling broader direction.

This defense exposes the fundamental trap of institutional capture. Meta has systematically recruited respected journalists, human rights defenders, and academics to well-paid positions on its Oversight Board, lending it a veneer of credibility. When board members like Rusbridger justify their participation through "minor victories," they ignore how their presence legitimizes a business model fundamentally incompatible with the public interest.

What once felt like slow erosion now feels like a landslide, accelerated by broligarchs who claim to champion free speech while their algorithms amplify authoritarians.

Imagine a climate activist serving on an Exxon-established climate change oversight board, tasked with reviewing a handful of complaints while Exxon continues to pour billions into fossil fuel expansion and climate denial. 

Meta's oversight board provides cover for a platform whose design and priorities fundamentally undermine our shared reality. The "public square" - a space for listening and conversation that the internet once promised to nurture but is now helping to destroy - isn't merely a metaphor, it's the essential infrastructure of justice and open society.

Trump's renewed attacks on the press, the abrupt withdrawal of U.S. funding for independent media around the world, platform complicity in spreading disinformation, and the normalization of hostility toward journalists have stripped away any illusions about where we stand. What once felt like slow erosion now feels like a landslide, accelerated by broligarchs who claim to champion free speech while their algorithms amplify authoritarians.

The Luxury of Neutrality

If there is one upside to the dire state of the world, it’s that the fog has lifted. In Perugia, the new sense of clarity was palpable. Unlike last year, when so many drifted into resignation, the mood this time was one of resolve. The stakes were higher, the threats more visible, and everywhere I looked, people were not just lamenting what had been lost – they were plotting and preparing to defend what matters most.

One unintended casualty of this new clarity is the old concept of journalistic objectivity. For decades, objectivity was held up as the gold standard of our profession – a shield against accusations of bias. But as attacks on the media intensify and the very act of journalism becomes increasingly criminalized and demonized around the world, it’s clear that objectivity was always a luxury, available only to a privileged few. For many who have long worked under threat – neutrality was never an option. Now, as the ground shifts beneath all of us, their experience and strategies for survival have become essential lessons for the entire field.

That was the spirit animating our “Am I Black Enough?” panel in Perugia, which brought together three extraordinary Black American media leaders, with me as moderator.

“I come out of the Black media tradition whose origins were in activism,” said Sara Lomax, co-founder of URL Media and head of WURD, Philadelphia’s oldest Black talk radio station. She reminded us that the first Black newspaper in America was founded in 1827 - decades before emancipation - to advocate for the humanity of people who were still legally considered property.

Karen McMullen, festival director of Urbanworld, spoke to the exhaustion and perseverance that define the Black American experience: “We would like to think that we could rest on the successes that our parents and ancestors have made towards equality, but we can’t. So we’re exhausted but we will prevail.”

And as veteran journalist and head of the Maynard Institute Martin Reynolds put it, “Black struggle is a struggle to help all. What’s good for us tends to be good for all. We want fair housing, we want education, we want to be treated with respect.”

Near the end of our session, an audience member challenged my role as a white moderator on a panel about Black experiences. This moment crystallized how the boundaries we draw around our identities can both protect and divide us. It also highlighted exactly why we had organized the panel in the first place: to remind us that the tools of survival and resistance forged by those long excluded from "objectivity" are now essential for everyone facing the erosion of old certainties.

The Power of Protected Spaces

If there’s one lesson from those who have always lived on the frontlines and who never had the luxury of neutrality – it’s that survival depends on carving out spaces where your story, your truth, and your community can endure, even when the world outside is hostile.

That idea crystallized for me one night in Perugia, when during a dinner with colleagues battered by layoffs, lawsuits, and threats far graver than those I face, someone suggested we play a game: “What gives you hope?” When it was my turn, I found myself talking about finding hope in spaces where freedom lives on. Spaces that can always be found, no matter how dire the circumstances. 

I mentioned my parents, dissidents in the Soviet Union, for whom the kitchen was a sanctuary for forbidden conversations. And Georgia, my homeland – a place that has preserved its identity through centuries of invasion because its people fought, time and again, for the right to write their own story. Even now, as protesters fill the streets to defend the same values my parents once whispered about in the kitchen, their resilience is a reminder that survival depends on protecting the spaces where you can say who you are.

But there’s a catch: to protect the spaces where you can say who you are, you first have to know what you stand for – and who stands with you. Is it the tech bros who dream of living forever, conquering Mars, and who rush to turn their backs on diversity and equity at the first opportunity? Or is it those who have stood by the values of human dignity and justice, who have fought for the right to be heard and to belong, even when the world tried to silence them? 

As we went around the table, each of us sharing what gave us hope, one of our dinner companions, a Turkish lawyer, offered a metaphor in response to my point about the need to protect spaces. “In climate science,” she said, “they talk about protected areas – patches of land set aside so that life can survive when the ecosystem around it collapses. They don’t stop the storms, but they give something vital a chance to endure, adapt, and, when the time is right, regenerate.”

That's what we need now: protected areas for uncomfortable truths and complexity. Not just newsrooms, but dinner tables, group chats, classrooms, gatherings that foster unlikely alliances - anywhere we can still speak honestly, listen deeply, and dare to imagine.

More storms will come. More authoritarians will rise. Populist strongmen and broligarchs will keep fragmenting our shared reality.

But if history has taught us anything – from Soviet kitchens to Black newspapers founded in the shadow of slavery - it’s that carefully guarded spaces where stories and collective memory are kept alive have always been the seedbeds of change.

When we nurture these sanctuaries of complex truth against all odds, we aren't just surviving. We're quietly cultivating the future we wish to see.

And in times like these, that's not just hope - it's a blueprint for renewal.

The post The capture of journalism and the illusion of objectivity appeared first on Coda Story.

Last week, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky spoke to right wing influencer Ben Shapiro, founder of "The Daily Wire". The interview showed how much stock Zelensky puts in speaking to a MAGA and Republican audience. It is with this audience that Zelensky has little credibility and Ukraine little sympathy, as Donald Trump calls for a quick peace deal, even if it means Ukraine ceding vast swathes of territory to the Russian aggressor. Zelensky needs Shapiro to combat conservative apathy about the fate of Ukraine, and combat its admiration and respect for Putin as a supposed bastion of traditional values and religious belief. 

Two questions into the interview, Shapiro confronts Zelensky with a conservative talking point. Is Ukraine persecuting members of the Russian Orthodox Church? It is a view that is frequently aired in Christian conservative circles in the United States. Just two months ago, Tucker Carlson interviewed Robert Amsterdam, a lawyer representing the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Amsterdam alleged that USAID, or some other U.S. government-sponsored organization, created an alternative orthodox church "that would be completely free of what they viewed as the dangerous Putin influence." This, Amsterdam said, is a violation of the U.S. commitment to religious freedom. Trump-supporting talking heads have frequently described Ukraine as killing Christians, while Vladimir Putin is described as a defender of traditional Christian values.

On April 22, Putin met with the Patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church and Patriarch Kirill, his Russian counterpart. The Serbian Patriarch told the Russian president that when he met with the Patriarch of Jerusalem, the latter said "we, the Orthodox, have one trump card... Vladimir Putin." It was the Serbian Orthodox Church's desire, the Patriarch said, that "if there is a new geopolitical division, we should be... in the Russian world." It is Orthodoxy's perceived political, rather than purely spiritual, link to Russia that the Ukrainian parliament was hoping to sever in August last year by passing legislation to ban religious groups with links to Moscow.

The Russian orthodox church, which is almost fully under Kremlin’s control, is one of Moscow’s most potent tools for interfering in the domestic affairs of post-Soviet countries. Its ties to Russian intelligence are well-documented and run deep. Patriarch Kirill, head of the Russian Orthodox Church, spent the 1970s spying for the KGB in Switzerland. Today, he blesses Russian weapons and soldiers before they’re deployed to Ukraine.

While Christian conservatives in the U.S. accuse Ukraine of violating religious freedoms and "killing" Christians, Zelensky says that it is, in fact, Russian forces that are persecuting Ukrainian Christians. On Easter, Zelensky said 67 clergymen had been "killed or tortured by Russian occupiers" and over 600 Christian religious sites destroyed. I spoke to the Emmy-winning journalist Simon Ostrovsky who said Russia targets Christian denominations.

"If we're talking about an evangelical church," he told me, "then the members of the church will be accused of being American spies. And if we're talking about the Ukrainian Catholic Church, they'll consider it to be a Nazi Church.” But, Ostrovsky added, "Russians have been able to communicate a lot more effectively than Ukraine, particularly to the right in the United States. Russia has been able to. make the case that it is in fact the Ukrainians who are suppressing freedom of religion in Ukraine and not the Russians, which is absurd."

Back in 2013, Pat Buchanan, an influential commentator and former Reagan staffer, asked if Putin was "one of us." That is, a U.S.-style conservative taking up arms in the "culture war for mankind's future". It is a perception Putin has successfully exploited, able to position himself as the lone bulwark against Western and "globalist" decadence. Now with Trump in the White House, propelled there by Christian conservative support, which has stayed steadfastly loyal to the president even as other conservatives question policies such as tariffs and deportations without due process. With the Christian right as Trump's chief constituency, how can he negotiate with Putin free of their natural affinity for the president not just of Russia but arguably traditional Christianity?

The battle over religious freedom in Ukraine is not just a local concern – it’s a global information war, where narratives crafted in Moscow find eager amplifiers among U.S. Christian conservatives. By painting Ukraine as a persecutor of Christians and positioning Russia as the last defender of “traditional values,” the Kremlin has successfully exported its cultural propaganda to the West. This has already had real-world consequences: shaping U.S. policy debates, undermining support for Ukraine, and helping authoritarian leaders forge alliances across borders. The case of Ukraine shows how religious identity can be weaponized as a tool of soft power, blurring the line between faith and geopolitics, and revealing how easily domestic debates can be hijacked for foreign influence. In a world where the persecutors pose as the persecuted, understanding how narratives are manipulated is essential to defending both democracy and genuine religious freedom.

A version of this story was published in this week’s Coda Currents newsletter. Sign up here.

The post The Christian right’s persecution complex appeared first on Coda Story.

Victor Orbán wants to adopt a zebra. Reading about the Hungarian Prime Minister's bizarre request to become a “symbolic ‘adoptive parent’” of a zoo zebra, I had a feeling of déjà vu. Another oligarch, Bidzina Ivanishvili, who lives in a glass castle overlooking my hometown Tbilisi, is also obsessed with zebras. To be fair, he has a whole private menagerie. "Lemurs roamed free in my yard like cats," Ivanishvili once boasted to journalists. He's even taken selected reporters to meet his zebras. I never managed to get on that list.

These seemingly eccentric obsessions with exotic animals reveal a fundamental truth about how power itself works. The zebra collection isn't merely decorative – it's emblematic of a system where the arbitrary whims of the powerful become reality, where resources that could serve many are instead directed toward personal indulgence. Orbán admires Ivanishvili's Georgian Dream party, which has steered the country away from EU integration. Trump openly praises Orbán. These men create a web of mutual admiration, exchanging not just tactics but symbols and sometimes even PR consultants – as we learned when Israeli media revealed that Benjamin Netanyahu’s advisers had orchestrated a covert campaign to counter negative discourse around Qatar. Those same advisers were also tasked with cleaning up Serbian president Aleksandar Vučić's public image.

Years ago as a BBC correspondent in Central Asia, I remember staring with bemusement at a massive golden statue in Turkmenistan of the former president, Saparmurat Niyazov, the self-styled ‘Turkmenbashi’, the ‘father of all Turkmen’. The statue rotated to always face the sun. We journalists used to dismiss it as the eccentricity of a dictator in a little-known corner of the world. These weren't mere quirks, though, but  early warning signs of an authoritarian pattern that would spread globally.

Last weekend, we gathered voices who have witnessed authoritarianism's rise across continents for our event "The Playbook." Their unanimous observation: the patterns emerging in America mirror what they've already witnessed elsewhere.

Nobel laureate Maria Ressa, who has faced multiple criminal charges and arrest warrants in the Philippines for her journalism, described her own sense of déjà vu watching events unfold in the United States. Democracy dies not in one blow but through "death by a thousand cuts"—media capture, then academic institutions, then NGOs, until the entire society bleeds out, Ressa warned.

Bill Browder, the architect of the Magnitsky Act that holds Russian leaders to account for human rights violations – which he lobbied for after his lawyer Sergei Magnitsky was murdered in Russian custody – mapped how Vladimir Putin perfected symbolic terrorization through selective targeting. He saw this pattern being repeated in the U.S.: "This attack on law firms, as an example, going after Covington & Burling, Perkins Coie, and Paul Weiss... what's the message to every law firm in America? Don't go after the government." He pointed to judges facing impeachment threats and green card holders being threatened with deportation as classic examples of the Putin playbook unfolding in America – striking fear into entire sectors through selective prosecution.

Many audience questions focused on resistance strategies, with particular frustration directed at the Democratic Party's seeming inability to mount an effective opposition. "Why are they so quiet about this?" Armando Iannucci asked, voicing a common concern about the lack of a coordinated response.

Yet Browder managed to see a bright side in America's chaotic, decentralized resistance: "The Putin model is to find the leader of the opposition and then destroy them," he noted. "But if you don't have a leader and resistance comes from everywhere, there's no way to stop it." He pointed to student-led protests in Serbia and Georgia, where grassroots movements without central leadership proved remarkably resilient.

Few know more about resistance than anti-apartheid era South African activist Kumi Naidoo, who served as head of both Greenpeace and Amnesty International. While he offered practical resistance strategies, Naidoo also emphasized something crucial: "We have demonized people who do not agree with us," he cautioned. "We cannot move forward in this moment where we find ourselves unless we consciously build bridges to the people that are not with us." This doesn't mean compromising on principles, but rather understanding the genuine concerns that drive people to support authoritarian figures.

"The worst disease in the world that we face,” Naidoo said, “is not HIV/AIDS or cancer or influenza—it's a disease we can call affluenza." This pathological obsession with wealth accumulation creates the perfect environment for would-be dictators, as ordinary people mistakenly see oligarchs not as threats to democracy but as aspirational figures. The zebra-collecting billionaire becomes someone to admire rather than fear.

Every speaker at our event expressed a haunting familiarity with America's unfolding crisis – they've all seen this movie before, even though no one, right now, can possibly predict how it ends. Iannucci, creator of “The Death of Stalin” and “Veep – so, someone who has, literally, written the script – said the current reality might put him out of the job. How do you parody something already so absurd? 

“Trump,” he said, “is a self-basting satirist in that he is his own entertainment." Still, Iannucci underscored why humor remains vital in dark times: "Dictators and autocrats hate jokes because laughter is spontaneous, and they hate the idea of a spontaneous reaction that they have no control over."

Far from mere entertainment, Iannucci argued that storytelling itself becomes essential resistance. He challenged us to move beyond speaking only to those who already agree with us: "We must tell authentic stories which are rooted in reality. And understand that to stand a chance to get through this moment we're in, we have to invest equally on the objective side as well as the subjective side."

As authoritarians build their global networks of mutual admiration, from private zoos to public policy, the countering networks of resistance become all the more crucial.

Maria Ressa's powerful assertion that "when it is a battle for facts, journalism becomes activism" particularly resonated with me. As a journalist, I've been trained in objectivity and balance. Yet we now face a moment where the foundations of free thought that my profession relies on are themselves under direct assault. This isn't about choosing political sides – it's about recognizing when factual reality itself is being deliberately undermined as a strategy of control.

I also found myself enthusiastically agreeing with Kumi Naidoo who emphasized that we must genuinely listen to those who support authoritarian figures, not to validate harmful policies but to understand the legitimate grievances that fuel support for them. From Manila to Moscow to Washington, the pattern is clear but not inevitable. The script is familiar, but we still have time to write a different ending – one where free thought and factual discourse prevail over manipulation and fear.

If you would like to become part of conversations like this one, we have news: we have just launched a brand new membership program connecting journalists, artists, thinkers and changemakers across borders. Join today to receive the recording of this event and access to future gatherings where we'll continue connecting dots others miss.

The post When autocrats buy zebras appeared first on Coda Story.

We’re now a couple of months into Donald Trump’s second coming as president.   For perspective on what’s happening, it’s worth studying the tenure so far of the president’s favorite European leader, Viktor Orbán, the longtime prime minister of Hungary.  Orbán took over Hungary when it was a democracy by winning an election in 2010 and has transformed it into an authoritarian state. Trump is emulating Orbán. Whether he can succeed depends on whether Americans can mount an effective resistance.  

To set the stage for Orbán’s rise, we start with what happened in Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.  

The pace of political change in the early 1990s was dizzying, and the forces propelling democracy seemed unstoppable: old political barriers between East and West collapsed; free markets sprang up everywhere and democratic elections were held; a divided Germany was reunited; the Soviet Union dissolved; Europe expanded; and a new global economy seemed to be taking over the world.

These changes caused one optimistic observer to predict that democracy would be the final form of government.  But there were other forces at work, less visible at first, but leading to a very different kind of change. Some effects of the changes listed above included: international companies moving their factories out of Europe to Asia; neoliberal shock therapies cutting social spending in the new democracies of Eastern Europe; social services that had been provided by the old regimes were replaced unevenly by capitalism; corruption broke out as state assets were privatized; economic inequality grew between the new class of oligarchs benefiting from privatization and everyone else; bank bailouts and lending crises shook the financial system; then came the massive flow of refugees into Europe from wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and North Africa. 

All this led to the rise of xenophobic politics – first in Hungary, then across Europe. It was a populist pushback against disruptive and disorienting changes.

This is when the assault on democracy began, and for seven years I was in the middle of it, in Hungary, where I was president of Central European University.  I saw first-hand how a politician like Orbán could manipulate a populist rebellion in order to take over a democracy and turn it into an authoritarian state. 

When my term ended in 2016, I returned to the U.S. – just in time for the first election of Donald Trump.  Friends joked that maybe I had carried the Hungarian anti-democracy disease back home.  

Hungary has been a laboratory for reactionary populism, years before it spread to the rest of Europe and to the U.S. The 2008 financial crisis hit Hungarians harder than most Europeans and Americans, and many began to feel no better off than they had been under communism. By 2014 a European Commission poll showed that 70% of Europeans distrusted their elected governments – up from only 25% in 2002.  In Eastern Europe people were feeling left behind by the loss of jobs, stagnating incomes, austerity programs and cuts in social welfare – all products of the economics of globalization.  

Hungarians, some have argued, have a deep-seated victim mentality – the product of centuries of invasions by Mongols, Turks, Russians, Austrians, Germans and Soviets – and Hungarian civil society was stunted by outside domination.  On top of that, the country was deeply divided between a majority rural population that spoke only Hungarian and a cosmopolitan minority who were the dominant elite.  

This set the stage for an anti-democratic politician, and in walked Viktor Orbán.

Ironically, Orbán had been a hero of the democracy movement that overthrew the old regime. He had good organizing and rhetorical skills, which he used to stimulate Hungarians’ sense of victimization. He attacked the European Union as “the new Moscow”. He railed against refugees, calling them “a threat to Christian civilization”. He campaigned on the memorable slogan, “make Hungary great again,” and he promised Hungarians that he would rescue them from migrants and foreigners and people of other races and religions. He created a new identity politics by offering the vision of a “Great Hungarian Nation” as a way to prop up a worn out and disintegrating society.  

Orbán boasted that he would build a new form of government, which he called “illiberal democracy” -- an Orwellian term he invented to justify turning his election into a weapon to attack democratic institutions. He maneuvered a narrow electoral victory into a supermajority in the parliament, and paved the way for rewriting the Hungarian Constitution:

Viktor Orbán has become an icon for anti-democratic nationalists on both sides of the Atlantic. Steve Bannon once declared that “Orbán was Trump before there was Trump.”

Orbán took over the media through government regulation, censorship, and financial pressure -- and today he controls 85% of the average Hungarian’s sources of information.  

He undermined the judiciary and the rule of law by expanding and packing the Constitutional Court, forcing independent judges to retire, cutting back the Court’s jurisdiction and drastically revising the Constitution.

He built a governing base out of a new oligarchy of corrupt businesses who benefited from noncompetitive government contracts, with funding from Europen Union grants to Hungary as a new member state.  The grants totaled nearly 30 billion euros before they were finally suspended when Hungary was held by the European Court of Justice to be violating the EU’s rule of law requirements. 

Orbán attacked Hungarian civil society -- branding organizations that received any support from the US or Europe as “foreign agents”, conducting harassment investigations of critics, and taking away the academic freedom of universities.  

I was running an international university whose mission was to revive academic freedom in Eastern Europe. During the Obama presidency, when the US promoted academic freedom, I was able to protect CEU from Orbán and expand its academic programs.  But when Donald Trump was elected in 2016, he endorsed Orbán, and Orbán took the gloves off and started attacking universities, forcing CEU out of the country and taking over others by censoring and dictating what they could teach.

Viktor Orbán has become an icon for anti-democratic nationalists on both sides of the Atlantic, and he’s had an especially large influence on Donald Trump’s MAGA movement.  Steve Bannon once declared that “Orbán was Trump before there was Trump.”  

Orbán has developed a playbook that’s now kept him in power for 15 years, and his playbook is the foundation for Trump’s Project 2025.  Here are Orbán’s rules for turning a democracy into an authoritarian state – rules that Donald Trump is now working to implement in the U.S.:     

One: take over your party and enforce internal party discipline by using political threats and intimidation to stamp out all dissent.

Two: build your base by appealing to fear and hate and branding immigrants and cultural minorities as dangers to society, and demonizing your opponents as enemies of the people.    

Three: use disinformation and lies to justify what you’re doing.

Four: use your election victory to claim a sweeping mandate -- especially if you don’t win a majority.

Five: centralize your power by destroying the civil service.  

Six: redefine the rule of law as rule by executive decree.

Seven: eliminate checks and balances and separation of powers by taking over the legislature, the courts, the media, and civil society. 

Eight: rely on your oligarchs to supervise the economy, and reward them with special access to state resources.    

Nine: ally yourself with other authoritarians like Vladimir Putin and support his effort to undermine European democracies and attack sovereign countries like Ukraine.

Ten: get the public to believe all this is necessary, and resistance is futile.

The scope of Orbán’s influence reaches across Europe.  

In Austria, a political party founded by former Nazis will be part of a new coalition government this year headed by a leader who has close ties to Russia and opposes European support for Ukraine. A similar nationalist far-right government has taken over next door in Slovakia.

Europe’s three biggest countries, Italy, France and Germany, have all swung toward the far-right, but so far they remain democracies. 

Italy has a nationalist government headed by Prime Minister Georgia Meloni, who’s followed parts of the Orbán playbook, but has been pushed toward the center and has softened her position on immigration and Ukraine.  

In France, the far-right party of Marine Le Pen won last year’s parliamentary elections, but a coalition of opposition parties, prodded by Emmanuel Macron, united to deny her party a parliamentary majority. Their resistance will be tested by new elections in June.  

In Germany the center-left government headed by Olaf Scholz fell at the end of last year. In late February, parliamentary elections took place that determined whether the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party would become part of a new government.  Viktor Orbán, Elon Musk and JD Vance all endorsed the AfD before the elections, but it came in second with just under 20% of the vote, and polls show that 71% of Germans believe that the AfD is a threat to democracy because of its overt connections to the Nazi past. 

Poland, the biggest new democracy in Eastern Europe, at first adopted but is now resisting the Orbán model.  A far-right government elected in 2015 almost destroyed the independence of the Polish judiciary, but opposition parties united to defend the courts and defeated the government in 2023, replacing it with a centrist regime headed by Donald Tusk, with a strong commitment to restore Polish democracy.  

So, what lessons can be drawn from all this? 

One lesson is that populist movements are having a big impact on democracy.  They start as reactions to destabilizing events, like economic or cultural upheavals, and they demand change and democratic reform. It’s important to listen to these movements, to understand their demands, and to show how democracy can give people the ability to shape and adapt to change. Meanwhile authoritarians like Viktor Orbán may seem attractive at first but inevitably suppress people’s voices and freedom, and promote corruption and economic inequality.   

Responding to populism can be done by building coalitions for economic fairness on issues like healthcare, education, taxes and public spending.  There are historical examples of this, like the American Farmer Labor coalition that brought together urban workers, white farmers and black sharecroppers and led to the Progressive Movement and the New Deal in the 20th century.  Today there’s an urgent need for a new populist movement to attack economic inequality.

A second lesson is that defending democracy should itself be a populist cause. In the Orbán playbook the national flag is hijacked by the authoritarian leader.  The flag of a democracy must be reclaimed as a symbol of the rule of law, of a society built on human rights and freedoms and international alliances and humanitarian values. When these soft power democratic assets are destroyed, a huge void opens up -- to be filled by authoritarians like Xi Xinping and Vladimir Putin who are the ultimate political models for Viktor Orbán and Donald Trump. 

A third lesson is that the ultimate goal of an authoritarian leader is to weaponize the state against all democratic opponents. Orbán’s playbook demonizes anyone who doesn’t support the leader as an “enemy of the people.” This stigma is then enforced by targeting opponents with regulatory penalties like tax audits, educational penalties like denials of accreditation, political penalties like harassment investigations, physical penalties like withdrawing police protection, criminal penalties like prosecution. The result is a hollowed-out shell of democracy – like Orbán’s Hungary.

What about the U.S.?  The US is better situated than Hungary to resist authoritarianism.  It’s thirty times bigger and infinitely more diverse, and its diversity is the source of its economic and cultural strength. The US has an enormous and active civil society, a judiciary that remains mostly independent, a free and open if partially captured and manipulated media, and a constitution that guarantees the rights of the people to challenge and change their government.  Donald Trump won less than fifty percent of the vote in last fall’s election, and his approval rating is well below that in recent polls. 

This is not a mandate for hollowing out American democracy.  

National polls show that 70% of Americans today see democracy as a core American value.  Resistance to the assault on democracy is not only possible, it’s essential, and it can work, as shown by the growing number of successful lawsuits that have been brought against Trump’s flood of executive decrees, and the rising tide of grassroots mobilization by civil society groups across the country, who are organizing demonstrations and lobbying legislators to stand up for democracy. 

Defending democracy is a long game. For two and a half centuries Americans have fought to expand the right to vote, to achieve equal protection, to oppose intolerance and political violence, to gain freedom of speech and religion, to guarantee due process of law. These goals may now seem to be blocked by Trump, but the U.S. is not Germany in the 1930s nor Hungary in 2025, because citizens across the country are beginning to resist authoritarianism. To succeed, authoritarianism requires big government, and Americans have long been opposed to big government. 

Building resistance is hard work and sometimes may seem futile, but every small act counts and many small continuous acts can make a profound difference in resisting an authoritarian regime.  Six decades ago, in South Africa at the height of apartheid, the original Robert F. Kennedy eloquently predicted what would be achieved by resisting authoritarianism:  

“Each time a person stands up, he sends forth a tiny ripple of hope, and crossing each other from a million different centers of energy and daring those ripples build a current that can sweep down the mightiest walls of oppression.”

A version of this piece was first published in Rappler.

Image credits:
Donald Trump and Viktor Orban in the Oval Office. May 13, 2019. Washington, DC. Mark Wilson/Getty Images.
Vladimir Putin and Viktor Orban on the sidelines of the Third Belt and Road Forum in Beijing on October 17, 2023. Grigory Sisoyev/POOL/AFP via Getty Images.
Xi Jinping and Viktor Orban. Liszt Ferenc Budapest airport, Ferihegy, Hungary.May 8, 2024. Vivien Cher Benko/POOL/AFP via Getty Images.

The post The Orbán precedent appeared first on Coda Story.

"What do we even do when the Justice Department ignores court orders?" reads one text from an American friend on my phone. “None of this feels real,” says another.

As we navigate the whiplash-inducing headlines emerging daily from Trump's Washington, I often find myself thinking of Oksana Baulina, who joined our team in 2019 to produce a documentary series about Stalin's Gulag survivors. By then, Russia's state media was actively rehabilitating Stalin's image, recasting the Soviet dictator as an "efficient manager" who had made necessary sacrifices for the motherland. We felt an urgent need to preserve the testimonies of the few remaining survivors—men and women in their eighties and nineties whose first-hand accounts could counter this historical revisionism.

It was no longer safe for me to travel to Moscow to work with Oksana on developing the project, so we met in neighboring Georgia, in Tbilisi, my hometown. She arrived dressed every bit as the fashion magazine editor she had once been at Russian Vogue before pivoting to become an opposition activist and journalist.

Over wine one evening, she described the constant cat-and-mouse game she had experienced working with Alexei Navalny's anti-corruption foundation. She talked about how Navalny's team had to constantly reinvent itself, adapting to each new restriction the Kremlin devised. When the authorities blocked their websites, they migrated to YouTube and social media. When officials raided their offices, they decentralized operations. When the government froze their bank accounts, they found alternative funding methods. The space for dissent was shrinking daily, she explained, and with each new constraint, they needed to innovate, come up with fresh tactics to continue exposing corruption in Russia and holding Putin accountable.

"The walls are closing in," she told me, "and most people don't even notice until they're trapped."

Her words have acquired an unsettling resonance as I watch the American political landscape transform. When I draw these parallels to my American friends, I often see a familiar resistance in their eyes. Some will say comparing America to authoritarian states is alarmist, that the differences between these societies are too vast. "These are apples and oranges," they'll argue. But the anatomy of repression—the methods used by the powerful to dismantle democratic institutions—remains remarkably similar across time and borders.

There's a reason why those who've lived under authoritarian systems recognize the warning signs so clearly. For Americans, this trajectory feels unimaginable – a departure from everything they know. But for people like Oksana, those who've witnessed democracy crumble, it's more like going back to the future – a painfully familiar pattern returning in new forms.

Recently, a friend in Georgia received a summons that captured the essence of life in an authoritarian state: show up to a state commission hearing and risk becoming a target, or don't show up and face jail time. A decade ago, this would have been unthinkable in Georgia, a country that once exemplified the possibilities of post-Soviet democratic transformation. But that's the thing about authoritarianism—it advances by turning the unthinkable into the inevitable.

Authoritarianism often takes a precise, technical approach to dismantling democracy. It's not always about sudden, violent takeovers. Usually, democratic backsliding is a careful process of erosion, where each small step makes the once outrageous appear normal. What makes this process particularly insidious is how it subverts democracy's own tools – elections, parliaments, courts, and media – turning them against the very systems they were designed to uphold.

Since Coda's inception, we've been tracking the changing landscape of power: the expanding geography of authoritarianism, the abuse of technology, the rise of oligarchy, and the weaponization of historical narratives. Our unique editorial approach identifies "currents" – the patterns bubbling beneath the daily headlines – allowing us to detect emerging trends before they become apparent. Through this lens, we've observed that while authoritarian regimes deploy varied tactics, three essential elements of the playbook repeat themselves with remarkable consistency across different contexts and continents.

The first move is always the manipulation of memory and nostalgia. Vladimir Putin understood this better than most. His regime didn't just recast Stalin from tyrant to "efficient manager" – it undermined organizations like Memorial that documented Soviet crimes by branding them as "foreign agents" before shutting them down entirely.

For Oksana, like many others on our team, the Gulag documentary project was deeply personal. Her family had directly experienced political repression under Soviet rule. For the Russian-language version, she chose a different title than "Generation Gulag." She called it: "The Repressions Don't End."

This same pattern is visible in the United States, where the "Make America Great Again" movement taps into a yearning for an imagined past—one in which power structures went unquestioned and concepts like racial equity didn't "complicate" the natural order. This isn't just a political slogan; it's a carefully crafted narrative that creates social conditions that make challenging the mythical past dangerous. 

We've seen this play out in Viktor Orbán's Hungary, where school textbooks have been rewritten to glorify the country's imperial past and minimize its complicity in the Holocaust. In India, where Narendra Modi's government has systematically reshaped history education to center Hindu nationalist narratives and diminish Muslim contributions. And in Florida, where educational restrictions on teaching African American studies and racial history follow the same playbook – controlling how societies understand their past to make it easier to reshape their future. 

But rewriting the past is merely the first act. The next phase is to transform this nostalgia into a weapon that redefines loyalty to the nation. Once the mythical golden age is established, questioning it becomes not just disagreement but betrayal. In Russia, this meant that anyone who questioned the revered myths about Soviet glory suddenly became suspect – a potential traitor or foreign agent.

As Oksana traveled across Russia filming interviews with Gulag survivors, many said how distraught they were to see that at the end of their lives, the narratives they thought had been discredited were gaining traction again. The perpetrators of the crimes against them – their executioners, their prison guards – were being glorified once more in state media and official histories.

It's the ultimate form of injustice, echoing what many of my Black American friends tell me they feel today as they watch decades of hard-won progress toward equity being reversed. After fighting so hard to dismantle statues of Confederate generals and slave owners, they now witness white supremacist narratives being rehabilitated and those who challenge them branded as unpatriotic.

Of course, these aren't direct comparisons. Each country follows its own path. Perhaps America's market economy will prove resilient against authoritarian capture. Perhaps its institutions will withstand the assault better than their counterparts elsewhere. Perhaps the federalized system will provide firewalls that weren't available in more centralized states.

But, thinking back to countless conversations with friends who lived through authoritarian transitions, I'm reminded of how gradually the water heats around us all. Each small capitulation, each moment of silence stems from a perfectly reasonable thought: "Surely it won't affect me personally."

Among the 35 victims of Stalin’s Gulags that Oksana interviewed was Irina Verblovskaya. It was a love story that landed Irina in jail "I never thought they would come for me," she told Oksana, her voice steady but her eyes still showing the pain of decades-old wounds. She never thought she was political enough to be noticed. 

American friends often ask me what to do, how to respond once these patterns of repression become evident. I hesitate to answer with certainty. The cases I know most intimately are cases of failure. Nearly everything my dissident parents fought for in Georgia has been reversed in my lifetime. Yet paradoxically, their fight continues to inspire – precisely because it never truly ended. In Tbilisi today, people have stood in the freezing cold for more than a hundred nights, protesting laws that mirror authoritarian Russian legislation.

After years covering wars and political crises, I've noticed that soldiers on the ground often understand which way a battle is turning before the generals do. A taxi driver frequently has a better grasp of city dynamics than the mayor. My first rule is to always listen to people in the thick of it, to pay attention to those who may be at the margins of power but who are the first to feel its effects. Our failure is rarely in lacking prophets, but in refusing to heed their warnings.

Who are America's prophets today? They're the people routinely dismissed as alarmists – constitutional scholars warning about judicial capture, civil rights leaders identifying voter suppression patterns, journalists documenting the normalization of extremist rhetoric, and immigrants who recognize repressions they became familiar with in the countries they fled. Their warnings aren't political hyperbole – they're based on rigorous research, reporting and lived experience. And just as they are the first to detect the warning signs, they're often the first people to be targeted when the final act of the play unfolds.

The last, game-winning tactic from the authoritarian playbook is the criminalization of dissent. This process begins with words – the increasing use of terms like "enemy of the state", “threat to national security”, or "treason" to describe one’s political opponents. See how these labels proliferate in the far-right media. Note how disagreement is increasingly framed as betrayal. To anyone who has lived through authoritarianism, this language isn't merely rhetoric – it's preparation. Project 2025's blueprint for reshaping the Justice Department follows this pattern – creating systems where political loyalty supersedes institutional independence. 

The mechanisms may have evolved but the fundamental approach remains unchanged. In Russia, no one embodied this three-act progression more clearly than Alexei Navalny. In 2014, he was still able to mobilize hundreds of thousands in Moscow's streets against Putin and the Kremlin’s corruption. His warnings about Russia's growing authoritarianism were largely dismissed in the West as exaggerated. Yet the noose tightened around him – first arrests, then poisoning, imprisonment, and eventually death. He posed too great a threat, and the system couldn't tolerate his existence.

That night in Tbilisi in 2019, Oksana talked a lot about what it was like to work with Navalny's team, to mobilize Russians against Putin. We argued about whether or not Navalny was racist. For all his bravery fighting corruption, Navalny had made derogatory remarks about people from Central Asia and the Caucasus, calling Georgians "rodents" that should be "exterminated." Like her, I had grown up with the Soviet collapse as the backdrop of my youth—we were the same age—but my experiences came from a Georgian movement that fought not just the Soviet system but Russian colonialism too.

Our wine-fueled argument eventually settled into a consensus that Western liberal democracy, for all its flaws, remained the best system available—the fairest and freest option we knew. It's only now that I recognize my own slight condescension toward her because she was proudly an activist. After years working in Western media, I had been almost vaccinated against the idea of being an activist myself—journalism had to be pure, objective, detached.

I was wrong. Oksana understood something I didn't yet grasp: in environments where truth itself is under assault, journalism inevitably becomes a form of resistance. For her, this wasn't theoretical—it was daily reality. The boundary I so carefully maintained was a luxury she couldn't afford, and it is now one I no longer believe in.

The Final Warning

A year later, after we filmed about 30 interviews with survivors of Stalin’s purges all across Russia, Oksana went back to show a few of them the result of our work. We have a video of Oksana visiting Olga Shirokaya, a 96-year-old Gulag survivor who had been arrested when she was 27. They sit down on Olga’s couch to watch the film, Olga's eyes widen as she sees her own story reimagined through animation. 

"I feel like I can breathe again," she tells Oksana, her voice trembling. "I didn't think in such a short piece you could so truthfully find the essence of all the things I told you."

I'm haunted by that footage now. Oksana sits there, bright and elegant, while this survivor of Stalin's terror watches her own testimony. By then, Navalny was already in prison. The full scale invasion of Ukraine  was just weeks away. Did Oksana sense what was coming? Did she know she was documenting not just Olga's past, but her own future?

https://youtu.be/4Lphp2DiPXQ?si=3GXESXlR81mZvnFS

When Putin launched his invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Oksana left Russia. She went to Kyiv to report on the war for an independent Russian outlet – her final act of resistance. On March 23, almost exactly a month since the war had begun, while documenting civilian damage from Russian bombing, Oksana was killed in a Russian missile strike. She was 42.

"The Repressions Don't End" wasn't just the title she chose for the Russian version of our documentary project. It was how she understood history's patterns – patterns that would claim her own life.

We've seen this movie before across different contexts and continents. The script is familiar, the plot mostly predictable. But we don't yet know how it ends – especially in a country with America's democratic traditions, constitutional safeguards, and decentralized power structures.

And so, when friends ask me "what do we do," I tell them: Look to those who've been there before. Democracy isn't saved through grand gestures, but through thousands of small acts of courage. Through showing up, speaking up, and refusing to turn away from what is happening before our eyes. Through recognizing that the authoritarian playbook works precisely because each small tactic seems too minor to resist. 

We've seen this movie before. But we're not just a passive audience—we're also actors. And we still have the power to change the ending.

All illustrations and videos in this article are from Coda Story's Generation Gulag

The post How Democracies Die: The Script for a Three-Act Play appeared first on Coda Story.

In Russia, we learn early that power corrupts absolutely, strongmen wear their worst intentions like badges of honor , and atrocities spiral from seemingly minor threats. Where I grew up, we hold these truths to be self-evident.

Having spent most of my life watching Putin's Russia take shape, I recognize familiar patterns in American politics today. There is a theory, expressed only half in jest, among some who analyze Donald Trump—as he undermines traditional alliances and creates havoc within the federal government—that he must be a Russian asset. I understand what they mean. Trump consistently parrots Putin talking points, and Russian state media celebrates Trump with unusual enthusiasm. As American presidents, whether left or right, are rarely cheered in Russia, one might suspect some kind of collaboration.

But there is a simpler explanation: Trump and Putin are remarkably similar men who naturally understand each other. No conspiracy required—Trump would feel right at home in Moscow.

This isn't to suggest moral equivalence. Trump, after all, has not waged a genocidal war claiming hundreds of thousands of lives. He aspires to dictatorship but hasn't succeeded in achieving it—yet. He hasn't killed his political opponents or nationalized major companies to enrich his friends. Given America's robust institutions, he is unlikely to ever have the opportunity to do these things. In any case, he likely doesn't harbor such aims—he seems much more jovial than Putin.

Still, the parallels between them are unmistakable:

Both men emerged in the moral ambiguity that followed World War II's short-lived moral clarity. They share a worldview in which only large, feared countries deserve respect. Trump famously told Bob Woodward that “real power is… fear.” In both domestic and foreign affairs, neither operates appears to believe that promises matter or that empathy should guide decision-making. While many politicians behave similarly, few presidents so openly belittle neighboring countries and their leaders as Trump and Putin routinely do.

Both men consider loyalty—even feigned loyalty—to be the only true virtue. Trump's pardoning of the January 6 insurrectionists demonstrates his adherence to this principle. Unlike in his first term, when staffers frequently defected or expressed dissatisfaction, Trump now trades competence for loyalty in those he employs, exactly as Putin does. 

Just observe JD Vance's transformation. During Trump's first term, he was a clean-shaven intellectual on a book tour who compared Trump to Hitler. Now, he resembles a Central Asian heir to the throne and his almost comically masculine posturing mimics his boss’s style. This shapeshifting ability shouldn't surprise anyone who read Vance's memoir, “Hillbilly Elegy,” in which he described his childhood talent for adapting to different father figures. "With Steve, a midlife-crisis sufferer with an earring to prove it,” Vance wrote, “I pretended earrings were cool... With Chip, an alcoholic police officer who saw my earring as a sign of 'girlieness,' I had thick skin and loved police cars." For men like Trump and Putin, loyalty isn't optional, it's existential, and Vance has mastered the art of becoming whatever his current patron requires.

Both Putin and Trump harbor a profound distrust of democratic institutions. Trump's fixation on the "stolen election" of 2020 mirrors Putin's trauma from his failed bid to manipulate the 2005 Ukrainian election to his advantage. For both men, personal political losses were transformational. In Putin’s case, every challenge to his authority has turned him into a different, usually worse, person. 

It may seem paradoxical that a man who never faces competitive elections changes with each successive term, but it's true – and each iteration is more dangerous than the last. Trump too has changed since his last term. He may still be erratic, may still be a lying, megalomaniacal, overconfident salesman. But those of us who have seen authoritarian evolution up close recognize a fundamental transformation. Trump’s rage at institutional betrayal has calcified into conviction, into a doctrine founded on distrust. The trauma of defeat in 2020 didn't just wound Trump's ego; it convinced him to view the entire democratic apparatus as illegitimate. This shift, this hardening of his position should not be underestimated.

Another thing Trump and Putin have in common is that both believe corruption is universal. I recognize in Trump a mindset common in Russia—indeed, it's fundamental to how power operates in Moscow. Trump doesn't just call opponents "crooked” as a joke, he seems to genuinely believe that graft, and graft alone, motivates everyone. For Trump, corruption is not merely personal enrichment but is the only effective means of governance, of exerting control. This approach makes dealing with Putin convenient—negotiations are simpler when you believe everyone has a price. But I’ve seen in my country how such transactionalism ultimately backfires, creating whole new avenues of institutional corruption that involve orders of far greater magnitude than simple personal enrichment ever could. 

Apart from an intrinsic understanding of corruption, both Trump and Putin also understand, crave and deliberately create chaos. Whether through war, nuclear threats, dismantled treaties, or bureaucratic upheaval, disorder provides leverage. When Elon Musk is tasked with destroying the civil service, the goal is to make government employees more pliable for whatever comes next. The damage, of course, will extend beyond Trump's tenure—after he leaves office, American civil servants will have lost their trust in the entire American system, the whole edifice of government, and it won’t be easy to restore that faith.

And now If Trump and his all-too-loyal allies seem detached from reality, then the joke is on reality.

Many American observers now hold out hope that constitutional guardrails and democratic institutions will do their job. These observers believe checks and balances will contain Trump's excesses until the midterms or the next presidential election bring relief. They're not entirely wrong—America is certainly better positioned to withstand authoritarian creep than Russia was in Putin's early years. 

America's independent judiciary, free press, federalized power structure, and long democratic tradition provide genuine protective layers that Russia lacked. But I've also seen how institutions crumble not through frontal assault but through slow erosion, as bureaucrats, judges, and legislators become complicit through fear, ambition, or simple exhaustion. 

When I read pundits like Ezra Klein argue we shouldn't believe Trump's threats because his power is more limited than he pretends, I recognize a familiar pattern of wishful thinking. Klein suggests that since Trump lacks congressional control and broad public support, his power exists mainly in our collective imagination of it. This analysis assumes Trump operates within the traditional boundaries of American politics. But that's precisely what authoritarians never do. Those who dismiss Trump's ability to transform America make a fundamental error of perspective. They judge his capabilities by the system's rules, while he succeeds by dismantling those very rules. 

Trump has few constitutional powers, true. But autocrats rarely acquire power through constitutional means—that's precisely why they want to become autocrats: to avoid this hassle. They find cracks in the system—a corrupt judge here, a sycophantic legislator there, a couple of overworked bureaucrats willing to look the other way.

Worse, those who can most effectively prevent state capture are least equipped to recognize it. Trump isn't trying to subdue coastal liberals and activists; he’s going after unelected civil servants, military officers, and corporate stakeholders. Whatever their qualifications, these aren't people prepared for civil disobedience—that's not in their job descriptions. They advance their careers by executing orders without overthinking them, not by questioning authority. Whatever resistance they might offer has been further diminished by Musk's crusade against the "deep state."

Meanwhile, the elected officials who can resist often voluntarily surrender. Many Republican congressmen, whatever their real feelings and opinions, have meekly knelt before Trump's throne. Autocratic systems actively select for the unprincipled and obedient. Compare Trump's second administration to his first—adverse selection is already evident.

And now If Trump and his all-too-loyal allies seem detached from reality, then the joke is on reality. 

So far, Trump has twice won the most competitive elections on the planet, and Musk is officially the world's richest man, having built businesses few thought possible. JD Vance, in addition to becoming VP by 40, wrote a bestseller at 31. They all have a history of making their ideas come true. If you think the world isn't crazy enough to follow them further into the abyss, you might want to reconsider your assumptions. In my part of the world, at least, it's always been just crazy enough.

Even though nearly every statement Trump makes is false, he remains deeply true to those falsehoods. His fictions, which share so much with those invented by Putin, have given both men control of their nations’ narratives – false or not. So, when evaluating Trump's threat, consider Pascal's wager: If we spend four years on high alert over dangers that never materialize, we've endured unnecessary stress. If we relax and let his worst ambitions come to fruition, we face a potential catastrophe. The first scenario is clearly preferable.

Americans often ask how ordinary Russians can support Putin's regime. Perhaps now you're getting a clearer picture. The path from democracy to autocracy isn't marked by tanks in the streets but by the slow erosion of norms, the replacement of competence with loyalty, and the methodical exploitation of institutional vulnerabilities.

Trump has given us plenty of advance warning. Authoritarians announce their crimes long before they commit them. Even the most unprincipled men hold deep convictions and manifest character traits that rarely change. That's not advanced political theory—it's Russian History 101. The question remains, though, now that we know – what are we going to do?

The post The Shadow Puppet: A Russian’s Warning about Trump appeared first on Coda Story.

“I signed an order,” Donald Trump declared in his address to Congress this week, “making it the official policy of the United States government that there are only two genders: male and female." It wasn’t quite the victory for common sense he thought it was. President Trump, consciously or not, was following a playbook. One that we at Coda Story have tracked for years — a playbook that was written in Russia and is now being followed almost to the letter in America.

For nearly a decade, our team has documented how anti-LGBT legislation and rhetoric has migrated from Russia to Central Asia to Turkey to Georgia, Brazil, and now the United States. 

Trump's speech was instantly recognizable to those who have followed this trail. He took us on a tour of its classic landmarks: presenting anti-transgender policies as "protecting women," framing gender-affirming care as "mutilation," and positioning this politicized language as a return to common sense rather than an attack on civil rights. 

But to understand how we got here, we need to look back more than a decade to when the Kremlin first deployed anti-LGBT rhetoric not as a moral stance, but as a tactical weapon.

A Russian export

In 2012, facing mounting protests over corruption, Vladimir Putin's government desperately needed to change the agenda and refocus national anger elsewhere. As our contributing editor Peter Pomerantsev later wrote: "Putin faced a mounting wave of protests focusing on bad governance and corruption among the elites. He desperately needed to change the agenda and refocus national anger elsewhere."

The opportunity came when self-declared feminist provocateurs Pussy Riot performed their "punk prayer" in Moscow's central cathedral. Putin seized the moment. Suddenly Russian state TV shifted their attention from corruption scandals to tabloid rants about witches, God, Satan, and anal sex. Europe, previously a symbol of the rule of law and transparency, was rebranded as "Gayropa."

This wasn't about deeply held religious beliefs. As Pomerantsev noted, "Putin was probably telling the truth when he told a TV interviewer he had no problem with homosexuals. His administration is said to contain several, and some key members of the media elite are themselves discreetly gay." Russia's social culture is, Pomerantsev wrote, "hedonistic and, if anything, somewhat libertine; rates for abortion, divorce and children born out of wedlock are high. Church attendance is low. The US Bible belt it certainly isn't." 

But if Putin had no personal problem with homosexuality, he saw the potential of playing to prejudice. Russia's 2013 "gay propaganda" law banning the "promotion of non-traditional sexual relations" to minors became the template. Soon, nearly identical laws appeared in former Soviet countries—first in Lithuania, then Latvia, then across Central Asia. The language was often copied verbatim, with the same vague prohibitions against "propaganda" that left room to criminalize everything from pride parades to sex education to simply mentioning that LGBT people exist.

The creation of a global axis

What began as a deliberate distraction from Putin’s failure to rein in corruption evolved into a transnational movement. Russian "family values" defenders organized international conferences, bringing together American evangelicals, European far-right politicians, and anti-LGBT activists from Africa.

Those meetings bore fruit. The most powerful connections happened through the World Congress of Families, where links between Russian Orthodox activists and American evangelical groups were forged. These meetings created pathways for rhetoric and policies to travel, often through multiple countries in other continents, before reaching the mainstream in Western democracies.

"Homosexual propaganda is the disease of a modern anti-Christian society."

When Trump spoke about banning "gender ideology," he echoed language first deployed by the Kremlin. When he announced that he had "signed an executive order to ban men from playing in women's sports," he was repeating almost word-for-word the justifications used for Russia's bans on transgender athletes.

From Russia to Brazil to America

By 2020, this Christian-inflected, homophobic, family values playbook had made it to Brazil, where President Jair Bolsonaro deployed its tactics to appeal to a wide swathe of religious conservatives. In May 2020, at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, Bolsonaro attempted to divert attention from his mishandling of the crisis by posting on Facebook that the World Health Organization was encouraging masturbation in children as young as four.

The post was bizarre, quickly deleted, and made little sense—but it wasn't the product of some Bolsonaro fever dream. Anyone who had watched Russian state television was already familiar with the crazy conspiracy theory about WHO encouraging childhood masturbation.

It first appeared on Russian state TV channels around 2014, when Putin's traditional values crusade had really picked up momentum. The whole theory was based on a WHO document on sex education that mentioned early childhood masturbation as a normal psychosexual phenomenon that teachers should be prepared to discuss—an obscure, academic point distorted by Russian media into evidence that European children were being forced to masturbate from the age of four.

Bizarre as it was, the story had legs, repeated so often that it migrated from Russian television to the Brazilian president’s social media to Christian conservative talking points in the U.S. and Britain. 

Watching the Edges

What happens on the periphery—both geographical and narrative—eventually moves to the center. Eight years ago, we were documenting anti-LGBT legislation in Kyrgyzstan that seemed fringe, distant, and surely far removed from established democracies. Today, similar laws are being implemented in countries like Hungary, Georgia, and even the United States.

"People [who] call themselves traditionalists rise up. If you are gay, lesbian, especially transgender, you will be not only beaten, you will be killed."

Georgia, my own country, is a fascinating case study in how such rhetoric takes root. Once the most promising democracy among the former Soviet republics, Georgia has regressed. With the Kremlin-friendly Georgian Dream in power, and despite determined and vocal opposition, the ruling party pushed through a "foreign agents" law modeled directly on its Russian counterpart and “family values” legislation that targets LGBT rights, including banning Pride parades and public displays of the rainbow flag.

The pattern is unmistakable and what makes it particularly dangerous is how these policies are laundered through increasingly respectable channels. Phrases that began on Russian state TV like "gender ideology" and protecting children from "propaganda" have become mainstream Republican talking points.

Russia's Blueprint: Unleashing Violence

The consequences of this exported blueprint are devastating. It gives license to religious conservatives everywhere to act on  their prejudices and then point to them as universal. In Indonesia, for instance, which has been mulling changes to its broadcast law that single out investigative journalism and LGBT content, two young men in conservative Aceh were publicly flogged under Shariah law for gay sex. Vigilantes burst into a flat to find the men allegedly mid-embrace.   

In Russia, the gay propaganda law unleashed unprecedented violence against LGBTQ people. As Lyosha Gorshkov, a gay Russian professor who fled to the United States, told us in 2016:  "people [who] call themselves traditionalists rise up. If you are gay, lesbian, especially transgender, you will be not only beaten, but you will be killed. Government keeps targeting LGBT population because it's easiest target.”

Before fleeing Russia, Gorshkov was targeted by the Federal Security Service (the modern version of the KGB). An agent at his university called him into his office and demanded he identify communists and homosexuals. "He would follow me every single week, calling me, looking for me at the university," Gorshkov explained. When a bogus article circulated claiming Gorshkov was "promoting sodomy," he knew he had to leave.

In St. Petersburg, which became the epicenter for Russian homophobia, LGBT people faced increasing danger. Nearly nine years ago, journalist Dmitry Tsilikin was murdered in what police believed was a homophobic attack. Local politicians like Vitaly Milonov, who masterminded the city's gay propaganda law that later went national, routinely used dehumanizing language that inspired vigilante violence.

"We have to face moral dangers,” Milonov told our reporter Amy Mackinnon. Homosexual propaganda, he said, is “the disease of a modern anti-Christian society," Milonov told our reporter Amy MacKinnon.

Coming Full Circle

President Trump's speech this week represents a concerning milestone in this journey of authoritarian rhetoric. When he promised to bring "common sense" back by recognizing only two genders, he was echoing Putin from a decade earlier, though no one acknowledged the source.

Particularly troubling is how within the United States such rhetoric is becoming law. Iowa's legislature recently passed a bill to strip the state's civil rights code of protections based on gender identity—the first state to explicitly revoke such protections. Georgia's state legislature, meanwhile, passed a bill to cut off funding for gender-affirming care for minors and people held in state prisons. Georgia had already passed a bill banning transgender athletes from school sports.

These are the legislative fruits from rhetorical roots planted over a decade ago. I'll never forget the May afternoon in 2016 when I sat in Tbilisi's main concert hall, watching Josiah Trenham, an Eastern Orthodox priest from California, take the stage at the World Congress of Families conference. The hall was packed with hundreds of guests, many of them Americans who had traveled to the Georgian capital to discuss ways to "save the world from homosexuality." What still haunts me is how warmly the audience applauded Trenham’s words.

"I have witnessed my nation disgrace itself before God and men," he thundered. "My counsel to beloved Georgians is this: stand firm in your faith against the LGBT revolution. Do not give in or your cities will become like San Francisco, where there are 80,000 more dogs in the city than there are children. Tell the LGBT tolerance tyrants, this lavender mafia, these homofascists, these rainbow radicals, that they are not welcome to promote their anti-religious anti-civilizational propaganda in your nations."

Later, when I confronted Trenham, he insisted he hadn't encouraged violence, claiming instead that the people "who are for provocation and violence are the LGBTs themselves." Outside, hundreds of Georgian Orthodox activists were gathered with religious icons and signs that quoted Biblical scripture. They were free to express their hate. But when my phone rang, it was an LGBT activist calling in panic because ten of his friends had been arrested for writing "Love is equal" on a sidewalk only a few blocks away.

Cynical Kremlin propaganda coupled with genuine religious fervor had created this monster, and more monsters were being bred everywhere. The success of the Russian playbook lies in its incremental nature. First, you frame the issue as one about protecting children. Then you expand to education. Then to adults. At each step, those opposing the restrictions can be painted as ideologues who don't care about protecting the vulnerable.

Setting Trump's speech alongside those made by others, from political leaders to religious preachers, reveals that the U.S. is just the latest domino to fall. Solid family values as a contrast to the licentiousness of the decadent West  was a campaign that began in the Kremlin's halls of power as a distraction. It has now become a cornerstone of authoritarian governance worldwide.

In Tbilisi, at the World Congress of Families conference, a Polish anti-abortion activist explained: "You have to understand that in the west politicians are thinking in four-year terms... but in Russia they think more like emperors." The Kremlin’s long game has paid off.

For years, we've documented how authoritarianism travels across borders, now that story is becoming America’s story.

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