Ukraine has turned ground robots into a frontline workhorse, and the state is now trying to buy them at scale through its first competitive, ministry-spec tender. Viktor Pavlov, an officer of the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade's UGV battalion, laid out the risks of that model to Army Inform, the Defense Ministry's outlet, in an interview. Once a robot clears the military's technical requirements, price becomes the main criterion, Pavlov says. The order is split into lots, and no maker can take more than half a class. He warns the model may not tell a cheap, makeshift machine from one that actually survives at the front.

Robots now handle the war's deadliest chores—driving supplies through kill zones and reaching the wounded where people can't—and Ukraine has already contracted more than 22,000 for 2026. How the military buys them now shapes whether the push yields machines troops trust or a stockpile of cheap ones they don't.

From disposable drones to the next mass weapon

Aerial drones became disposable, mass-produced weapons years ago. Ground robots—the tracked and wheeled machines that haul supplies, pull out the wounded, and attack Russian positions—are only now reaching serial state supply. In August, the Defense Procurement Agency (DOT), the body that buys Ukraine's arms, opened its first competitive tenders for logistics and strike robots built to specs set by the Defense Ministry. Pavlov, founder of Ukraine's UGV School, calls it an experimental format that can work where market prices are inflated. Splitting the order into lots also gives smaller engineering teams a real chance, he said, because many large producers are already busy with state contracts.

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Why the lowest bid may beat the best robot

A tender rewards the cheapest product that formally meets the requirements, not the best one, Pavlov said. A thermal camera, for example, can be listed as desirable rather than mandatory, so a maker chasing the lowest price will most likely leave it off. On any given feature the machines diverge—suspension, cameras, comms channels, a winch—one has it, another doesn't, yet both can land in the same class.

The machines themselves are very different. One carries 250 kilograms, another up to 349, but both fall into the "200-plus" category. Unlike FPV drones, which share standard sizes and parts, ground robots have no common frame—Ukraine fields many local variants. Pavlov compared the choice to picking an iPhone over a cheaper Android: on paper the features match, but soldiers know which machine they can run and repair.

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He also fears the model punishes innovation. A company can spend 18 months and a 20-person team building a robot, then watch a rival copy it, skip the research costs, and undercut it. A design troops already know how to run and repair—like the Ratel—is a known quantity. An untested bargain can break down mid-mission with no spare parts.

A mixed system, not tenders alone

Price competition should be one tool, not the only one, Pavlov argued. New robots should first reach units through pilot buys, letting soldiers test them and say what works. Proven systems can then be contracted in bulk, with tenders saved for classes where the offers are truly comparable. Ukraine's robots are too varied, he said, and what units need can't always be squeezed onto a spec sheet.