Two separate train derailments hit Russia’s Leningrad Oblast on 14 September—one involving 15 fuel tanker cars, the other killing a train driver. Just a day earlier, three Rosgvardiya personnel were killed by an explosive device planted on railway tracks in Oryol Oblast. Russian authorities are investigating all incidents as possible sabotage.

15 tankers derail in Luzhsky district

According to Russian Governor of Leningrad Oblast Alexandr Drozdenko, a locomotive pulling 15 empty tank cars derailed in Luzhsky district at the Stroganovo-Mshinskaya rail section. No casualties were reported. Drozdenko stated that two emergency recovery trains were dispatched from St. Petersburg to the site of the incident.

As a result of the derailment, train movement was blocked in two directions. Ten suburban electric trains were delayed or canceled.

Ukrainian Telegram channel Exilenova+ reported on the derailment, and another channel, Supernova+, claimed sabotage affected two separate railway segments in Leningrad Oblast—specifically in Luzhsky and Gatchina districts.

Train driver dies in second derailment near Semrino

Russian news Telegram channel Astra reported another derailment in the same oblast near the station of Semrino, located in Gatchina district. In this incident, a lone locomotive left the tracks. The train driver was trapped inside the cabin and later died in the ambulance, Astra wrote.

Governor Drozdenko confirmed that sappers were deployed to the scene. He also noted that investigators were examining the version of sabotage.

Explore further

Ukraine’s drones hit deep—St Petersburg’s main fuel plant engulfed in flames (video)

Three Rosgvardiya members killed in Oryol Oblast rail explosion

On 13 September, an explosive device detonated on the Maloarkhangelsk–Glazunovka rail segment in Oryol Oblast, killing two Rosgvardia national guard members and injuring another. One day later, the injured officer died, bringing the total death toll to three.

Governor of Oryol Oblast Andrei Klychkov initially confirmed the deaths of two personnel, and a day later, he announced the third fatality. Acting Governor of Kursk Oblast Aleksandr Khinshtein later clarified that all three victims were Rosgvardiya officers.

Direct trains from Uzhhorod to Vienna, Budapest, and Bratislava start running on 12 September 2025, marking Ukraine’s first step toward abandoning its Soviet-era railway infrastructure in favor of European standards.

Ukraine’s completion of its inaugural European-gauge railway line represents more than improved travel times—it demonstrates how a country under invasion is advancing rail integration faster than some existing EU members who have debated similar projects for decades.

Breaking from Moscow’s rail grip

The new line from the capital of Zakarpattia oblast, Uzhhorod, to Chop near the Ukraine-Slovakia-Hungary tripoint uses the standard European gauge of 1,435 mm instead of Ukraine’s current 1,520 mm Soviet broad gauge, eliminating time-consuming train changes at borders that have slowed passenger and freight movement for decades.

“For the first time in Ukraine’s modern history, a European-gauge railway has been built from scratch—a 22-kilometre stretch between Chop and Uzhhorod. Thanks to this, Uzhhorod has become the first regional centre to gain a direct European-gauge connection with EU countries—including the capitals Bratislava, Budapest and Vienna,” said Chairman of the Management Board of JSC Ukrainian Railways (Ukrzaliznytsia) Oleksandr Pertsovskyi.

Ukrainian railway workers laid 60,000 concrete sleepers, 4,000 tons of rails, and 69,600 cubic meters of ballast while installing modern Ukrainian-made signaling systems with microprocessor control.

The 22-kilometre project was finished for less than 30 million euros, whereas in the EU, the costs of building a railway vary between 12 and 45 million euros per kilometre.

Faster than the Baltics

Ukraine’s rapid progress contrasts sharply with established EU members struggling with similar conversions. The Rail Baltica project, intended to connect Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to European-gauge networks, has faced delays and cost overruns since its 2014 launch, with completion now pushed to 2030.

While Baltic states joined NATO and the EU in 2004, they retained Russian-gauge railways; Ukraine treats infrastructure conversion as essential to its survival and European integration.

Strategic infrastructure as a geopolitical statement

“Ukrzaliznytsia has become a true lifeline during Russia’s war of aggression—for citizens seeking safety, for businesses sustaining the economy, and as a channel of “iron diplomacy,” bringing world leaders to Ukraine in solidarity and support. It is a first, but very significant step towards fully integrating Ukraine’s railways with the European network, and towards Ukraine’s future inside the European family.” said Ambassador of the European Union to Ukraine Katarína Mathernová.

This project is part of the extended Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) corridors inside Ukraine.

Under the Connecting Europe Facility, the European Commission has provided €110 million ($129 million) in non-reimbursable support (mobilising €220 million ($258.6 million)) to integrate the Ukrainian and EU rail systems along these corridors, including a July grant of €76 million ($89 million) for the Poland–Lviv standard-gauge line.

Lviv connection next

Officials have already announced the next phase: extending standard-gauge track from the Polish border to Lviv, Ukraine’s largest western city. Pertsovskyi has also set out near-term execution goals:

The July CEF grant supports the Poland–Lviv link, creating a direct standard-gauge route from Ukraine’s industrial heartland to EU markets.

Future plans include additional European-gauge sections in Zakarpattia and Volyn oblasts, routes to the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, and comprehensive freight corridors from Ukrainian industrial centres to European ports and markets.

Wartime integration and EU timelines

“This is a historic step towards EU integration. Especially in wartime, when railways serve as a vital lifeline for Ukraine’s economy and people, strengthening these transport links is more important than ever.” said Teresa Czerwińska, Vice-President of the European Investment Bank.

That compresses the traditional accession sequence—stabilise politics, build institutions, then knit infrastructure.

If Ukraine can convert track, align signalling, and meet EU technical standards faster than some members did in peacetime, other milestones, then market access, regulatory alignment, and TEN-T build-out need not wait for a “perfectly stable” post-war moment.

The policy question for Brussels is whether wartime institutional capacity should accelerate, rather than delay, integration.

Only to discover they still can’t find available tickets due to the same structural problems that have plagued the system for years.

This shows Ukraine’s broader challenge with state enterprise reform: companies like railway operator UZ excel at customer-facing modernization while struggling with deeper institutional governance. The mismatch between good PR and bad governance shows the limits of surface-level reforms in transforming Soviet-era institutions.

This pattern carries stakes beyond Ukraine’s borders.

Western partners have earmarked billions for Ukrainian infrastructure reconstruction, with the EU alone pledging €50 billion ($58 billion) through 2027. If Ukraine’s largest state enterprises can’t solve fundamental capacity problems while excelling at public relations, it raises questions about whether reconstruction funds will address real inefficiencies or create more impressive-looking dysfunction.

For EU integration, Ukraine must prove its institutions can deliver results, not just better customer experiences.

Modernization meets Soviet-era constraints

Meanwhile, UZ—world’s sixth largest rail passenger transporter and world’s seventh largest freight transporter—has accelerated customer improvements during wartime rather than postponing them. CNN reported last year that the railway operates 55 accessibility-adapted passenger cars, while over 10,000 employees received disability awareness training. In 2023, following social media campaigns, UZ introduced women-only compartments on four main routes.

These changes represent genuine modernization. UZ opened its first merchandise shop in November 2022 at Kyiv’s Central Station, followed by a second at Lviv’s main station in late 2023.

The company also has an online shop selling model trains, traditional tea cup holders, mugs, railway-branded clothing, and travel utensils—moves that signal UZ’s confidence in its public image and commitment to European-style customer service.

These financial pressures compound UZ’s governance problems beyond ticket shortages. In 2022, anti-corruption prosecutors charged three officials with embezzling 103 million hryvnias ($2.5 million) through diesel fuel procurement schemes, manipulating prices to overpay by 10% on 55,000 tons of fuel.

This was followed in 2024 with charges against the former chairman and eight employees for equipment contract fraud.

This pattern reflects a broader challenge across Ukrainian state enterprises.

In March 2024, then-First Deputy Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko argued that companies like UZ, the postal service Ukrposhta, and energy transmitter Ukrenergo demonstrate successful reform through supervisory boards and professional management.

That may be the case, but governance reforms remain fragile while customer-facing improvements prove more sustainable. UZ successfully modernizes the passenger experience because those changes require operational adjustments on a lower organizational level rather than systemic institutional transformation.

Wartime performance vs. institutional problems

The railway’s wartime operational record illustrates this tension well. According to company data, UZ transported 25 million long-distance passengers in 2023, including 2 million to EU countries, while handling 14 million tons of freight by November—a 34% increase in freight volume from the same period in 2022. These operational successes occurred alongside governance failures.

UZ’s approach—prioritizing visible customer improvements over trickier changes in structural governance—may reflect wartime pragmatism rather than reform strategy.

Or the avoidance thereof.

Yet this creates sustainable gaps between public perception and institutional reality. Successful branding can mask persistent governance problems, potentially complicating future reform efforts when customer satisfaction remains high despite ongoing structural issues.

In other words, the public and those who have to make these decisions may shrug off the need for any reform by asking: Why change something that works? Even if it doesn’t.

The pendulum problem

Ukraine faces an urgent choice because reconstruction funding is available. The country can continue this hybrid approach—excellent customer service masking structural dysfunction—or tackle the harder institutional reforms that would solve capacity problems.

Western partners evaluating billions in infrastructure investments must know which path Ukraine will choose.

Surface modernization creates good headlines and satisfied international observers.

Still, it won’t solve the underlying problems that make passengers hunt for tickets on existing trains, but it can’t expand capacity to meet demand.

It’s whether Ukraine’s institutions can evolve beyond Soviet-era constraints while maintaining their wartime operational success. So far, they’ve proven adept at one but not the other.