Russia weaponizes civilian 4G networks with new reconnaissance-strike drone
Ukraine’s military intelligence revealed that Russia is actively using an unnamed new drone with cellular communication and remote control capabilities.
– they can control the drone from hundreds of kilometers away using existing cell towers
– the communications blend invisibly with regular cellular traffic
– completely blocking these signals would require disrupting civilian networks across vast areas.
The result is a drone that’s much harder to detect, jam, or trace compared to conventional military aircraft.
The drone functions as a reconnaissance platform, a strike weapon, or a decoy designed to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses with false targets, according to The Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense.
It can transmit live video through cellular towers and receive remote steering commands via LTE networks.
In strike mode, operators can guide the drone directly onto targets using first-person-view principles—essentially turning it into a manually controlled kamikaze weapon with a human pilot watching through the drone’s camera.
New drone characteristics
Ukrainian analysts describe a delta-wing design similar to the infamous Iranian-designed Shahed-131, though smaller. The resemblance isn’t coincidental because both use the same basic aerodynamic concept that’s proven effective for Russia’s drone swarm tactics.
A jam-resistant satellite positioning system uses four patch antennas paired with Chinese-made Allystar modules. This suggests Russia has specifically designed the drone to operate in electronic warfare environments where standard GPS might be blocked or spoofed.
A DLE engine mounted in the nose section makes the aircraft “most similar to the ‘Italmas’ loitering munition produced by the Russian Zala Group,” intelligence officers noted. But kamikaze drones put them up front since the whole aircraft is meant to crash into targets. This design choice signals the drone can switch between spying and suicide missions as needed.
Where do the parts come from? Nearly half the components trace back to Chinese manufacturers, according to the intelligence assessment. The shopping list includes communication modules, a minicomputer, power regulators, and quartz oscillators—all sourced from China’s commercial electronics industry.
Ukrainian intelligence published a detailed 3D model and component breakdown on the War&Sanctions portal, part of their ongoing effort to document and analyze Russian weapons systems. The technical dissection provides insight into how Russia continues adapting commercial technology for military purposes despite international sanctions.
The emergence of this drone variant highlights Russia’s evolving approach to unmanned warfare—combining proven airframe designs with commercially available communication technology to create more flexible and resilient weapons systems.