Valery Gergiev, the Russian conductor and longtime ally of Vladimir Putin, is scheduled to perform on July 27 at the Un’estate da Re festival in the Royal Palace of Caserta, Italy. Tickets are already on sale.

But behind the mask of the great conductor lies something far more troubling. A recent Linkiesta investigation exposes a sophisticated network of shady foundations, fictitious companies, and significant real estate holdings spanning Venice, Milan, Rome, and the Amalfi Coast.

At its center sits a monumental estate in Massa Lubrense that allegedly hosts meetings aimed at circumventing international sanctions and diffusing Russian propaganda narratives through cultural interventions.

Where Gergiev is banned vs. where he’s welcome

Unlike Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, and Scandinavian nations — where cultural institutions severed ties with pro-Kremlin artists — Italy has chosen a more “tolerant” or “neutral” approach. Some even echo the favorite mantra of Russian propaganda: “Art is above politics.”

Here’s a reminder of where Gergiev has been banned:

• Germany: Fired from the Munich Philharmonic.
• UK: Removed from the Edinburgh Festival and other programming.
• USA: Canceled performances and tours.
• France: Banned from Théâtre des Champs-Élysées and other venues.
• Canada: Included in the list of individual sanctions.

But in Italy, Gergiev seems to be welcomed with open arms — all in the name of “cultural dialogue,” even as war crimes continue in Ukraine.

Putin’s conductor: A history of regime support

Gergiev, Putin’s most loyal cultural ally who received the specially revived Hero of Labour award in 2013, has never hidden his loyalty to the Putin regime.

After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, cultural leaders around the world called for a boycott of Gergiev, accusing him of direct complicity in the Kremlin’s aggression. Major orchestras and opera houses in Europe and the US dropped him. In 2022, La Scala dropped him from its programming after he refused to condemn the war in Ukraine.

His appointment to control both the Bolshoi and Mariinsky theaters wasn’t just ceremonial — it followed the ouster of Vladimir Urin, who had dared to sign an anti-war petition in 2022, making Gergiev’s loyalty even more valuable to the Kremlin.

His fondness for dictators and warlords predates Ukraine. In 2016, following the Russian and Syrian military seizure of Palmyra, Gergiev performed a highly publicized “liberation concert” among the ruins. Broadcast widely on Russian state TV, the concert served as cultural propaganda to legitimize Moscow’s role in Syria and reinforce Putin’s image as a “defender of civilization.”

The €100 million Italian empire and sanctions evasion network

The financial mechanics behind his Italian operations reveal a more complex picture. As early as 2022, Alexei Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation documented that Gergiev had diverted over 300 million rubles into personal accounts, using cultural foundations funded by Gazprombank, Rosneft, and VTB.

Gergiev owns a real estate empire in Italy, reportedly worth more than €100 million, inherited from Countess Yoko Nagae Ceschina, a Japanese harpist and philanthropist. Her will granted him the Barbarigo Palace on Venice’s Grand Canal, the historic Caffè Quadri in Piazza San Marco, an 18-room villa in Olgiate, vast land holdings in Romagna, and a villa on the Sorrento Coast.

Recently, Italy’s famous Alajmo restaurant family renewed its rental agreement for Caffè Quadri — paying Gergiev €3.5 million over seven years. This means a sanctioned Kremlin-aligned figure is directly profiting from Italy’s most prestigious public spaces.

Massimiliano Coccia’s Linkiesta investigation reveals something more systematic: at least a dozen satellite companies orbiting around Gergiev’s main operations, spanning real estate, cultural, and logistics sectors across Campania, Lazio, and Lombardy.

EU funds for Putin’s ally

And now, in July 2025, Gergiev is scheduled to perform in Campania — at a festival funded in part by the Italian government, the Campania regional administration, the Teatro Verdi in Salerno, and Italy’s Ministry of Culture. It is officially branded as a cultural initiative supported by EU Cohesion Funds (Fondi Coesione Italia 21/27).

This makes any attempt to “normalize” Gergiev’s presence even more troubling.

Art as propaganda: The Bolshoi’s latest production

Gergiev himself constantly proves art isn’t neutral. Just this month, his Bolshoi Theatre closed its season with a production of Prokofiev’s opera Semyon Kotko that ended with a message glorifying Russia’s invasion of Ukraine:

“In 2014, a junta seized power in Kyiv and began repressions against its own citizens. In response, the residents of the city and region proclaimed the Luhansk People’s Republic. Instead of negotiations, the criminal Kyiv regime began the destruction of Donbas.”

Immediately following that, the next paragraph was projected:

“In February 2022, the Russian army came to the aid of the people of Donbas, who had been fighting for their lives and freedom for eight years. As a result of a nationwide referendum, Luhansk has forever returned to being part of Russia.”

This wasn’t art — it was state propaganda using opera as a delivery system, reversing historical facts to justify war crimes. As La Repubblica noted in its coverage, Gergiev’s own theater made it explicitly clear that the opposite of “art is outside politics” is true.

Why cultural neutrality during wartime is complicity

And now — after three years of genocide, missile strikes on residential buildings, torture and executions of prisoners, and mass atrocities documented by international bodies — this concert in Campania becomes part of a broader trend: the normalization of brutality through culture.

At this point, let’s be clear: art is never apolitical — especially during a war. We cannot ignore the fact that Valery Gergiev is not merely a world-class conductor, but a public ally of a regime internationally accused of war crimes. His return to the European stage is not a neutral cultural gesture — it is a political act.

Yes, in peacetime, one might argue for “separating art and politics.” But in wartime — especially a war of conquest launched in 2014 and escalated into full invasion in 2022 — such neutrality becomes complicity.

The unanswered question about local facilitators

Inviting Gergiev to Campania — with European funds — is a dangerous appeasement of Russia’s cultural offensive, which seeks to blur the line between art and propaganda.

While De Luca tries to mask this performance under the guise of tolerance, peace, and dialogue, Picierno confronts him with a point that is hard to refute: among the many equally famous and talented Russian musicians who have condemned the war, the Campania Region chooses Putin’s faithful friend and ally.

But the crucial question raised by investigators remains unanswered: which local entrepreneur or company proposed Gergiev’s engagement to the Campania Region? Who acted as facilitator for an event that showcases Russian power while a war rages?

The protests growing internationally

The announcement has ignited protests across Italy and abroad.

• Over 700 intellectuals—including Nobel laureates—signed an open letter declaring the event “a gift to the dictator.”
• Yulia Navalnaya, widow of the Russian opposition leader killed in a Russian prison camp, stressed that Gergiev is part of the regime that killed her husband.
• The Europa Radicale party launched its own petition and started buying tickets to bring protests inside the venue.

Italy’s Culture Minister withdrew approval for the concert, warning that using cultural platforms to amplify propaganda is unacceptable. Despite mounting criticism, the concert remains scheduled for 27 July, with the Caserta Police Headquarters monitoring the event through DIGOS (Italian Special Operations Unit).

There are fears that the protest, promoted by Ukrainian associations as well as Russian dissidents, could spill over into the Royal Palace. Many of the tickets for the front rows have sold out, and those who purchased them were representatives of Italian and Ukrainian associations, as confirmed by the president of one of these.

Deputy Prime Minister Antonio Tajani responded to criticism by noting that Gergiev holds a Dutch passport, so he can travel freely within the EU. The questions about how Gergiev obtained his Dutch passport while maintaining Russian citizenship have remained unanswered for almost a decade.

Russian state media celebrates the “return to Europe”

Russian state media is already hailing the concert as Gergiev’s triumphant “return to Europe,” claiming Italy will not cancel the event.

Once again, culture is weaponized. Since Soviet times, music, ballet, and the arts have been key tools of Kremlin messaging. The KGB had entire departments focused on shaping the regime’s image through culture.

This is not about freedom of expression. It’s about responsibility. Art can either support humanism or whitewash violence. When Gergiev conducts in war zones or imperial ruins, he’s not just waving a baton. He’s legitimizing state terror.

What message is Italy sending by supporting Ukraine politically, but welcoming Kremlin propagandists culturally?

When sanctions are among the few peaceful forms of pressure we have left, any cultural compromise becomes a form of complicity. Those who claim “art is above politics” must ask: above whose politics? Above human rights? Democracy? Solidarity?

And in the end — as always — it is the innocent who pay the price.

Editor’s note. The opinions expressed in our Opinion section belong to their authors. Euromaidan Press’ editorial team may or may not share them.

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Ukraine can win the war against Russia, but only by building “national resilience” systems and embracing asymmetric technological warfare rather than hoping for traditional military breakthroughs.

That’s the strategic roadmap from Valerii Zaluzhnyi, Ukraine’s former commander-in-chief and current ambassador to Britain, in a foreword that consolidates his strategic thinking developed over the past year.

Writing for journalist Roman Romaniuk’s upcoming book “What Will Be Used to Fight World War III?”, Zaluzhnyi argues that victory depends on adapting to a new kind of warfare that makes conventional operations increasingly impossible.

“The key to our victory is not just resilience, but decisive and timely responses,” Zaluzhnyi writes. But those responses must target infrastructure protection and technological capabilities, not territorial gains.

His analysis explains why current fighting has devolved into World War I-style stalemate—and why that’s actually creating Ukraine’s path to victory.

Why breakthrough operations won’t work

The precision weapons era that dominated warfare from the 1970s through 2022 has ended. Electronic warfare now blocks most guided munitions. Battlefield reconnaissance drones make troop movement lethal. The result is a grinding stalemate where neither side can achieve major territorial gains.

“When robots began to appear massively on the battlefield, they made any movement of soldiers impossible,” Zaluzhnyi explains. “We couldn’t move forward towards the Russians, and the Russians, accordingly, couldn’t move forward either.”

This isn’t temporary. Zaluzhnyi predicts the technological factors creating this deadlock will persist until around 2027, when new navigation systems and autonomous weapons restore the possibility of offensive operations.

The war is shifting toward “the remote dismantling of a nation’s capacity to resist” through systematic infrastructure attacks rather than front-line advances.

The new victory formula

Rather than lamenting this shift, Zaluzhnyi sees opportunity. Ukraine’s survival strategy becomes its victory strategy: build systems that can withstand remote warfare while developing asymmetric capabilities to target Russian infrastructure.

“The development of technology, along with the demographic and economic situation in the coming years, is likely to favour a war of attrition,” he writes.

Ukraine’s advantage lies in adapting faster to this reality than Russia.

The victory formula requires three elements:

1. National resilience infrastructure: Power grids, transportation networks, and government systems designed to function under constant attack. Ukraine has already begun this transformation out of necessity.
2. Asymmetric technological capabilities: Cheap, scalable autonomous systems that can target high-value Russian assets at minimal cost. Ukrainian innovation in drone warfare exemplifies this approach.
3. Information warfare defense: Protecting public morale and mobilization efforts from Russian psychological operations designed to erode resistance.

“War strategy will focus not so much on capturing territory as on depleting the enemy’s resources and capabilities, creating chaos and ultimately eroding the nation’s capacity to resist,” Zaluzhnyi explains.

Why Ukraine can win this way

Ukraine’s advantages in attritional warfare are real but require strategic focus. The country has already demonstrated superior “tactical application and technological support” compared to Russia’s numerical advantages.

Ukrainian forces achieved decisive victories in 2022 using precision weapons like Javelin anti-tank missiles, HIMARS rocket systems, and Neptune anti-ship missiles that destroyed Russia’s Black Sea Fleet flagship.

But these successes came before electronic warfare created the current deadlock.

The next phase requires different tools. Autonomous drone swarms that can overwhelm air defenses. Cyber capabilities targeting Russian critical infrastructure. Most importantly, resilient systems that allow Ukraine to function while Russian infrastructure degrades.

“Large-scale attacks by autonomous swarms of cheap precision drones using entirely new navigation channels will destroy not only frontline personnel, weapons, and military equipment, but also the enemy’s critical economic and social infrastructure,” Zaluzhnyi predicts.

But if Ukraine builds proper resilience systems, this becomes a contest Ukraine can win.

The timeline factor

Zaluzhnyi’s analysis carries urgency. By 2027, technological advances will restore the possibility of massive conventional operations using “totally ruthless” autonomous weapons.

“Artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies continue to develop at a rapid pace,” he writes.

“For the first time ever, human involvement will be fully or partially removed not only from the process of control, but also from decision-making about target engagement.”

The window for building resilience systems and asymmetric capabilities is narrowing. But Ukraine has already demonstrated what’s possible. The challenge is scaling successful innovations while protecting the infrastructure that keeps the country functioning.

Help Ukraine win the war through developing technology, like Zaluzhnyi says: support the David vs. Goliath defense blog to support Ukrainian engineers who are creating innovative battlefield solutions and are inviting you to join us on the journey.

Our platform will showcase the Ukrainian defense tech underdogs who are Ukraine’s hope to win in the war against Russia, giving them the much-needed visibility to connect them with crucial expertise, funding, and international support. Together, we can give David the best fighting chance he has.

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Western implications

Zaluzhnyi’s framework has implications beyond Ukraine. Most NATO countries couldn’t handle the scale of attacks Ukraine endures regularly. “In October alone, Ukraine faced over 2,000 air threats, including drones and missiles,” he noted recently. “Few NATO countries could counter such an onslaught without exhausting their air defense systems.”

Western militaries remain focused on expensive legacy systems that become vulnerable in massive conflicts. Meanwhile, the real military revolution is happening in cheap, scalable, autonomous systems that Ukraine pioneered out of necessity.

“Half of winning is knowing what it looks like,” Zaluzhnyi concludes, quoting military strategist Sean McFate. “Brains are more important than brute force.”

Ukraine’s path to victory lies not in outgunning Russia, but in out-thinking it. Building systems that can survive what’s coming while developing capabilities Russia can’t match.

The war of attrition isn’t something Ukraine must endure—it’s something Ukraine can win.

Ukraine’s State Service on Ethnic Policy and Freedom of Conscience (DESS) has issued Metropolitan Onufriy an ultimatum: prove your church actually left Moscow or face dissolution.

The directive gives the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP) until 18 August 2025 to produce formal documents severing ties with Russia’s Orthodox Church. Three years after claiming independence, Ukrainian investigators found the church remains canonically subordinate to Moscow through multiple mechanisms—governing documents, institutional structure, and liturgical requirements.

The timing? Two weeks after Ukraine stripped Onufriy’s citizenship for allegedly hiding his Russian passport since 2002, and one week after DESS found that his church is still affiliated with Moscow.

What Ukraine actually wants

The State Service (DESS) isn’t asking for vague promises. They want Metropolitan Onufriy to provide decisions from the UOC MP’s highest governing bodies confirming the church’s exit from Russian structures. He must publicly reject any appointments to Russian church bodies and prepare an official statement terminating all connections with Moscow.

Can he do it? That depends on whether the UOC MP’s governing documents actually allow such independence—something the recent state investigation suggests they don’t.

The DESS investigation found multiple indicators of continued Russian control. The UOC MP still cites the 1990 Gramota (Charter) from then-Patriarch Alexy II as its constitutional foundation, which explicitly states the church is “connected through our Russian Orthodox Church.” The church must still commemorate the Moscow Patriarch in liturgy, have its statutes approved by Moscow, receive holy chrism from Russia, and ensure Ukrainian bishops participate in Russian church councils as obligated members.

Each requirement demonstrates canonical subordination that contradicts independence claims.

What the commission found

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church says it left Moscow. Documents say otherwise.

The Moscow test: when push comes to shove

Want to know if the UOC MP really left Moscow? Look at what happened when Russia started grabbing Ukrainian dioceses.

Since 2022, Russian authorities unilaterally transferred three UOC MP dioceses in occupied territories to direct Moscow control—Crimea, Rovenky, and Berdiansk. The UOC MP leadership’s response? Silence.

When 33 UOC MP bishops condemned these seizures in October 2024, did their church’s governing bodies support them? No. Complete silence again.

This stands in stark contrast to protests and condemnation when UOC MP parishes defect to join the rival Orthodox Church of Ukraine.

It shows that the UOC MP can resist when it chooses to. It just doesn’t choose to resist Moscow.

Legal machinery grinding forward

This ultimatum represents the practical implementation of Ukraine’s August 2024 law banning Russian-affiliated religious organizations. The legislation gave religious groups nine months to sever Russian connections—a deadline that’s already expired.

Theologian Cyril Hovorun, who has closely followed the law’s development, argued it’s “not primarily about the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, nor is it about banning it outright” but rather about forcing the UOC MP to “get out of this deadlock it’s put itself in” with Moscow.

DESS will now compile a list of religious organizations connected to the banned Russian Orthodox Church structure. That potentially affects the UOC MP’s approximately 8,000 parishes serving millions of faithful.

Religious scholar Yuriy Chornomorets, who participated in earlier expert evaluations, told Euromaidan Press that “the conclusions use only facts; therefore, its findings are impossible to counter.”

The UOC MP has filed a lawsuit against Ukraine’s Cabinet of Ministers over the investigation. They consistently maintain they severed ties with Moscow after Russia’s February 2022 invasion. Ukrainian investigators? They concluded these claims lack any documentary foundation.

Explore further

“Not about banning.” Theologian unpacks Ukraine’s new anti-Russian church law

What’s Moscow’s stake?

The UOC MP represents 23% of the Russian Orthodox Church’s parishes worldwide—the largest concentration outside Russia itself. It remains Moscow’s sole surviving pillar of influence in a Ukraine that has otherwise severed all connections to Russia since 2022.

The church’s ideological power runs deep. The fantasy of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus as “Holy Rus” united against the “satanic West” forms the theological cornerstone of Putin’s war.

Ukraine’s Intelligence Directorate previously reported that under the guise of “religious cooperation,” the Russian Orthodox Church functions as an instrument of hybrid influence aimed at destabilizing Ukraine.

The citizenship revocation of Onufriy serves as legal theater. The real drama unfolds in courtrooms where the UOC MP’s survival hangs in the balance.

Explore further

Anatomy of treason: how the Ukrainian Orthodox Church sold its soul to the “Russian world”

€50 billion sits waiting. But Ukraine’s solar revolution measures just 102 MW. And Rome just promised more money through the same broken system.

The Ukraine Recovery Conference wrapped up in Rome last week with familiar promises: €2.3 billion in new agreements, including €265 million for “energy security and green transition” and €500 million in guarantees and grants to help Ukraine’s small businesses.

But missing from the announcements was any mention of fixing the fundamental problems that keep Ukrainian communities locked out of the European Union’s flagship funding tool, the Ukraine Facility.

€50 billion Ukraine Facility shows limited renewable energy results

Let’s be clear: this facility, worth €50 billion, is a significant commitment. Pillar II, the part meant to help rebuild Ukraine’s economy and support clean energy projects, has the potential to do real good. But right now, it’s still lagging behind. There is no data, transparency, or investor confidence. Most importantly, there is no access for small and medium-sized businesses.

The money is there. But the results are harder to find. One result was a bank survey conducted by the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) with 20 banks, which showed that Ukrainian banks have issued 3,500 loans worth almost UAH 17 billion for energy projects.

It seems like a lot, however, many of the energy projects supported so far rely on diesel or gas, hardly the clean energy transformation we’ve been promised. The numbers tell the story: while solar projects received funding for 102 MW, gas-piston cogeneration units got 185 MW and diesel generators another 102 MW. Ukrainian banks financed nearly three times more fossil fuel capacity than solar power.

The scale of this shortfall becomes clear when you consider what Ukraine had before the war: approximately 9.9 GW of installed renewable energy capacity, including about 6 GW from solar power alone. Ukraine’s National Renewable Energy Action Plan aims for renewables to constitute 27% of electricity consumption by 2030, requiring a total installed capacity of 12.2 GW of solar energy.

Despite the ongoing war, Ukraine commissioned around 660 MW of new renewable energy capacities during 2022-2023, encompassing solar, wind, biogas, and small hydroelectric power plants.

Wind and solar power plants generated about 10% of Ukraine’s electricity as of 2023, with the share of clean energy produced, including large hydropower plants, reaching 20.3%—an increase from the pre-war period.

In 2024, Ukrainian state banks approved loans for the construction of 83 MW of solar power plants on the roofs of private households, which is an absolute record for the country since the implementation of such projects.

It should be noted that before the full-scale invasion, only 0.98 GW of grid-connected solar power plants had been built in Ukrainian households.

Ukraine energy funding lacks basic transparency

Citizens can’t even find a basic map showing where these 3,500 projects are located. No one knows exactly which projects have been funded, which regions are benefiting, or even how many of these projects have actually started working.

Some project details emerge piecemeal – like Mykolaiv’s 20 MW solar plants – but comprehensive data remains elusive. Citizens still can’t answer basic questions: Which oblasts received the most funding? How many small businesses applied versus how many got approved? What percentage went to Ukrainian companies versus international contractors?

These questions remain unanswered even after Rome. More basic transparency is needed, so that citizens and civil society can track where this money goes and whether it’s doing any good.

The small amount of information available in the public domain highlights that financial support for initiatives under Pillar II only started in 2025 and lacks a clear implementation schedule, despite the fact that these steps are crucial to improving Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and sustainable development in the face of current challenges.

As of today, all renewable energy projects implemented in Ukraine since 2022 are supported by leading international partners, rather than under Pillar II.

Even EU-supported analysis confirms the system’s dysfunction. A recent report by climate campaign group Razom We Stand found that there is “no comprehensive, publicly accessible database or consolidated statistical reporting” on funded projects. The report calls for establishing “a robust, transparent reporting system” – acknowledging the very transparency problems Ukrainian communities have been experiencing.

Small Ukrainian businesses shut out of EU energy funding

Then there’s the issue of who’s actually able to access these funds. Most of the financing so far seems to flow through international banks. But Ukraine’s recovery won’t come from top-down aid alone. Local businesses, especially small and medium-sized ones, are the backbone of any real rebuild. And right now, they’re shut out.

• Start with the money: many grant windows under Pillar II require €1 million minimum funding, which automatically excludes smaller regional providers or community energy initiatives. Then add excessive documentation requirements—multi-part technical, financial, and environmental submissions that mirror EU-level procurement formats.
• Most materials are available only in English or bureaucratic EU-style Ukrainian, with no clear summaries for local implementers.
• There’s little structured guidance to help applicants navigate these technical procurement rules. Local governments and SMEs are left to figure out highly complex eligibility criteria on their own.
• The scoring and selection criteria remain opaque, discouraging applicants who can’t afford dedicated bid writers or consultants.

Three months after Rome, the EU announced another €1.6 billion initiative for Ukrainian SMEs, scheduled for implementation in “the second half of 2025.” The pattern continues: more announcements, delayed implementation, while Ukrainian companies wait for access.

Despite all this, and against the backdrop of this devastating war, Ukraine is pushing forward with its clean energy revolution. Andriy Konechenkov, Chairman of the Board of the Ukrainian Wind Energy Association, recently announced that seven new wind power plants are currently under construction in Ukraine, with a total capacity of 4 GW of projects ready for implementation.

Last month, international consulting company Boston Consulting Group predicted an increase in the share of renewable sources in the structure of Ukrainian electricity production from 15% (2022 figure) to 28% until 2040, with the potential for further growth.

Balint Silhavi, Principal of the Boston Consulting Group, said: “We expect that about 50% of new generation will be solar and wind power plants. This means that the entire energy sector will become greener and greener.”

Rome chose more billions over basic fixes

These renewable energy projects and optimistic predictions show that Ukraine is working independently to push for renewable energy rebuilding. Rome was the moment to address the systemic dysfunction keeping Ukrainian communities locked out of their own recovery funding.

Instead, the EU chose to announce more billions flowing through the same broken channels.

Ukraine needs more than big promises. We need smart, targeted support that strengthens our economy, protects our communities, and builds toward long-term energy independence through renewables. Pillar II was meant to help deliver that. Rome should have fixed the system instead of feeding it more money.

This isn’t Ukraine’s first attempt at energy transformation that foundered on bureaucratic dysfunction.

In the late 2000s, Ukraine launched regional energy service companies like UkrESCO, which proved highly successful at implementing energy efficiency and investment projects. But the state failed to support their full privatization, retaining partial ownership through state enterprise shares.

The initiative lost momentum and never scaled—despite clear demand and early success.

That example shows what happens when system-level support disappears: even strong models fail to grow. Ukraine cannot afford to repeat that mistake with Pillar II, especially not while fighting for its survival.

Rome was the chance to course-correct. Instead, the EU chose to pour more billions into a system that systematically excludes the Ukrainian actors who should be rebuilding their own country.

As EU-funded research acknowledges, “continued collaboration with the Ukraine Facility and the European Commission is essential to prioritise renewable energy sources (RES) projects.” The question is whether this collaboration will finally deliver results or produce another year of billion-euro announcements while Ukrainian communities build their energy future independently.

Maksym Bevz

Maksym Bevz is Head of Renewable Energy and Green Recovery Campaigns for Ukraine with over…

Iryna Ptashnyk

Iryna Ptashnyk is a Senior Research and Development Expert with 13 years of legal experience…

Editor’s note. The opinions expressed in our Opinion section belong to their authors. Euromaidan Press’ editorial team may or may not share them.

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The Ukrainian capital has new rituals. At midnight, Kyiv moms drag their camping gear and babies to the nearest metro station, where they try to catch a few hours of Z’s while Russia pummels killer drones into apartment buildings all night. Others take the risk of the “bathroom shelter.“

The Iranian-designed Shahed drones whirr like lawnmowers but screech when diving on their final descent, too fast for missiles to intercept. Hiding behind two walls of the bathroom doesn’t guarantee survival if it’s a direct hit—your entire apartment will likely be vaporized.

While NATO countries study drone threats in war games, Ukraine is finding the answer to a riddle nobody has solved yet—how to counter swarms of cheap, mass-produced, deadly drones if the missiles needed to down them are ten times as expensive.

Russia says it will soon be launching up to 1,000 of these $35,000 Iranian-designed drones each night. They’ve gotten too upgraded to be shot down by gunfire, too high-flying for mobile air defenses. The West can’t produce enough interceptor missiles to match this volume, and even if they could, the cost would be prohibitive.

Is this the end of the war—will Russia terrorize Ukrainian civilians into accepting the Kremlin’s enslaving conditions?

How it feels

My bomb shelter is a bathroom floor

Not so fast, said President Zelenskyy in Rome last week. Ukrainian engineers have cracked something no NATO country has figured out: how to hunt these drones cheaply.

“We will shoot down everything. Scientists and engineers have found a solution. This is the key. We need finances. And we will raise it.”

Hours earlier, those same swarms had just finished a 10-hour bombardment of Kyiv with 400 drones and 18 missiles, leaving two people dead, 16 wounded, and apartment buildings burning across Ukraine’s capital.

Russia’s bureaucracy finally finds its groove

The pattern is consistent throughout the entire war. Ukraine is nimble with decentralized innovation. Russia’s bureaucracy moves slowly, but eventually overpowers with sheer numbers. Numbers of bodies thrown into the trenches. And now, numbers of Shaheds rammed into apartment buildings.

Putin called for 1.4 million drones annually in 2025—ten times Russia’s 2023 production. At the Alabuga facility in Tatarstan, Russia aims to build 6,000 drones by summer 2025 using Iranian blueprints and Western electronics that somehow keep trickling through sanctions.

The plan is working. Russia quintupled its Shahed campaign from 200 launches per week in September 2024 to over 1,000 weekly by March 2025. Experts warn Moscow could launch over 1,000 Shaheds daily by the end of 2025.

The upgraded Shaheds are nastier than the originals. Russian engineers reprogrammed them to approach at 2,800 meters altitude—beyond the reach of mobile air defenses—then dive at targets traveling 600 km/h while carrying 90-kilogram warheads, double the original payload.

Explore further

Shahed drones now dive like missiles—and Ukraine can’t shoot fast enough

Russian forces now target one or two cities at time instead of deploying 500 drones nationwide, flying at altitudes above 2km to stay out of reach of machine guns, Counteroffensive.Pro reported.

For months, the pendulum swung Russia’s way. Civilian casualties reached record levels—June 2025 alone saw 232 civilians killed and 1,343 wounded from drone attacks.

“Another night hunched over mobile phones in the dark,” reported Al Jazeera’s correspondent from Kyiv, describing how residents track incoming threats while “listening for that change in pitch that a Shahed engine makes when it goes into its terminal descent.”

What NATO discovered it couldn’t do

NATO has been trying to solve the same problem with typical Western approaches: expensive, complex systems designed by committee.

• The Pentagon’s most ambitious counter-swarm test in June 2024 successfully defended against up to 50 attacking drones using eight different weapon systems.
• The UK just tested radio frequency weapons against multiple drone targets simultaneously—but only at ranges up to one kilometer.

But when 400 Shaheds converge on Kyiv simultaneously from multiple axes, even a perfect grid of 1-kilometer defense bubbles would get overwhelmed by the sheer numbers attacking each sector at once. NATO’s September 2024 exercise showcased over 50 counter-drone technologies, yet Ukrainian officials who attended warned that defending European cities against drone swarms would be “near impossible.”

Ukrainian creativity strikes back

Then Ukrainian engineers did what they do best: find a cost-effective solution no Western country could crack.

The breakthrough came from Ukraine’s decentralized innovation ecosystem. Sixteen companies developed interceptor drones costing as little as $1,000 each—a fraction of Western missile costs. The budget Сhaika costs just 39,900 UAH ($950) on the Brave1 marketplace, while Sky Defenders’ ZigZag interceptor costs 128,000 UAH ($3,000), still dramatically cheaper than $430,000 IRIS-T missiles.

Ukrainian interceptors achieved a 70% kill rate against Shaheds in optimal conditions—nearly double the 35-40% success rate of traditional mobile fire groups using machine guns. Over 100 strike drones have been destroyed by Ukrainian interceptor drones as of March 2025.

The “Clean Sky” program intercepted 550 Russian drones during pilot testing, with one remarkable night operation destroying 33 enemy aircraft.

Three developers told Counteroffensive.Pro the minimum requirements:

• speed over 200 km/h (regular FPV flies at 120 km/h),
• ability to climb to 6 km altitude, terminal guidance systems,
• warheads between 600-1200 grams.

“The bigger the target, the bigger the warhead needed for more precise detonation. Because you can hit a wing, but it will only tear it off and not destroy the target itself,” Olha Bihun, CEO of Anvarix, told Counteroffensive.Pro.

Ukraine’s approach creates a budget version of Israel’s Iron Dome concept. Where Iron Dome uses $40,000-$100,000 interceptor missiles against cheap rockets, Ukraine deploys $1,000-$5,000 interceptor drones against $35,000 Shaheds. The economics look promising—but proving they work at scale remains the challenge.

Anti-Shahed strategy still a work in progress

But intercepting Shaheds isn’t like shooting down tanks with FPV drones.

Operator training takes six months, Taras Tymochko of the Come Back Alive Foundation told Counteroffensive.Pro, but Ukraine has very few training centers, forcing experienced units to spend time teaching new operators instead of focusing on interceptions.

The economics get messier under real combat conditions. While a single $2,000 interceptor against a $35,000 Shahed sounds like a winning trade, operators often need multiple attempts. Counteroffensive.Pro found that five interceptors are sometimes required to down one Shahed—suddenly that’s $10,000-$25,000 per successful intercept.

Operational challenges compound the complexity. Ukrainian electronic warfare systems meant to jam Shaheds also interfere with interceptor communications, creating coordination nightmares between different units with different equipment. Counteroffensive.Pro reported the average wait time for radar stations from Ukrainian producers reached 13 months, up from six months just half a year ago.

Weather remains a formidable enemy: rain and snow significantly degrade performance, with moisture damaging electronic components. Strong winds above 10 m/s affect flight stability, while cold temperatures reduce battery performance by up to 50%.

Current deployment covers only frontline regions and Kyiv, leaving major cities like Kharkiv, Odesa, and Zaporizhzhia vulnerable. Despite interceptor successes, civilian casualties continue mounting. Falling debris from successful intercepts creates additional casualties: a drone intercepted above Kyiv can still fall on an apartment building, killing those beneath.

Technology is Ukraine’s chance to win the war. This is why we’re launching the David vs. Goliath defense blog to support Ukrainian engineers who are creating innovative battlefield solutions and are inviting you to join us on the journey.

Our platform will showcase the Ukrainian defense tech underdogs who are Ukraine’s hope to win in the war against Russia, giving them the much-needed visibility to connect them with crucial expertise, funding, and international support. Together, we can give David the best fighting chance he has.

Join us in building this platform—become a Euromaidan Press Patron. As little as $5 monthly will boost strategic innovations that could succeed where traditional approaches have failed.

Ukraine pioneers asymmetric warfare solutions at global scale

Ukraine faces what no NATO country has solved: how to defend sleeping cities against hundreds of simultaneous drone attacks designed to terrorize civilians into political submission.

Russia’s nightly Shahed campaigns aren’t random terror. They’re a calculated military strategy to force Ukrainian mothers into metro stations with their babies, to exhaust entire populations, to break morale until Ukraine accepts Moscow’s political demands.

Every intercepted drone above Kyiv isn’t just a military victory; it’s a family that gets to sleep in their own bed.

Throughout Russia’s invasion, Ukraine keeps pulling this off: finding cheap and effective solutions that redefine how wars are fought:

• When Russia’s Black Sea Fleet dominated Ukrainian waters, Ukraine developed naval drones that forced the entire fleet to retreat from Sevastopol.
• While Western capitals worried about escalation, Ukraine trucked in dirt-cheap drones to destroy Russian bombers right in their bases in Operation Spiderweb.

Explore further

“Kill a navy for the price of a car”: Ukraine’s drones drove out Putin’s fleet from the Black Sea — then turned on his fighter jets

Now, with Shahed swarms, Ukraine is inventing the rules for hunting cheap attack drones with even cheaper interceptors.

NATO allies are watching closely. Iranian proxies are already copying Russian tactics. The technology being tested over Kyiv tonight could be protecting London, Berlin, or Washington tomorrow. Ukraine isn’t just defending itself; it’s developing the playbook for asymmetric drone warfare that every major city will eventually need.

Can Ukraine scale innovation faster than Russia scales terror?

The crucial test: can Ukraine’s decentralized creativity scale to match Russia’s industrial bureaucracy?

In 2024, Ukraine’s drone industry operated at only 37% capacity due to lack of government contracts. However, the recent $4 billion in G7 funding secured for interceptor manufacturing could turn that around.

Component shortages plague the industry. Defense Express noted that interceptor drones require expensive night vision cameras to catch Shaheds, which are typically launched in dark hours, driving up costs compared to regular FPV drones.

Russian forces adapted faster than Ukraine could scale defenses. New Shahed variants feature rear-facing cameras for evasion, programmed evasive maneuvers when detecting interceptors, and enhanced warheads carrying 90kg payloads. Russia launches dense formations of 10-15 drones simultaneously, mixing decoy drones with armed Shaheds to deplete defenses.

In previous cycles, Ukraine innovated, Russia adapted and scaled, forcing Ukraine to innovate again. But interceptor drones represent something different—a technology that demands both innovation and industrialization.

Can Ukrainian engineers prove they can master mass production too? The answer determines whether families in Ukraine sleep safely in their beds or pack camping gear for another night underground. Ukraine must win at Russia’s own game: turning clever ideas into industrial reality fast enough to counter a terror campaign designed to break civilian morale and force political submission.

Ukrainian authorities charged prominent anti-corruption activist Vitaliy Shabunin with military service evasion on 11 July, prompting widespread condemnation from civil society groups who view the prosecution as political retaliation.

The charges involve $5,400 in alleged improper military salary payments while Shabunin was on official assignments to civilian institutions. Meanwhile, Deputy Prime Minister Oleksiy Chernyshov, facing corruption charges worth millions, remains in office and participates in international conferences—highlighting what critics call selective prosecution.

True to form, Shabunin didn’t mince words in his response.

“Using the war, Volodymyr Zelensky is taking the first but confident steps toward corrupt authoritarianism,” he wrote in his first public statement after the searches, accusing the president of weaponizing criminal proceedings to “catch, intimidate, and show everyone by example that, if he wants, he can do anything to anyone.”

A flawed but dedicated reformer

Shabunin is a polarizing figure who has drawn substantial criticism even from reform advocates.

A Texty.org.ua editorial argued that the anti-corruption movement led by groups like Shabunin’s has prioritized creating “new punitive bodies” over addressing systemic causes of corruption, generating “a witch hunt [that] deflated the reformist passion.”

Yet, Ukrainian civil society is remarkably united in defending the nonconforming, vocal activist.

Prominent civil society leader Olga Aivazovska, chair of the election monitoring organization OPORA, decried Shabunin’s prosecution as “obvious revenge.”

“Vitaliy often focused on individuals, and this did not solve the problems of the system, but it is individuals who decide to take revenge,” she explained. “Selective justice is evil, because it will not contain even a gram of justice.”

Ukraine’s anti-corruption reforms have supporters as well

Why post-Euromaidan anti-corruption reform in Ukraine is still a success

Since co-founding the Anti-Corruption Action Center (ANTAC) in 2012, Shabunin has become one of Ukraine’s most polarizing anti-corruption figures.

Critics describe his methods as “too categorical and emotionally harsh,” the editorial board of Dzerkalo Tyzhnia acknowledged. He admitted to physically attacking a pro-government blogger in 2017, and his house was set on fire in 2020 in an apparent arson attack.

Shabunin’s confrontational methods have made him and his organization the target of smear campaigns: in 2017, a film aired in parliament accused ANTAC of embezzling funds, and in 2016, the Prosecutor General’s Office opened a probe against the NGO for alleged embezzlement of US Embassy funds—closed after the embassy issued an official statement.

When Russia launched its full-scale invasion, Shabunin voluntarily enlisted on 25 February 2022. He participated in Kyiv’s defense and later served in territorial defense units across multiple regions.

What is Shabunin accused of?

The State Bureau of Investigation (DBR) formally charged Shabunin with two crimes: systematically evading military service under martial law and large-scale fraud. The total alleged damages: UAH 224,000, roughly $5,400.

Notably, while the bureau’s press release mentions allegations about illegal vehicle use, the Anti-Corruption Action Center notes this accusation doesn’t appear in the formal charges—only in the public statement, apparently to create a more damaging impression.

But did Shabunin actually do anything wrong? According to ANTAC, the charges hold zero water.

1. The accusation of evading military service is “absurd, ANTAC says: Shabunin always followed the instructions of his military unit.

In September 2022-February 2023, when the unit was stationed near Kyiv, he was seconded to the National Agency for Anti-Corruption Prevention, ANTAC wrote. There, he played a key role in establishing Ukraine’s prized Delta operational awareness system, which irritated some gain-seeking generals, said anti-corruption journalist Yuriy Nikolov. As well, he worked on other anti-corruption measures, ANTAC said.

ANTAC claims that the DBR pressured Shabunin’s commander to falsely testify against the anti-corruption activist, pointing to a coordinated intimidation campaign.

2. The DBR accusation that Shabunin fraudulently obtained “combat bonuses” while in Kyiv is equally absurd, according to ANTAC.

He received the regular 20,000 UAH serviceman’s salary and the extra UAH 30,000 that all soldiers received at the time ($1,200/month), not any “combat bonuses,” ANTAC says.

Incredibly, the sum that he is accused of illegally gaining (UAH 224,000) includes the UAH 40,000 in taxes that Shabunin never even saw, ANTAC adds.

When $5,400 matters more than millions

Compare this to cases the same bureau ignores. Deputy Prime Minister Chernyshov faces charges involving millions in state damages, yet remains in his government position. The High Anti-Corruption Court refused to remove him from office on 2 July.

Even more telling is the case of Oleh Tatarov, deputy chief of the Presidential Office. Charged by anti-corruption investigators in 2020 with bribery, his case was systematically obstructed and quietly closed in April 2022.

Tatarov continues wielding significant influence over law enforcement—the same agencies now pursuing Shabunin.

Most tellingly, the State Bureau of Investigation—created specifically to investigate high officials, judges, and law enforcement—is pursuing a civil society activist for minor violations while ignoring the very officials it was designed to target.

The procedural violations were equally telling. According to the Anti-Corruption Action Center, investigators conducted searches at Shabunin’s home and military unit without court orders, seized his phone without a warrant, and confiscated personal devices belonging to his wife and children.

Ukrainska Pravda, one of Ukraine’s largest independent outlets, revealed the extent of presidential involvement: President Zelensky personally raised Shabunin’s case at high-level military meetings, while officers were ordered to photograph the activist daily and send the images to the Presidential Office.

Questions from the trenches

The most damning assessment comes from an unexpected source: the front lines themselves. Yehor Firsov, a former Ukrainian MP who left parliament to serve in the army, posted a stark warning on social media.

“We are fighting not for a president or ‘parliamentary majority,’ we are fighting to preserve democracy and freedom—which is precisely why Putin attacked Ukraine,” Firsov wrote.

“And if there is less democracy and freedom in the country […] what should we suffer or die for? For the officials who resort to repression to prevent criticism of their power?”

His words capture what makes the Shabunin case so dangerous. Ukrainian soldiers volunteered to defend democratic values, not to preserve a system where critics face prosecution while corrupt officials enjoy impunity.

“The Shabunin case showed that every serviceman today is vulnerable if they have the courage to criticize the authorities,” Firsov continued. “‘Find the person, and there will always be an article in the Criminal Code for them.'”

“You can be a supporter of Vitaliy Shabunin, you can criticize him—this is what freedom and democracy are all about. But right now, it looks like outright political persecution, which may turn into a system tomorrow,” Firsov added.

Civil society responds

Remarkably, even former President Poroshenko—under whom Shabunin faced charges in 2017—condemned the current prosecution. “I see the searches of Vitaliy as something much bigger – a manifestation of the authorities’ full-scale offensive,” Poroshenko wrote, expressing gratitude for Shabunin’s role in establishing anti-corruption infrastructure during his presidency.

VoxUkraine editor Natalija Shapoval described the Shabunin charges as “crossing the red line,” noting this marks the first time during the war that criminal cases have targeted prominent anti-corruption figures.

Even the Texty.org.ua editors who had criticized anti-corruption approaches joined the condemnation, recognizing the Shabunin case as representing “the worst practices of Yanukovych’s time,” harking back to Ukraine’s pro-Russian president ousted in the Euromaidan revolution of 2014.

International silence, domestic consequences

Perhaps most troubling is the international response, or lack thereof.

According to the Dzerkalo Tyzhnia editorial, the government’s authoritarian turn stems partly from changing international dynamics:

“Today, when neither civil society nor the media feel clear support from the United States anymore, because Donald Trump’s team is completely indifferent to the values that used to be the cornerstone, the government in Ukraine has finally allowed itself to be itself.”

The Shabunin prosecution fits within a troubling sequence of events. In June, the government cancelled the results of a transparent competition for the head of the Bureau of Economic Security after the winning candidate wasn’t controlled by the Presidential Office.

“This is not about BEB and not about Shabunin,” the Dzerkalo Tyzhnia editorial concluded. “This is about the long-standing, deeply hidden desire of several corrupt and unprofessional authorities to deal with those they could not destroy before, only because of existing external support.”

The choice ahead

Ukraine’s international partners built their support on the premise that they’re backing a democracy fighting for survival. If that democracy is eroding from within—using wartime as cover for suppressing dissent—the foundation of Western backing becomes questionable.

For Shabunin himself, some technical violations may be real, and his confrontational methods have earned him enemies across Ukraine’s political spectrum. But technical violations exist for everyone—as Firsov noted, “there will always be an article in the Criminal Code” for anyone authorities want to target.

The question isn’t whether Shabunin followed every bureaucratic rule perfectly, or whether his methods were always appropriate. The question is whether Ukraine will use those rules selectively to silence critics while ignoring far more serious violations by allies.

The Shabunin case tests whether those principles will survive the war that was meant to defend them.

As the Dzerkalo Tyzhnia editorial warned: “While Russia is gnawing away at our villages, the authorities are gnawing away at rights and freedoms throughout the rest of the country—and therefore at Ukraine’s prospects of being other than Russia.”

The morning of 10 July started like any other for Colonel Ivan Voronych. Around 8 AM, the veteran Ukrainian Security Service officer stepped out of his apartment building in Kyiv’s Holosiivskyi district, likely heading to another day of what had become Ukraine’s most dangerous work – running covert operations against Russia.

He never made it past the parking lot.

A gunman approached and fired five shots from a silenced pistol. Voronych died instantly from multiple penetrating wounds. The killer vanished in an SUV, leaving behind a crime scene that would send shockwaves through Ukraine’s intelligence community.

According to Roman Chervinskyi, the former intelligence officer who broke the news, this wasn’t random violence. The five point-blank shots, the silenced weapon, the clean escape – everything pointed to a professional hit.

Commander of the gray zone

This wasn’t just another intelligence officer. The New York Times reports that Voronych (also spelled Voronich in some reports) served in the SBU’s elite Alpha Special Operations Center and had spent decades building Ukraine’s most sensitive capabilities against Russia.

His career reads like a spy thriller. Starting in the mid-1990s, Voronych eventually commanded what the NYT describes as “a unit that received technical support from the CIA” and was responsible for eliminating high-level Russian proxy commanders.

This CIA-supported Fifth Directorate eliminated Russian proxy commander Arsen Pavlov (“Motorola”) in Russia’s puppet Donbas “republics” in 2016. His unit played a key role in Ukraine’s August 2024 cross-border offensive into Russia’s Kursk Oblast.

But the decades between reveal little about his other operations – a silence that speaks to the classified nature of Ukraine’s most sensitive work against Russia.

That moment in 2016

Donbas warlord Motorola killed in Donetsk

After Russia’s full-scale invasion, Voronych became part of what sources call an elite unit operating in the “gray zone” between front lines. 

Chervinskyi described Voronich as “one of those who started a direction in the Service that now creates many problems for the orcs” – Ukrainian slang for Russian forces.

An unprecedented target

What makes this killing significant isn’t that it represents some fundamental shift in the shadow war—both sides have been targeting each other’s operatives for years. Ukrainian intelligence has assassinated “dozens” of Russians since the invasion began, reaching deep into Russian territory with car bombs and targeted shootings.

Russia has struck back before. Maksym Shapoval, a key figure in Ukraine’s 2016 Crimea operations, was assassinated in 2017. There was an attempt on current military intelligence head Kyrylo Budanov in 2019 and his wife in 2025.

But the targeting of someone like Voronych appears unprecedented in terms of seniority and operational significance since the full-scale war began. This was a decades-long veteran with deep CIA connections who had been instrumental in some of Ukraine’s most sensitive operations against Russia.

The Russian fingerprints

More than 24 hours after the killing, Ukrainian police and the SBU continue investigating, but no suspect has been publicly identified. The silence is telling.

Former SBU officer Ivan Stupak doesn’t buy into any domestic motive.

“99%—Russian special services chose him as a target,” he told Espreso TV. “Five bullets with a silencer rules out any possibility this was some personal dispute or neighborly grudge. This was a professional hit.”

The targeting itself suggests serious intelligence penetration. The FSB infiltration of Ukrainian security services is well-documented – this February, SBU chief Vasyl Maliuk personally arrested a high-ranking traitor in the SBU’s Anti-Terrorist Center who had been feeding intelligence to Moscow since 2018.

Russian military bloggers welcomed the killing and suggested Moscow was responsible. The Rybar channel, linked to Russian military intelligence, said there were “plenty of motives for eliminating this SBU employee.”

Update: On 13 July, the suspected killers of Voronych were killed while attempting to escape arrest:

Explore further

Russia’s foreign hit squad eliminated in Kyiv shootout after assassination of SBU colonel

Voronych played key role in Kursk incursion

The timing and target suggest this may be long-delayed payback. Voronych’s involvement in the 2016 Motorola assassination has now been made public through NYT reporting. Pavlov was a beloved figure among Russian-backed forces—his killing was a major psychological blow that Russian commanders never forgot.

Former SBU chief Ivan Bakanov, who knew Voronych personally, told the NYT the implications are stark: “If the motive is a domestic murder—that’s one thing. But if this is a public execution carried out by Russians—that’s a completely different story that requires an immediate response.”

After Russia’s full-scale invasion, Voronich became part of what sources call an elite unit operating in the “gray zone” between front lines. His unit played a key role in Ukraine’s bold August 2024 cross-border offensive into Russia’s Kursk Oblast, according to NYT.

The Kursk operation marked a watershed moment in the war. Although the strategic outcomes of the incursion remain debated, it undoubtedly demonstrated to Ukraine’s Western partners that Ukraine has the capability to conduct daring raids and that Russia is not invincible.

As US and UK intelligence chiefs noted, the operation was “a significant tactical achievement” that exposed Russian vulnerabilities.

Perhaps most importantly, the offensive laid Russia’s nuclear threats bare—showing them to be empty rhetoric designed to manipulate Western support for Ukraine. The operation “succeeded in making a complete mockery of Vladimir Putin’s red lines,” as one analyst put it, yet no nuclear escalation followed. This pattern of nuclear intimidation remains the main constraint on Western support for Ukraine’s victory plans.

Escalation of the shadow war

The assassination doesn’t change the fundamental rules of the shadow war – those have been evolving for years as both sides have escalated their targeting campaigns. But it does represent something significant:

It also raises uncomfortable questions about security. How did assassins penetrate Kyiv’s defenses to eliminate such a high-value target? Ukrainian security experts note that more than a day has passed without any official suspect description or wanted notice – suggesting this was no ordinary crime.

Ukraine’s capital not safe for its own spies

This assassination fits into an escalating shadow war where both sides have been eliminating each other’s operatives with increasing sophistication. Ukrainian intelligence has been actively targeting Russian officers implicated in war crimes since the full-scale invasion began.

The targets have been high-profile and devastating to Russian operations.

• In December 2024, chemical weapons chief Igor Kirillov was killed by a remotely detonated explosive outside his Moscow apartment building.
• In April 2025, Lieutenant General Yaroslav Moskalik died in a car explosion near Moscow. Russian drone program chief Colonel Aleksey Kolomoytsev was eliminated in Moscow Oblast in September 2024.

• These operations have reached beyond military targets. In May 2025, former Ukrainian official Andrii Portnov, who fled Ukraine and supported Russian aggression, was shot dead outside an elite Madrid school where he was dropping off his children.

For Ukraine’s intelligence services, Voronich’s death represents both a devastating loss and a troubling escalation. The decades of operational knowledge that died with him cannot be replaced overnight. While senior Ukrainian intelligence officers like Budanov already live under heavy security after multiple assassination attempts, Voronich’s killing suggests Russia’s capabilities in Kyiv have improved.

The success of this operation – no arrests, no public suspect description – indicates a level of operational sophistication that should concern Ukraine’s remaining intelligence leadership.

Read the follow-up:

Technology is Ukraine’s chance to win the war. This is why we’re launching the David vs. Goliath defense blog to support Ukrainian engineers who are creating innovative battlefield solutions and are inviting you to join us on the journey.

Our platform will showcase the Ukrainian defense tech underdogs who are Ukraine’s hope to win in the war against Russia, giving them the much-needed visibility to connect them with crucial expertise, funding, and international support. Together, we can give David the best fighting chance he has.

Join us in building this platform—become a Euromaidan Press Patron. As little as $5 monthly will boost strategic innovations that could succeed where traditional approaches have failed.

Czech intelligence has confirmed what economists suspected: Ukrainian refugees are now contributing more to the Czech economy than they receive in government assistance, according to the Security Information Service’s (BIS) annual report for 2024.

The intelligence assessment reveals that Ukraine’s displaced population has successfully integrated into Czech society while their economic output has already exceeded government expenditures since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion.

This finding highlights a troubling pattern across Europe: even clear economic benefits from refugee contributions have failed to prevent political backlash, as Poland’s recent election of an anti-Ukrainian president demonstrates despite refugees generating 2.7% of Polish GDP. Czech Republic now faces similar risks with anti-Ukrainian parties leading 2025 election polls.

Explore further

The Polish model for abandoning Ukraine

Czech success follows European pattern

The BIS reported that by end-2024, over 390,000 Ukrainian citizens held temporary protection status in the Czech Republic. The intelligence service documented their successful integration, noting “their economic contribution having already exceeded the volume of financial support and social benefits they have received from the Czech government since the beginning of the war.”

This fiscal turnaround happened faster than many expected. The Czech Labor Ministry estimated Ukrainian workers contributed up to 15 billion Czech crowns annually in taxes. Meanwhile, their presence helped solve chronic labor shortages across key sectors—services, healthcare, and social assistance.

People in Need tracked the numbers closely. By 2023, Ukrainian refugee support reached perfect balance: spending and revenues both hit approximately 22 billion crowns. The organization noted a clear trend: “while spending exceeded income in the year’s first half, income dominated in the second half.”

Political storm clouds gathering

But here’s the catch: positive economic data doesn’t guarantee political survival. Prime Minister Petr Fiala’s SPOLU coalition faces probable defeat in October 2025 parliamentary elections. Polls show ANO party crushing the competition with 35% support compared to SPOLU’s meager 19.5%.

What’s ANO’s position on Ukraine? Former Prime Minister Andrej Babiš has made it clear: the war is “not our war.” His party reportedly plans to kill the Czech munitions initiative that has supplied Ukraine with critical ammunition. ANO recently joined the “Patriots for Europe” faction alongside Viktor Orbán and Marine Le Pen—hardly Ukraine’s biggest fans.

The far-right Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) party makes ANO look moderate. Polling at 12.5% and likely to partner with ANO, SPD’s Tomio Okamura calls for ending Czech military aid and starting peace talks with Russia. His party pushes “welfare-chauvinist” arguments—social benefits should go to Czech citizens, not refugees.

Security picture remains positive

Czech intelligence found no serious downsides to Ukrainian refugee presence. The BIS assessment noted refugees “have not had a negative impact on the crime rate in the Czech Republic.” No evidence emerged of Ukrainian involvement in illegal arms trafficking, though the service warned such activity could develop after the war ends.

Current numbers tell a success story: 75% of economically active Ukrainians have jobs, with 88% working legally. But there’s room for improvement. International Organization for Migration data shows massive underemployment—68% of female and 50% of male refugees work below their qualification levels.

The skills mismatch represents missed opportunities. People in Need calculated that a single mother earning minimum wage generates 7,600 crowns monthly for the state. But put her in a job matching her qualifications at 32,000 crowns? She’d contribute 15,555 crowns monthly instead.

European warning signs

Poland offers a stark warning about political sustainability. Despite Ukrainian refugees generating a stunning 2.7% of GDP—worth €16 billion—Polish support for helping Ukrainians crashed from 94% to 57%. The result: Karol Nawrocki won the presidency promising to cut refugee benefits.

The Czech Republic shows similar vulnerabilities. Interior Minister Vít Rakušan indicated that roughly 60% of refugees plan to stay permanently, suggesting successful long-term integration. Yet authorities are already exploring return facilitation centers, following Germany and Poland’s lead.

The intelligence assessment suggests refugee flows will remain stable unless “Ukrainian defense were to collapse and Russia made a significant breakthrough on the front line.” But political stability? That’s another question entirely.

Three years of war have created a dangerous template: economic evidence of refugee benefits gets overwhelmed by war fatigue and anti-immigrant sentiment. Czech Republic’s pro-Ukrainian government may soon learn that fiscal success doesn’t guarantee electoral survival.

Explore further

Czech Republic to discuss refugee return facilities with Ukraine

The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine documented 232 civilian deaths and 1,343 injuries in June 2025, marking the highest monthly casualty toll in three years as Russian forces launched ten times more missile strikes and drone attacks than in June 2024.

Russia’s unprecedented escalation of violence against civilians coincides with military recruitment reaching 30,000 troops monthly while Ukrainian territories face daily bombardment from an estimated 600,000 Russian forces—the highest troop presence since the invasion began.

The surge demonstrates Moscow’s strategic shift toward terrorizing populations across practically every Ukrainian region as Russian military casualties exceed one million, forcing reliance on terror tactics against defenseless civilians rather than battlefield advances.

Escalating campaign targets all regions

The June statistics reveal Russia’s expanding geographical scope of civilian terror, with casualties documented in at least 16 oblasts and Kyiv, regardless of distance from frontlines. The UN monitoring mission noted Russia’s tenfold increase in long-range missile strikes and loitering munition attacks compared to the same period in 2024.

“Civilians across Ukraine are facing suffering we haven’t seen for more than three years,” said Danielle Bell, head of the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine. “The increase in long-range missile strikes and drone attacks has brought even more death and harm to civilian populations in areas far from the front lines.”

The 9 July assault exemplified this unprecedented escalation, with Russian forces deploying 741 projectiles—728 drones and 13 missiles—in the largest single-night attack since the full-scale invasion began, primarily targeting the western city of Lutsk with 50 drones and five missiles.

Since then, Russia had launched massive aerial assaults each night, with the latest—12 July—targeting west Ukraine, hitherto considered a safe haven from Russia’s terror.

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Russia targets Ukraine’s western “safe havens” with record 597-drone attack

Children forced underground as trauma spreads

The psychological impact on Ukrainian children has reached alarming levels as families adapt to constant aerial threats. “Children are sleeping not in beds, but in corridors, basements or bathrooms, covering their ears with their hands so as not to hear the sounds of sirens and explosions,” Bell emphasized. “Such experiences leave deep psychological trauma.”

The broader 2025 trend confirms systematic deterioration in civilian protection. During the first half of 2025, total civilian casualties reached 6,754 people—a 54% increase compared to the same period in 2024, when 4,381 casualties were documented. Deaths among civilians rose 17%, while injuries surged 64%.

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Ukraine’s sleepless nation: 80% trapped in chronic stress from nightly Russian attacks

Russian weapons evolution drives casualty surge

Three primary factors drove the dramatic increase in civilian casualties: Russia’s deployment of powerful long-range missiles and drones against urban areas, enhanced destructive capacity of these weapons, and growing frequency of attacks. The expanded use of short-range drones has proven particularly deadly for communities near frontlines.

“In many regions, daily life has been reduced to constantly seeking shelter,” Bell noted. “During mass bombings, people remain in shelters for hours, and when they emerge, they often see that their homes or workplaces have been damaged or completely destroyed. This cycle of seeking shelter and suffering losses has become harsh everyday reality for many communities.”

Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion on 24 February 2022, the UN mission has documented at least 13,580 civilian deaths, including 716 children, and 34,115 civilian injuries, including 2,173 children.

Background

Russia’s escalating civilian casualties occur as military losses mount exponentially. Ukrainian officials announced in June that Russian military personnel losses reached 1,000,340 since 24 February 2022, with more than 628,000 deaths occurring in just the last 18 months. Despite these massive losses, Russia continues recruiting approximately 30,000 troops monthly while maintaining about 600,000 forces in Ukraine.

The June civilian casualty surge follows April 2025 becoming the deadliest month for Ukrainian civilians since September 2024, with 209 deaths and 1,146 injuries primarily from ballistic missile strikes on major cities including Kryvyi Rih, Sumy, Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, Kyiv, and Kharkiv.

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My bomb shelter is a bathroom floor

In the wee hours of 12 July, Russia struck the west-Ukrainian cities of Lviv, Lutsk, and Chernivtsi. East-Ukrainian Kharkiv was also affected.

The attack comes one day after Russia’s record aerial missile attack on Kyiv as President Zelenskyy warns that Russia is ramping up its capacities to launch up to 1000 Shahed kamikaze drones at Ukraine daily.

The attack involved 597 drones (339 of them were Shahed kamikaze drones, the rest — imitator drones) and 26 cruise missiles, the air force reported. 319 Shaheds and 25 cruise missiles were reported downed.

The drone attack lasted 11 hours, while the missile attack started at 3:34 and lasted 1.5 hours, according to the monitor TG channel.

A 26-year-old woman and a 43-year-old man were killed in Chernivtsi due to falling drone wreckage, which has seen relatively few attacks since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Lviv, another relatively safe haven, has also come under the brunt of Russia’s escalating attacks. 46 buildings were damaged, and 500 windows smashed in an attack that also damaged the Lviv Polytechnic University.

A private house was destroyed in Lviv; cars also suffered damage.

Poland scrambles jets, but no help to Ukraine

The attack forced Poland to scramble its military aircraft overnight, the Polish Armed Forces Operational Command reported.

Poland has previously scrambled its jets in response to Russia’s attacks on western Ukraine, as it is standard procedure for Poland’s military to scramble jets and increase the readiness of air defense systems when “there is a danger of Russian air strikes on western Ukraine and potential assumptions that [the] border of Poland might be impacted.|

Throughout the war, Russian missiles and attack drones have repeatedly infringed the airspace of Romania, Latvia, Poland, and other NATO members, with Ukraine asking EU and NATO ministers in late August 2024 to start shooting down Russian missiles and drones heading toward NATO over Ukraine.

Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski has stated that his and other countries have a duty to intercept Russian missiles before they enter NATO territory, though NATO maintains it “will not become a party to the conflict.”

Ukrainian authorities have confirmed that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP) remains legally subordinate to Russia’s Orthodox Church despite its claims of independence.

The State Service of Ukraine on Ethnic Policy and Freedom of Conscience (DESS) concluded in a 21-page investigation that Ukraine’s second-largest Orthodox denomination has maintained canonical ties to Moscow through its governing documents and institutional structure.

The timing proves significant as it comes just one week after Ukraine stripped UOC MP leader Metropolitan Onufriy of Ukrainian citizenship for allegedly concealing his Russian passport since 2002.

Russian church charter still governs Ukrainian operations

The DESS investigation revealed that the UOC MP continues to cite the 1990 Gramota (Charter) from then-Patriarch Alexy II of Moscow as its constitutional foundation. The document explicitly states that “the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is connected through our Russian Orthodox Church to the One Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church.”

According to the findings, the UOC MP must still commemorate the Moscow Patriarch in liturgy, have its statutes approved by Moscow, receive holy chrism from Russia, and ensure Ukrainian bishops participate in Russian church councils as obligated members.

Religious scholar Yuriy Chornomorets, who participated in earlier expert evaluations, told Euromaidan Press that “the conclusions use only facts; therefore, its findings are impossible to counter.”

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The documents that prove Ukraine’s Moscow Patriarchate Church never left Russia

Limited response to Russian diocese seizures

The commission noted that Russian authorities have unilaterally transferred three UOC MP dioceses on occupied territories to direct Moscow control since 2022, including dioceses in Crimea, Rovenky, and Berdiansk. The UOC MP leadership offered no resistance to these transfers.

When 33 UOC MP bishops condemned Moscow’s diocese seizures in October 2024, their own church’s governing bodies remained silent, the investigation found.

Legal implications under Ukraine’s church ban

The findings provide legal justification for implementing Ukraine’s August 2024 law banning Russian-affiliated religious organizations. The legislation gave religious groups nine months to sever Russian connections or face dissolution through court proceedings.

DESS will now compile a list of religious organizations connected to the banned Russian Orthodox Church structure, potentially affecting the UOC MP’s approximately 8,000 parishes.

The UOC MP has consistently maintained it severed ties with Moscow after Russia’s February 2022 invasion, but the Ukrainian investigation concludes these claims lack documentary foundation.

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Ukraine just stripped citizenship from the leader of Putin’s favorite church—his 8,000 parishes are next

The historically Moscow-aligned Ukrainian Orthodox Church is still affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church despite claims to the contrary, a Ukrainian state committee has found.

In a lengthy investigation, the Ukrainian State Service of Ukraine on Ethnic Policy and Freedom of Conscience (DESS) has concluded that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC MP) is still legally part of the Russian Orthodox Church.

The law gave religious organizations nine months to sever relations with Russia. Now, DESS is probing whether the connections are still there.

But, how does one establish such matters? After all, the UOC MP insists it supports Ukraine and that it already cut its Russian ties back in 2022.

Moreover, it is leading a global campaign decrying alleged state religious persecution. This initiative has been particularly fruitful among American Republicans, in part thanks to lavish lobbying efforts.

Canonically speaking

The path of an Orthodox church to autocephaly (independence) is notoriously vague and complicated. Unlike the Catholic Church, governed by a single primate from Rome, global Orthodoxy is defined as a constellation of amicable jurisdictions that received independence according to pastoral needs.

Ideally, of course. In practice, however, the path to church independence has been fraught with political strife, stonewalling, and competition between two centers of Orthodox gravitas—the Moscow and Ecumenical patriarchates.

Enter the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

The UOC MP’s predicament stems from centuries of imperial church politics. The 1686 transfer of the Kyiv Metropolitanate from Constantinople to Moscow began Russian control over Ukrainian Orthodoxy—control that outlasted the Soviet Union and continued into independent Ukraine.

This pattern wasn’t unique to Ukraine. The Russian Orthodox Church historically granted limited “autonomy” to Orthodox communities in its sphere—a status somewhere between full independence and direct diocesan control. The Japanese Orthodox Church, Latvian Orthodox Church, Estonian Orthodox Church, and Ukrainian Orthodox Church all received similar arrangements.

True autocephaly, by contrast, means complete independence—as Moscow granted to the Polish Orthodox Church in 1948 and the Orthodox Church in America in 1970. The language was unambiguous: full canonical independence with no mention of accessing global Orthodoxy “through” another church.

What the documents say

So what about Ukraine’s status today?

The 21-page report reads like a forensic autopsy. It dissects the UOC MP’s claims using two key criteria:

1. What the church’s foundational documents say
2. and what its actions reveal.

The smoking gun lies in a 1990 document: the Gramota (Charter) issued by then-Patriarch Alexy II of Moscow. The UOC MP still cites this in its governing statutes. It grants the Ukrainian church “independence and autonomy in its governance”—but with a crucial caveat.

“The Ukrainian Orthodox Church is connected through our Russian Orthodox Church to the One Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church,” the Gramota declares.

Emphasis ours

For DESS investigators, this single line proves subordination. Ukraine’s second-largest Orthodox denomination remains canonically tied to Moscow.

But wait—doesn’t the UOC MP claim it severed these ties after Russia’s 2022 invasion? The church leadership has repeatedly insisted they’re no longer part of the Russian Orthodox Church structure.

The investigation reveals a different story. A 2017 addition to the Russian Orthodox Church’s statutes—Chapter X, titled “The Ukrainian Orthodox Church”—still mandates that the Ukrainian church must:

• Commemorate the Moscow Patriarch’s name in all Ukrainian churches
• Have its statute approved and confirmed by the Moscow Patriarch
• Have its primate blessed by the Moscow Patriarch
• Submit decisions about creating or dissolving dioceses to Moscow’s Archiereus Council for approval
• Ensure Ukrainian bishops participate in Russian church councils as obligated members
• Accept Moscow’s Holy Synod decisions as binding
• Receive holy chrism (consecrated oil) from the Moscow Patriarch

What about the 27 May 2022 Local Council at Feofania Monastery? The UOC MP points to this gathering as proof of their independence. The council did adopt changes to the church statute, removing some explicit references to Moscow.

But the DESS investigation calls this a “notable step toward independence” that “did not mean the withdrawal” from the Russian Orthodox Church. Why not?

The Gramota remains the constitutional foundation.

The investigation found no documents from the UOC MP’s governing bodies—its Sobor, Bishop’s Council, or Holy Synod—declaring withdrawal from the Russian Orthodox Church structure. The silence is deafening.

UOC MP actions speak louder

But documents only tell half the story. What have the churches actually done?

Russian church authorities have been unilaterally transferring UOC MP dioceses on Russian-occupied lands to direct Moscow control since 2022. Three Crimean dioceses in June 2022. The Rovenky diocese in October 2022. The Berdiansk diocese in May 2023.

Some UOC MP bishops have publicly supported Russian aggression. Metropolitan Panteleimon of Luhansk and Alchevsk participated in pro-war events and attended celebrations for Patriarch Kirill’s anniversary.

True, some clergy operate under Russian occupation, where resistance could mean imprisonment. But the church’s response reveals its priorities.

The UOC MP aggressively condemns priests who defect to the rival Orthodox Church of Ukraine, granted independence by Constantinople in 2018. It bans them from serving.

When Moscow transfers entire dioceses? Silence.

In October 2024, 33 UOC MP bishops condemned Moscow’s unilateral diocese transfers. Were they supported by their colleagues? No. The church’s governing bodies said nothing.

This shows they can resist when they choose to. They just don’t choose to resist Moscow.

UOC MP leader’s Russian citizenship

Ukraine just stripped citizenship from the leader of Putin’s favorite church—his 8,000 parishes are next

The grassroots revolt

Between 2022 and 2024, multiple groups of clergy and laypeople issued appeals to Metropolitan Onuphrius. They demanded complete canonical separation from Moscow.

Were these appeals considered? The investigation notes they were “left without consideration by the highest organs of church authority and governance of the UOC MP.”

The verdict

The DESS conclusion is unequivocal: the Kyiv Metropolitanate remains affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church under all four criteria established by Ukrainian law:

1. the UOC still belongs to Moscow’s structure
2. its documents still reference Russian control
3. Moscow still makes binding decisions for Ukrainian dioceses
4. Ukrainian bishops still sit on Russian church councils.

For Ukrainian authorities, this provides legal justification for potential further action. For the church itself, it represents a canonical Catch-22. It must maintain the Russian connection that legitimizes its existence while operating in a country that has banned that very connection.

Is the commission biased?

While the UOC MP hasn’t responded officially to the DESS conclusion, prominent figures like Iona Cherepanov have decried it as “Soviet,” implying that the commission is biased and implements state decisions to, allegedly, persecute the UOC MP.

That’s impossible, says religious scholar and philosopher Yuriy Chornomorets, who had previously taken part in an expert committee that arrived at similar conclusions. The DESS conclusion uses only facts; therefore, its findings are impossible to counter, Chornomorets told Euromaidan Press.

The sophistication and detail of analysis testify to the high level of expertise of the DESS experts, he maintains. Moreover, the conclusions in the documents are supported by quotes from UOC MP leaders themselves.

Theologian Cyril Hovorun told Euromaidan Press that the conclusions “correspond to canonical realities as they are understood in Eastern Christianity.”

The UOC still references Moscow’s 1990 charter. It still operates under Russian Orthodox Church statutes. Ukrainian bishops still sit on Russian church councils.

These aren’t interpretations—they’re documented facts.

Why doesn’t the UOC MP break free from Russia?

The path forward is surprisingly straightforward, according to Chornomorets. The UOC would need to officially decide to leave the Russian Orthodox Church. It must notify all Orthodox patriarchs of its new status. It should condemn Moscow’s seizure of Ukrainian dioceses.

“The UOC must start acting like an autocephalous church,” he argues.

So why haven’t they?

This question haunts Ukrainian religious observers. The UOC’s response reveals a stunning contradiction.

“Today the UOC admits it remains part of the Russian Orthodox Church but claims it intends to become autocephalous,” Chornomorets notes. “Yet it demands Ukrainian authorities treat it as if it already achieved independence.”

The duplicity runs deeper. “When UOC bishops operate outside Ukraine—in Europe, for instance—they demand local Orthodox hierarchs treat them as Russian Orthodox Church representatives,” he explains. They want to be independent in Ukraine but Russian abroad.

Religious historian Andriy Smyrnov believes Metropolitan Onuphrius is waiting for the war to end. Why? “To return to the Russian Orthodox Church.”

Chornomorets offers a blunt explanation. “UOC leadership maintains passivity because they’re not afraid of Ukraine’s democratic state—they’re panicked by Putin.” He suggests UOC leaders fear they could end up dead like Russian officials who displease the Kremlin.

Financial incentives provide another explanation. Influential Russian-born oligarch Vadym Novinskyi—who obtained Ukrainian citizenship in 2012 under Viktor Yanukovych, serves as a UOC deacon, and is widely considered the church’s main financial patron—allegedly channels VTB Bank loans to pro-Russian bishops.

Novinskyi’s funding could be part of the explanation, Hovorun believes. But not all of it.

Meanwhile, Smyrnov believes the UOC MP hasn’t declared autocephaly “because it would place them in a schism.” Breaking away unilaterally would leave the church without recognition from other Orthodox patriarchates.

“But really, over three years they could have appealed to church primates, could have restored communication with the Ecumenical Patriarch [severed in 2018 – ed] and asked for help,” he says.

The irony is palpable. While Chornomorets notes that 74% of UOC faithful support immediate separation from Moscow, their bishops cling to Russian ties that Ukrainian law now explicitly forbids.

What happens next?

DESS expert Viacheslav Horshkov, one of the report’s authors, outlines the immediate next steps. “It’s too early to talk about parishes now,” he tells Euromaidan Press. “The next step is a directive to the Kyiv Metropolitanate of the UOC to eliminate signs of affiliation with the Russian Orthodox Church.”

The church will have 30 days to comply, with a possible 60-day extension upon request. If they meet the requirements—which Horshkov considers realistic—the matter closes.

If not, the Kyiv Metropolitanate will be officially recognized as affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church, and the case goes to court.

The timeline remains uncertain. But if the court strips the Kyiv Metropolitanate of its legal entity status, questions will arise for subordinate structures—diocesan administrations, monasteries, missions, and spiritual educational institutions.

Parishes face different options. “Parishes can peacefully transition to independent status or exist without legal entity status,” Horshkov explains. “They have several options for determining their fate. They can even register a new association.”

“The new law preserves Russians’ right to worship freely, hold gatherings, and maintain their own temples,” Chornomorets explains. “But it strips them of privileges to use approximately 3,000 religious buildings belonging to the state as historical monuments or local communities.”

He notes the law’s limitations.

“The sanctions are too mild—loss of legal entity status for religious communities, monasteries, seminaries, dioceses, and the Kyiv Metropolitanate, but nothing that would constitute a real ‘ban on the Russian Orthodox Church.'”

DESS will now compile a list of religious organizations connected with the banned Russian Orthodox Church structure. “If a parish ends up on the list and doesn’t comply with the directive to eliminate affiliation, and uses state property, then the lease agreement will be terminated,” Smyrnov says.

But there won’t be mass prosecutions. The focus remains on the Kyiv Metropolitanate itself.

Smirnov expects Metropolitan Onuphrius might convene a bishops’ council to declare the UOC independent in response to the DESS directive.

But the 75-year-old Metropolitan, who came of age in Moscow’s Holy Trinity-St.Sergius Lavra, represents a generation of church leaders whose worldview remains fundamentally tied to the Russian Orthodox tradition, regardless of political circumstances.

Why does it matter if the UOC MP is still affiliated with Russia?

Since Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion, Ukraine has attempted to prod the UOC MP with its 8,097 parishes, vs the roughly 9,000 of rival independent OCU, into ditching Moscow, thus reducing the amount of Russian soft power in the embattled country.

The UOC MP has been viewed as Russia’s soft power tool for decades, promoting a version of the “Russian world” ideology that envisions Ukraine as part of a “Holy Rus” rather than an independent state.

As Andriy Smyrnov notes, the church spread Russian narratives that Ukraine should exist as Russia’s province, not a sovereign nation.

The stakes extend beyond theology.

Ukraine’s second-largest Orthodox denomination faces a choice: genuine independence or continued subordination to a church that blesses the bombs falling on Ukrainian cities.

Editor’s note: the article was updated to include comments from Viacheslav Horshkov

Euromaidan Press is expanding and searching for professional soulmates who believe in independent journalism.

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Ukraine’s strongest ally just elected a president who wants to cut refugee benefits, block EU membership, and exploit historical grievances. How did Poland—once Ukraine’s loudest champion—turn against its neighbor?

To the south, Romania nearly elected the far-right and pro-Russian George Simion. To the west, Slovakia’s Robert Fico and Hungary’s Viktor Orban have long parroted Kremlin talking points and tried to block aid to the embattled country. Now Poland, long one of Kyiv’s most consistent, vocal, and strongest allies, has begun to sour on its neighbor as well.

Since Russia initiated a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Kyiv has received tremendous diplomatic support, especially from its neighbors in the region. However, after more than three years of war, cracks in this support are beginning to show.

The culmination of this trend was in June 2025 with the election of Karol Nawrocki. An arch-conservative and nationalist, Nawrocki has promised to limit benefits to Ukrainian refugees, block Kyiv’s accession to NATO and the EU, and has stoked historical trauma between the states.

A nail biting contest

For weeks, journalists, analysts, and politicians had been watching Poland’s presidential election cycle. What was initially predicted to be a walk in the park for the liberal centrist candidate, Rafał Trzaskowski, has become a neck-in-neck race with his conservative challenger, Karol Nawrocki.

A few months ago, many Poles would have struggled to even identify Karol Nawrocki in a photo lineup. The former head of the Institute of National Memory (IPN), many were surprised when Jarosław Kaczyński, leader of the conservative party Law and Justice (PiS), selected him to run for president.

After spending weeks catching up to Trzaskowski, Nawrocki barely snatched victory on 1 June.

Why was Nawrocki successful?

Nawrocki’s previous obscurity made his victory surprising. His main challenger appeared to be a tailor-made presidential candidate, while Nawrocki was dogged by scandals—allegations of football hooliganism, exploiting an elderly man for cheap rent, potentially soliciting prostitutes.

The ruling government coalition, headed by Donald Tusk, is an unwieldy creature comprising the progressive left, centrist liberals, and conservatives. Since coming into power in 2023, it has become incredibly unpopular.

United more in their antipathy towards PiS, the parties have proved adept at angering most segments of Polish society.

Tusk’s coalition had promised everything and delivered few of its core pledges. The abortion liberalization bill failed by just three votes because members of Tusk’s own coalition voted it down. Meanwhile, there has been no movement on legalizing same-sex marriage.

Conservative voters were incensed at the government undoing many of PiS’s former policies, while liberal and progressive urban supporters felt betrayed by broken promises.

Another factor playing in Nawrocki’s favor were efforts by the United States’ current Trump administration to back him.

In early May, Nawrocki attended the White House National Prayer Day and met with Donald Trump. Later that month, Homeland Security Director Kristi Noem urged Poles to vote for the conservative Nawrocki during a speech at the CPAC.

Tired of the new neighbors

The question is, why? Since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war, Poland has been one of Ukraine’s staunchest allies. It has taken in millions of Ukrainian refugees since February 2022; it has provided billions of złoty in aid; and has vociferously backed Kyiv on the global stage.

The transformation has been dramatic. Over one million Ukrainians now comprise nearly 7% of Poland’s population.

War fatigue has set in after three years of conflict with no end in sight

• More Poles now believe that Ukraine should give up territory to Russia to halt the war.
• The majority want military-aged Ukrainian men to return home.
• There is a growing sense that Ukrainian refugees take advantage of state benefits.

Economic competition narratives have taken hold despite evidence to the contrary. Ukrainian refugees have founded around 60,000 enterprises and boosted Poland’s GDP by 2.7% in 2024.

Many Poles are now receptive to restricting Ukrainian refugee benefits. Both major candidates proposed cutting the 800+ złoty monthly child benefit—roughly $170—that helps Ukrainian families, with Nawrocki promising outright cuts and Trzaskowski proposing to limit it only to working Ukrainian refugees.

This targets largely women with children, and the administrative costs of determining employment status would likely exceed any savings from the cuts.

A harsh new reality

So, what does Karol Nawrocki’s election mean for Kyiv? The consequences are mixed. While Poland’s crucial wartime support remains secure, longer-term strategic goals face new obstacles.

1. No threat to military support

Ukraine can breathe easy on one front: Poland’s military backing will continue. Nawrocki has declared support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and resistance to Russian aggression and explicitly supports giving military aid to help Ukraine fend off Russia’s invasion.

Poland will remain Ukraine’s vital logistics hub for Western arms deliveries and a vocal diplomatic advocate for Ukraine’s fight against Russia. The fundamental strategic partnership against Russian aggression stays intact—Nawrocki may be skeptical of Ukrainian integration, but he’s firmly anti-Russian.

2. Immediate impact on refugees

Unfortunately, this support will not extend past helping Ukraine fight Russia. As it relates to Poland’s treatment of Ukrainian refugees, Nawrocki has taken a hardline position and has vocally targeted the vulnerable group fleeing Russia’s vicious war.

In April, the then candidate declared that he would push for and sign a law that prohibited immigrants be treated better than Poles, “in their own country.” Ukrainians comprise the largest immigrant group, making the intent clear.

If Nawrocki were alone in pushing for these restrictive policies, life would be complicated for Ukrainian refugees, but still secure. The president has very few domestic affairs powers outside of the veto.

What is cause for concern is that many of Poland’s political class have also adopted anti-Ukraine stances. The current ruling coalition has voiced support for cutting child benefits for certain categories of refugees.

What the vibes were like in 2022

Poland is stepping up for Ukrainian refugees, but it cannot take everyone in

3. The long run

The second danger lies in Ukraine’s post-war future. Nawrocki has explicitly conditioned EU and NATO membership on resolving “civilizational issues”—primarily allowing Polish exhumations of Volyn massacre victims.

He declared that “a country that cannot answer for a very brutal crime against 120,000 of its neighbors cannot be part of international alliances.”

Despite Ukraine having acquiesced to exhumations earlier in 2025, Nawrocki has previewed how he will use the issue. In early June, Nawrocki publicly chastised Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy over the need to “[solve] overdue historical issues.” Days later, Poland passed a law establishing a day of remembrance for victims of “genocide.”

More on how the Polish far-right weaponized history against Ukraine:

From open arms to political war: how Poland’s far-right turn Ukraine into a wedge issue

This triggered a diplomatic spat, with Ukraine taking umbrage over the word “genocide.”

This controversy represents a major point of contention between the two countries. Were the massacres of Poles in Volyn in 1943 a genocide, or a tragedy of war? Many Poles, not only conservatives, view the killings as a form of genocide. Ukraine believes that the matter should be viewed with more nuance, especially in the context of Polish animosity towards Ukrainians in the lead up to WW2.

Many conservative politicians in Poland would prefer to keep the Volyn massacres in the public eye. Much like with demands for war reparations from Germany, there is little reason for them to actually sit with the opposing side and come up with a sensible solution. Rather, it is advantageous to use these historical points of contention for political support.

Unfortunately, the current governing coalition, despite being opponents of Nawrocki, has signaled that they will also use this historical point of contention to gin up support.

Nawrocki has also identified agriculture as a pressure point, promising to prevent “unfair competition with Ukraine for Polish agriculture.”

This matters not because of agriculture’s economic weight—it comprises only around 3% of Poland’s GDP—but because of its political significance. Farmers represent a key constituency for conservative parties, and Ukrainian grain has triggered Polish farmer protests and border blockades.

4. The extremist threat

Like in the United States, Poland, despite being a parliamentarian and multiparty system, is largely divided into two blocs, conservative and centrist liberal. These two groups have been in power for decades.

Similar to their US peers, many young people in Poland reject this duopoly. Furious at the rising cost of living and economic instability, many youth voters sprinted to the far ends of the political system.

While some have thrown their weight behind the leftwing party Razem, far more have thrown in their lot with the far-right Sławomir Mentzen and his party Konfederacja. Mentzen has used the Ukraine war to his political advantage—organizing border blockades against Ukrainian trucks and targeting Ukrainian refugees with his rhetoric.

While the young firebrand’s support fell from a high of 18%, he still came in third during the first round with nearly 15% of the vote share, making inroads across demographics.

A gloomy forecast

If the governing coalition were to collapse, the far-right Konfederacja would have a huge advantage. It would be able to point to the inability of the two large parties to govern and play on the resulting disaffection. While Razem fully supports Ukraine’s fight and welcomes refugees, Konfederacja has shown that it has a larger support base.

Ukraine is currently faced with two major dilemmas.

1. Putin and the Russian army continue to push westward, making small and costly gains, yet still stretching the limits of Ukraine’s manpower and logistics.
2. Two of its closest allies, the US and Poland, have elected leaders who are either sympathetic to Russia, or view Ukraine as a tool to advance their nationalist agenda.

When the war finally ends, Ukraine will need all of the assistance it can get to both recover and quickly accede into the EU (NATO looks like it is out of reach). It is a shame that its future is clouded by the self-serving nationalism of its friends.

For the past three years, I’ve spent many nights sleeping in the bathroom. That puts at least two walls between me and the street—thick walls, made of concrete and brick. I naively hope they’ll protect me from shrapnel if there’s an explosion nearby.

I don’t even think about what would happen if a drone flew straight into my window. It’s a sort of fatalism. In case of a direct hit, there are too many factors you can’t predict. And if you can’t predict something—you try not to think about it.

I barely remember the time before the war anymore. And I’m not talking about 2022—I mean 2014. The war has been close one way or another all this time: funerals, hospitals, friends, fundraisers, work on the frontline, news from the occupied territories. Only a completely unempathetic fool can claim the war is far away and doesn’t really concern them.

In case you missed it: the war in Ukraine started in 2014, when Russians occupied Crimea. Sometimes I hear nonsense like “Well, that was a long time ago, what’s the difference now.” Huge difference. Occupied territories remain occupied even decades later.

Since 2022, Russia stopped pretending altogether and decided to wage full-scale war. So here you are, living in the capital of a country whose right to exist Russians completely reject, whose entire people’s existence they deny.

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Hours after Trump-Putin call, Russia attacks Kyiv with record 550 missiles and drones (updated)

Two beds, every night

Every night I prepare two beds: a regular one in the bedroom, and one in the bathroom, made of several sleeping pads and sleeping bags. Before going to sleep, you check the air raid map and make a decision.

Will you start the night in a normal bed, or is it better to go straight to the bathroom so you don’t end up running around the apartment in the middle of the night? You also bring your go-bag into the bathroom—tech, documents, first aid kit, flashlight. So that if something happens, everything is within reach.

Sometimes, if you don’t forget, you also bring a bottle of water. Since I’m tall, sleeping in the bathroom isn’t very comfortable. Despite its size, I still don’t fit on the floor.

Reading the patterns

You learn to predict the attacks. If Russians attacked neighboring regions—Poltava or Cherkasy—for several nights in a row, that means you should expect an attack on Kyiv soon.

It’s easy to tell when drones are headed for Kyiv. If they are, they arrive early, while it’s still light out, and can come not just from Sumy Oblast, but also from Chernihiv. If you see that happening, you head straight to sleep in the bathroom.

If drones are only flying from Sumy Oblast, there’s a chance they’ll target somewhere else that night, and you might be able to sleep in a normal bed without interruption. But not always—there are different scenarios.

Just before dawn, you might jolt awake because ballistic missiles are flying toward Kyiv. Sometimes the air raid alert goes off at the same moment as the explosions, or just a minute or two before the strike. There’s no time to get to a shelter. Only the bathroom.

What sleep deprivation actually looks like

If you spend the whole night in the bathroom—it’s hard to call that real sleep. Your joints ache, no matter how many sleeping pads you lay down. The floor is never going to feel like a bed. And because of that damn joint pain, you can’t fall asleep.

But that’s not even the worst part. Aching joints are the least of your worries. When your windows rattle and your doors slam because something gets shot down nearby—it’s pretty hard to sleep. And if it’s a ballistic missile—the whole city hears it.

Or you might wake up to a horrible buzzing right over your building. That’s a modified Iranian Shahed drone, which of course no one ever officially supplied to the Russians. Trust me—that’s not a sound you ever want to hear.

On nights like last night, the number of these drones can reach the hundreds. Literally. The monitoring channels even stop reporting which districts they’re flying over and how many—because there’s just no point. This shit is everywhere.

Then the reports start coming in about impacts. Every time, they’re somewhere near your friends or family. Because I have friends all over Kyiv. So you start messaging them, asking if they’re okay. You get nervous when they take too long to reply.

Morning after

By morning, the air raid alert is over. All in all, you got maybe three hours of sleep. That’s how it’s been for three years.

When you read articles about how sleep deprivation is a threat in wars between countries on another continent—you want to laugh hysterically. Because I know what that is. And I want to tell you that you get used to it too.

When you go outside in the morning—you see the coffee shop near your home is already open. The supermarket too. You get your coffee, buy cigarettes, and head to the metro.

You walk there angry and sleep-deprived. But alive. And not injured. And as awful as it sounds—you’re grateful for that. Because if you made it through the night, then today you can do something important. Someone else wasn’t as lucky.

People sit in cafés, eat croissants, drink their coffee. But before that, they might have spent the night in a metro station, an underground parking garage, or a basement. Or in the bathroom. This is now the fourth year. The war itself—the twelfth.

What peace actually means

I’m not even going to try describing how people live in Kharkiv, Sumy, or Odesa. And especially Kherson, where Russians literally hunt people using FPV drones. That’s a whole different level of terror and trying to survive within it.

Russia’s “drone safari” in Kherson

The UN confirmed what I saw in Kherson: Russia is hunting civilians for sport

That’s why any news about Putin’s so-called “desire for peace” makes us furious. We hear that damn “desire for peace” several times a week. And Kharkiv or Sumy—every single day. Russia has no desire for peace. So there won’t be any.

Putin only understands strength. That fact is as simple as two times two. But some people—some politicians—pretend things aren’t so black and white. Countries that once gave your country security guarantees can’t even close the skies over you.

They not only refuse to give you air defense missiles for free—they refuse to sell them. Ukrainians are very angry about that. Incredibly. Because they have every right to be. We’ve lived three years under full-scale war and nightly terror.

Learning how to live in full-scale war isn’t a skill anyone should ever have to acquire. I hope you never have to experience anything like this.

But here we go again:

Stas Kozliuk

Stas Kozliuk is a Ukrainian reporter and photojournalist.

Editor’s note. The opinions expressed in our Opinion section belong to their authors. Euromaidan Press’ editorial team may or may not share them.

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The Pentagon has suspended shipments of critical air defense missiles to Ukraine amid concerns about depleted US stockpiles.

The timing is especially concerning: Russia just launched record-breaking missile and drone attacks last month.

Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiga captured the stakes: Russian attacks killed 37% more civilians in the past six months, he noted, while emphasizing Ukraine’s willingness to “buy or borrow” air defense systems if needed.

Why this matters for Ukraine’s survival

How many missiles did Russia fire at Ukraine in June alone? Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha reported Russia launched over 330 missiles, including almost 80 ballistic missiles, plus over 5,000 attack drones and 5,000 KABs (guided bombs).

Now the US has halted 30 Patriot missiles, nearly 8,500 155mm artillery shells, and over 250 precision GMLRS missiles.

Ukraine loses its primary shield against Russian ballistic missiles without sustained Patriot resupply. But the vulnerabilities run deeper.

Ukraine’s defense architecture faces critical gaps

Defense Express analysis reveals how heavily Ukrainian air defense relies on American systems:

• Long-range protection: Patriot systems are Ukraine’s main shield against ballistic missiles—the fast-moving projectiles that can hit anywhere in the country. European alternatives? Ukraine operates French-Italian SAMP/T systems, but Ukrainian air defense expert Serhii Morfinov notes “the question of whether there are enough missiles for SAMP/T systems is very big.”
• Medium-range coverage: Norwegian NASAMS launchers fire American AIM-9 and AIM-120 missiles to intercept aircraft and cruise missiles. Aging American HAWK systems also depend on US resupply.

• Precision strikes: American HIMARS rocket launchers lose their GMLRS guided missiles—the precision weapons that hit Russian supply lines and command posts up to 80 kilometers away.
• Close-range defense: Portable Stinger missiles and truck-mounted Avenger systems protect troops and installations from low-flying aircraft and drones.

What Ukraine can use without American support

Which air defense systems don’t depend on US supplies? Defense Express breaks down Ukraine’s non-American options:

• Short-range systems (up to 10km): Polish Piorun, French Mistral, Swedish RBS-70, and British Martlet missiles provide portable defense. German systems using FZ275 LGR missiles offer additional coverage. Ukraine also operates modified “Osa” systems converted to use R-73 missiles.
• Medium-range systems (up to 20km): German IRIS-T SLS and British Raven systems with ASRAAM missiles on SupaCat chassis. Spain’s Spada systems were promised in 2022 but haven’t appeared in combat.

• Long-range coverage: Only German IRIS-T SLM systems provide medium-range coverage without American missiles. The problem? Ukraine has far more Norwegian NASAMS systems, which depend entirely on US-supplied AIM-9 and AIM-120 missiles.
• Soviet-era systems: If Ukraine still has missiles, aging S-125, “Tor,” and “Buk” systems remain operational. But Soviet ammunition became scarce years ago, forcing Ukraine to create “FrankenSAMs”—Soviet launchers modified to fire American AIM-7 missiles.

The critical gap? Anti-ballistic missile defense. France and Italy provided only two SAMP/T batteries compared to roughly 10 Patriot systems. SAMP/T missiles are also reportedly in short supply.

Suspension shows aid used as leverage

This marks the second major aid suspension under Trump. The first occurred in March 2025 after a heated 28 February Oval Office confrontation where Trump told Zelenskyy “you’re not winning this” and “you don’t have the cards right now.”

That March suspension reportedly pressured Ukraine into negotiations and signing a minerals deal. Within weeks of the aid cutoff, Ukraine had abandoned its victory plan and shifted to promoting ceasefire proposals.

This suspension, like the one in March, also came out of the blue. Ukrainian MP Fedir Venislavskyi told RBC-Ukraine that Kyiv had “worked out various scenarios” for such contingencies but confirmed the decision was “very unpleasant for us.”

How significant is this suspension? Russian responses provide the answer. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated that “the less weapons are supplied to Ukraine the closer the end of the special military operation.” Moscow recognizes the strategic opportunity.

Explore further

The weapons Ukraine just lost to US aid freeze, explained

Ukraine’s growing vulnerabilities

Ballistic missile exposure becomes critical

What happens without PAC-3 interceptors? Ukraine becomes “very vulnerable to Russian ballistics,” Morfinov writes. Russia can systematically target:

• Aviation at airfields
• Command centers and military headquarters
• Defense production facilities
• Critical infrastructure and logistics hubs
• Air defense systems themselves during drone swarm attacks

The cascading effect threatens everything. Russian forces use drone swarms to locate Ukrainian air defense positions, then target them with ballistic missiles that depleted Patriot batteries cannot intercept.

Artillery ammunition shortage compounds frontline pressure

Can Ukraine maintain counter-battery fire with 8,500 fewer 155mm shells?

Morfinov explains this creates “weakening during the great summer offensive by the Russians along the entire front line.” Ukrainian production and alternative sources provide some mitigation, but gaps remain.

The loss of GMLRS precision rockets hits harder. Ukraine must rely more on F-16s carrying Storm Shadow missiles, which increases pilot risks.

Explore further

Can Europe fill in the gap if Trump abandons Ukraine?

Strategic implications extend beyond battlefield

Military analyst Jack Watling of the Royal United Services Institute warned that “this decision will cost Ukrainian lives and territory.” The psychological impact compounds material losses as Ukrainian forces and civilians question Western resolve.

NATO Chief Mark Rutte argued on Fox News that “Ukraine cannot do without all the support it can get” for ammunition and air defense. His framing challenges the administration’s logic: “It is also in the interests of the US for Ukraine not to lose this war.”

Rutte’s formula—”secure Europe means secure US”—positions Ukrainian victory as essential for American security, directly contradicting the “America First” rationale.

Pentagon justification reveals broader shift

Why suspend aid now? Defense policy chief Elbridge Colby stated the review ensures “US forces’ readiness for Administration defense priorities.” Translation: Pacific focus amid China concerns takes precedence.

The Pentagon cited recent Middle East operations, including Iran’s retaliatory attack on Qatar that prompted “the largest single engagement of Patriot air defense missiles in US history.” White House spokesperson Anna Kelly’s statement about putting “America’s interests first” suggests strategic repositioning rather than temporary inventory concerns.

Ukraine scrambles for alternatives

How prepared was Ukraine for this scenario? Venislavskyi confirmed that “Ukraine has a certain reserve capacity” for such contingencies, while diplomatic efforts intensify to reverse the decision.

The suspension accelerates Ukraine’s pivot toward domestic production.

Previous reporting shows Ukraine produced over two million FPV drones in 2024 and developed long-range variants capable of 1,700-kilometer strikes.

But critical vulnerabilities remain in air defense and precision strike capabilities. European capacity constraints limit immediate alternatives—the EU faces supply shortages and slower production timelines. Frozen Russian asset proceeds provide funding, but cannot address immediate ammunition shortfalls.

The question facing Ukraine: Can domestic production and European alternatives fill the gaps before Russia exploits the opening?

Metropolitan Onufriy, leader of the Moscow-aligned Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC MP), has had his Ukrainian citizenship revoked, the Ukrainian Security Service announced.

The announcement comes amid growing tensions over the UOC MP’s allegiance in a war increasingly recognized to be driven by the quasi-religious ideology of the “Russian world,” promoted by the Moscow Patriarchy, which is still recognized as the mother church by many UOC MP faithful.

The Security Service (SBU) reported that Onufriy, birthname Orest Berezovskyi, had willingly received Russian citizenship in 2002, while still holding the status of a Ukrainian citizen.

At the time, dual citizenship was prohibited by Ukrainian law, and while a groundbreaking law allowing dual citizenship is pending approval by Ukrainian President Zelenskyy, it still prohibits allegiance to “unfriendly states” like Russia for Ukrainian citizens.

Reportedly, Zelenskyy has signed the decree stripping Onufriy of citizenship, although it has not been published.

UOC MP denies everything, vows to fight back

A UOC MP spokesman rejected the claim that the UOC MP primate has a Russian passport and stated that Onufriy has only Ukrainian citizenship.

Metropolitan Onufriy of the UOC (MP) will also appeal the presidential decree and prove that he has no other citizenships than Ukrainian, the spokesman said in a comment to Suspilne.

The issue of Onufriy’s citizenship had already come up in 2023, when a media report found that he and 20 other UOC MP hierarchs had Russian passports.

After the publication, the UOC MP’s top hierarch decried Russia’s invasion and claimed that his Russian citizenship was extended by default from the time when he lived and studied in Moscow. Nevertheless, now he does not have a Russian passport now and considers himself only a Ukrainian citizen, he said without specifying when he stopped being a Russian citizen.

However, media reports from NV and Agenstvo have circulated scans of Onufriy’s allegedly valid passport, casting doubt on these refutations.

Can Ukraine actually strip its citizens of citizenship?

Ukraine’s Constitution prohibits stripping citizenship—but allows terminating it for those who voluntarily acquired foreign passports without resolving their Ukrainian status.

Parliament member Serhiy Vlasenko explained that Onufriy now automatically becomes a foreigner in Ukraine, losing all citizen rights. He must register as a foreign resident, obtain residence and work permits—”the same procedures as any Russian Federation citizen coming to Ukraine.”

The legal distinction matters. President Zelensky previously terminated citizenship for oligarchs Igor Kolomoisky, Viktor Medvedchuk, and businessman Hennadiy Korban using identical grounds: holding undeclared foreign passports.

Onufriy can challenge the decree in court. But if judges confirm he holds a Russian passport, the presidential decree stands. And renouncing Russian citizenship isn’t simple—it requires a “long, complex, bureaucratized procedure” involving personal participation in Russian consular processes.

The citizenship revocation transforms Ukraine’s top Moscow-aligned cleric into a legal foreigner in the country where he leads 8,000 parishes.

What will happen to Onufriy?

Ukrainian law technically gives stateless individuals three months to leave before facing deportation. But reality operates differently. As Archbishop Iona of the St. Iona Monastery casually noted on Facebook, many UOC bishops stripped of citizenship “continue to live and serve the church and people of Ukraine. Don’t panic.”

Namely, 13 UOC hierarchs lost their citizenship in January 2023. Five more followed in February 2023. None were deported. They remain in Ukraine, conducting services, managing parishes—functionally unchanged despite their legal limbo.

The SBU’s move creates a different kind of pressure. If Onufriy attempts international travel, he faces the fate of businessman Hennadiy Korban and others stripped of Ukrainian passports: denied re-entry, effectively trapped inside the country they call home.

But deportation? Unlikely. Ukraine lacks both political will and practical mechanisms to forcibly remove an 80-year-old religious leader whose 8,000 parishes still serve millions of faithful. The state has bigger battles, like the ongoing court proceedings under August 2024’s law banning Moscow-linked religious organizations.

The nine-month transition period for churches to prove independence has expired. The UOC MP now faces potential dissolution of its entire network—a far more existential threat than one prelate’s passport problems.

The citizenship revocation serves as legal theater while the real drama unfolds in courtrooms where the UOC MP’s survival hangs in the balance.

Does the law ban the UOC MP? Not so fast

“Not about banning.” Theologian unpacks Ukraine’s new anti-Russian church law

Is the UOC MP aligned with Moscow?

The status of the UOC MP in Ukraine became especially contentious after Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. The Moscow-aligned church, which enjoyed privileged status for years while promoting “Russian world” ideology, came under increased pressure to clarify its allegiance.

And while the UOC MP claimed to sever ties with its mother church, the Russian Orthodox Church, in May 2022, it did not walk the talk, a Ukrainian expert committee found in 2023.

Reportedly, there is a split within the church, with hardliner parishes ignoring the instructions to no longer pray for the Moscow Patriarch during liturgies.

As well, the alleged severance of ties is not followed up by recognition of the UOC MP as a separate entity in the Orthodox world’s constellation of independent churches. The UOC MP hierarchs are also, apparently, still part of the Moscow Patriarchy’s ruling structure—the Synode.

The Ukrainian state has attempted to curb the UOC MP’s influence—not only via the August 2024 law, but by opening 174 probes into the collaboration of separate church hierarchs with Russia, with 31 guilty sentences.

However, many UOC MP faithful insist they are patriots of Ukraine, with select church voices stressing that UOC MP faithful defend Ukraine in the ranks of the Ukrainian army.

Thus far, the UOC MP’s status is hybrid: while some leaders like Metropolitan Iona have flipped from “Russian world” advocate to self-declared Ukrainian patriot, leaflets promoting Russian chauvinistic and imperialistic views are still observed in other church centers.

Explore further

Anatomy of treason: how the Ukrainian Orthodox Church sold its soul to the “Russian world”

Growing church drama in Ukraine

The UOC MP’s precarious position is complicated by competition with the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), granted independence by Moscow Patriarch Kirill’s nemesis, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, in 2018.

Both structures have roughly similar numbers of parishes (8,097 UOC MP vs 9,000 OCU). 687 parishes have ditched affiliation with the UOC MP to join the OCU since 2022. However, these transitions are increasingly marred by accusations of forceful takeovers amid state backing.

What is Moscow’s stake? The UOC MP represents a whopping 23% of the Russian Orthodox Church’s parishes worldwide, and is the largest concentration of parishes outside Russia itself.

The UOC MP remains Moscow’s sole surviving pillar of influence in a Ukraine that has otherwise severed all connections to Russia since 2022. Its ideological power runs deep: the fantasy of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus as “Holy Rus” united against the “satanic West” forms the theological cornerstone of Putin’s war.

This, as well, as revocations of leases on historic churches in state property, has prompted the UOC MP to lead a campaign decrying alleged religious persecution in Ukraine. This messaging has had impressive success among American Republicans, largely due to the lobbying efforts of lawyer Robert Amsterdam.

The Ukrainian state would indeed prefer a single Orthodox Church, and public opinion increasingly backs decisive action.

A June 2025 SOCIS poll found 34.7% of Ukrainians support liquidating the UOC MP as a legal organization, while 10.8% favor forcing its merger with the OCU.

Combined, 45.5% want the state to act decisively.

Yet 31.7% believe the government shouldn’t interfere in religious affairs, revealing Ukraine’s deep ambivalence about using state power against a church that still claims millions of faithful.

The resistance of even Ukraine-oriented UOC MP parishes to joining the OCU structure hints at deeper issues beyond historical animosity between two competitors.

Clashing allegiances, models of religious life, and the OCU’s desire to occupy the privileged state-promoted status once held by Moscow’s church in Ukraine will continue to stir Ukraine’s religious life for many years ahead.

Explore further

Russian World: the heresy driving Putin’s war

Editor’s note: This article was updated to include the section “Can Ukraine actually strip its citizens of citizenship?”

Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry summoned the top US diplomat Wednesday to address concerns over military aid delays, warning that any slowdown would “encourage the aggressor to continue war and terror.”

Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha requested the meeting with Chargé d’Affaires John Ginkel as the Pentagon suspends critical air defense shipments and precision munitions to Ukraine. The timing could not be worse—Russia is unleashing its heaviest bombardments on Ukrainian civilians in months while Washington halts the very weapons needed to protect them.

Ukrainian warnings on aid consequences

Deputy Foreign Minister Mariana Betsa expressed gratitude to the United States for support provided since Russia’s full-scale invasion began but emphasized the critical importance of continuing delivery of previously allocated defense packages, especially focusing on strengthening Ukraine’s air defenses.

“Any delay or slowing down in supporting Ukraine’s defense capabilities would only encourage the aggressor to continue war and terror, rather than seek peace,” Betsa told the American diplomat, according to the ministry statement.

The Ukrainian side emphasized that Russia not only rejects the full and unconditional ceasefire that Ukraine agreed to on 11 March, but also continues to escalate aerial attacks against Ukrainian cities and communities, killing civilians, and conducting battlefield assaults.

“In these circumstances, strengthening Ukraine’s defense capabilities and increasing coordinated transatlantic pressure on the aggressor are critically important,” Betsa said.

Pentagon cuts air defense amid Russian escalation

The Pentagon’s decision to halt air defense missiles and precision munitions shipments follows an internal review showing American arsenals had dropped to concerning levels. Officials justified the suspension as “putting America’s interests first,” even as Russia intensifies bombardments of Ukrainian cities.

The White House confirmed Wednesday that the Pentagon suspended deliveries due to concerns that US weapons stocks had been depleted. Ukrainian officials said they had not received official notification of the suspension or revision of delivery schedules for previously agreed defense assistance.

• Since February 2022, the US has provided $66.9 billion in military aid to Ukraine. The last package worth $500 million was announced by the Biden administration on 9 January, with the US not announcing new packages in the five months since Trump took office.
• The Trump administration suspended all military aid in March following a confrontational meeting, only to resume deliveries weeks later. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte warned that Ukraine “cannot do without” US support as European allies cannot fill the gap.

North Korea plans to send an additional 25,000 to 30,000 troops to assist Russia against Ukraine, Ukrainian intelligence assessments reveal, tripling Pyongyang’s military commitment from the original 11,000 soldiers deployed in November 2024.

North Korean military build-up accelerates

The new troop deployment could arrive “in the coming months,” according to Ukrainian intelligence assessments reviewed by CNN. Russian defense ministry documents indicate Moscow can provide “needed equipment, weapons, and ammunition” to further integrate North Korean units into Russian combat operations.

Satellite imagery from the Open Source Centre shows a Russian personnel carrier arriving at Dunai port in May, matching patterns from last year’s initial North Korean deployments. Additional activity at North Korea’s Sunan airport in June revealed cargo planes, potentially IL-76 aircraft, consistent with troop transport operations.

“This appears to indicate the routes previously used to move D​PRK troops are active, and could be used in any large-scale future transfer of personnel,” Joe Byrne, senior analyst at the Open Source Centre, told CNN.

Heavy casualties fail to deter expansion

Around 4,000 of the original 11,000 North Korean soldiers were killed or injured in Kursk Oblast, according to Western officials. Yet rather than deterring further deployment, these losses have prompted deeper military cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang.

Ukraine’s Defense Minister Rustem Umerov warned Thursday that Kim Jong Un risks destabilizing his own government by exposing elite troops to high casualty rates. “Russia’s use of elite North Korean troops demonstrates not only a growing reliance on totalitarian regimes but also serious problems with its mobilization reserve,” Umerov said.

Russian media footage from the Kursk region reveals extensive North Korean military preparations, including dugout accommodations and translation materials for basic military Russian terms. Videos show North Korean and Russian troops conducting joint training exercises, marking greater integration than initially observed.

Strategic implications for Ukraine’s defense

The timing coincides with Russia amassing 110,000 troops near Pokrovsk, a strategic population center in eastern Ukraine, according to Ukraine’s military chief Oleksandr Syrskyi. This concentration suggests preparations for a major offensive against Ukrainian defensive positions.

Sergei Shoigu, a top Putin adviser, announced during his 17 June Pyongyang visit that 1,000 North Korean sappers and 5,000 military construction workers would join Russian forces to clear mines and “restore infrastructure destroyed by the occupiers” in Kursk Oblast.

South Korea’s National Intelligence Service briefed lawmakers that North Korea has begun selecting personnel for overseas deployment as early as July or August, indicating the expansion could begin within weeks.

Explore further

North Korean forces may soon fight inside Ukraine, says Seoul

Weapons technology exchange deepens

Beyond manpower, North Korea has supplied Russia with extensive military hardware since 2023. Ukrainian intelligence documented 82 strikes by North Korean KN-23 and KN-24 ballistic missiles, including a January 2024 attack that killed 11 civilians in Pokrovsk.

A UN member states report revealed North Korea sent at least 100 ballistic missiles and 9 million artillery shells to Russia in 2024. Training manuals for North Korean artillery, translated into Russian, demonstrate the increasing interoperability between the two militaries.

Jenny Town, senior fellow at the Stimson Center, suggested the assessment of 30,000 troops “sounds high… but they can certainly come up with that number.” She told CNN 10,000 to 20,000 troops might deploy in stages, with Russian generals potentially training forces inside North Korea.

Background

The expanding North Korean-Russian military partnership represents a significant shift in the war’s dynamics. Previous reporting revealed Russia’s plans to deploy North Korean troops to new offensives in eastern Ukraine, with forces expected to wear Russian uniforms while claiming to defend “Russian territory” in occupied Ukrainian oblasts.

Recent intelligence assessments indicate that more than 6,000 North Korean soldiers have been killed, wounded, or gone missing while fighting alongside Russian forces in Russia’s Kursk Oblast, according to UK intelligence, representing over half of the estimated 11,000 troops initially deployed to the area.

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said he understands the US administration’s desire to prioritize its own interests, but at the same time calls for continued military support for Ukraine.

The statement, delivered after the White House confirmed the suspension of systems approved under President Biden, a move that raises alarm as Ukraine fights against ever-increasing Russian missile and drone attacks.

Speaking on Fox News, Rutte said he “fully understands” the US desire to ensure American security interests are met first.

“But when it comes to Ukraine, in the short term, Ukraine cannot do without all the support it can get when it comes to ammunition and air defense systems,” Rutte said.

The NATO secretary general referenced discussions between Presidents Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Donald Trump during last week’s NATO summit, describing “a very good discussion, in particular focusing on air defense systems.”

The White House confirmed Wednesday that the Pentagon suspended deliveries of air defense missiles and precision-guided munitions to Ukraine due to concerns that US weapons stocks had been depleted.

“Yes, I understand that the US has to take care of its own weapons stockpiles. At the same time, we must allow for some flexibility,” Rutte said.

Ukrainian officials said they had not received official notification of the suspension or revision of delivery schedules for agreed defense assistance.

European limitations acknowledged

Rutte said European countries are increasing defense spending and aid to Ukraine, “but we cannot do without practical support from the US.”

“It is also in the interests of the US for Ukraine not to lose this war… And a secure Europe also means a secure US. This all is completely connected,” the NATO secretary general said.

Explore further

Politico: US cuts critical air defense shipments to Ukraine needed to protect civilians from Russian terror

Ukrainian prosecutors have documented 273 Ukrainian prisoners of war killed by Russian forces since the invasion began, but only two Russians face convictions for these systematic executions.

The Prosecutor General’s Office revealed these figures in response to a LIGA.net information request, exposing a massive accountability gap as Ukraine fights for survival while its captured soldiers face execution rather than protection under international law.

Russian executions surge while prosecutions stagnate

The numbers paint a stark picture. In the first six months of 2025 alone, prosecutors documented 22 separate killings involving 56 Ukrainian prisoners. Russian forces have accelerated their execution campaign while facing minimal consequences.

Seven Russian soldiers have been charged with these specific war crimes across 77 criminal cases. Only three cases reached trial. Two received convictions—though prosecutors won’t say if these were real trials or symbolic in absentia verdicts.

The latest case surfaced 1 July when Russian troops tied a Ukrainian prisoner to a motorcycle and dragged him through a field. Russian military bloggers filmed it. They celebrated it. They shared it online.

From “Glory to Ukraine” to mass executions

Each killing follows documented patterns that reveal systematic policy, not battlefield chaos.

March 2023: Russian soldiers executed Ukrainian sniper Oleksandr Matsievskyi after he said “Glory to Ukraine” while standing in a trench. They forced the 42-year-old to dig his own grave first.

Explore further

Ukrainian Army names POW who Russians executed for saying “Glory to Ukraine” (UPDATED)

February 2024: Russian forces promised to evacuate wounded Ukrainian defenders from Avdiivka’s Zenit plant for prisoner exchange. Instead, they shot six soldiers: Heorhii Pavlov, Andrii Dubnytskyi, Ivan Zhytnyk, Oleksandr Zinchuk, and Mykola Savosik. The execution videos appeared on Russian Telegram channels.

December 2023: Russian troops forced three Ukrainian prisoners to kneel before shooting them at close range near Robotyne. The same month, they killed two surrendering soldiers near Avdiivka after the Ukrainians emerged from bunkers with raised hands.

Russian commanders issue direct execution orders

Ukrainian intelligence has documented over 150 additional prisoner executions with evidence showing direct orders from Russian commanders.

“Prisoners are not needed—shoot them on the spot,” one Russian deputy brigade commander told troops, according to UN investigators who interviewed Russian deserters.

The Financial Times identified Russian soldiers posting execution videos online while their units received honors from Putin. Russia’s 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade earned “Guards” status in July 2024 despite documented involvement in prisoner executions.

Explore further

Russian forces executed over 150 POWs from Ukraine intelligence units as part of systematic policy

Torture, branding, and systematic dehumanization

For prisoners who survive initial capture, Russian facilities offer systematic torture. UN investigators found 95% of returned Ukrainian prisoners experienced torture including beatings, electric shocks, sexual abuse, and mock executions.

The brutality extends beyond beatings. A Ukrainian soldier recently revealed how a Russian surgeon burned “Glory to Russia” into his stomach while he was unconscious after surgery. Guards forced prisoners to memorize the Russian national anthem, beating those who failed “until they couldn’t get up.”

At least 206 Ukrainian prisoners have died in Russian custody, according to Ukrainian government figures reported by the Associated Press. Forensic analysis of returned bodies shows untreated infections, missing organs, and extensive trauma, according to forensic expert Inna Padei.

Explore further

United24: Ukrainian soldier tells how Russian surgeon burnt Glory to Russia on his body while in captivity

Escalating execution methods target psychological impact

Recent cases show calculated cruelty designed for maximum psychological damage:

• Forced labor before death: Russian forces make wounded prisoners conduct dangerous demining work before execution.
• ISIS-style killings: Russian Telegram channels shared videos of Ukrainian soldiers being beheaded, with executioners wearing Russian military symbols.
• Mock evacuations: Russian commanders promise prisoner exchanges, then execute captured soldiers and film the results.
• Public degradation: Prisoners shot in legs for “not speaking clearly” before final execution shots to the back.

War crimes documentation outpaces accountability

Ukraine has opened 125,000 war crimes cases since February 2022. Prosecutors call prisoner executions their “priority number one.”

But documentation far exceeds accountability. Russian forces operate across multiple front sectors with apparent impunity. They film their crimes. They share them online. They receive military honors.

The Olenivka prison massacre alone killed 49 Ukrainian prisoners—more than the total number of Russians even charged with prisoner executions. Ukrainian prosecutors determined Russian forces used thermobaric weapons to kill prisoners and hide torture evidence.

Meanwhile, Ukrainian treatment of Russian prisoners follows international law. While some Russians faced mistreatment during initial capture, UN investigators confirmed abuse stopped once they reached official Ukrainian facilities.

Euromaidan Press, an independent English-language online media outlet covering Ukraine, is looking for a Fundraising Communications Manager to expand our funding channels and strengthen our Patreon community.

About Us:

We fight against Russian disinformation and bring the truth about Ukraine to the world. We value effective, meaningful actions and have no patience for the mere appearance of activity.

You’re the right fit if you can:

1. Increase media revenue through consistent and systematic fundraising efforts.
2. Create compelling ideas and messages, write fundraising content, design visuals, and publish on our website and social media.
3. Work with the leadership team to launch and evaluate the feasibility of commercial partnerships.
4. Identify, attract, and retain patrons and sponsors to support the media.
5. Grow and engage our Patreon community through strategic, ongoing campaigns.
6. Build and nurture relationships with donors, patrons, partners, and our community.
7. Continuously refine and enhance our fundraising strategy to maximize effectiveness.

Candidate requirements:

• Results-driven mindset with a focus on achieving tangible outcomes.
• Ability to quickly learn new skills and adapt to evolving tasks.
• Previous experience in fundraising, sales, partnership management, or related fields.
• Be able to convey the value of partnerships persuasively.
• Ability to run effective communication campaigns in collaboration with the team—from developing ideas and writing texts to setting up and analyzing website tracking (we’ll provide guidance and support).
• Creativity and initiative, consistently generating new ideas for fundraising.
• Strong self-organization skills, capable of developing, planning, and managing structured processes and projects from scratch.
• Good command of Ukrainian, proficiency in English (B2+), both written and spoken.

Bonus Points If You Have:

• Experience working in media.
• A track record of building engaged communities.

What we offer:

• Full-time remote position with a flexible schedule.
• 24 calendar days of paid vacation + 10 paid sick days.
• Competitive salary: fixed monthly rate + commission based on funds raised.
• A supportive, values-driven team.
• A chance to directly impact independent media growth and promote Ukraine’s global image.

Apply by sending your resume to euromaidanpress (a) gmail.com with the subject “Vacancy: Fundraiser.”

Менеджер з фандрейзнингових комунікацій

Euromaidan Press, незалежне англомовне онлайн видання про Україну, шукає Менеджера/ку з фандрейзингових комунікацій, що залучить додаткові канали фінансування для нашого медіа та посилить спільноту патронів. 

Про нас: боремо російську дезінформацію, доносимо світові правду про Україну. Любимо ефективні, осмислені дії, не любимо імітацію бурхливої діяльності. 

Ви наша людина, якщо зможете: 

1. Збільшити доходи медіа через постійний та системний фандрейзинг
2. Створювати ідеї та меседжі, які працюють, писати фандрейзингові тексти, робити картинки, постити це все на сайті та соцмережах
3. В співпраці з керівництвом медіа, запустити напрям комерційних партнерств та оцінити життєздатність цієї ідеї
4. Знайти та утримати меценатів для медіа
5. Наростити та розвинути спільноту патронів через систематичні кампанії 
6. Підтримувати та розвивати стосунки із донорами, меценатами, спільнотою та партнерами
7. Покращувати ефективність фандрейзингової стратегії 

Вимоги до кандидата/ки:

1. Працювати на результат
2. Швидко освоювати нові навички та задачі
3. Мати попередній досвід у фандрейзингу/продажах/управлінні партнерствами або зв’язаних сферах
4. Вміти переконливо доносити цінність партнерства
5. Могти проводити ефективні комунікаційні кампанії в співпраці із командою: від розробки ідей до написання текстів до налаштування та аналізу міток на сайті (все покажемо і пояснимо)
6. Бути креативним та ініціативним: постійно генерувати нові ідеї для залучення коштів 
7. Мати добру самоорганізацію: розробляти, планувати та управляти системними процесами та проектами з нуля
8. Мати добру англійську, як усну, так і письмову: В2 +

Буде перевагою: 

1. Досвід роботи в медіа 
2. Досвід розбудови спільнот 

Умови роботи:

• Повна зайнятість
• Дистанційна робота та гнучкий графік 
• Відпустка 24 к.д та 10 к.д. лікарняних
• Конкурентоспроможна заробітна плата: фіксована помісячна ставка + відсоток від залучених коштів
• Ціннісна та підтримуюча команда 
• Можливість прямого впливу на розвиток незалежних медіа та просування бренду України в світі 

Надсилайте резюме на адресу euromaidanpress (a) gmail.com з темою Vacancy: Fundraiser

Euromaidan Press, an independent English-language online media about Ukraine, is searching for a defense tech reporter who will inform our international readers about everything they need to know in the fast-evolving world of Ukrainian defense technology.

Main responsibilities:

• Identify important topics about defense technology and its impact on the war and regularly cover them. Formats include interviews, adaptations of Ukrainian materials, news, and analysis.
• Create engaging and compelling multimedia content about Ukrainian defense startups.
• Lead the development of our defense tech coverage project in a way that will be most meaningful for Ukraine’s defense scene, ensuring its success for both our media and the defense sector.

Candidate requirements:

• Advanced understanding of military topics and technology.
• A good network of contacts in defense circles.
• Well-versed in the political, social, economic, and military situation in Ukraine and abroad.
• Experience in English-language journalism and international communication.
• English level C1 or higher, good knowledge of Ukrainian/Russian.
• Ability to quickly and efficiently write, adapt, translate, and edit English-language texts.
• Proficiency in cross-cultural communication.
• Ability to confidently use social networks and have a general understanding of digital trends.

Working conditions:

• Full-time employment.
• Remote work and flexible schedule.
• 24 calendar days of vacation and 10 calendar days of sick leave.
• Competitive salary.
• Value-driven and supportive team.
• Opportunity to directly influence the development of independent media and promote Ukraine’s brand in the world.

Please submit your CV, motivation letter, and examples of prior work to euromaidanpress (a) gmail.com with the subject: Vacancy: Defense tech reporter

EuromaidanPress.com, an independent English-language media about Ukraine, is searching for a journalist to deliver the most interesting and relevant news to our curious global readers on our website and social media.

We fight against Russian disinformation and bring the truth about Ukraine to the world. We value effective, meaningful actions and have no patience for the mere appearance of activity.

What we require:

• Excellent English (starting from C1) and Ukrainian.
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• Experience in SMM.
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What we offer:

• Remote job.
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• Competitive salary.
• Friendly team.
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• A chance to defend Ukraine with the pen (no less important than with the sword).

As we expand our team, you will have the opportunity to take on other journalistic formats, not only news.

We are looking for a member who will become part of the team and plans to stick around. Please do not apply if you are looking for a temporary job before moving on.

Please send your motivation letter, CV with examples of prior work to euromaidanpress@gmail.com.

Ukrainian drones struck the electrical substation at Russia’s Kushchevskaya military airfield overnight on 24-25 June, damaging power infrastructure at the base that houses combat aircraft attacking Ukrainian positions, ASTRA reported citing its sources in Russian emergency services.

Ukraine’s long-range drone program continues chipping away at Russian military capacities as Ukraine’s western allies still hesitate on helping strike targets inside Russia.

The power strike reflects Ukraine’s shift toward disabling airfield operations rather than just destroying aircraft. Without electricity, Russian forces cannot fuel planes, run maintenance equipment, or operate defensive systems effectively.

Third strike on the same target

This marks the third Ukrainian attack on Kushchevskaya (Kushchovskaya) in 14 months. In April 2024, Ukrainian strikes damaged military aircraft at the base. A month later, Ukraine hit a Russian Su-27 fighter and additional infrastructure at the same airfield.

The airfield hosts Su-34 fighter-bombers, Su-25 ground attack aircraft, Su-27 fighters, and MiG-29 interceptors that Russia uses against Ukrainian defensive positions.

Russian emergency services confirmed at least one drone penetrated the airfield perimeter and struck the electrical installation. No casualties were reported, though the operational impact remains unclear.

Forcing dispersal

Ukraine’s repeated strikes on Krasnodar airbases have forced Russia to scatter aircraft across multiple locations, increasing operational burdens according to UK intelligence. The dispersal protects aircraft but spreads maintenance resources thin and complicates mission planning.

Previous Ukrainian disruption of Russian tactical aviation has compelled Moscow to further spread its aircraft fleet, creating logistical challenges that reduce combat readiness.

Why does power infrastructure matter? Modern airbases need consistent electricity for fuel pumps, communications, maintenance equipment, and electronic warfare systems. Damage to power systems forces Russia to conduct repairs under combat conditions or operate with reduced capabilities.

Recent strikes escalate

The Kushchevskaya attack follows Ukraine’s most ambitious airfield operation to date. On 1 June, Ukrainian intelligence executed Operation Spiderweb—coordinated drone strikes on five Russian airbases from Murmansk to Siberia. The operation destroyed at least 13 strategic bombers and caused an estimated $7 billion in damage.

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Nine days later, Ukrainian drones struck the VNIIR-Progress facility in Cheboksary, which produces antenna systems for Russian Shahed drones and guided bombs. The attack triggered massive fires and halted production.

Each strike forces Russia to divert resources from offensive operations to airbase defense and infrastructure repairs.

Ukraine’s air defenses are losing the drone war. Russian engineers have made their Shaheds fly twice as high and much faster while Ukrainian cities rely on systems that can’t keep up.

The numbers are getting ugly. Ukrainian missile systems track 20 targets maximum. Russia launches dozens at once and plans to send hundreds simultaneously, according to Ukrainian outlet Texty. Ukrainian officials failed to prepare adequate countermeasures despite having the groundwork for years.

Russian upgrades are working

Original Shaheds flew low and slow — easy targets for Ukrainian mobile teams with machine guns. Not anymore.

Russians removed restrictions on Iranian engines. Current Shaheds cruise at 2,500-2,800 meters altitude hitting 200-210 km/h. Some new jet-powered variants reach 550-600 km/h.

Higher altitude puts them beyond machine gun range. Faster speeds make helicopter chases nearly pointless — choppers max out around 250 km/h, forcing 5-10 minute pursuits of individual drones while swarms pass through.

Electronic warfare used to save Ukrainian cities. Operators would spoof GPS signals, sending Shaheds into empty fields instead of apartment buildings.

That’s over. Modern Shaheds pack 12-channel “Comet” navigation systems. Where one jamming device worked before, now you need 12+ working simultaneously. The drones resist jamming from below and horizontal angles — you can only affect them from above. Good luck with that.

“We’re lucky because Russians still have problems with launchers,” notes the Texty analysis. “They can’t launch more than four drones per time unit. When they get more Shahed launchers, then we’ll be sad.”

Air defense mathematics don’t work

Each Ukrainian air defense system handles 10, 15, maybe 20 targets at once. Period. Doesn’t matter how many systems you have — launch enough drones and some get through.

Add decoy drones to the mix, and things get worse. Russia launches real Shaheds alongside “Parody” foam decoys designed to look like transport planes on radar. Operators waste ammunition on fakes while real threats slip past.

Systems need reloading time. During those minutes, drones penetrate defense perimeters unopposed. Russia currently attacks with dozens of platforms. Soon it’ll be hundreds targeting individual cities.

Germany’s Skynex system works well against low-altitude drone swarms clustered in small areas. Its 35mm programmable rounds cost $500 each and detonate near targets.

But at 2,000+ meter altitude with decoys mixed in? Effectiveness drops sharply. Shaheds get through.

Mobile teams becoming irrelevant

Ukraine’s mobile anti-aircraft groups used to be the most cost-effective drone killers. Teams with machine guns mounted on pickup trucks would hunt down low-flying Shaheds.

Current drone tactics make this nearly impossible. Shaheds approach at 2,000-2,500 meters then dive almost vertically onto targets. Mobile groups can only engage old models still flying low profiles.

Practice from recent raids shows destroying diving drones is extremely difficult. Hitting Shaheds on high-altitude routes? Nearly impossible.

Bucha Witches may be soon losing against Shaheds

“Bucha Witches” take down the drones that once hunted them

Solutions exist but production lags

Anti-Shahed interceptor drones could work. Ukraine’s been talking about them for over a year. Volunteer organizations actually use them.

“Come Back Alive” fund reports shooting down 17 Shaheds and 30 “Gerber” decoys since March. That’s it—a drop in the ocean.

The state has “significantly more capabilities than large volunteer funds” but hasn’t established industrial production. Colonel Vadym Sukharevskyi reported successful drone-on-drone kills in February. Then came military bureaucracy, Defense Ministry delays, and Sukharevskyi’s dismissal. Nothing scaled.

Ukrainian forces test laser systems. They work faster than conventional weapons but need time to focus on targets. If drones approach in wide formations, even high-speed lasers can’t react everywhere simultaneously. Plus they’re expensive and mostly unavailable.

Threat keeps escalating

Russia isn’t standing still. New Shaheds carry 90-kg warheads—double the original payload. Weekly launches increased from 200 to over 1,000 by March 2025.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently warned that Russian weapons contain technology from 12 nations, including the US. Captured Shaheds reveal more than 30 Western-manufactured components—American servo drives, Japanese batteries, Canadian antennas.

Meanwhile, the US redirected 20,000 promised air defense missiles from Ukraine to the Middle East.

Texty concludes Ukraine will eventually organize new anti-Shahed defenses. Question is whether adaptation comes fast enough to protect cities from increasingly sophisticated attacks.

The drone war is becoming a race between Russian engineering improvements and Ukrainian defensive innovation. Right now, Russia’s winning.

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Why Russian Shahed explosive drones increasingly evade Ukrainian air defenses and reach Kyiv (updated)

Western sanctions designed to paralyze Russian aviation have “failed miserably,” with aircraft parts worth at least €1 billion reaching Russia since February 2022, according to an extensive investigation by Finnish broadcaster YLE.

The investigation reveals that Russia has created a vast smuggling network spanning over 360 companies worldwide to acquire critical aircraft components from Boeing and Airbus, including engines, radar systems, and flight computers suitable for military use.

YLE’s analysis of Russian customs data shows Airbus parts worth almost €600 million and Boeing parts worth nearly €400 million have entered Russia through intermediary companies, primarily in Dubai, Türkiye, and China.

The scale of sanctions evasion

How extensive is Russia’s aircraft parts smuggling operation? YLE found approximately 4,000 shipments containing Boeing or Airbus components between February 2022 and September 2024.

The network involves companies from dozens of countries, with some individual firms making hundreds of deliveries to Russia. Nearly 100 companies operating from the United Arab Emirates alone have supplied aircraft parts to Russia, according to YLE’s investigation.

Dubai has emerged as the central hub for sanctions evasion, with almost one-third of all aircraft parts shipments to Russia originating from the UAE, typically through Dubai, YLE reported.

Russia’s desperate need drives the trade

Why does Russia go to such lengths to acquire these components? YLE found that Russia has approximately 500 Western-leased aircraft that it effectively “stole” when Western companies demanded their return after the invasion began.

Without access to original parts, these aircraft face severe maintenance challenges. YLE reported that Russia has been forced to manufacture cheaper copies of original components and purchase old aircraft for spare parts, significantly weakening aviation safety.

Professor Stephen Wright from Dublin Institute of Technology told YLE that Russia sees this elaborate smuggling operation as necessary because it lacks capabilities it once possessed.

“Russia was an aviation technology pioneer before the Soviet Union collapsed, but has since lost its expertise,” Wright explained to YLE. “The West has taken leadership in civilian aircraft while Russia focused on military aviation.”

Companies claim compliance while parts flow continues

How do major manufacturers respond to evidence that their parts reach Russia? Both Airbus and Boeing refused YLE’s interview requests, instead providing brief statements claiming full compliance with sanctions.

Airbus told YLE it “complies with all applicable laws and sanctions related to Russia” and can track genuine parts, but acknowledged having “no means to control the use of non-genuine parts.”

Boeing’s statement to YLE was even shorter, saying only that the company suspended spare parts and support for Russian customers in early 2022 and continues following US sanctions.

YLE noted that both companies failed to answer specific questions about how they prevent their parts from reaching Russia through intermediaries.

The Dubai connection

Dubai’s role in sanctions evasion extends far beyond aircraft parts, according to YLE’s findings. The investigation shows dozens of Dubai-based companies began supplying Russia only after February 2022, with one firm making at least 35 deliveries since the invasion began.

Before the war, this same company had zero shipments to Russia, YLE reported.

Many Dubai companies involved in the trade have been added to EU or US sanctions lists, but YLE found that when one company faces sanctions, multiple replacement firms are quickly established.

The UAE has not imposed sanctions against Russia, making the business legal under local laws, though YLE noted it’s possible that Russians themselves or their hired proxies control many of these operations.

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Military implications

YLE’s investigation found that Russia has acquired components suitable for military use, including radar systems and flight computers, alongside standard civilian aircraft parts.

However, Professor Wright told YLE that Russia likely doesn’t use foreign-acquired aviation technology for military purposes, as “Russian military technology is highly developed compared to civilian aircraft.”

The greater concern, Wright indicated to YLE, is the impact on aviation safety as Russia struggles to maintain its civilian fleet with smuggled and copied components.

Broader sanctions evasion patterns

The aircraft parts smuggling network represents just one facet of Russia’s systematic sanctions evasion efforts. Previous investigations have documented how foreign microchips reach Russian military equipment through similar intermediary schemes.

Russia has employed numerous methods to circumvent restrictions, including routing critical components through Chinese suppliers that continue providing dual-use technologies despite export controls.

The systematic nature of these evasion schemes has enabled Russia to maintain military production capabilities despite international restrictions designed to cripple its defense industry.

Bomber factory expansion

YLE: Russia expands factory producing bombers Ukraine just destroyed in Operation Spiderweb

Russia is dramatically expanding its only strategic bomber production facility, but the billion-euro investment will not solve the problems plaguing its aviation industry, according to a new investigation by Finnish broadcaster YLE.

Satellite imagery analyzed by YLE shows massive construction at the Kazan Aviation Plant has added 19,000 square meters of production space since winter—equivalent to three football fields. The expansion is part of approximately €1 billion in modernization investment, according to YLE’s analysis.

But the new hangars won’t fix underlying problems. Former Finnish intelligence officer Marko Eklund, who analyzed the satellite imagery for YLE, concluded the expansion “will not solve the problems of the aviation industry and the industry as a whole.”

The production constraints

Why won’t bigger hangars solve the problems? YLE’s investigation revealed multiple constraints beyond factory space.

Kazan delivered just four bombers in 2024: two modernized Tu-160M aircraft and two new Tu-160M2 models, according to YLE’s reporting. The plant faces what YLE described as “constraints beyond factory space”—sanctions limiting access to Western components, workforce shortages, and disrupted Soviet-era supply chains.

YLE reported that Russia cannot manufacture these aircraft from scratch, instead relying on decades-old components stored at the facility. Production lags behind planned schedules due to sanctions and labor shortages.

Ukraine targets the aircraft

The Kazan facility produces the Tu-160 and Tu-22M3 bombers that Russia uses for cruise missile strikes against Ukrainian cities. Ukraine has systematically targeted these aircraft types in operations across Russian territory.

Ukraine’s June Operation Spiderweb destroyed aircraft that experts say cannot be easily replaced. Many of the targeted aircraft types went out of production when the Soviet Union collapsed.

The scale of the challenge becomes clear when comparing production to destruction. YLE found that Kazan delivered just four bombers in 2024, while Operation Spiderweb destroyed at least 10 strategic aircraft in one night using 117 drones across five airfields.

Ukrainian officials claimed 41 aircraft were hit total, representing approximately 34% of Russia’s strategic bomber fleet—nearly a decade’s worth of Kazan’s current production output eliminated in hours.

Ukraine has also directly targeted the Kazan plant itself, with drone strikes hitting the facility in January 2025.

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Civilian aircraft struggles mirror military problems

YLE found that Russia’s aviation difficulties extend beyond military production. The plant’s civilian Tu-214 program illustrates similar constraints.

Kazan received orders for 23 Tu-214 passenger jets but has delivered only one aircraft in 2025, YLE reported. Delays became so severe that Russia’s flagship carrier Aeroflot threatened to cancel orders, though analysts believe cancellation unlikely given substantial state investment.

YLE noted that sanctions created demand for domestic aircraft while simultaneously limiting the capacity to produce them.

Expansion addresses symptoms, not causes

YLE’s analysis suggests the €1 billion expansion focuses on production capacity while underlying problems persist.

The facility expansion includes new assembly halls and modernized equipment, according to YLE’s satellite analysis. However, the broadcaster noted that sanctions and workforce issues continue to hamper actual production output.

As YLE’s investigation concludes, Russia’s massive factory expansion may not address the fundamental constraints that limit aviation production—component availability, skilled workers, and disrupted supply chains that larger hangars cannot solve.

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Georgia broke a longstanding tradition Saturday by failing to send an honor guard to meet the coffin of Vano Nadiradze, a 55-year-old volunteer who died defending Ukraine. For the first time, Georgia did not greet a soldier who defended Ukraine with a guard of honor, according to Echo of the Caucasus newspaper.

The decision marks a stark departure from previous protocol as Georgia’s government aligns increasingly with Russian interests while over 80 Georgian volunteers have died fighting Putin’s forces in Ukraine.

Nadiradze’s body arrived in Tbilisi on Saturday after he died last weekend, reportedly from a heart attack. Nadiradze is said to have defended Ukraine in the ranks of the SBU unit since the beginning of the full-scale war and was a media figure who actively informed Georgian audiences about the war.

The volunteer was sentenced in absentia to 14 years in prison for “mercenary” by Russia, marking him as a target of Putin’s regime. His coffin was met only by family, friends, and concerned citizens who knew him, while the Defense Ministry has not commented on the unprecedented protocol breach.

Georgia’s Russian turn

The government’s decision comes as Georgia undergoes what critics call a complete capture by Russian influence. Since 2022, the rhetoric of the Georgian government towards the West made a hostile turn since the onset of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, with officials echoing Russian propaganda narratives.

Georgia’s ruling party, now dubbed “Russian Dream” by opposition figures, announced it would halt the country’s EU integration process until 2028, sparking some of the largest demonstrations on record. The decision mirrors Viktor Yanukovych’s 2013 rejection of EU association in Ukraine, which triggered the Euromaidan revolution.

Candid confession

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Mounting pressure on Ukrainian volunteers

Georgian volunteers fighting for Ukraine face increasing persecution at home. About 300 people from the combat unit he led were put on the wanted list in Georgia, according to Georgian Legion commander Mamuka Mamulashvili. Many of our guys who were returning to Georgia were advised by the Georgian special services to leave, he reported.

The crackdown extends beyond the Georgian Legion to other volunteers. Several Georgian volunteer fighters returning from Ukraine have been summoned for questioning by Georgia’s State Security Service (SUS) in connection with a purported coup plot, with charges including terrorism and coup plotting.

Heavy toll among Georgian defenders

Georgians likely rank first among foreign fighters killed fighting for Ukraine, with estimates suggesting around 60 Georgians have been killed fighting in Ukraine, possibly the highest death toll of any foreign nationality fighting for Ukraine. The total may exceed 80 according to Georgian media reports.

Despite government hostility, Georgian public support for Ukraine remains strong. According to the Caucasus Barometer survey, 69% of respondents consider Russia as Georgia’s main enemy, creating a stark divide between the population and the increasingly pro-Russian government.

Background

Georgia’s democratic crisis deepened after October’s fraudulent parliamentary elections, where the ruling Georgian Dream party claimed 54% of the vote amid widespread allegations of fraud. International observers noted serious irregularities, with statistical analysis suggests that the party derided as “Russian Dream” stole 15% of the votes.

The government’s abandonment of EU integration has triggered massive protests reminiscent of Ukraine’s Euromaidan. For many Georgians, this mirrors Ukraine’s experience when Viktor Yanukovych rejected the EU association agreement in 2013, leading to the Euromaidan revolution.

Poland activated its air defenses and scrambled fighter jets during Russia’s largest single-night aerial assault on Ukraine, as Moscow’s unprecedented 537-projectile barrage forced NATO allies into costly defensive mobilizations near the Ukrainian border.

Polish Operational Command reported deploying “Polish and allied aircraft” while activating ground-based air defense systems and radars on high alert during the night of 29 June. The defensive operation continued until after 6 AM when threat levels decreased, with no reported violations of Polish airspace.

“Due to the combined air attack by Russia against Ukraine, Polish and allied aviation was raised into the air, and ground-based air defense systems and radars were put on high alert,” the command stated, noting that such procedures have become standard after previous incidents when Russian missiles violated Polish airspace during mass attacks on Ukraine.

The defensive mobilization occurred as Ukrainian F-16 pilot Maksym Ustymenko died repelling Russia’s most massive night attack, when Moscow launched 477 Shahed drones, 41 cruise missiles, seven ballistic missiles, and four hypersonic Kinzhal missiles—many targeting western Ukraine near the Polish border.

Poland has repeatedly activated its air defenses during major Russian attacks, including scrambling F-16 fighters in January 2024 when Moscow launched massive missile strikes against Ukrainian cities. Previous incidents have included Russian missiles entering Polish airspace and forcing emergency responses from Warsaw.

The overnight assault killed and injured dozens of Ukrainian civilians, adding to Russia’s mounting toll of terror attacks. Recent strikes have demonstrated the deadly effectiveness of Russia’s tactics, with attacks in June killing a 5-year-old boy and destroying homes in Sumy Oblast, while Kharkiv endured its most extensive attack since the invasion began earlier this month.

Poland repeatedly scrambles jets

Poland has repeatedly activated its air defenses during major Russian attacks, including scrambling F-16 fighters in January 2024, and has reported airspace violations during previous incidents.

Such responses have become routine throughout 2025, with Poland scrambling jets during Russia’s “largest attack” on the region on 9 June, a massive assault on 26 May involving 355 drones, and multiple other incidents as Moscow targets western Ukrainian regions near the Polish border.

The 29 June attack represents Russia’s largest single-night assault as Moscow systematically targets Ukrainian civilians to extract political concessions.

Explore further

F-16 pilot killed while repelling Russia’s most massive-yet night terror attack on Ukraine (updated)

Ukraine’s Air Force pilot Maksym Ustymenko, 32, died defending against Russia’s largest single-night aerial assault of the war, as Moscow launched 537 projectiles in a coordinated terror campaign targeting civilian infrastructure across the country.

The massive assault demonstrates Russia’s strategy of escalating terror attacks to pressure Ukraine into unfavorable peace negotiations. By overwhelming air defenses with record-breaking volumes of weapons, Moscow aims to demonstrate Ukraine’s vulnerability and create unbearable civilian casualties that force Kyiv to accept territorial concessions—using mass destruction as diplomatic leverage while Trump pushes for talks.

A photograph of Ustymenko was shared by Lilia Averianova, the mother of another fallen F-16 pilot, “Juice” Andrii Pylschykov:

“Max, a guy of steel. Always striving to be the best. Best at defending Ukraine. He was the super-intellect of the group, a great I.T. guy. He had big, strong wings. Big responsibility. Big dedication… Together with Andrii since the first year, together forever in the sky,” she wrote.

The wife of another Ukrainian pilot told that Ustymenko leaves behind a four-year-old son.

Russian forces deployed an unprecedented combination of 477 Shahed drones, 41 cruise missiles, seven ballistic missiles, and four hypersonic Kinzhal missiles during the 29 June overnight attack, according to Ukraine’s Air Force Command. Ukrainian defenders destroyed 475 of the aerial targets, but the massive scale overwhelmed some defensive capabilities.

“The pilot used the full range of onboard weapons and shot down seven air targets. During the last one, his plane was damaged and began to lose altitude. Maksym Ustymenko did his best to take the plane away from the settlement, but he did not have time to eject… He died like a hero!” the Air Force confirmed.

Russia launched the weapons from multiple staging areas, including Kursk, Shatalovo, Orel, Bryansk, and Millerovo in Russia, as well as occupied Crimea and Black Sea positions, as detailed by Ukrainian Air Force, demonstrating the coordinated nature of the assault designed to stretch Ukrainian defensive resources across the entire country.

Poland scrambled its jets but shot down nothing. Meanwhile, Ukrainian air defenses claimed an 88% interception rate despite the overwhelming numbers, shooting down 249 targets with weapons fire and electronically suppressing or causing 226 others to crash through electronic warfare systems.

The operation involved Ukraine’s aviation, surface-to-air missile units, electronic warfare divisions, mobile fire groups, and unmanned systems working in coordination. Debris from intercepted targets fell in eight areas across the country, per the official report.

The massive coordinated attack underscores Russia’s strategic shift toward using swarm tactics to saturate Ukrainian air defenses. The Iranian-designed Shaheds have become increasingly difficult to counter as Russia modifies their flight patterns, uses decoy drones, and launches them at higher altitudes to evade detection.

The attack comes as President Trump has suspended US military aid to Ukraine to pressure Kyiv into peace negotiations, according to multiple reports, while the US recently diverted 20,000 anti-drone rockets originally destined for Ukraine to Middle East operations before Israel’s strikes on Iran.

The loss of pilot Ustymenko highlights the personal cost of Ukraine’s air defense operations, as F-16 pilots face increasing risks from Russia’s evolving tactics and massive drone swarms that can overwhelm even sophisticated Western aircraft through sheer numbers.

The massive assault struck six locations across Ukraine, with debris from intercepted weapons falling in eight additional areas, according to the Air Force. While specific casualty figures from the 29 June attack have not yet been disclosed, the operation represents Russia’s continued escalation of its terror campaign against Ukrainian civilians, following recent patterns of strikes that have killed dozens and injured hundreds in single attacks.

The attack comes amid mounting civilian casualties from Russia’s intensified aerial campaign. Recent strikes have demonstrated the deadly effectiveness of Russia’s combined missile-drone tactics, with ballistic missiles proving particularly lethal due to Ukraine’s limited ability to intercept them without sufficient Patriot systems.

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Shaheds become more difficult to intercept

Russian Shahed drones have become increasingly difficult to intercept as Moscow adapts its tactics through swarm launches, radar decoys, and higher-altitude flight paths. The Iranian-designed weapons cost approximately $35,000 each but force Ukraine to expend more expensive interceptor missiles, creating an asymmetric warfare advantage for Russia.

The massive night attack occurs amid acute shortages of air defense ammunition.

Ukraine received only half of the Patriot systems it requested and operates just six operational batteries out of 25 needed for full coverage. The US refuses to share its 60+ Patriot arsenal while production constraints limit global output, and Europe lines up for 1,000 additional missiles.

Explore further

Why Russian Shahed explosive drones increasingly evade Ukrainian air defenses and reach Kyiv (updated)

Every dictator has that one moment when triumph becomes trap. For Putin, it happened in 2014 when he bloodlessly seized Crimea and watched his approval ratings soar from 63% to 88%.

However, now the peninsula that made him look like a strategic genius threatens to destroy him. Ukraine’s systematic campaign is turning Crimea from Russia’s “unsinkable aircraft carrier” into a sinking ship that could drag Putin’s regime down with it.

How Ukraine broke Putin’s Black Sea fortress

The numbers tell the story of a military disaster unfolding in slow motion.

Ukraine has destroyed or damaged 33% of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet—the same fleet that once turned the Black Sea into “Russia’s lake.” By July 2024, Moscow had pulled all major naval assets out of Sevastopol, abandoning the historic base after 240 years of Russian control.

But the naval retreat was just the beginning. Ukrainian ATACMS and Storm Shadow missiles have systematically picked apart Crimea’s air defenses, creating critical gaps across the peninsula.

The crown jewel of Russian vulnerability remains the Kerch Bridge itself.

Ukraine’s June 2025 underwater attack—the third successful strike since 2022—used 1,100kg of TNT equivalent targeting underwater support pillars. Despite billions in defensive investments, Russia cannot protect its only direct supply route to Crimea.

When your greatest asset becomes your biggest liability

The strategic mathematics have flipped completely. An estimated 150,000-160,000 Russian troops remain trapped on the peninsula, not advancing Putin’s war but simply trying to survive it. These forces—equivalent to several army divisions—sit uselessly defensive while Ukraine pounds Russian positions elsewhere.

Ukraine’s naval drone revolution exemplifies how innovation trumps conventional power. Military analysts describe it as the first successful campaign to neutralize a major naval fleet through asymmetric drone warfare—a template that’s reshaping naval combat globally.

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How Ukraine’s scrappy marine drones are revolutionizing naval warfare

Putin’s throne sits on Crimean sand

Here’s what makes Crimea uniquely dangerous for Putin: his entire political identity depends on it.

The 2014 annexation didn’t just boost his approval ratings—it created what analysts call the “Crimean consensus,” the rare moment when 80% of Russians felt like a superpower again. Atlantic Council research identifies Crimea’s seizure as “arguably the most important single element in modern Russia’s national narrative and the greatest achievement of Putin’s entire reign.”

Putin personally took credit for the “brilliant” bloodless operation, linking Crimean success directly to his genius. This created a new social contract: Russians accepted poverty and repression in exchange for restored great power status.

Carnegie Endowment analysis reveals Putin established this bargain post-Crimea—meager social services propped up by the feeling of belonging to a great power again.

Why every Ukrainian strike hits Putin personally

Because Crimea represents the foundation of Putin’s imperial narrative and proof of his strategic mastermind image, Ukrainian successes there generate disproportionate damage to regime legitimacy. Each successful Ukrainian strike doesn’t just destroy military targets—it demolishes the myth of Russian invincibility that keeps Putin in power.

International Crisis Group expert Oleg Ignatov noted recent Ukrainian attacks delivered “the worst setback for Putin for 2025 in terms of military damage and the impact on public morale.” When your political survival depends on looking invincible, every visible defeat becomes exponentially more dangerous.

Ukraine’s systematic demolition strategy

Ukraine’s 2024-2025 campaign represents methodical strategic degradation, not random symbolic strikes.

ATACMS missiles with 300km range have enabled precision strikes on previously secure targets, including the devastating May 2024 attack on Belbek airbase that destroyed two MiG-31 fighter jets and crippled fuel infrastructure.

The genius lies in targeting interconnected infrastructure to create cascading failures.

Ukrainian forces have struck over a dozen major military installations, achieving what RUSI analysts describe as “strategic successes that could shape the ultimate outcome of the war.” Each strike forces Russia to spread its remaining defenses thinner while demonstrating that Ukrainian capabilities keep growing.

Psychological warfare and morale destruction

Each successful strike delivers psychological impact that extends far beyond physical damage.

The naval warfare revolution exemplifies this dynamic. Ukraine’s use of naval drones has not only sunk Russian vessels but fundamentally challenged assumptions about naval power projection.

This represents more than tactical innovation. It demonstrates that technological creativity can overcome conventional military advantages, inspiring broader confidence in Ukrainian capabilities.

Explore further

“Kill a navy for the price of a car”: Ukraine’s drones drove out Putin’s fleet from the Black Sea — then turned on his fighter jets

The economics of strategic disaster

Crimea’s economic math reveals Putin’s strategic miscalculation in stark numbers. The peninsula requires over $7 billion annually in Russian subsidies while producing less than 1% of Russian GDP.

Russia has invested over $20 billion in the past decade on a territory that receives 65-70% of its budget from federal transfers, making it Russia’s most expensive dependency.

Illusory energy wealth and fragile tourism dreams

Even Crimea’s supposed energy wealth proves largely illusory.

While Russia appropriated Ukrainian offshore gas and oil reserves worth $800 million to $1.2 billion in proven reserves, with potential undiscovered reserves valued at $7 billion, these resources remain largely undeveloped due to sanctions and security concerns.

The tourism sector, despite showing growth, remains fundamentally vulnerable.

Despite a 25% increase in 2024 tourism demand reaching 3.3 million visitors, the industry remains fragile and dependent on bridge access (62.1% of tourists). Each Ukrainian attack on transportation infrastructure directly impacts civilian economic activity. This creates a vicious cycle where military necessity undermines economic viability.

Explore further

Russians in Crimea pack up as relentless sound of air alerts and sight of tanks become their new reality

Why Ukraine must strike now

Current conditions create an unprecedented window for decisive action.

Atlantic Council’s Serhii Kuzan assesses that “with the Black Sea Fleet in retreat, logistical connections disrupted, and air defenses depleted, the Kremlin’s grip on Crimea already appears to be significantly weaker than it was when the full-scale invasion began.”

Ukrainian capabilities continue expanding while Russian defenses degrade. The integration of Western weapons with Ukrainian innovation has created a tactical advantage that compounds over time.

Each successful strike not only destroys targets but forces Russia to spread remaining assets ever thinner across an increasingly vulnerable peninsula.

Putin’s shrinking options point to regime survival

Putin’s response to Ukrainian pressure reveals his true priorities. When faced with losing control, he has consistently chosen retreat over escalation—including withdrawing the Black Sea Fleet rather than risking nuclear confrontation despite Crimea’s symbolic importance.

This suggests regime survival instincts ultimately override territorial commitments.

Sustained Ukrainian success could force Putin into impossible choices between costly military escalation to defend the peninsula and politically damaging strategic retreat. Historical patterns suggest that when dictators face existential threats to their foundational achievements, regime survival instincts may prevail over territorial pride.

Expert timeline assessments vary, but continued Ukrainian pressure combined with economic constraints and military setbacks could create conditions for significant regime instability within 2-5 years if current trends continue.

The domino that could topple Putin

Crimea has evolved from Putin’s greatest political achievement into his most dangerous strategic vulnerability. Ukrainian operations have systematically transformed the peninsula from Russia’s naval stronghold into an increasingly indefensible liability that drains resources while providing diminished military value.

The convergence of military degradation, economic burden, and political vulnerability suggests that sustained Ukrainian pressure on Crimea represents a uniquely threatening challenge to Putin’s rule. Unlike other territorial disputes, Crimean control has become so central to regime legitimacy that its loss could precipitate broader political instability.

The final battle for Ukrainian freedom and Russian reckoning has begun, and its outcome will be decided on the shores of occupied Crimea.

Ukraine has discovered Putin’s Achilles’ heel. Every successful strike on Crimea doesn’t just advance military objectives—it chips away at the foundational myth that keeps Putin in power.

The peninsula that made Putin look invincible could be the very thing that destroys him.

Russia’s war against Ukraine took center stage at this June’s GLOBSEC conference in Prague. The high-profile political gathering was a witness to the death of Ukraine’s victory plan, replaced with ceasefire rhetoric and frozen conflict scenarios following the election of Donald Trump to US president.

It is, however, universally accepted that this frozen conflict is not a step to peace, as it would allow Russia to re-arm and re-attack, most likely, on a greater scale. However, Ukraine may ultimately face few other options, as the West hesitates to make decisive steps to turn the tide.

A frank post-panel exchange with former US Special Representative for Ukraine Kurt Volker succinctly revealed the real reason for the West’s hesitation: nukes. Illustrating how deeply Russia’s nuclear threats have shaped Western policy constraints, he argued that a frozen conflict represents Ukraine’s best realistic outcome because direct confrontation with Russia “would become a nuclear war and annihilate everybody.”

When pressed on why the collective West cannot prevent this scenario despite Ukraine facing ongoing human rights violations and cultural erasure in occupied territories, Volker’s response was stark: “The reason is quite obvious. It’s because a direct war against Russia would become a nuclear war.”

The exchange exposes how senior Western officials have internalized Moscow’s nuclear blackmail— arguably the Kremlin’s greatest weapon—as an insurmountable constraint on Ukraine support, inadvertently enabling the proliferation of instability around the globe. Volker, who served as US envoy to Ukraine during Trump’s first presidency, grew visibly frustrated when challenged on the implications of this logic, ultimately ending the conversation when questioned about Western hesitation to allow strikes on Russian territory.

EP: Right now, you mentioned a ceasefire and a standoff as the best-case scenario for Ukraine. And I’m wondering how that factors in with expert analysis that would allow Russia to rearm and re-attack Ukraine and beyond. How does that factor in with the human rights violations ongoing in occupied territories and erasure of national identity? And how do we prevent a Minsk Three that essentially allowed Russia to stage this larger war? How can we call it a best-case scenario in this case?

Volker: Well, because all the other scenarios are worse. And of course, Russia is going to rearm, regroup, and plan to attack again. No one should have any other expectations. And the key thing is to make it so difficult for Russia, painful for Russia, that we can deter Russia from actually doing it.

They are going to rearm, but if they find that it’s going to be too costly, too painful for them, we can stretch out that timeline indefinitely as to when they attack.

This is what we did during the Cold War with the Soviet Union from 1945 up until the Soviet Union collapsed. So that, I think, is the best we’re going to be able to do.

And meanwhile, that buys time for us to work together to strengthen Ukraine politically, economically, and militarily. And eventually, Russia is going to have to change because Putin will not live forever.

The way that they have gone about this aggression, not only against Ukraine but elsewhere as well, is not sustainable. And I think that they are going to have to come to terms with what they have done. And we’re going to have to put up basically a wall to protect ourselves against them.

EP: It appears that this scenario means that essentially Ukraine loses the occupied territories forever, because the return of any connection to Ukraine is ongoing, and there is no reason to expect that they will not be just integrated into Russia beyond repair.

Volker: I don’t agree with that. We had a divided Germany for 40 years, which was eventually unified. We had the Baltic states occupied by the Soviet Union for 40 years, which got their independence back.

I don’t think we can predict how things will go in the future. And I don’t think anyone should recognize these as legitimately Russian territory. They’re not. And you’re absolutely right that things will happen during occupation that are absolutely horrible. But again, we have to think, so what is the other alternative? I don’t see one.

EP: That is a great remark. Why is there no alternative? Why is the collective West not strong enough to prevent the scenario? I don’t agree with the Germany analogy. The Soviet Union was not there to brainwash the Germans out of believing that they’re Germans. Meanwhile, it is doing that in Ukraine because that is the objective of Russia.

Volker: That is the objective of Russia. And the reason is quite obvious. It’s because directly launching a war against Russia would become a nuclear war and annihilate everybody. And no one wants to do that.

EP: But why are we so confident in this scenario?

Volker: In which?

EP: In the scenario of a nuclear war, because that is Russia’s greatest advantage, fear-mongering of a nuclear war.

Volker: Well, as long as we are not threatening the existence of Russia as a state and trying to do regime change in Russia, I don’t believe they’re going to use nuclear weapons. But if we are in a full-scale war with Russia, they will use nuclear weapons. I don’t see why we would doubt that.

EP: Why? But what reason do we have to say that?

Volker: Because it’s in their doctrine and they have the actual missiles themselves.

EP: But multiple assessments have shown that Putin wants self-preservation as well. You can’t play with nuclear weapons. The US would not do that.

Volker: Putin is not always rational. If he were rational, he wouldn’t have started this war to begin with. And they have the capability. And no one in the West is going to say, yeah, let’s risk it. Let’s go to war with Russia and see what happens.

EP: That essentially gives a carte blanche for any country with nuclear weapons to do whatever they want.

Volker: No, that’s not true. Because Putin is not going to use nuclear weapons unless he is faced with that threat to the state. So, you know, we have conventional means, we have sanctions means, we have lots of ways to deter nuclear use and lots of ways to push back on Russia, which we need to do.

EP: Mr. Volker, but during these three years of war, Russia has repeatedly threatened the use of nuclear weapons, claiming a risk to its state. For instance, when Ukraine liberated the territories that Russia occupied. And nothing followed.

Volker: That’s baloney. They know themselves that these are not Russian territories, and so that’s just posturing. Ukraine is attacking Russian territory on a daily basis, and this is one of the red lines that the West is afraid to cross precisely because of this nuclear threat. Because if the West were attacking and defeating Russia, they would use nuclear weapons. With Ukraine doing this, they’re not going to do that.

EP: Ukraine is also posing a threat to the Russian state.

Volker: Not really. Certainly. Not really. You’re threatening to weaken their military to a point where they can’t continue fighting, but you are not threatening to take over the Russian state or to topple the Kremlin. And they know that.

EP: But why is the West so afraid to allow strikes in Russian territory? Is it precisely because of fear of nuclear threats?

Volker: I wouldn’t say we are afraid to allow strikes on Russian territory. In fact, Ukraine has been doing this, as you said, almost every night now, and you don’t hear anything from the West.

EP: Yes, but the West is not joining in, and there has been a three-year hesitation on allowing any sort of strikes.

Volker: You’re asking the same question again and again, and I don’t think I’m going to give you a different answer. So, nice to meet you, and thank you. Good luck.

This exchange took place following a panel discussion on Ukraine’s future at a security forum. Volker served as US Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations from 2017-2019 and US Ambassador to NATO from 2008-2009.

The longer version

Ukraine’s victory plan is dead, killed by Russian nuclear mind games

At the GLOBSEC security conference in Prague, a senior European policy official delivered perhaps the most honest assessment of Western strategy heard in months. “I agree we are good at deterrence,” he told a packed room under Chatham House rules, “but even better at self-deterrence.”

The admission hung in the air like an uncomfortable truth no one wanted to acknowledge. Across three days of high-level panels at Europe’s premier security gathering, a stark pattern emerged: behind closed doors, experts candidly discussed how the West has abandoned the goal of Ukrainian victory, while public sessions featured sanitized rhetoric about “sustainable peace” and “ceasefire as a first step.”

The elephant in the room at GLOBSEC wasn’t Russian aggression or European unpreparedness—it was the quiet death of Ukraine’s victory narrative, and how Western self-deterrence killed it.

A shorter version

Frozen conflict Ukraine’s “best case scenario” because Russia has nukes, Kurt Volker says

The vanishing victory plan

The transformation has been swift and devastating. In 2022, Zelensky’s original peace plan demanded complete Russian withdrawal, war crimes tribunals, and reparations—the full accountability of total defeat.

On the eve of Trump’s election and Western talks of ceasefires, in October 2024, Zelensky presented his “Victory Plan” to Ukraine’s parliament. He called for complete Russian withdrawal, NATO membership, and positioning Ukraine to “force Russia to peace.” The rhetoric was still about total Russian defeat.

By June 2025, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha was singing a different tune at GLOBSEC’s main stage. “A real and lasting ceasefire is the first step to peace,” he declared, parroting the Trump administration’s desire to freeze and forget the war.

The Oval Office spat was the breaking point. On 28 February 2025, Trump told Zelensky bluntly: “you’re not winning this” and “you don’t have the cards right now.” When Ukraine initially resisted ceasefire proposals, the United States temporarily suspended aid. Within weeks, Kyiv had capitulated.

At GLOBSEC, this transformation was visible in real time. In panels operating under Chatham House rules, where officials could speak freely, the assessment was brutally honest. “I think we have helped Ukraine to defend itself, but we haven’t helped Ukraine to win,” the senior official observed. The problem?

“It was fear that if we did too much, Russia would act in a forceful manner that would involve us all.”

But when Ukrainian officials appeared on public panels, they dutifully promoted ceasefire proposals that experts acknowledge would lead to Ukrainian defeat, ensuring the freezing of a war that would allow Russia to rearm and reattack while continuing brutal human rights abuses on occupied lands.

How Russia’s nuclear threats became its ultimate weapon

The heart of the problem, as revealed in GLOBSEC’s frank discussions, is what a senior European foreign policy analyst called “a very well-laid information trap, which people who didn’t understand deterrence and didn’t understand Russia walked straight into.”

The information trap has a name—reflexive control. The technique, developed in the 1960s by Soviet mathematician Vladimir Lefebvre, is designed to trick opponents into making self-defeating decisions without realizing they’re being manipulated.

The Soviets perfected this during the Cold War through elaborate deceptions. They developed fake models of intercontinental ballistic missiles for participation in Red Square parades to create “an exaggerated impression on the American side of the shock potential of Soviet nuclear weapons,” as documented by Timothy Thomas in his seminal study of reflexive control theory.

The goal was to trick the West into wasteful spending on nonexistent threats while Soviet leaders knew their actual capabilities were far more limited.

Yet each time, Western officials delayed, debated, and ultimately provided too little, too late.

Ukraine’s Spider Web operation provided a perfect case study. In June 2025, Ukraine struck Russian strategic aviation bases, reportedly destroying one-third of Russia’s nuclear-capable bomber fleet. Where was Putin’s promised escalation? Where was the nuclear retaliation that had paralyzed Western decision-making for years?

“If you can hit the strategic strike force of a nuclear power without having the kind of retaliation that has been the nightmares of Olaf Scholz and Jake Sullivan, then it really is a lesson we should be learning,” the senior foreign policy analyst noted during one GLOBSEC discussion.

Modern Russia has refined reflexive control into a systematic assault on Western decision-making. As Ivana Stradner from the Foundation for Defence of Democracies explained during a closed-door GLOBSEC session, Russian analysts have long studied “how you can actually reflexively control the United States. That’s exactly what Moscow is doing right now in Europe.”

The technique operates through a precise three-part system: mathematical modeling combined with analysis of how you process information and how your enemy processes information.

As Stradner noted, “whoever has information superiority is going to win this war.”

The evidence against Russian nuclear blackmail was overwhelming, yet ignored. Each time, Putin’s threatened escalation failed to materialize. China would never tolerate Russian nuclear use that could trigger global retaliation affecting Chinese interests. And Putin himself, obsessed with personal survival and billion-dollar palaces, hardly fit the profile of a leader ready for nuclear suicide.

But the lesson wasn’t learned. As the senior European official pointedly asked: Russian “red lines”—”have you seen them work?” The answer was obvious to everyone in the room, yet Western policy remains captive to threats that existed only in imagination.

The West chose not to win

Ukrainian officials at GLOBSEC laid out the stark reality that Western leaders refused to acknowledge. “Unfortunately, we don’t now have enough power to do it on the battlefield. I have no doubt that our partners have this power,” explained Yehor Cherniev, deputy chairman of Ukraine’s National Security Committee. “Russian ability to wage war has two pillars: economy and military capacity.”

The Ukrainian analysis was straightforward: Russia could be defeated through either military or economic pressure.

• On the military side, this meant providing sufficient weapons without restrictions and removing the artificial limitations that kept Ukraine fighting with one hand tied behind its back.
• On the economic side, it meant actually using the sanctions power and frozen assets that could cripple Russia’s war machine.

“There is so much space with the sanctions on their oil and gas, their metallurgy, their financial sector,” Cherniev continued. “And the Western world, you can do this and can put this burden much more on Russia’s economy. Without the financing, their army cannot move forward.”

The tragedy revealed at GLOBSEC was that the West chose neither path.

Instead of decisive military support, Ukraine received delayed, limited aid with restrictions that protected Russian territory. Instead of economic warfare using Russia’s own frozen assets, Europe debated legal niceties while taxing its own citizens for defense.

The means to victory existed; the will to use them did not.

“If we collectively in Europe realized that Ukraine’s victory is central, we wouldn’t be sitting here three and a half years in still not having won the war,” the senior foreign policy analyst admitted.

Kacper Rekawek from the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism was more direct: “We chose not to win this. We, the West. Maybe we’re unable to because we have grown too lazy, too fat, too comfortable. And the ones who wanted to win this, generally for Ukraine and with Ukraine—the likes of Poland and the Baltics—just don’t have the bandwidth to push the others into thinking that this is a geopolitical struggle.”

Being lost is a rare chance:

“You have a once-in-a-hundred-years chance to proverbially kick some Russian ass. Last time was 1917, when they made a suicidal mistake. We just need to push them for suicide to actually happen.”

How nuclear theater works

Former spy boss: Moscow plants nuclear docs through captured spies

The resource paradox

The absurdity of Western defeatism becomes clear when examining the numbers.

• Europe’s economy is 12 times larger than Russia’s, its population four times greater.
• The frozen Russian assets alone—€300 billion of the aggressor’s own money sitting in European banks—could fund Ukrainian victory multiple times over.
• Combined European and American GDP dwarfs Russia’s by orders of magnitude.

Yet European leaders speak of “preparing for war by 2030” while refusing to use existing resources to prevent it. The clearest articulation of what was lost came from Olena Halushka of the International Center for Ukrainian Victory during GLOBSEC’s opening panel.

“If the goal is to help Ukraine survive, that’s one type of aid,” she explained. “If the goal is to help Ukraine win, that’s a whole other story about supporting and commitment.”

The clearest way to support Ukraine would be to use the frozen €300 bn of Russian funds for Ukrainian defense.

More precisely:

How Ukraine could spend $ 300bn in frozen Russian assets to win the war

However, EU countries have not mustered the will for full confiscation, and only a fragment—€3.5 bn windfall profits from the €183 bn sitting in Belgium’s Euroclear—has been spent on helping Ukraine’s resistance in 2024. But starting from 2025, even these proceeds will not buy weapons for Ukraine; rather, they will be used to repay a €50 bn loan issued by the G7.

The West, Halushka argued, had unconsciously shifted from victory to survival mode. European leaders speak of preparing for war by 2030, of ramping up defense production over five to ten years. But, “the elephant in the room is that the best way to deter Russian aggression from expanding, deter Russia from attacking other countries, is to help Ukraine win.”

Ukrainian victory would eliminate the Russian threat to NATO’s eastern flank. Ukrainian defeat—disguised as a “frozen conflict”—guarantees future Russian aggression.

The expert consensus on current ceasefire proposals is damning. Every serious analyst who spoke at GLOBSEC warned that Trump’s approach would create a dangerous frozen conflict rather than lasting peace.

Historical precedent supports their pessimism: Russia has used identical tactics in the 2014-2015 Minsk process, designed to present an identical illusion of “peace.” The full-scale invasion followed in 2022.

Western decision paralysis enables broader aggression

Ukraine’s victory wasn’t just abandoned—it was sacrificed to a broader Western reluctance to confront authoritarian aggression. As the senior foreign policy analyst revealed during GLOBSEC discussions, Western intelligence communities exhibit “an inherent bias to be warning against the worst” with “a negative bias because that warning is seen as your job.”

“When nuclear war is at stake, you can understand the urge to caution. But actually, the result of that caution is a worse strategic situation that puts you in grave danger of another kind,” he revealed the working mechanism of nuclear decision paralysis.

The cost of this indecision becomes clear when examining current ceasefire proposals. Even tentative ceasefires and ensuing frozen conflict appear to be wishful thinking: Russia is not even interested in taking a breather, as it keeps making unacceptable demands for Ukraine to surrender regions it controls, without a fight.

“I’m surprised how many people are seriously hoping that something may come out of the process where the starting points are absolutely unacceptable. We are speaking about a whole new level of escalation where Russia can add into their constitution whatever they want: Suwalki, Narva, Svalbard, Dresden, whatever their lawmakers decide,” Olena Halushka stated bluntly.

This constitutional annexation strategy represents the ultimate weaponization of nuclear blackmail—allowing Russia to claim any territory simply by adding it to domestic law, then threatening global war if the world doesn’t comply.

“The international law rules-based world order is already destroyed,” Halushka continued, “but that would be a whole new level of destruction.”

Meanwhile, the West’s much-vaunted “coalition of the willing,” suffers from the same paralysis that enabled Russian success. Former Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielis Landsbergis has repeatedly asked: “Coalition of the willing to do what? And coalition of the willing to do when?”

The initially enthusiastic Franco-British idea of putting EU boots on the ground is facing an uncertain future after failing to secure American backing. Or rather, because it was designed as a post-ceasefire deterrence force, while achieving this very same flawed ceasefire needs immediate deterrence.

The consequences of this coalition paralysis are becoming increasingly stark. New GLOBSEC analysis assigns a 20% probability to “Hybrid World War III”—a scenario where multiple global conflicts blur international focus on Ukraine while Russian aggression spreads.

Ukrainian experts warn this represents the second most likely scenario after prolonged war of attrition, reflecting how Western indecision creates conditions for broader conflict escalation that the intelligence community’s excessive caution was supposedly designed to prevent.

Explore further

GLOBSEC mapped seven Ukraine war scenarios through 2026. Even the “best case” spells future disaster.

The road not taken

GLOBSEC’s most sobering discussions focused on what victory could have looked like.

Ukraine has proven that “no safe place now in Russia” exists for military targets, demonstrating capabilities that have surprised even supporters. The country’s defense industry has scaled production 35-fold in some areas, developing drone and electronic warfare technologies that NATO militaries are eager to learn from.

“Ukraine is rewriting the rules of modern warfare,” as one Ukrainian official noted. The irony is palpable: the West abandoned victory just as Ukraine was demonstrating it was achievable.

Instead of leveraging these Ukrainian capabilities for decisive victory, Western policymakers chose managed stalemate.

The question left hanging in Prague’s corridors was stark: will Western leaders find the courage to align their policies with their private understanding before Russian nuclear blackmail succeeds permanently? Signs of awakening were visible—recognition that Europe faces an existential threat, not a regional conflict.

But with Ukraine already being pushed toward ceasefire negotiations and Russian forces entrenching in occupied territory, the window for course correction is rapidly closing.

The tragedy is that officials who privately know better continue to implement policies that, as they themselves admit, make the catastrophic war everyone fears far more likely. Whether private wisdom can overcome public cowardice before it’s too late remains the defining question of our time.

GLOBSEC, a leading European think tank, has released its latest security scenarios report analyzing potential developments in the Russian war in Ukraine through 2025-2026, finding that a war of attrition with lowered intensity due to resource depletion represents the most probable outcome.

The comprehensive analysis, based on surveys of 61 top Ukrainian security experts including former defense ministers, ambassadors, and senior military officials, offers a distinctly different perspective from Western-based assessments. Unlike typical think tank reports that rely primarily on external analysis, this study draws directly from the expertise of those who have been managing the war effort firsthand.

“The original concept of the Scenarios was to provide an aggregated assessment from the top Ukrainian experts in security, defence, foreign policy, and diplomacy on how the security situation in Europe is perceived from inside a country under military attack,” the report states.

The expert pool includes seven former ministers of defense and foreign affairs, nine ambassadors, and 25 senior-ranking current and former officials who have direct operational experience with the conflict.

This insider perspective assigns a 38% probability to what researchers term “war of attrition with lowered intensity of hostilities due to draining out of resources on both sides.”

Speaking at a GLOBSEC panel discussion during the report’s presentation, Iuliia Osmolovska, Director of GLOBSEC’s Kyiv Office, presented the sobering assessment that “four military scenarios outweighed significantly the probability of three peace scenarios – it’s 75% altogether against 25%,” suggesting limited prospects for meaningful peace settlement in the next 18 months.

Military factors drive scenario predictions

The report identifies a stark shift in driving factors compared to previous analyses. “Unlike the first edition of Scenarios for 2022/23, where political drivers were equal in numbers to military ones (5:5), military and military-financial drivers continue to define the situation in 2025/26 (9:1),” according to the study.

The top factors influencing Ukraine’s security situation include:

• Development of Ukraine’s defense sector to enhance self-sufficiency
• Ukraine’s resource capacity to sustain war expenditures
• Ukraine’s technological advantage in drones and electronic warfare
• Population morale and mobilization dynamics

Former Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov emphasized during the panel that priorities remain unchanged since 2022: “Priority number one still is air defense systems, all types… Second priority still remains artillery shells… The third probably point of this list, it’s electronic warfare.”

Compare with GLOBSEC’s 2024-2025 report:

Five realistic scenarios of war in Ukraine in 2024: GLOBSEC report

Technology and self-reliance take center stage

The analysis reveals Ukraine’s growing focus on military self-sufficiency. The country has achieved remarkable progress in drone production, with 95% of frontline drones now manufactured domestically by over 1,000 companies. Ukraine aims to produce 4 million drones in 2025, representing a dramatic scaling from zero production capability in early 2022.

“This war is the last conventional war in the history of mankind, and we are fighting in a new type of hybrid war,” Reznikov explained, highlighting the evolution toward drone and electronic warfare technologies.

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European defense awakening, but challenges remain

Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna delivered a stark assessment of Europe’s preparedness, stating, “Unfortunately, Putin didn’t wake Europe up… who actually woke up Europe? Based on the investments in our own defense, it was actually President Trump.”

Tsahkna awarded grades to European defense efforts: “A++ for the Baltic states and Poland and Finland and Sweden, frankly, it’s a gamma for, or if not verging on a delta, for much of the rest of Europe.”

Former NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Sir Richard Shirreff was even more direct, declaring “America is no longer a reliable ally” and emphasizing that “Europe holds free and secure against Russia. What do you need to… What objective do you need to satisfy that? You need the defeat of Russia in Ukraine.”

Nuclear self-deterrence fuels global conflict risk

While resource depletion drives the most probable scenario, the second-highest probability (20%) points to a more alarming development: “Hybrid Type World War III,” in which Russian impunity encourages other conflicts globally.

This scenario is driven by what Iuliia Osmolovska identifies as a dangerous Western nuclear paralysis. “While we are afraid, or our partners are afraid of Russia using nuclear weapons, we basically make Russia feel that their blackmailing bears fruit,” she explained.

“This creates an adverse effect internationally, because the countries that do possess nuclear weapons feel emboldened by seeing that if you are in possession of nuclear weapons, then you can enjoy impunity to do whatever you want.”

The ripple effects are already visible. “Look at Iran. Look at Pakistan and India right now,” Osmolovska noted. The scenario envisions nuclear proliferation risks rising as authoritarian regimes conclude that nuclear threats provide effective leverage against Western responses.

Seven scenarios range from global conflict to fleeting ceasefire

The GLOBSEC analysis presents seven scenarios with varying probabilities – but crucially, none deliver sustainable peace:

1. Hybrid World War III (20% probability) – Western nuclear self-deterrence emboldens global aggressors
2. Current intensity maintained (13% probability) – US and Europe provide optimal support
3. Russian breakthroughs amid US withdrawal (4% probability) – Russia gains amid reduced Western aid
4. War of attrition with lowered intensity (38% probability) – Resource depletion forces reduction
5. Ceasefire on unacceptable terms for Ukraine (11% probability) – Ukraine forced into bad deal
6. Reasonably acceptable ceasefire (12% probability) – Patchy peace process with no sustainable outcome
7. “Peace” addressing Ukraine’s interests (2% probability) – The most dangerous illusion.

What the “best case” actually looks like

Even Scenario 7, which the report describes as addressing “Ukraine’s interests and security,” reveals the hollowness of any negotiated outcome. This supposedly optimal scenario would include the rejection of Russia’s maximalist demands.

• Cessation of hostilities along existing contact lines without official recognition of annexed territories.
• Rejection of Ukrainian neutrality or demilitarization demands.
• No written commitments ruling out future NATO membership.
• Presence of European “deterrent forces” on Ukrainian territory as peacekeepers.

Yet even this outcome—achieved only through maximum US pressure on Russia via “draconian sanctions” or China distancing itself from Moscow—remains fundamentally unstable. The report acknowledges that Russia would use “legal language as vague and ambiguous as possible” to “challenge it in the future and use it as a precursor to a renewed conventional attack on Ukraine.”

The fundamental reality: Russia will never stop

The report’s most sobering conclusion is that even this most optimistic 2% scenario doesn’t achieve genuine peace. The analysis makes explicit that Russia’s core objectives remain unchanged since 2022:

• Ukraine’s neutrality and exit from Western security structures;
• Demilitarization rendering Ukraine defenseless;
• “De-nazification” – replacement of Ukraine’s leadership with Russian proxies;
• Territorial concessions acknowledging “Russia’s historical rights.”

As the report states: “Russia will never accept Ukraine as an independent sovereign country, capable of taking independent decisions about its own development, alliances and friends.”

Explore further

Why freezing Ukraine’s war would guarantee another Russian invasion

The cycle of deception

Even under the best-case scenario, the analysis warns of “shifting cycles of ‘conventional-hybrid-conventional warfare'” where any peace agreement becomes merely preparation for renewed aggression. Russia would exploit any ceasefire to:

• Reconstitute military forces while Ukraine faces agreement constraints on defense development;
• Launch intensified hybrid warfare campaigns across Europe, with the report noting Russia will “continue with aggressive hybrid attacks in Europe”;
• Exploit Western “war fatigue” and reduced defense spending as partners assume the threat has passed;
• Lock in territorial gains while rebuilding capacity for the next assault.

Why “peace” becomes the greatest threat

The scenarios reveal a counterintuitive strategic reality: negotiated settlements may pose greater long-term risks than continued warfare. A false peace would:

• Freeze current territorial gains, rewarding Russian aggression;
• Allow Russia to rebuild while constraining Ukrainian defense development through agreement terms;
• Create Western complacency leading to reduced military preparedness;
• Leave Ukraine vulnerable to the next, potentially decisive Russian assault.

The report’s classification of even the most favorable agreements as temporary pauses reflects the Ukrainian experts’ sobering assessment. While they assign 2% probability to a scenario “addressing Ukraine’s interests,” the analysis makes clear this would still be temporary. In their view, any diplomatic solution short of Russia’s complete strategic defeat merely postpones—and potentially worsens—the inevitable next phase of aggression.

Explore further

The peace trap: Five ways Putin wins if Ukraine freezes the war

European defense reality check

The GLOBSEC panel revealed stark assessments of Western military readiness. Former NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Sir Richard Shirreff declared “America is no longer a reliable ally,” while emphasizing Europe’s need for strategic autonomy: “with a population of four times that of Russia, a GDP combined 12 times that of Russia, plus all the Russian assets sitting here in Europe, absolutely we can do it.”

However, Tsahkna warned that Europe faces a critical timeline problem: “we need to have at least 5-10 years” to build adequate defense capabilities, while noting “only for four years” remain before potential Russian readiness for renewed aggression.

US analyst Heather Conley observed a gradual American disengagement: “the United States is right now in a slow moving away,” noting that “anti-drone capabilities that were destined for Ukraine have now gone to the Middle East” due to other regional demands.

The path forward: critical actions required

The analysis reveals that achieving favorable outcomes requires immediate, concrete actions rather than diplomatic gestures alone. With military factors now driving the situation at a 9:1 ratio over political considerations, Western allies face a narrow window for decisive intervention.

Critical military support requirements:

• Ensure production of 10-12 air defense complexes monthly for Ukraine
• Scale artillery shell production to 40-50 thousand units per month by 2026
• Support development of 120-150 long-range ballistic missiles annually from 2026
• Back production of 300-400 medium and long-range UAVs per month

Strategic defense imperatives: European allies must prepare for potential direct confrontation with Russia by 2027-2030, the timeframe intelligence services identify for possible renewed Russian aggression. This requires reviewing NATO strategic plans for deploying at least 500,000 troops and developing genuine European strategic autonomy.

Economic warfare continuation: Maintaining G7+ sanctions coordination while strengthening measures against Russia’s shadow fleet becomes essential, as economic pressure remains one of the few tools forcing Russian strategic recalculation.

The report’s stark conclusion: half-measures risk the worst-case scenarios of either Ukrainian defeat or broader European conflict. The 75% probability assigned to continued military scenarios versus 25% for peace outcomes underscores that decisive military support now determines whether Europe faces prolonged instability or achieves sustainable security.