The Russian air force is lobbing as many as 5,000 glide bombs at Ukrainian positions every month, including some bombs weighing 3,000 kg. Just one of those aerial monsters is powerful enough to flatten a high-rise building.

The glide bombs blast holes in Ukrainian defenses, disrupt military logistics, and terrorize everyday Ukrainians living near the front line, leveling entire apartment buildings in one go.

In the battle for Pokrovsk, Russian forces drop up to 450 glide bombs per week on a single sector, destroying fortified strongpoints that Ukrainian forces spent months building—and allowing Russian infiltration. One FAB-3000 bomb can completely obliterate a fortified position, turning Ukrainian defensive networks into rubble and forcing troops into open fields where they become easier targets.

There are measures Ukrainian forces can take to blunt the relentless bombardment—but none are cheap. And some could take months if not years to have any meaningful effect.

Recent footage from the front line in Myrnohrad, in eastern Ukraine's Donetsk Oblast, dramatically illustrates the power of Russia's glide bombs, which range as far as 65 km on pop-out wings and satellite guidance. Russian industry developed the glide bomb kits in early 2023 in response to heavy Russian air force losses during close bombing sorties.

The recent footage depicts a 1,500-kg or 3,000-kg glide bomb striking a multi-story building—and demolishing it.

"Glide bombs are a truly terrifying weapon," Canadian journalist Neil Hauer explained. He recalled a story about 3,000-kg glide bombs striking an apartment building in Kostiantynivka, in eastern Ukraine. "Leveled it to the ground in one go," Hauer wrote.

The inexpensive glide bombs, each costing just a few tens of thousands of dollars, dramatically reduce Russian warplanes' exposure to the most dangerous Ukrainian air defenses. Instead of attacking from directly overhead, planes could attack from 40 km (with the first generation of glide bombs) or from 65 km (with a newer generation that debuted this year).

Why glide bombs work—and how Russia protects its bombers

It's no coincidence that, as Russia's hundreds of Sukhoi Su-30 and Su-34 fighter-bombers switched to glide bombing since 2023, the rate of loss for both types has declined. Since Russia widened its war on Ukraine in February 2022, the Russian air force has written off around 15 Su-30s and around 40 Su-34s.

More than 250 of the jets remain in service—and Sukhoi continues to deliver replacement airframes at a rate of a couple of dozen a year.

Ukrainian forces aren't defenseless. They can:

• jam the glide bombs with electronic warfare systems;
• shoot down the glide-bombing Sukhois with their best long-range air defenses;
• and suppress the rate at which Russian industry completes replacement jets.

But jamming requires constant adaptation as the Russians add more and more satellite navigation receivers to successive generations of glide bombs. Long-range air defenses are in short supply as the Ukrainian air force prioritizes the defense of major cities and power plants against the most damaging Russian cruise missiles and ballistic missiles.

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Russian jets accumulate dangerous flight hours

Disrupting the Russian aerospace industry is a long-term solution to the glide-bomb threat.

Flying nearly daily glide-bombing sorties, the Russian Su-30s and Su-34s have "built up significant fatigue hours" on their metal airframes, analysts Nikolay Staykov and Jack Watling wrote in a new study for the Royal United Services Institute in London. Warplanes are built tough, but they can become unreliable and unsafe after a few thousand flight hours.

More and more Russian jets are reaching that dangerous threshold. The recent crash of an Su-30 may underscore that risk.

Strangling Sukhoi—sanctions and drone strikes

Ukraine and its allies can accelerate the decline of the Russian fighter fleet and slow the pace of glide bombings—by strangling Sukhoi and its suppliers with sanctions, and directly attacking the most critical production facilities with long-range attack drones.

The aerospace industry in Russia is uniquely vulnerable.

"Because of the number of precision subcomponents necessary to assemble fighter aircraft, even minor delays and disruption to production have a significant knock-on impact in suppressing the acceleration of aircraft production," Staykov and Watling wrote.

If Ukraine's allies can close gaps in sanctions on Russia's aerospace industry to cover all tiers of suppliers and, equally importantly, properly enforce the sanctions, it could "reduce the threat" from the Kremlin's glide bombers by reducing the number of flyable planes.

It wouldn't happen quickly, of course. It could take years before fatigue grounds a significant portion of the Su-30 and Su-34 fleet. Drone strikes on the factories could speed up the degradation by driving the production rate of new jets closer to zero.

But an intensive effort to drone Russian aerospace plants might have the unintended consequence of taking the pressure off the oil industry—and boosting Russia's wider economy.

At present, Kyiv aims most of its long-range drones at Russia's oil industry. The oil campaign has disabled 20% of Russia's oil refining, forced a VAT hike, and driven Moscow's National Wealth Fund toward exhaustion by 2026—"the most efficient thing Ukraine can do" to hurt Russia's war machine, as one economist says.

But every drone aimed at an oil refinery is a drone not aimed at aircraft factories building the bombers that drop 5,000 glide bombs monthly. Pivoting to strikes on airplane factories focus might reduce bombardment in two or three years, if it works. Every month of delay means 5,000 more bombs.

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How Ukraine can win, p.2: The single drone target that could cripple Russia’s oil empire

The Ukrainian 1st Azov Corps is mopping up the last Russian positions in a 40-square-kilometer salient north of Pokrovsk in Donetsk Oblast, winning a two-month battle that could free up hundreds—possibly thousands—of troops. Meanwhile, Pokrovsk itself is falling to Russian infiltrators after a yearlong siege, and 100 kilometers south, Russia's 90th Tank Division is advancing across open terrain toward the logistics hub of Huliaipole in Zaporizhzhia Oblast.

The victories north of Pokrovsk create a brutal dilemma: Ukrainian commanders can use these freed-up troops to buttress the new defensive line forming north of the fallen city—or rush them 100 kilometers south to Huliaipole, where Russia's 90th Tank Division is advancing across open terrain toward Zaporizhzhia.

Outnumbered five-to-one, they don't have enough troops to do both.

Ukrainian forces gain ground north of Pokrovsk

Counterattacks by the Ukrainian 1st Azov Corps since mid-August have steadily reduced a 40-square-kilometer salient that the Russian 132nd Motor Rifle Brigade had carved out of the front line north of Pokrovsk a few weeks earlier. The salient bent toward the village of Dobropillia, which sits astride one of the main supply lines into Pokrovsk.

Liberating the village of Kucheriv Yar late last month and defending the nearby village of Shakhove from repeated Russian mechanized assaults, Ukrainian forces have the momentum in the salient battle. Now they're killing, capturing, or forcing out the last few Russians.

The armed forces of Ukraine "are continuing to mop-up the Dobropillia salient, successfully recapturing several positions around the village of Shakhove," the pro-Ukraine Conflict Intelligence Team reported last week. "These successes may allow Ukrainian reserves to be redeployed from this sector to strengthen the Pokrovsk direction."

In other words, Russian commanders may have viewed the Dobropillia salient as a "counter-fixation axis for Ukrainian reserves," according to military theorist Delwin. The Russians devoted just enough troops and vehicles to the salient battle to keep the 1st Azov Corps fixated on fighting north of Pokrovsk—so the corps wouldn't shift its attention to Pokrovsk proper.

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Dobropillia diversion: did Russia trick Ukraine into losing Pokrovsk?

Pokrovsk likely lost despite northern gains

The problem, however, is that the Russians have the momentum in Pokrovsk—and it may be impossible for the Ukrainians, outnumbered five to one, to seize it from them. "Russian forces will very likely seize Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad," the Institute for the Study of War in Washington, D.C. concluded Tuesday.

The Russians succeeded in infiltrating Pokrovsk following a brutal yearlong siege in part because the salient battle drew the 1st Azov Corps into fighting north of Pokrovsk—keeping it from fighting in Pokrovsk, which was garrisoned by two exhausted Ukrainian units. The 68th Jaeger Brigade and 155th Mechanized Brigade began retreating north in late October.

Now that the 1st Azov Corps is on the verge of winning the salient fight, it's probably too late to do much for Pokrovsk. A few elite Ukrainian units, including one commando team that helicoptered into the city on 29 October, are clinging to fighting positions on the northern edge of Pokrovsk, holding open a narrow escape route for any Ukrainian troops still attempting to flee that city or neighboring Myrnohrad.

Pokrovsk, a once-thriving mining city of 60,000 people, is almost certainly lost—as is smaller Myrnohrad. The Ukrainian forces romping to victory in the disappearing Dobropillia salient may end up staying in the area, buttressing a new defensive line north of Pokrovsk.

Southern front threatens Huliaipole logistics hub

Or they may head south to the junction of Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts, where a powerful force led by the Russian army's biggest division, the 90th Tank Division, has been steadily advancing across unfortified open terrain, pushing back an outgunned and outnumbered Ukrainian force.

"Unfortunately, over the past few weeks, Russian forces have made a series of gains toward Huliaipole and, more broadly, achieved notable advances in the southeastern sector," explained Tatarigami, founder of the Ukrainian Frontelligence Insight analysis group.

Reinforcements could stiffen Ukrainian defenses around Huliaipole. But Ukrainian commanders must choose carefully where they send their precious few reserves.

Their choice to fight so hard over the Dobropillia salient may have hastened Pokrovsk's fall. Likewise, rushing troops south to Huliaipole could weaken the new defensive line forming north of Pokrovsk.

At the same time, stiffening that defensive line at the expense of Huliaipole could accelerate Russian gains in the south. As long as Russia has more troops than Ukraine has, there are no easy choices for infantry-starved Ukrainian commanders.

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Ukraine dominates with drones—until fog arrives in Pokrovsk

The overcast and foggy weather that rolled in with the winter months is an opportunity for Russian forces to rush infantry and vehicles across the drone-patrolled no-man's-land and secure new positions in Pokrovsk, Myrnohrad, and other contested settlements.

That's because bad weather means poor visibility for drones—and drones are now the main means of defense for infantry-starved Ukrainian formations.

If the drones can see, the Russians struggle to advance. If the drones can't see, the Russians advance quickly—and in large numbers.

This was dramatically evident this weekend. "During recent days, the Russians have intensified efforts to penetrate Pokrovsk on light equipment through the southern suburbs," the Ukrainian 7th Rapid Response Corps, which defends Pokrovsk and neighboring Myrnohrad, explained on social media on Tuesday.

"For this, the enemy used adverse weather conditions, including thick fog," the corps added. "This reduces opportunities for our aerial reconnaissance."

How fog blinds Ukrainian drone defenses in Pokrovsk

Videos from Pokrovsk during the stretch of bad weather depict dozens of Russian troops motoring into the city on bikes and in compact cars and trucks. Yes, videos also depict some Ukrainian drone strikes on the intruding Russians—but too few and too slow to halt the Russian advance.

"There are currently more than 300 Russians in the city," the 7th Rapid Response Corps warned. "Their goal remains unchanged—to reach the northern borders of Pokrovsk with a further attempt to surround the agglomeration."

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First Russian truck enters Pokrovsk as fog blinds Ukrainian drones

The Russians were already creeping into Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad before the weekend fog, but much more slowly. Now with the advantageous weather, Russian forces have accelerated their advance dramatically—and the fragments of two Ukrainian brigades still in Myrnohrad face potential encirclement.

Russian commanders exploit weather to bypass drone surveillance

One Ukrainian drone operator has been warning for months—years even—that fog and other obscurants can blunt Ukraine's drone edge, assuming Russian commanders have the foresight to take advantage of the concealment.

"Need to say that Russian [paratroopers are] trying to use fog and a lot of smoke at the battlefield," drone operator Kriegsforscher reported a year ago. "And it really helps."

Four months later in March, the Russians continued to attack under the cover of smoke and fog in Kriegsforscher's sector. "I need to say that because of the smoke, it was hard for us to find them," the drone operator stated. "It's effective."

The fog that protected the Russians back in the spring is even thicker now. In late October, analyst Moklasen observed the Russian 336th Naval Infantry Brigade attacking toward the village of Dobropillia, just north of Pokrovsk.

"Heavy fog," Moklasen observed. The concealment allowed Russian bike troops to sweep a road of Ukrainian munitions and clear a path for up-armored Russian vehicles to assault toward Dobropillia while the bikers fetched the wounded and sped them back toward Russian lines.

Dobropillia remains in Ukrainian hands despite the foggy Russian attacks, but the same can't be said of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. After a yearlong siege, the settlements are on the cusp of falling to the larger Russian force.

Ukraine's infantry shortage exposes critical vulnerability

The loss underscores an important truism. Infantry can fight through fog in a way drones can't, but Ukraine has too few infantry to fill the aerial gaps when the drones can't fly or see.

"Drones and artillery help, but infantry still matters," Finnish analyst Joni Askola explained. "You need soldiers to hold ground. Ukraine does not have enough."

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Dobropillia diversion: did Russia trick Ukraine into losing Pokrovsk?

In their never-ending effort to protect armored vehicles from the tiny first-person-view drones that are everywhere all the time all along the 1,100-km front line of Russia's wider war on Ukraine, Russian forces have introduced a number of bizarre innovations.

The resulting "cope cages" and "turtle," "porcupine" and "hedgehog" tanks are ungainly and, frankly, ugly. But they work. In fact, they work so well that Ukrainian forces usually copy each modification for their own armored vehicles.

The latest Russian anti-drone innovation is no exception.

Adding thousands of metal "hairs" to the existing anti-drone cope cages on a growing number of hedgehog tanks, the Russians have inspired the Ukrainians to do the same.

Now "both Russian and Ukrainian forces are modifying their tanks into so-called hedgehogs," the pro-Ukraine Conflict Intelligence Team observed.

"This is the progress we're making," one Ukrainian mechanic narrated in a recent video appealing to supporters for donations of industrial-grade aluminum cabling. Mechanics unravel the cabling into individual metal threads and weld a bundle with around 100 of the threads onto a tank's cope cage.

A single hedgehog might boast 900 bundles for a total of 90,000 metal hairs. Each hair can detonate an incoming FPV before it strikes a tank's hull.

The cost of protection

There are downsides to do-it-yourself anti-drone armor, of course. All that extra weight can quickly ruin a vehicle's gearbox.

And the heavier turtles, porcupines and hedgehogs are prone to getting mired while trying to cross rivers and streams. But a loss of mobility is a small price to pay for extra protection.

To be fair, Ukrainian forces have managed to eventually knock out even the most heavily up-armored Russian tank. But they have to use more and more of their precious FPV drones to do it.

One heavily up-armored Russian turtle tank, which sported an add-on metal shell or shed, deflected around 25 Ukrainian mines and first-person-view drones before the 26th munition—a drone—finally disabled it during an assault toward the city of Siversk in eastern Ukraine late last month.

From cope cages to hedgehogs

Turtle tanks aren't even the latest and toughest up-armored Russian vehicles. Cope cages were in use before Russia widened its war on Ukraine in February 2022. Turtle tanks first appeared in the second year of the wider war. Porcupine tanks with a few thick metal spines showed up early this year. The first hedgehogs crawled onto the battlefield in the fall.

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Russian improvised armor destroying tanks it’s meant to protect

First spotting each new species, defenders' laughter quickly turned to begrudging respect. “Everyone laughs at the design of their sheds, but in fact they work like Hell,” one Ukrainian blogger wrote about the Russian turtles. The DIY vehicles can eat “a lot of FPVs,” the blogger pointed out.

The more FPVs a given vehicle can absorb before succumbing, the likelier the vehicle is to survive an assault across the drone-patrolled no-man's-land, potentially leading accompanying infantry-laden vehicles to the relative safety of some new underground position.

It's in this manner that the Russians gain ground: securing a new lodgement with a few infantry and then gradually expanding it with reinforcements. Not every vehicle and soldier needs to survive the drone barrage; it only takes a few to begin the slow accumulation that will eventually overwhelm outnumbered Ukrainian defenders.

Why Ukraine copies Russian armor

From mockery to respect to mimicry, Ukrainian forces have followed the Russians' lead—first deploying cope cages, then turtles.

One Ukrainian turtle belonging to the 24th Mechanized Brigade, holding positions outside the ruins of Chasiv Yar in eastern Ukraine’s Donetsk Oblast, rolled through Russian artillery and drone bombardment to evacuate wounded Ukrainian troops back in the spring.

"Our armor again withstood multiple FPV hits and was able to take the fighters to a safe place," the brigade reported.

The Ukrainian hedgehogs should be even more effective. And now at least one Ukrainian mechanic, the one in the recent video, is pleading for more donations of industrial cable. "We need them," he intoned. Every three tons of cable makes a new hedgehog that can ward off Russian drones.

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End of Ukraine’s “wunderwaffe” drones? Russian turtle tanks eat FPVs as 14 vehicles break through

The yearlong siege of Pokrovsk is coming to an end. At the same time, the three-month battle for the Dobropillia salient, a few kilometers north of Pokrovsk, is also coming to an end.

It may not be a coincidence. It's possible the Russians have fought just hard enough around Dobropillia to tie down Ukrainian reserves who otherwise might have rushed south and reinforced Pokrovsk.

In other words, Russian commanders may have viewed the Dobropillia salient as a "counter-fixation axis for Ukrainian reserves," according to military theorist Delwin. The tactic—known as a counter-fixation axis—works by threatening a secondary objective to pin down enemy reserves, preventing them from reinforcing the primary target. The Russians may have committed just enough forces to the salient battle, primarily from a quintet of marine brigades and regiments, to keep the Ukrainian 1st Azov Corps busy ... and keep it out of Pokrovsk.

Delwin's theory makes some sense, and could serve as a warning for Ukrainian commanders as the Ukrainian garrisons retreat from Pokrovsk and neighboring Myrnohrad and the campaign for Donetsk Oblast enters a new phase. That warning is simple: expect deception and diversion.

The Russian breakthrough toward Dobropillia

When the Russian 132nd Motor Rifle Brigade discovered gaps in the undermanned Ukrainian line north of Pokrovsk and swiftly marched 15 km toward the village of Dobropillia back in early August, they initially aimed to gain fire control over the village—and pummel it with drones and artillery.

And for good reason: one of the two main supply lines into Pokrovsk threaded through Dobropillia. Severing that supply line could've accelerated the starvation of the two Ukrainian brigades in the Pokrovsk garrison.

But the Ukrainians reacted swiftly, deploying the 1st Azov Corps and several of its well-equipped brigades. The Ukrainians squeezed the 40-square-kilometer salient from both sides, forcing the Russians away from Dobropillia proper and surrounding them in at least two groups, including one in the village of Kucheriv Yar.

Meanwhile, the Ukrainian 225th Assault Regiment and 33rd Mechanized Brigade established a strong defense in the village of Shakhove, which anchored the southeastern corner of the salient. The defenders of Shakhove rebuffed repeated Russian mechanized assaults, preventing heavy Russian reinforcements from entering the salient.

Erasing the salient

In late October, the Ukrainian 132nd Reconnaissance Battalion liberated Kucheriv Yar, taking Russian prisoners and eliminating around half of the salient. North of Pokrovsk, the momentum was on the Ukrainians' side as they eliminated the two-month-old incursion and straightened their line.

Farther south in Pokrovsk and Dobropillia, however, the Russians had the momentum.

Russian regiments failed to captured Dobropillia, but they still managed to put pressure on the supply lines into Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad by pushing drone teams as close as possible to the front line.

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First Russian truck enters Pokrovsk as fog blinds Ukrainian drones

The strategic gamble: trading Dobropillia pressure for Pokrovsk penetration

Russian infiltrators slipped into Pokrovsk from the south, suffering enormous casualties but managing, slowly yet steadily, to accumulate enough forces inside Pokrovsk to destabilize the increasingly outnumbered and outgunned Ukrainian garrison.

When the Ukrainian Tymur Special Unit staged a daring helicopter assault into Pokrovsk on 29 October, it wasn't a sign the Ukrainians were winning in the city. Quite the opposite.

The Tymur commandos were part of a wider Ukrainian effort to hold a few key fighting positions in northern Pokrovsk—and keep open an escape route for the last survivors of the city's garrison.

"The battle for the city is coming to an end," observer Thorkill concluded on Wednesday.

We may never know how much longer the city may have held if the Russians hadn't occupied the 1st Azov Corps in a long battle around Dobropillia. But it surely helped the Russian strategy in Pokrovsk that the 1st Azov Corps never fought in the city itself.

The Russians' apparent plan worked. And it may have worked even better if, for example, those mechanized columns had been able to get past Shakhove and bolster the Dobropillia salient. A harder fight over the pocket could've drawn in even more Ukrainian units, further weakening defenses in and adjacent to Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.

"Overall, Russian commanders in charge of the operation cannot be overly praised," Delwin wrote, "as they should have exploited this further."

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Ukrainian commandos rush into Pokrovsk to hold escape corridor open for fleeing garrison

A thick fog blanketed Pokrovsk and neighboring Myrnohrad on Thursday. For the Russians, it was a long-awaited opportunity—to rush more forces past Ukraine's drones and into the embattled settlements.

They succeeded more than they failed. For the first time since the Russian Center Group of Forces arrived on the outskirts of Pokrovsk around a year ago, the Russians managed to get a vehicle into Pokrovsk. A truck.

That truck's crew immediately got to work removing obstacles from a road on the southern edge of Pokrovsk. Potentially clearing the way for more Russian vehicles to motor into Pokrovsk as the long, bloody battle for the city enters its final phase.

Why the weather now favors Moscow's forces

A surveillance drone from Ukraine's Peaky Blinders unit managed to get a clear view of the truck. But it seems conditions were too nasty for attack drones to strike the vehicle. "Unfortunately, the bad weather is now playing into the hands of the occupier," Peaky Blinders reported.

"If earlier we saw the infiltration of Russian troops into Pokrovsk exclusively on foot," the drone unit added. "At most, there were sometimes attempts to break through on a motorcycle. Today, through the fog, we noticed the first Russian military pickup in the city. They took their time throwing down the barricades and drove through the streets of Pokrovsk."

Russian strategy shifts from mechanized assault to infiltration

The truck's arrival was a long time coming. The Russian group of forces reached Pokrovsk's outskirts in late 2024 but struggled to slip infantry into to the city—to say nothing of getting vehicles in. The Russians outnumbered the Ukrainians five to one, but Ukrainian drones, mines, and artillery blasted every Russian assault group.

In early 2025, the Russians switched their strategy. As the weather warmed and the ground firmed up, Russian field armies parked their surviving armored vehicles and began sending infantry toward and around Pokrovsk on foot or on motorcycles.

These infiltration tactics were extremely costly in lives and light equipment.

Tens of thousands of Russians have been killed, wounded, and captured around Pokrovsk. But the Ukrainian garrison in Pokrovsk struggled to keep infantry in every fighting position.

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Ukrainian commandos rush into Pokrovsk to hold escape corridor open for fleeing garrison

If a Russian infiltration team could get across the drone-patrolled no-man's-land and reach the edge of Pokrovsk, it could shelter in a basement and await reinforcements.

"The situation around Pokrovsk deteriorated over time as Russian forces kept infiltrating through the southern part of the city," explained Michael Kofman, an analyst with the Carnegie Endowment in Washington, D.C. "Ukrainian positions grew increasingly thin."

The coming of fall, with its wetter, colder, and cloudier weather, was a turning point. "Worsening weather enabled Russian troops to get more men into the city in recent weeks," Kofman added.

Why exhausted Ukrainian defenses couldn't stop every incursion

But even as more Russian infantry sneaked into Pokrovsk, Ukrainian forces in and around the city managed to defeat a fresh wave of Russian mechanized assaults. The long break in vehicular operations had helped the Kremlin stockpile thousands of tanks and other vehicles—and many of them have staged around Pokrovsk.

That changed in the past month or so as Russia's own creeping encirclement of Pokrovsk and neighboring Myrnohrad, and the growing number of Russian drones along this sector of the front, squeezed Ukrainian logistics. "Virtually every vehicle heading into the city comes under attack," Ukrainian philanthropist Serhii Sternenko reported.

Even as Ukrainian defenses stiffened north of Pokrovsk, the defenses in Pokrovsk frayed for a want of people, supplies, and heavy weapons ... but mostly people.

Given Ukraine's continuing struggles to recruit enough fresh troops, it was probably only a matter of time before a Russian vehicle ran the gauntlet and arrived in Pokrovsk.

That time has come. It was already overdue for the surviving Ukrainians to retreat from Pokrovsk. Now withdrawal is even more urgent. "Losing the city now is far less critical than preserving the force," Kofman wrote.

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Ukraine hits elite Rubicon drone base, but it’s too late to save Pokrovsk

When a company from the Ukrainian 425th Assault Regiment raised a Ukrainian flag on the city council building near the center of Pokrovsk on or just before Wednesday, it may have looked like Ukrainian forces were counterattacking in the embattled city.

Nothing could be further from the truth. The survivors of Pokrovsk's Ukrainian garrison are, in fact, trying hard to escape the ruins of the once-thriving mining city. To give the survivors of the 68th Jaeger Brigade and 155th Mechanized Brigade a fighting chance to escape to the new Ukrainian line north of Pokrovsk, several elite—but very small—units have deployed into the city.

They include that company from the 425th Assault Regiment. Don't mistake the company's jaunt into the city center for a counteroffensive. It's actually the covering effort for a belated general retreat. After a year of hard fighting, the battle for Pokrovsk "is coming to an end," observer Thorkill noted.

Why Russia's numerical advantage matters in Pokrovsk

The Russian Center Group of Forces suffered shocking casualties marching on Pokrovsk from the ruins of Avdiivka, 40 km to the southeast, starting in the spring of 2024. The Russian group bled for every meter it advanced, but thanks to its sheer size—its 100,000 or more troops outnumber the local Ukrainian forces five to one—it did advance.

By the new year, it was on Pokrovsk's outskirts. By this summer, Russian infantry had begun infiltrating Pokrovsk in growing numbers—taking advantage of wide gaps in Ukrainian defenses to dart into the city, hunker down in some basement and await reinforcement.

A Russian incursion north of Pokrovsk in August drew Ukrainian reserves away from the city. Renewed Russian mechanized assaults this fall—following a long pause in mech attacks that allowed the Kremlin to stockpile vehicles—kept up the pressure north of Pokrovsk.

How Russian infiltration tactics broke Ukrainian defenses

"The geometry of the battle has long been unfavorable" for Ukraine, wrote Michael Kofman, an analyst with the Carnegie Endowment in Washington, D.C., citing "deteriorating conditions, lack of reserves and [low] manning levels of deployed units."

That geometry got worse last month. "The situation around Pokrovsk deteriorated over time as Russian forces kept infiltrating through the southern part of the city," Kofman noted. "Ukrainian positions grew increasingly thin. Worsening weather enabled Russian troops to get more men into the city in recent weeks."

Russian drone teams have followed the infiltrators into Pokrovsk. Now Russian drones range across Pokrovsk and the few roads into the city and neighboring Myrnohrad. There's still a 3-km gap between the westernmost and easternmost Russian elements north of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad—a way out for the Ukrainian troops in both settlements.

But that gap is patrolled by explosive drones. And it's in danger of closing completely any day now, especially if bad weather covers a fresh Russian push.

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Ukraine hits elite Rubicon drone base, but it’s too late to save Pokrovsk

Hold the door

To hold open the gap as long as possible, and allow the survivors of the 68th Jaeger Brigade and 155th Mechanized Brigade to retreat north, the Ukrainian command has deployed that company from the 425th Assault Regiment as well as a company from the 82nd Air Assault Brigade and three special operations units.

These elite troops, perhaps just a few hundred in number, are too few and too lightly equipped to push back the thousands of Russians winding their way into Pokrovsk. But operating from defensive positions on the northern edge of Pokrovsk, the newly deployed elite troops have succeeded in holding off the Russians for now.

The "shattered subunits" of the 68th Jaeger Brigade and 155th Mechanized Brigade seized the opportunity to escape starting on the night of 27 October, according to Thorkill. Many of the survivors "left the city on foot." Russian drones and aerial bombs rained down, killing some of the escapees. But others made it out.

There are still some Ukrainian troops in the chaotic center and southern quarters of Pokrovsk. "Trapped," In Thorkill's assessment. It's probably no coincidence that the 425th Assault Regiment recently appeared in the city center. There were probably Ukrainian troops in need of rescue in the area.

What happens after Pokrovsk falls

As Ukrainian troops look for ways out of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, the fates of both settlements are clear. The Russians will capture their ruins in the coming days or weeks.

The porous front line will then shift a few kilometers north into the fields and villages north of Pokrovsk. The battle for Donetsk Oblast will grind on, with the Russians having yet again traded tens of thousands of casualties for a Ukrainian city whose outnumbered defenders fought for longer than should be possible.

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Ukraine’s window closes: Russian forces 3km from trapping Myrnohrad troops

Russia's elite Rubicon (also spelled Rubikon) drone group is strangling the Ukrainian troops in Pokrovsk and neighboring Myrnohrad. So the Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate, the HUR, is trying to strangle Rubicon—by striking at its operators in one of their rear bases.

But the Ukrainian effort is too little, too late.

A recent HUR drone raid on an alleged Rubicon base near Avdiivka, 40 km southeast of Pokrovsk, is a desperate effort to delay the likely inevitable outcome of the yearlong Russian siege of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad in eastern Ukraine's Donetsk Oblast.

Potentially thousands of Ukrainians are still fighting in and just south of the settlements, but they're nearly cut off by a Russian force that outnumbers them five to one. The Russian armed forces "have intensified efforts to encircle the Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad agglomeration," the Conflict Intelligence Team noted.

"Currently, only about 3 km remain between the converging segments of the contested area north of Pokrovsk and southwest of Krasnyi Lyman—a narrow corridor through which Ukrainian troops could potentially exit the operational encirclement," CIT warned.

Rubicon's stranglehold on Pokrovsk supply routes

Disrupting one Russian drone group might buy the Ukrainians more time to escape Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. But it's unlikely to save the settlements.

The HUR launched its attack drones at the Rubicon base under the cover of darkness on or before Tuesday. Footage from the long-range, first-person-view drones shows at least one of them slamming into a two-story building the HUR claimed housed Rubicon operators.

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Ukraine’s window closes: Russian forces 3km from trapping Myrnohrad troops

It's unclear how much damage the raid inflicted. And it probably doesn't matter very much. The real damage along the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad axis is being inflicted by Rubicon teams flying short-range first-person-view drones whose operators are on the front line ... not behind it near Avdiivka.

How Rubicon perfected supply-line warfare in Kursk

Rubicon is among the best Russian drone groups. It made its major combat debut in February when it deployed its FPV teams north of the Ukrainian-held salient around the town of Sudzha in western Russia's Kursk Oblast. The drones swiftly destroyed hundreds of Ukrainian trucks, cutting off the flow of supplies into Sudzha and compelling the Ukrainian troops to retreat.

The elite unit was created in mid-2024 under orders from Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov, combining drone development, operator training, and electronic warfare capabilities. It operates at least seven detachments of 130-150 personnel each, with projections to reach 5,000-6,000 specialists by fall 2025.

The Kremlin's attention then shifted south to Donetsk ... and Pokrovsk.

FPV drones make Ukrainian resupply nearly impossible

Sometime this summer or fall, the Russian Center Group of Forces—which had been steadily grinding toward Pokrovsk for more than a year—finally got close enough to the settlements for supporting FPV operators to fly their tiny drones directly over the two main supply routes threading into Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.

Some controlled by radio, others guided by signals traveling along jam-proof fiber-optic cables, the FPV drones made it extremely dangerous for any Ukrainian vehicle to travel along the roads during daytime. The proliferation of FPVs with thermal cameras meant nighttime was only slightly safer.

"All that we are seeing today in Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad happened mostly due to the unmanned FPV forces of the Russians, who are blocking our logistics," Ukrainian service member Skhidnyi wrote. "The same crews that destroyed our logistics on the Kursk direction last winter and spring are still operating."

There may be scores of Russian FPV teams along the porous front line around Pokrovsk. Realistically, the HUR can't hit them all.

Ukrainian forces previously struck Rubicon's command post in August 2025, destroying a large ammunition depot in Donetsk Oblast. While that operation temporarily disrupted the unit's operations, military experts warned the unit remains a systemic threat that requires a comprehensive counter-strategy beyond individual strikes.

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Ukrainian troops nearly cut off as Pokrovsk defense strategy fails

The gap between separate contingents of Russian troops advancing east and west of Myrnohrad is now just 3 km. With every passing day, it becomes much more difficult for the Ukrainian troops south of the closing Russian pincer to receive supplies through the gap—or retreat through it to the north.

Current situation in Myrnohrad: Russian pincer gap stands at just 3 km between advancing forces. Ukrainian defenders—parts of the 25th Air Assault and 38th Marine brigades—face an encirclement timeline measured in days, not weeks. One remaining corridor under heavy drone surveillance provides the only escape route.

The implication is clear, according to the pro-Ukraine Conflict Intelligence Team. "It is time for the [armed forces of Ukraine] to abandon Myrnohrad and the area south of it," CIT urged.

Myrnohrad, an industrial town with a pre-war population of around 40,000, lies just east of Pokrovsk, a mining city with a pre-war population of more than 100,000.

Why Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad matter strategically

Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad anchor Ukrainian defenses in Donetsk Oblast. Capturing Pokrovsk would give the Russian Central Group of Forces a clearer shot at the twin cities of Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, 60 km to the north—major population centers that remain under Ukrainian control.

For more than a year, outnumbered Ukrainian forces have defended Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. At tremendous cost in men and machines, the Russians ground toward the city, trading bodies and equipment for every meter of Ukrainian soil.

Initially rebuffed on the outskirts of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, the Russians pivoted—and began encircling the twin settlements instead of directly assaulting them.

In March, the Russian 132nd Motor Rifle Brigade discovered gaps in Ukrainian defenses northwest of Pokrovsk and quickly marched north toward the village of Dobropillia, which sits astride one of just two main supply routes into Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.

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Pokrovsk is falling. Ukraine’s northern defense line is rising.

The Russians lost the subsequent battle for the Dobropillia pocket, but only after the Ukrainian 1st Azov Corps—one of Ukraine's main formations then in reserve for emergencies—rushed toward the salient.

Russian drones turn supply routes into kill zones

The Ukrainian counterattack prevented the supply lines from being overrun by Russian infantry, but couldn't prevent the best Russian first-person-view drones—flown by Rubicon and other elite groups—from striking Ukrainian vehicles speeding down the roads into Pokrovsk.

"Virtually every vehicle heading into the city comes under attack," Ukrainian philanthropist Serhii Sternenko warned. "It's impossible to quickly evacuate the wounded. It's impossible to deliver supplies and ammunition on time. The main losses aren't at the positions, but on the road."

Fresh mech assaults tighten Russian grip

Resuming mechanized attacks after a long pause, the Russians continued to close their pincer around Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad through October, slowly strangling their Ukrainian garrisons. Now it's too late to save either settlement. "Both towns are effectively lost and recapturing them is nearly impossible," CIT noted, "as AFU reserves were deployed to the neighboring front-line section to stabilize and eliminate the Dobropillia breakthrough."

Today, there are hundreds of Russian infiltrators inside Pokrovsk and more than 100,000 Russians in the wide front around the city.

Parts of just two Ukrainian brigades—the 25th Air Assault Brigade and the 38th Marine Brigade—remain in and around Myrnohrad. They should retreat first, followed by any troopers from the 155th Mechanized Brigade who remain in Pokrovsk.

Escape possible but increasingly deadly

The pincer is closing, but it's not impossible for the Ukrainians to escape. "Although we expect the gray zone to close soon, full encirclement and capture or killing of all soldiers trapped in the pocket cannot be anticipated," CIT explained. "In modern warfare, where Russian advances often involve small units, similar small Ukrainian groups may still be able to break out, despite the risks of drone strikes or firefights."

But the retreat will be dangerous. And the Ukrainians will have to escape on foot, leaving behind any heavy equipment that remains in Myrnohrad.

The order to quit Myrnohrad could have—and, according to some observers, should have—come much earlier. Ukrainian forces are preparing new defensive lines north of Pokrovsk. And with their advantage in drones as well as the natural advantages any defender enjoys over an attacker, the Ukrainians are increasingly adept at defending open terrain where approaching Russian troops have nowhere to hide.

Unlike in cities, where the attacking Russians have everywhere to hide.

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Ukrainian troops nearly cut off as Pokrovsk defense strategy fails

Ukraine's pattern of late withdrawals

Sternenko urged Ukrainian commanders to learn from Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, and allow plenty of time for an orderly retreat once a city or town becomes indefensible.

But waiting too long to withdraw is becoming a tragic tradition in the Ukrainian armed forces. It happened in Bakhmut. It happened in Avdiivka. It happened in Sudzha.

"Every time, our forces withdrew at the last moment with heavy losses, abandoning property and equipment," Sternenko pointed out. "Not everyone could get out. Some remained in their positions forever."

"This is happening again right now."

Ukrainian troops are dangerously close to being surrounded in the 30-square-kilometer pocket stretching from Pokrovsk east to Myrnohrad. The open end of the pocket, the only escape route for some or all of no fewer than three Ukrainian brigades—the 25th Air Assault Brigade, the 38th Marine Brigade and the 155th Mechanized Brigade—is barely 10 km across.

Commanders have yet to order the garrisons in Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad to withdraw north to the next line of Ukrainian defenses.

In any event, it's probably too late for a safe and orderly retreat. Russian drones and artillery can range across the only roads and footpaths out of the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket. If there's any reason to hope for anything short of a catastrophic withdrawal, it's that the front line in Ukraine isn't really a line anymore—it's a porous zone of contested control.

Maybe all those Ukrainian paratroopers, marines, and mechanized troops can slip out of the pocket the same way Russian troops have been slipping into it—on foot in small groups, at night. But it's risky. And the retreating Ukrainians may leave behind a lot of heavy equipment.

Serhii Sternenko—founder of the Sternenko Fund, which equips Ukrainian forces with drones—surely spoke for many Ukrainians when he voiced his frustration.

Citing chaotic and costly Ukrainian retreats from Avdiivka, Vuhledar, and Sudzha, he asked how yet another Ukrainian force could find itself "in a fire sack."

"Every time, our forces withdrew at the last moment with heavy losses, abandoning property and equipment," Sternenko wrote. "Not everyone could get out. Some remained in their positions forever. This is happening again right now."

How this happened is clear to see. A powerful Russian force with more than 100,000 troops and hundreds of armored vehicles has been marching on Pokrovsk for more than a year since capturing the ruins of Avdiivka, 40 km to the southeast.

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Pokrovsk is falling. Ukraine’s northern defense line is rising.

Bloody march

The Ukrainian armed forces bled the Russians for every kilometer they advanced, but the main defensive line was anchored by Pokrovsk itself. That was consistent with Ukraine's urban defense strategy. For nearly four years since Russia widened its war on Ukraine, Ukrainian commanders have fortified cities at the expense of the countryside.

That used to make sense. Built-up urban areas can hide and protect infantry fighting on the defensive, helping them repel enemy assaults.

The problem, in 2025, is that Ukraine is desperately short of trained infantry.

"To put it as bluntly as possible: Ukraine has fallen short by at least 10,000 recruits per month over the past two years," Ukraine Control Map explained.

"We don't lack the will to fight," wrote Ryan O'Leary, the former commander of the now-shuttered Chosen Company, a volunteer unit that fought in Ukraine. "We lack the infantry to hold the ground so we can continue fighting."

Ukraine compensates with a large force of tiny explosive drones. But the drones are most effective on open terrain where there's nowhere for their prey to hide.

They're least effective over cities, where their prey has everywhere to hide. If Russian troops can slip through the many wide gaps in Ukrainian defenses, they can accumulate in small but growing numbers inside a city like Pokrovsk.

There, the "overwhelming number of Russian soldiers and the possibility to hide easily from drones inside cities” make a drone-based urban defense “more difficult,” French analyst Clément Molin explained. The drones can't find or hit all the Russians in their basement hideouts. And there are too few Ukrainian infantry to clear out the Russian infiltrators the old-fashioned way: with direct close combat.

Since arriving at the gates of Pokrovsk and nearby Myrnohrad late last year, the Russians have been slowly but steadily creeping into both cities in small groups. Today, there are around 250 Russian infantry inside Pokrovsk. That might not seem like a lot, but it's enough to create a lodgement for follow-on forces.

Meanwhile, Russian assaults northeast of Myrnohrad and northwest of Pokrovsk have partially closed a pincer around the twin cities, nearly bottling up the Ukrainians in the settlements. "The enemy cut off our logistics," Sternenko pointed out. Aerial resupply via drone is still possible, but drone resupply can't fully replace ground resupply, which is much more efficient.

There may have been an opportunity for Ukrainian troops to safely leave Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. But it was weeks ago. And it required Ukrainian commanders to understand that their most abundant forces—small drones—work best over open terrain.

The old urban defense model may be obsolete.

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Ukraine stops Russian armor—but infiltrators are already inside Pokrovsk

North of Pokrovsk, Ukraine is winning. South of Pokrovsk, Russia is winning.

Pokrovsk itself is likely lost—but that may matter less than the terrain around it. Open ground with clear sightlines and dense obstacles has proven easier to defend than sprawling cities, where Russian infiltrators exploit blind spots and gaps between Ukrainian positions.

The fall of the former mining city would open the road to Kramatorsk and Sloviansk—the last major Ukrainian strongholds in Donetsk Oblast. But Ukraine's counterattacks north of the city could establish a new defensive line against the Russian Center Grouping of Forces—perhaps 150,000 strong— in open terrain where Russian mechanized assaults have already failed repeatedly.

Capturing Pokrovsk has been the Russian command's top priority for a year now. Defending it has been the Ukrainian command's top priority. But the Ukrainians always had too few troops for the task.

Now there are hundreds of Russian infiltrators in the city center—and the supply lines to the embattled Ukrainian garrison are fraying.

"The fall of Pokrovsk appears inevitable," the pro-Ukraine Conflict Intelligence Team warned.

How urban warfare dynamics have changed

But Ukrainian victories north of the city should temper any dooming. Pokrovsk is likely to fall, and soon. But Ukrainian brigades may be able to establish a new and stronger defensive line north of the city.

That's because cities are no longer the key defensive positions they used to be.

"It has become easier to defend fields or villages than large cities," French analyst Clément Molin pointed out. "Fewer soldiers are needed, the Russian infantry is quickly spotted, and the increasingly numerous obstacles (ditches, barbed wire) sometimes prevent progress."

Ukraine's northern counteroffensive gains ground

That's not mere theory. A clutch of Ukrainian brigades overseen by the 1st Azov Corps isn't just holding the line in the fields just north of Pokrovsk—they're actively counterattacking in several directions, steadily chipping away at a salient Russian infiltrators carved in the Ukrainian line back in August.

In and around the village of Shakhove on the eastern edge of the collapsing salient, the Ukrainian 33rd and 93rd Mechanized Brigades and 95th Air Assault Brigade have repulsed several Russian mechanized assaults in recent weeks.

Despite occasionally bad weather that can interfere with aerial surveillance, drones have detected the approaching Russian vehicles—and mines, drones, and artillery have blasted them from above and below.

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Ukraine stops Russian armor—but infiltrators are already inside Pokrovsk

Russian mechanized assaults fail in open terrain

A Russian mech assault on Saturday may have been the biggest of the current campaign. "It’s hard to count how many [vehicles] were used because of the bad weather conditions (fog)," Ukrainian drone operator Kriegsforscher wrote. "But we are sure that [there were] dozens."

When the Ukrainians got done with them, 16 vehicles lay immobilized and burning, Kriegsforscher reported.

Shakhove holds. Meanwhile, a few kilometers to the west, on the other side of the collapsing salient, Ukrainian forces are on the move. In the past week, they've liberated several villages, including Kucheriv Yar.

Inside Pokrovsk: Russian infiltration continues

That won't save Porkrovsk, however. Ukrainian positions are too few and too widely spread to block all Russian attempts to infiltrate the city from the south.

The Russians have "used inter-positional space and infiltrated small infantry groups," gradually concentrating around 200 soldiers in Pokrovsk, according to the Ukrainian general staff.

"In effect, this statement acknowledges a critical shortage of Ukrainian manpower, which prevents the establishment of a continuous defensive line," CIT observed. "The gaps between Ukrainian strongpoints—the so-called inter-positional space—are precisely the areas through which Russian troops are advancing."

The end is coming for Pokrovsk. How soon is unclear.

"I believe the Pokrovsk battle is not over," Molin wrote. "It could last additional months. Everything will depend on what the leadership will do. Leave the city or fight for it."

Fighting for it could endanger the last few troops in the garrison, who may have to beat a hasty retreat as urban positions finally—and suddenly—become untenable. An orderly retreat could reposition Ukraine's precious manpower behind a new defensive along the open ground north of Pokrovsk.

Open ground that has proved to be a killing field for attacking Russians.

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Winter in Ukraine: when drones can’t see, tanks advance

Under the cover of rain and clouds, no fewer than 29 Russian vehicles attacked Ukrainian positions northeast of the fortress city of Pokrovsk on Monday morning.

A clutch of Ukrainian brigades, including the 33rd and 93rd Mechanized Brigades, assisted by the 1st Azov Corps and the Unmanned Systems Forces, knocked out more than half of the vehicles with mines, drones, and artillery, and scattered the infantry who managed to dismount.

Losing half of a battalion-size assault group would be catastrophic for any other military. For the Russian military, it may actually represent a victory of sorts. It's possible enough infantry survived the assault to find covered positions and create a lodgement for eventual reinforcements.

If those reinforcements arrive in time, the Russians may be able to consolidate their new positions and create opportunities for future advances. "The levels of success from this attack will become clearer in the coming days," AMK Mapping noted.

The Monday assault, apparently involved some of the five Russian marine brigades and regiments that rushed toward Pokrovsk this summer, was "one of the most massive in recent times," the 1st Azov Corps reported.

The assault targeted Ukrainian positions northeast of Pokrovsk, where the Russians are struggling to hold onto a salient they carved out of Ukrainian lines in August. That salient, bending northwest toward the village of Dobropillia, is—or was, until recent Ukrainian counterattacks—Russia's best chance to encircle Pokrovsk from the north.

If—or when—Pokrovsk falls, the Russian Center Grouping of Forces will have a clearer path toward Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, the last major free cities in Donetsk Oblast.

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Ukraine’s killer drones just hit a wall—Russia’s souped-up “turtle” tanks

Too many turtles

Notably, according to the 1st Azov Corps, there was an unusually large number of up-armored "turtle tanks" among the 29 Russian vehicles that rolled out on Monday.

Tanks often lead Russian mechanized assaults, absorbing first-person-view drones with their add-on armor, clearing mines with their front-mounted rollers, and firing their cannons to suppress Ukrainian troops.

"The enemy tried to complicate the actions of the defense forces of Ukraine by advancing the equipment in small groups—four to five units—along different routes and at different times," the 1st Azov Corps stated. "The invaders also counted on adverse weather conditions, which would complicate the work of drones. Despite this, their plan was thwarted."

Fifteen of the 29 vehicles were immobilized, according to the 1st Azov Corps.

But perhaps thanks to the large proportion of tanks in the assault, 14 vehicles weren't immobilized—and may have dropped off their infantry passengers in new positions.

It's possible the tanks ate so many drones that there weren't enough drones left over to hit the other armored vehicles trailing behind the tanks, as well as the infantry they landed.

"The clearing of the enemy infantry landing sites continues," the 1st Azov Corps reported.

But if Ukrainian drones and counter-assaults can't clear out these infantry, it could become a problem for the Ukrainian defense north of Pokrovsk.

Experts warned something like this could happen.

“For those mocking armored vehicles and specially turtle tanks and thinking drones are a wunderwaffe that have rendered armor obsolete, take a look at the sheer amount of FPVs that are required to destroy a well-up-armored tank,” analyst Jompy wrote.

There are recent examples of Russian turtle tanks shrugging off dozens of drones before succumbing.

“It’s not about how many dollars a tank costs versus a drone,” Jompy added. “It’s about how many targets drone-intensive defenses can take out before being overwhelmed.”

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Winter in Ukraine: when drones can’t see, tanks advance

The Kremlin spent much of this year to stockpiling and adding protection to tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and other armor. And then, in early October, these vehicles attacked.

First, they attacked in the east around Pokrovsk and in the south around Mala Tokmachka. Then, on Thursday, they rolled out along a third front—near Siversk in eastern Ukraine's Donetsk Oblast.

It was a costly failure. But the next mechanized assault on Siversk might work.

Russian regiments and brigades east of Siversk, possibly including the 6th and 7th Motor Rifle Regiments, mustered a large for the daytime attack, including: a tank, three IFVs, three all-terrain vehicles and around 20 motorcycles.

The up-armored "turtle tank," wrapped in a metal shell of add-on anti-drone armor, led the way—and the similarly up-armored IFVs trailed behind. The tank, fitted with a front-mounted mine-roller, safely detonated several mines and shrugged off more than a few explosive first-person-view drones as it rolled west.

But more drones were waiting. After absorbing dozens of explosions, the tank finally succumbed to an FPV drone that apparently struck its engine compartment, disabling it. The crew bailed out of the burning vehicle, only to fall victim to yet another drone that struck from above.

Russian equipment burned all across the sector. The Ukrainian 54th Mechanized Brigade and 81st Air Assault Brigade claimed they destroyed every single attacking vehicle.

While it's possible a few Russian infantry dismounted and went to ground in the tree line, the assault almost certainly didn't budge the front line.

More metal on the way

Yet. If the Russian mech assaults around Mala Tokmachka and Pokrovsk are any indication, further mech assaults are likely around Siversk.

After repeated attacks, the Russians managed to land infantry in Mala Tokmachka. They've tried several times to get a few tanks and IFVs across the no-man's-land and drop off infantry in the village of Shakhove, which anchors Ukrainian defenses northeast of Pokrovsk.

Letting the infantry attack on bikes or on foot for much of 2025, the Kremlin managed to save up hundreds, if not thousands, of heavy vehicles. It has enough armor in reserve to keep up the mechanized pressure in several directions.

Mechanized assaults are costly because all assaults are costly in this era of drone warfare. But as long as Russia is willing to pay the cost, the mech assaults can work.

Compared to infantry-led attacks, mech attacks "are definitely being faster in terms of advance and capturing the territory," Ukrainian drone operator Kriegsforscher noted.

That's because it might take just one or two drones to destroy a motorcycle or maim an entire infantry squad. But it takes around eight drones, on average, to disable a turtle tank, one Ukrainian drone operator told Ukrainian-American war correspondent David Kirichenko.

Ukrainian brigades might have just a few hundred FPV drones to defend against a single Russian attack. If there are enough attacking Russian vehicles and they can absorb several drones apiece before their crews die or give up, Ukrainian defenders may run out of drones before the Russians run out of vehicles.

That's apparently what happened in Mala Tokmachka. It could also happen in Shakhove. And the Russians clearly aim to achieve the same thing in Siversk: hurling metal and flesh at Ukraine's wall of drones until the drones are all gone.

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Ukraine stops Russian armor—but infiltrators are already inside Pokrovsk

Winter looms in Ukraine. And it's going to change how both sides fight as Russia's wider war on Ukraine grinds into its 44th month.

Expect rainy, overcast skies and deepening cold. That means fewer drones in sky—and more opportunities for vehicles to safely speed along the roads near the porous front line. But it also means even more difficult conditions for troops on the ground.

For the Russians, the imminent decrease in drone operations could prompt commanders to deploy even more tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. For the Ukrainians, supply runs to the most vulnerable front-line city—Pokrovsk in Donetsk Oblast—may get a bit safer.

Both Russian and Ukrainian infantry are going to be even more miserable, however, as they shiver in their cold muddy trenches and trudge through deepening winter mud.

The weather turned in early October. Not coincidentally, that's when Russian field armies around Pokrovsk finally deployed the hundreds, if not thousands, of tanks and other armored vehicles they had spent most of this year stockpiling.

Heavy vehicles are extremely vulnerable to the tiny explosive drones that are everywhere all the time along the 1,100-km front, of course. Anything that reduces the pace of drone sorties—bad weather than throws drones off course and obscures their sensors, for example—is a boon to vehicle crews.

“Russian forces are trying to carry out mechanized assaults under weather conditions unfavorable for UAV operations, while Ukrainian troops are repelling them,” the pro-Ukraine Conflict Intelligence Team noted.

The weather was bad in early October, but maybe not bad enough. Despite the overcast, Ukrainian drones detected and—with the help of artillery and mines—halted all four major Russian mechanized assaults around Pokrovsk in recent weeks.

"We have terrible weather conditions," Ukrainian drone operator Kriegsforscher reported after helping to knock out 16 vehicles on 9 October. "But we still managed to find an opportunity."

The Russians' fortunes may improve as the winter sets in, however.

"Rain and fog ... hinder Ukrainian reconnaissance UAVs from detecting [Russian] armored vehicle columns in advance," the pro-Ukraine Conflict Intelligence Team explained.

If more Russian armor can get across the wide drone kill zone and land infantry inside Ukrainian territory, the Russians may be able to accelerate their slow pace of advance around Pokrovsk as October turns into November.

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Ukraine stops Russian armor—but infiltrators are already inside Pokrovsk

Safer supply routes

But it's not all bad news for Ukraine. The same weather that obscures Russian tanks from Ukrainian drones also obscures Ukrainian supply trucks from Russian drones.

This is especially important for Ukrainian trucks trying to roll south into Pokrovsk past the 40-square-kilometer salient Russian forces carved out of Ukrainian lines near the village of Dobropillia back in August.

The rain and fog "may enable the [armed forces of Ukraine] to more safely use the road near the Dobropillia salient because the airspace contains fewer enemy drones on such days," CIT predicted.

So, while more Russian tanks attack, Ukrainian defenders around Pokrovsk may have more supplies, more shells, more missiles, and more capacity to resist.

The only clear losers are the infantry on both sides, who were already struggling in the cold mud that defines the early winter in eastern Ukraine—and are now about to struggle harder. With drones patrolling tens of kilometers in both directions from the line of contact, the journey to the line for an infantryman is "now a full-scale trek," one Russian blogger moaned.

It's often unsafe for vehicles, so the infantry walk. "With all your gear, about 30 kilos of it, you're dropped off 10 to 15 kilometers from the point where you'll be fighting," the blogger added. "In some areas, the trek can be up to 30 kilometers."

Imagine walking with that weight when it's cold and wet. Now imagine that only the miserable cold and wet are your best defenses against the drones that still stand a pretty good chance of killing you.

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Twenty-two tanks rolled to the fight. Ukraine’s drones saw—and ended their might.

The Ukrainian air force may eventually re-equip with Saab Gripen E/F fighters.

The nimble supersonic jets are uniquely suited to the Ukrainian way of war, which requires the air force to spread far and wide across small airfields and even roadway airstrips in order to avoid attack.

This matters because Ukraine's jets keep flying by avoiding big, vulnerable air bases—dispersing instead to highways and hidden strips across the country. But this survival strategy puts intense pressure on the aircraft. While Ukrainian brigades can coax American F-16s into this nomadic existence, it requires mobile support teams and kid-glove treatment.

The Gripen doesn't—it's built for rough-field warfare. Sweden designed the jet in the 1980s specifically to survive Soviet strikes on air bases, operating instead from highway strips scattered across the country.

Ukrainian Pres. Volodymyr Zelensky met with Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson in Helsinki on Wednesday in order to discuss the deal. "We expect that the future contract will enable us to obtain at least 100 of these jets," Zelensky said.

"We are looking into how this can be financed," Swedish defense minister Pål Jonson said of the potentially multi-billion-dollar acquisition.

It could take years for the first Gripens to arrive in Ukraine. If and when they do, they should fit right in.

Why dispersed operations keep Ukraine's air force alive

The Swedish fighter is specifically designed to fly from short, rough airstrips—just like the Ukrainian air force's current, mostly ex-Soviet, fighters do—all in order to avoid detection by Russian drones and bombardment by Russian missiles.

This difficult but critical dispersal practice is the main reason why the Ukrainian air force is still in the fight 44 months into Russia's wider war. Many of the jets the Ukrainians have lost have been hit at the air force's main air bases, which are big, vulnerable and well-known to Russian strike planners.

The Ukrainian jets that have survived are the ones that have avoided the big bases—and flown from small civilian airfields and long stretches of highway, instead.

Key survival factors for Ukrainian aircraft:

• Ability to operate from highways and improvised strips
• Short takeoff distances under 500 meters
• Protection against foreign object debris (FOD)
• Rapid dispersal to avoid concentrated Russian strikes
• Minimal ground support equipment requirements

How Soviet-era jets handle rough-field operations

Ukraine's main warplane, the Soviet-made Mikoyan MiG-29, is adept at dispersed operations.

As a supersonic MiG-29 touches down on its reinforced landing gear, doors close over its gaping air-intakes while gates open on top of the intakes. This system prevents rocks and other "foreign object debris," or FOD, from wrecking the jet's engines while it's operating from a dirty airstrip or roadway.

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Similar anti-FOD systems are standard on the Soviet-style jets that equip Ukraine's air force: not just MiG-29s, but also Sukhoi Su-24 bombers, Su-25 attack jets, and Su-27 interceptors.

The planes' robustness and short runway requirements—a MiG-29 needs just 300 m or so—is why they've endured in Ukrainian service.

Why American F-16s struggle with Ukrainian conditions

Ukraine's Western-made planes are needier and less rugged. American-designed Lockheed Martin F-16s in particular are ill-suited for ops from debris-cluttered runways.

They have no anti-FOD system. And their gaping under-fuselage intakes practically gobble up dirt and rocks. While Ukrainian brigades do fly the F-16 from dispersed airstrips, they do so with great care. It's not for no reason the air force has assembled special mobile units with all the support equipment you'd need to launch and land a delicate F-16 on a dirty runway.

Equally vexing, an F-16 needs 800 m of runway to take off at full weight.

The Gripen, by contrast, is a tough, spritely little plane—making it better for dispersed ops. It doesn't have the anti-FOD doors that a MiG does, but it does boast tall landing gear that helps keep it clear of debris. And thanks to its thrust-reverser and canards, which double as brakes, it can operate from 500 m of clean surface.

Sweden's approach came from its "Bas 90" system—a network of highway strips, hidden fuel caches, and minimal infrastructure designed to survive Soviet bombers wiping out traditional air bases. Swedish planners envisioned mechanics working from trucks while Gripens took off from 500-meter stretches of road between refuelings.

That Cold War nightmare never materialized for Sweden. But Ukraine is living it now.

Comparing fighter jets for dispersed operations

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The strategic case for choosing Gripen

As long as Russia is the main threat to Ukrainian security, Ukrainian warplanes must operate within range of long-range drones and cruise and ballistic missiles that can turn big air bases into kill zones.

Dispersal will be the key to their survival. The fighter that disperses the best is the obvious best choice for Ukraine's main future warplane.

The jet Sweden designed to hide from Russian missiles in the 1980s may soon face them for real—40 years later, over Ukrainian skies rather than Swedish forests.

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Ukraine’s 59-kill cargo plane proves low-tech can beat high-tech

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