A Ukrainian military-intelligence portal that publishes information about sponsors and accomplices of Russia’s aggression has uncovered the production network behind the Russian guided glide bomb D-30SN. Identified suppliers include manufacturers from Ireland, China, Switzerland, the United States, Taiwan, and Japan.

The intelligence service presented a list of 36 enterprises involved in its production cooperation; some of these still evade sanctions pressure.

Why is D-30 SN especially dangerous?

This bomb is not a simple free-fall weapon. It is fitted with aerodynamic surfaces like wings or special gliding surfaces that allow it to glide, significantly extending its flight after release from an aircraft. Its guided accuracy enables large-scale destruction.

To operate under electronic warfare conditions, the D-30 SN’s navigation system includes a satellite navigation module with an adaptive antenna array (CRPA) or the “Kometa-M8” familiar from other systems. This provides the navigation signal with resilience to jamming and interference commonly used to disrupt guided munitions.

The D-30SN can be carried by Su-34, Su-30SM, Su-35, Su-24 aircraft, and the S-70 “Okhotnik” UAV. When released from altitudes of 12–15 km, its effective range is up to 100 km.

Preliminary reports indicate that these glide bombs can also be launched from ground platforms, such as 300 mm Tornado-S MLRS, using a booster motor.

Conventional air-defence systems do not always intercept D-30 glide bombs because of their range, high accuracy, and gliding characteristics.

Who is responsible for D-30SN assembly?

The patent holder and main organizer of UMPB production is the Russian corporation Tactical Missile Armament Corporation (KTRV). The principal manufacturer is an enterprise within the corporation, the JSC Concern “Granit-Electron”.

Dozens of enterprises involved in D-30SN production are long known for their ties to Russia’s military-industrial complex and are already under sanctions by most members of the sanctioning coalition.

What’s inside the D-30SN?

Ukrainian intelligence has found a part from the Irish manufacturer TE Connectivity inside this bomb — a low-level signal relay IM06 12VDC.

TE Connectivity has operated in industrial technologies for about 80 years. The relay is an important element in the electrical control systems of a complex navigation-guided bomb, ensuring stable operation in combat conditions. In 2024, TE Connectivity agreed to pay $5.8 million in fines related to illicit supplies of goods, including wires and connector assemblies, connected with certain military projects in China, Reuters reports. 

Ukraine also found a Chinese sensor MT6701 STD 243 produced by Shanghai MagnTek Microelectronics Inc. (MagnTek). This company has been sanctioned by the US in the context of supplying microelectronic components to Russia. Nevertheless, these parts continue to be found in Russian weapons, which have killed at least 13,800 civilians in Ukraine (not counting the hundreds of thousands of victims in occupied cities such as Mariupol).

Also among the identified details was a Schottky diode SS54 by Yangzhou Yangjie Electronic Technology Co., Ltd. The company is based in Yangzhou near Shanghai and has ties to several sanctioned Russian enterprises, including Simmetron Electronic Components, which supplies the Russian military. Despite sanctions, supplies continue and contribute to Russia’s battlefield capabilities in Ukraine.

Yangjie is the parent company of the US manufacturer Micro Commercial Components (based in California) and has production and R&D facilities in China, Vietnam, Japan, and Taiwan. This makes the company’s role notable in the context of sanctions circumvention and support for Russia’s military industry.

Another Chinese component found is a step-down DC/DC converter by XLSEMI, which has also been blacklisted by the US and other Western countries. Nevertheless, its deliveries persist.

Ukraine’s intelligence has uncovered a quartz resonator ATS8SASM CTS172131 by American CTS Corporation in a deadly D-30 SN bomb. CTS Corporation appears on lists of companies whose products or components have repeatedly been found in Russian weapon samples on Ukrainian battlefields despite sanctions. This points to challenges in export-control enforcement and the difficulty of stopping illicit flows of military-related technology to Russia.

Another US company spotted in the list is Linear Technology Corporation (Analog Devices), which supplies DC/DC converters LTM4613V and LTM4615V. The US and EU have also sanctioned it for supplying microelectronic components to Russia, including for Orlan-10 UAV production.

Two Swiss companies were also detected in the D-30SN: STMicroelectronics and U-blox. Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, U-blox has halted sales to Russia, Belarus, and the occupied territories of Ukraine.

Nevertheless, U-blox modules have still been found in Russian-made reconnaissance drones. The company explains that such components could have been removed from civilian devices such as e-scooters, e-bikes, and cars and repurposed for military use.

How does Russia circumvent sanctions?

The ability of Russian President Vladimir Putin to circumvent Western sanctions is one of the major shortcomings of the Western response to the war in Ukraine. Rather than becoming economically isolated, Russia, after more than three years of war, feels relatively confident.

According to a New York Times, Russia’s technology imports often begin when US chipmakers sell products to international distributors. Chip manufacturers are not legally required to track the downstream destinations of their goods.

What should be done?

What should governments do? 

• Approve a list of goods subject to enhanced export controls.
• Prohibit their re-export to Russia, Belarus, Iran, and D​PRK.
• Formalize strengthened inspection procedures for shipments to high-risk jurisdictions.
• Increase penalties and liability for violations and negligence; involve banks in compliance checks (similar to AML/CFT measures).
• Exchange information and synchronize efforts with other countries.

What should manufacturers and distributors do?

• Create a list of products whose shipments require enhanced scrutiny.
• Approve and regularly update screening procedures that take into account recommendations, red flags, and common sanction-evasion schemes.
• Distribute new screening policies to counterparties and include compliance clauses in contracts.
• When products are discovered in the aggressor’s weapons, investigate supply chains, inform stakeholders and governments, and take measures to stop deliveries.